NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
INVENTORY -- NOMINATION FORM

SEE INSTRUCTIONS IN HOW TO COMPLETE NATIONAL REGISTER FORMS
TYPE ALL ENTRIES -- COMPLETE APPLICABLE SECTIONS

1 NAME
HISTORIC
Washita Battlefield
AND/OR COMMON
The Battle of the Washita

2 LOCATION
STREET & NUMBER
Northwest of Cheyenne U.S. 283
CITY, TOWN
Cheyenne
STATE
Oklahoma

3 CLASSIFICATION
CATEGORY
_DISTRICT
_BUILDING(S)
_STRUCTURE
_SITE
_OBJECT
PUBLIC ACQUISITION

OWNERSHIP
 общественно
PRIVATE

STATUS
_OCCUPIED
_UNOCCUPIED
_WORK IN PROGRESS
_ACCESSIBLE
_YES: RESTRICTED
_NO: UNRESTRICTED

PRESENT USE
_AGRICULTURE
_COMMERCIAL
_PARK
_EDUCATIONAL
_PRIVATE RESIDENCE
_ENTERTAINMENT
_RELI GIOUS
_GOVERNMENT
_SCIENTIFIC
_INDUSTRIAL
_TRANSPORTATION
_MILITARY
_OTHER

4 OWNER OF PROPERTY
NAME
Oklahoma Historical Society
STREET & NUMBER
Wiley Post Historical Bldg.
CITY, TOWN
Oklahoma City
STATE

5 LOCATION OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION
COURTHOUSE, REGISTRY OF DEEDS, ETC.
County Clerk's Office
STREET & NUMBER
Courthouse -- Main Street
CITY, TOWN
Cheyenne
STATE

6 REPRESENTATION IN EXISTING SURVEYS
TITLE
None
DATE

DEPOSITORY FOR SURVEY RECORDS
CITY, TOWN
STATE
DESCRIPTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITION</th>
<th>CHECK ONE</th>
<th>CHECK ONE</th>
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<td><em>EXCELLENT</em></td>
<td><em>UNALTERED</em></td>
<td>XXORIGINAL SITE</td>
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<td><em>ALTERED</em></td>
<td><em>MOVED</em> DATE</td>
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<td><em>FAIR</em></td>
<td><em>RUINS</em></td>
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<td><em>DETERIORATED</em></td>
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DESCRIBE THE PRESENT AND ORIGINAL (IF KNOWN) PHYSICAL APPEARANCE

The Washita Battlefield lies in the center of Roger Mills County, which borders the Texas Panhandle. The essential features of the site are generally unchanged and the area of original military action stretches some six miles along the Washita River. Though the original features are the same, there have been a number of man made intrusions which prevent encompassing the entire area of military activity.

The city of Cheyenne now sits in the center of the six mile action area. Numerous roads and highways cut across the battlefield. However on the west side of the city is located the site of the Custer surprise attack which was the focal point of the Battle of the Washita. This area likewise is impaired by the construction of various roadways as well as the Panhandle and Santa Fe Railroad Line which cuts across a significant portion of the site of Black Kettle's camp.

The routes of attack are indicated on the accompany sketch map titled "The Battle of the Washita- November 27, 1868," prepared by the Oklahoma Historical Society and found in the Special Report on Washita Battlefield prepared by Historian William Brown. This map indicates that the area of fighting was concentrated on the plains at the bend of the Washita or at the site of Black Kettle's encampment.

The terrain of this battlefield was most important in the success of the campaign. Custer and his subordinate commanders used the various ridge lines and mountains as a shelter to completely encircle the camp and effectively reduce the escape route. Black Kettle's forces were thereby trapped in the valley, causing such a high number of killed.

The Oklahoma Historical Society has purchased a small number of acres on a secondary road, just west of Cheyenne. On this tract they have built a small park and observatory. In this area are two shelters with picnic tables, rest facilities and numerous interpretive markers. The most impressive facility is the observatory. A small round structure with a brick base the observatory sits on the knoll of the park and looks out over the battlefield area. Facing north one can see to the ridge line from behind which Custer made his attack. Directly in front of the viewer has been placed a map, similar to the accompanying map, and shown on an accompanying photograph, which locates the routes of advance, attack and pursuit. The landmark plaque sits to the north of the observation point and faces south.
The cultural collision between white man and Indian reached its tragic climax in the post-Civil War years on the Great Plains. The white pioneer-settler—with his farms, villages, rails and roads—aimed to domesticate the land, to own it, to locate permanently upon it. The nomadic Plains Indian—with his horse, mobile home and migratory buffalo herds—aimed to adapt to brutal nature, not conquer and subdue it. Two such diametrically opposed philosophies were like flint and steel: whenever they met sparks flew.

The Battle of the Washita, November 27, 1868, was the first victory in a campaign destined to bring an end to the Plains Indian barrier. By demonstrating that U.S. troops would fight in the winter when the Indians preferred to be left along, it dealt a heavy blow to Indian morale. It also demonstrated the practicality and effectiveness of winter campaigning in the long struggle against the hostile Plains Indians.

General Sheridan's six-month Winter Campaign of 1868-69 was spearheaded by Col. George A. Custer's 7th Cavalry. After a hard, forced march through heavy snow, Col. Custer and 800 men made a surprise dawn attack on the village of Black Kettle, the peace leader of the southern Cheyenne. The soldiers laid waste to the town and destroyed a large herd of horses. When they departed with fifty-three women and children as prisoners, they left behind over one hundred dead warriors, including Chief Black Kettle.

The Battle of the Washita exerted a severe psychological impact, and thousands of Indians, their security shattered, broke camp and fled. Similar operations followed during this campaign, and by spring all of the southern tribes had been forced onto the reservations set aside for them. The continuation of this brutal strategy brought an end to the resistance of the Plains Indians.

The Washita Battlefield lies in the center of Roger Mills County, which borders the Texas Panhandle. The essential features of the site are generally the same and the area of Army and Indian activity stretches some six miles along the Washita River. The verdant valley, sheltered by surrounding hills, has scarcely changed in nearly a century.
MAJOR BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
Custer, George A., *My Life on the Plains* (New York, 1873)
Whittaker, Frederick, *Life of Gen. George A. Custer* (New York, 1876)
"Washita Battlefield" special study by William E. Brown, in National Historic

10 GEOGRAPHICAL DATA
ACREAGE OF NOMINATED PROPERTY 12 sq. miles - 7,680 acres

VERBAL BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION
See Continuation Sheet

11 FORM PREPARED BY
NAME / TITLE
Joseph Scott Mendinghall, Historian
ORGANIZATION
Historic Sites Survey - National Park Service
STREET & NUMBER
1100 L Street NW.
CITY OR TOWN
Washington
STATE / D.C.

12 STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICER CERTIFICATION
THE EVALUATED SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS PROPERTY WITHIN THE STATE IS:

As the designated State Historic Preservation Officer for the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-665), I hereby nominate this property for inclusion in the National Register and certify that it has been evaluated according to the criteria and procedures set forth by the National Park Service.

FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE SIGNATURE

FOR NPS USE ONLY
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS PROPERTY IS INCLUDED IN THE NATIONAL REGISTER

ATTEST: KEEPER OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER

(NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARKS)
Government policy had been to insulate Indians from whites by means of a vast Indian territory comprising the Great Plains between Missouri and the Rocky Mountains. But in the decade of the 1840's the Indian frontier was breached, and by the end of the Civil War land-hungry settlers were penetrating the plains along the river valleys. Thus, the Indian hunting grounds were encroached upon from the east. To the west were inhospitable mountains and deserts-- and more white men of the eastward moving mining frontier. The Indian had his back to the wall. No longer could he strike at the white man, then retreat into the wilderness. He had to stand fast and protect his way of life.

During the spring and summer of 1868 the Southern Plains ran red with blood. From the Platte to the Rio Grande, from Council Grove to Denver, the Indians went to war. Operating in small bands of 50 to 100 warriors, they swept through the inadequate frontier defense system and spread death and destruction to those who had encroached their domain. Cheyennes and Arapahoes struck in Kansas and Colorado. Comanches and Kiowas raided in Texas and New Mexico. Knowing every water hole in this arid region, traveling lightly and swifty from place to place, living off the land, the Indians seemed to appear out of nowhere to pillage and burn-- they then disappear with the same alacrity. When the supply-laden army troopers attempted to follow the war parties, the Indians dispersed in all directions, reuniting again at some prearranged meeting place a hundred miles distant.

Confounded by these tactics General Phil Sheridan was forced to develop a strategy that would counteract the Indians. Sheridan's experience with the Plains Indians during the 1868 raiding season convinced him that only a strong offensive blow could halt these depredations. He had learned, too, the rhythm of the seasons that set the pattern of Indian warfare and dictated the strategy of reprisal.

The fast striking war parties and combined efforts of tribes produced Indian fighting in the spring and summer when war ponies were nourished on rich plains grass. Winter was a different matter. Then the horse herds starved and the ponies were unfit for all but the most limited service. Plains blizzards forced the Indian into sheltered breaks and river valleys where he could warm himself by his tepee fire. In his refuge, immobilized by the condition of his horses, surrounded by his women and children, the Indian was vulnerable. His only protection was isolation and brutal weather.
General Sheridan proposed to ally himself with the weather. He would thus expose his troopers to hardship and suffering. He would go counter to the advice of scouts and plainsmen, who pronounced the sleet and ice and snow of winter an insurmountable barrier to the prosecution of a successful winter campaign. But if he could pull it off, a successful winter campaign—possible because they army could transport its forage and supplies in wagons—could not only punish the guilty Indians, but would destroy their belief that winter protected them from reprisal for their summer misdeeds. It would be a psychological blow of the first magnitude—a revolution in plains warfare. Thus Sheridan settled on a winter campaign, the most formidable yet undertaken and one that would set the pattern for the final defeat of the Plains Indians.

Sheridan planned a 6 months' campaign, one that would keep the Indians reeling throughout the winter. It was decided by General Sheridan that the 7th Cavalry spearhead the campaign. Custer had made the 800-man command an elite corps.

The general plan for the battle called for the 800-man command to break up into four attack groups of 200 men each, surround the village in the remaining hours of darkness, and at the first light strike the Indians from all sides. Major Elliot was to take the first group and circle east. Capt. William Thompson, with the second group, was to circle right and take the Indians from the southwest. These two columns set out at once for they had to march several miles to reach their attack points. The third detachment, commanded by Captain Edward Meyers, moved to the right into the timber about an hour before daylight. Custer's column, accompanied by the band, the Osages, the scouts, and the sharpshooters, prepared to charge frontally from the crest of the hill where the horse herd and village had been discovered. Lt. James Bell, in charge of the ammunition wagons, was to wait until the firing began, then make a dash for the village.

With devastating results, on the morning of November 27, 1868, General George A. Custer and the 7th Cavalry, operating from Camp Supply, 70 miles to the north, surprised and wiped out the forces of Black Kettle. At dawn the 7th charged the camp from three directions. Surprised and stunned, the Indians were driven from their lodges out into the snow and the awaiting sabers of the 7th. Completely sacking the village and destroying the pony herd, Custer escorted a large number of prisoners back to Camp Supply.
After celebrating the tremendous victory with a parade, Custer immediately went into a huddle with Sheridan and reported the results of the battle. He claimed 102 warriors killed (bodies later found on the field raised this total by a third), 53 women and children prisoners, and total destruction of the village.
The boundary encompasses the area of the primary focus of the battlefield--Black Kettle's campsite (outlined in red on the USGS map) -- as well as the area of primary military maneuvers as shown on the accompanying copy of the Oklahoma Historical Society sketch map entitled "The Battle of the Washita, November 27, 1968."

Beginning at the northwest corner of sec. 26, T.14 N., R.24 W. proceed east along the northern section lines of secs. 26 and 25, T.14 N., R.24 W. and secs. 30 and 29, T.14 N., R.23 W. but along the line of sec. 29 only to the intersection of that line with the west right-of-way of U.S. Route 283; thence south along said right-of-way to a point about 500 feet north of the city limits of Cheyenne; thence west one mile; thence south about 1200 feet to the intersection of the north edge of a light-duty road; thence west along this north edge extended in a straight line to a point of intersection with the west section line of sec. 11, T.13 N., R.24 W.; thence north along this line extended along the west section line of sec. 2, T.13 N., R.24 W. and secs. 25 and 26, T.14 N., R.24 W., to the point of beginning.
The Battle of the Washita
Map compiled by the old Historic Sites Survey