A. Name of Multiple Property Listing

Civil War Properties in Prince William County, VA

B. Associated Historic Contexts

Civil War Properties in Prince William County, 1861 - 1865

C. Geographical Data

Prince William County, VA

[ ] See Continuation sheet

D. Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this documentation form meets the National Register documentation standards and sets forth requirements for the listing of related properties consistent with the National Register criteria. This submission meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60 and the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for Planning and Evaluation.

[Signature of certifying official]
June 16, 1989

Director, Virginia Division of Historic Landmarks

I, hereby, certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved by the National Register as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

[Signature of the Keeper of the National Register]
8/8/89

State or Federal agency and bureau
E. Statement of Historic Contexts
Discuss each historic context listed in Section B.
[ X ] See continuation sheet

F. Associated Property Types
[ X ] See continuation sheet

G. Summary of Identification and Evaluation Methods
Discuss the methods used in developing the multiple property listing.

Since July 1987, Prince William County has been inventorying historic properties within its jurisdictional boundaries that are known or believed to date to the Civil War period. In addition to reviewing all of the county's site files, those knowledgeable about the county's Civil War sites, including relic hunters, were consulted. The important historical subthemes of Prince William County's Civil War history were determined through documentary research. (The property types, which are associative, correspond to these subthemes.)

An evaluation process was established to identify the specific Civil War properties that would be included with the submission of this Multiple Properties National Register report. Each inventoried property was evaluated in terms of the degree to which it was associated with a historical subtheme. Evaluation criteria included 1) strength of association with a property type; 2) the degree to which the property could be used to illustrate a property type or an aspect of a property type; 3) the number of other properties associated with the property type or an aspect of the property type; and 4) integrity (if known).

In January 1988, using the above criteria, about 30 properties were selected for further evaluation. The evaluation process continued and in consultation with Virginia Division of Historic Landmarks staff, the final sites (10) to be included with the initial Multiple Properties submission were identified. In the final selection, strength of association and integrity were emphasized.

Each of the property types and historic properties were researched. Secondary, and especially primary sources, were reviewed. Field work included reconnaissance and, in some cases, detailed mapping of features. Excavation was not conducted.

H. Major Bibliographical References
[ X ] See continuation sheet

Primary location of additional documentation:

[ ] State historic preservation office [ X ] Local government
[ ] Other State agency [ ] University
[ ] Federal agency [ ] Other

Specify repository: Planning Office, Prince William County
1 County Complex Court
Prince William, VA 22192

I. Form Prepared by
name/title: Jan Townsend
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E. Statement of Historic Contexts:

On April 17, 1861, five days after the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter, the Virginia Convention passed a secession ordinance. The citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia voted to ratify secession from the Union, and on May 23, 1861, the commonwealth and Prince William County officially became a part of the Confederacy. With that act, the war in Virginia began.

The following description of the Civil War history of Prince William County is based on historical narratives prepared by historical consultant J. Michael Miller.

The Battle of First Manassas

At 2 A.M. on May 24, 1861, Federal troops in Washington, D.C., crossed the Potomac River bridges and occupied the City of Alexandria and surrounding countryside. Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commanding the 30,000 Union troops stationed around Washington, now had a foothold for further operations in Virginia.

In May 1861 General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard was chosen to command the Confederate army then forming at Manassas Junction in Prince William County. He had direct orders to protect northern Virginia from any Federal attack. The Confederate strategy was essentially defensive. They believed that if the Confederacy could hold its territory and inflict heavy losses on the Northern invaders, the Union would lose patience with the war and arrange a peace.

McDowell was in no hurry to engage the Confederate army, at least until he had trained and organized his own men. At the very beginning of the war, the Union military strategy was first to encircle the entire Confederacy with a blockade, and then send an expedition down the Mississippi River to close this major artery of Southern supply. In the North's scenario, the South, with all her means of support closed, would eventually sue for peace.

The Northern public would not wait for such a protracted plan to work. They clamored for a confrontation with the main Confederate army in Northern Virginia, believing this would quickly end the war. President Abraham Lincoln yielded to political pressure and despite the advice of his generals, ordered an advance on Manassas.
Junction in June. McDowell protested but to no avail. McDowell then began developing a plan that he hoped would allow him to capture Manassas Junction without a major struggle.

According to McDowell’s plan, the Union army would move to Fairfax Court House and then to Centreville, directly opposing Beauregard’s army on the other side of Bull Run. McDowell would then send a flanking column south around the Confederate right, forcing the enemy to retreat to prevent a rapid advance on Richmond. The plan depended on Beauregard being intimidated by the superior number of Union troops and retreating without a major battle, for which neither side was prepared. To prevent Confederate reinforcements from strengthening Manassas Junction, the Union army in the Shenandoah Valley, under Major General Robert Patterson’s command, was instructed to keep the Confederates in his area busy with a simultaneous advance.

McDowell’s campaign was scheduled to begin on July 8, 1861. The new army, however, had supply and organizational problems. At 2 P.M. on July 16, McDowell finally moved forward with 35,000 men, the largest military force ever assembled in North America.

Beauregard was aware of the Union preparations and used June and the beginning of July to build his own army for the coming battle. Almost daily, new regiments from all over the South joined his command; but, as the Federals moved forward towards Prince William County, he still only had 22,000 troops to hold Manassas Junction. He knew that any Union attack would come along the Warrenton Turnpike, and so his men were deployed behind the natural defense of Bull Run Creek. Because the enemy advance had to cross the stream at one of the fords or the Stone Bridge on the turnpike, Beauregard concentrated his troops at these spots and awaited the Union advance.

On July 17 the Confederate pickets were driven back to their own defensive line by the advancing Union army. Beauregard telegraphed Richmond for reinforcements. He had decided to hold his ground. President Jefferson Davis ordered the men he had at Richmond and Fredericksburg to Manassas Junction. He also sent word to General Joseph Johnston to bring his 12,000 men from the Shenandoah Valley to reinforce Beauregard. On July 18 Johnston marched from the valley, leaving the Union general, Patterson, unaware of his departure.
The Federals swept aside the initial Confederate outposts at Fairfax Court House without a struggle, and occupied Centreville on July 18, again without a fight. Beauregard’s men on the south side of Bull Run now lay directly in front of the Union army. McDowell still had no knowledge of Johnston’s approach, being assured by Patterson that the Confederates were still in the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell probed the Southern right at Blackburn’s Ford on the afternoon of the 18th, and was forcibly made aware of the strength of the Confederate positions along Bull Run. The repulse somewhat dampened Union spirits, but most Federals were eager to attack again.

McDowell abandoned his plan to flank the Confederate right after the engagement at Blackburn’s Ford. He spent the next two days scouting Beauregard’s position and bringing up supplies. Unknowingly, he allowed the Confederate reinforcements time to reach Manassas Junction. The reinforcements brought Beauregard’s strength to 32,000 men, which was roughly equal to that of McDowell. The Union advantage had disappeared almost overnight. On July 20 Johnston himself arrived at Manassas Junction; although he outranked Beauregard, Johnson allowed him to continue to command the Southern army.

The new Union plan was to flank the Southern left, which was near Sudley Ford, by crossing at the unguarded ford by the church. Once the Confederate left had been turned, the rest of the army could then cross the fords and join in the battle. Beauregard, however, was not waiting to be attacked. He ordered his own army to flank the Union left, moving over the lower fords of Bull Run. Both these movements were scheduled to take place on July 21. If they had occurred simultaneously, the two armies would have moved around each other in a circle.

At 2:30 A.M., the Federals marched in three columns towards Bull Run. After a night of disorganized maneuvering, the battle opened at 6:00 A.M. with the sound of a 30-pounder Parrott rifle. The gun fired at the troops guarding the Stone Bridge, over which the Warrenton Turnpike crossed the run. The intent of this attack was to divert Confederate attention from the main force marching over Sudley Ford. Because the inexperienced soldiers were unaccustomed to complicated military maneuvers, however, the Union troops did not start crossing the ford until 9 A.M.
This delay dearly cost the Union. Without the cover of darkness, the blue columns were observed by the Confederates at the signal station on Signal Hill. To alert the Southern military leaders of the flanking movement, the commander at Signal Hill, Captain E. Porter Alexander, used semaphore to signal, "Look out on your left, you are turned." Regiments of Colonel Nathan Evans’s small South Carolinian brigade and Major Roberdeau Wheat’s battalion held the South’s extreme left. Evans’s and Wheat’s troops marched north to intercept the advancing Federals.

At 9:15 the Union attack, led by two Rhode Island regiments, began in full force. Evans’s and Wheat’s men drove the Federals back, wounding the division commander and killing one of the regimental commanders. Another charge came, and again the Federals were halted. Wheat’s battalion then charged the Federals, driving them back in confusion. This maneuver delayed the next Federal attack and allowed sufficient time for two arriving Southern brigades to strengthen the Confederate line.

The Confederates were still outnumbered three to one but fought on until overwhelmed at noon. As they were falling back, the Confederates were threatened by Colonel William T. Sherman’s brigade, which had crossed Bull Run near the Stone Bridge. The Confederate retreat turned into a rout, as they realized they were about to be engulfed by the Union advance. The Union troops were eagerly pressing south towards the crucial ground at Manassas Junction. They were only five miles away.

McDowell then halted his men in order to reform for the final advance on Manassas Junction. This action, however, allowed sufficient time for the Confederates to stabilize their line. More reinforcements also arrived to bolster those units that had been fighting all morning. One Confederate general raised his sword to the steady brigade of Brigadier General Thomas J. Jackson and shouted, "Look! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!" and the legend of Stonewall Jackson began. Jackson’s brigade made up the nucleus of the new Confederate defensive line, which had formed on Henry Hill. Although 6,500 men with 13 cannon held the hill, they were still outnumbered by McDowell’s seemingly victorious Federals.
After 2 P.M. McDowell issued what was intended to be the order to destroy the Confederate army and end the battle. He advanced two of his batteries to the hill to engage the Confederate guns so his infantry could attack. The battle soon circled around the Federal batteries, whose guns were simultaneously hit by Jackson’s short-range rifle fire and flanked by a savage cavalry charge led by Colonel J. E. B. Stuart. The Federal troops struggled to save the guns but were overwhelmed. Charge and countercharge under a boiling July sun swept over the guns, but neither side was able to control them. The Federal attack then lost momentum. By 4 P.M., Beauregard ordered an attack all along the battle line, which drove the Federals from the hill. McDowell still held a strong position on the rest of the battlefield, but his men were exhausted from the long day of combat. To make matters worse, new Confederate brigades were just reaching the battlefield. The fresh troops swung the balance of the battle.

The brigades of Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith and Colonel Jubal A. Early struck the Union right flank about 4 P.M. and overwhelmed the exhausted Federals of Colonel O. O. Howard. Panic spread to other units in the army, and they began to retreat towards Washington. Order left the army despite the efforts of the Union officers. The day’s combat was too much for the inexperienced troops.

McDowell did his best to rally his men, but the Federals clogged the roads to Washington. Beauregard now had the opportunity to deal the North a crushing blow. He sent his fresh infantry and cavalry to pursue the fleeing Union army. The pursuit by the cavalry came to a halt when they captured more Yankees than they could safely control. Upon receiving a report that new Federal units were preparing to attack his right at Union Mills, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crossed Bull Run, Beauregard stopped the infantry troops from pursuing the retreating Union troops. By the time he learned the rumor was groundless, darkness was near and the Union army was well on its way to safety.

The victory at First Manassas cost the Confederacy 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing. In contrast, the Union army lost 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, and 1,312 missing, most of whom were captured. The Confederate army never followed up its victory with an assault on Washington, preferring to resume a defensive posture. The Northern population became even more determined to fight the
war to victory. The Battle of First Manassas had taught the military leaders of both armies that they had a long way to go before the units of citizen soldiers could be developed into powerful armies.

Skirmishes occurred between the armies during this period, but the main danger to both armies was disease. Because so many men were living in close contact, the problems of health were tremendous. Measles, mumps, debilitating diarrhea, pneumonia, and a host of other diseases caused many deaths for soldiers who had never seen combat.

The Potomac River Blockade

After its victory at the Battle of First Manassas the Confederate army, now under the command of General Joseph Johnston, took up defensive positions along the Occoquan River, with forward positions in Fairfax County. The Union army now under Major General George B. McClellan was content to build up its strength and prepare for a decisive battle in the spring of 1862. Both armies built large winter camps to shelter their men and lines of fortifications to protect important positions. The long months of waiting were expected to take their toll, especially on the Confederate army, because the local food supply was inadequate to feed the army.

This period has been described by some historians as one of inactivity and training for the upcoming campaigns of 1862. During the fall and winter months, however, the Confederacy blockaded the Northern capital's major supply route for both military and civilian goods.

The first impetus for a blockade of Washington came when a gun battery was built at Aquia Creek (Stafford County) to protect the railroad landing, which was the northern terminus of the railroad from Richmond. Aquia's guns, however, were unable to command the main channel of the Potomac River. After studying a report about the Potomac River and its Virginia and Maryland shores, General Robert E. Lee ordered the construction of a heavy artillery battery at Evansport, which is now part of Quantico Marine Base. The Evansport Battery would be the most southerly of four major batteries, all of which would be located in Prince William County.
The order to begin building Evansport Battery was issued August 22, 1861.

Union leaders anticipated a Southern blockade and, in response, had formed the Potomac Flotilla of the U.S. Navy. Its purpose was to control the river and keep it open to shipping. The Flotilla, however, had a difficult mission. The U.S. Navy tried to gain assistance in the destruction of the batteries as they were being built. In spite of the urging of President Lincoln and the Secretary of the Navy, General McClellan, commander of the Army, fearing a major land battle, refused to cooperate. McClellan wanted to wait until his own army was prepared to move and after other Federal offensives had interrupted the railroad communication and supply network of the Confederacy.

On September 3, 1861, Brigadier General Isaac R. Trimble was selected to command the battery at Evansport. The command was a joint one between the army and navy, with Naval Commander Frederick Chatard responsible for the artillery. Construction of the batteries began in earnest, with the Confederates working at night and behind a shielding of trees so as not to reveal the batteries’ exact locations.

The Flotilla learned of the northernmost battery, Freestone Point, from escaped slaves, and on September 25 it attacked the suspected position. Freestone Point Battery returned the fire, confirming its existence and the presence of four guns. In the following weeks, however, Union ship captains discovered that the four guns could not command the entire main channel of the Potomac River and that Freestone Point’s firepower could be avoided.

On October 12 the major portion of the Potomac Flotilla was ordered to the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. The actual transfer of ships began on the October 15. Commander Thomas T. Craven gave permission for the ships to fire on the suspected batteries as they passed down the river. At 10:30 A.M., Pocahontas blindly opened fire on the Freestone Point Battery. The Confederates opened fire as Seminole, which was following, came into range. For forty minutes a general engagement ensued as Pocahontas and Seminole passed the batteries from Freestone to Evansport. No one was injured, but several shells took off the mizzenmast of Seminole, and the ships were sprayed with shell fragments.
The following day, Pawnee passed the guns and was struck six times. She refused to return the fire and no serious damage was done. On October 17, three river tugboats with a steamer were dispatched to again test the batteries. Two of the tugs were able to pass undetected, but the third was hit and disabled. The steamer crew did not attempt to make the passage. The batteries were becoming an effective deterrent to shipping.

On October 17 Commander Craven advised that no supplies be sent to the capital via the Potomac River. On that day forty ships were waiting to come up the river; they were rerouted to Baltimore. Ships drawing less than eight feet of water were allowed to run the batteries, but only after a warning had been issued by a Federal warship. Major General Joseph Hooker's 8,000-man division was dispatched to the Maryland side of the Potomac opposite the batteries.

This was a very serious situation for the U.S. government. Only a single, one-track railroad line connected Washington to Baltimore and the rest of the country. Not only were the city's residents dependent on river trade for food and supplies, but now the main army of the United States was based in Washington and had to be provided for as well. More importantly, however, was the political embarrassment. The upstart Confederacy was able to blockade the Northern capital with impunity. This opened up the real possibility of recognition and support of the Confederacy by Great Britain and France, which was one of the South's major goals.

The Confederate commanders were well aware of the importance of the batteries and deployed 12,000 men to protect them. Colonel Wade Hampton's brigade held the Occoquan River line to prevent a Federal attack overland. The Texas brigade was camped on the Telegraph Road at Neabsco and Powells creeks and were in supporting range of the Potomac River batteries and Wade Hampton's Occoquan line. Another brigade was distributed among the batteries and in Dumfries below Powells Creek. They were to be ready for an amphibious landing. Cavalry units provided a screen for the entire position, from Evansport on the south to Wolf Run Shoals on the north. The army units stationed at Manassas Junction were prepared to move quickly to eastern Prince William County if an attack should occur.

Washington felt the effects of the blockade almost immediately. Coal and wood, essential during the winter, were in short supply.
Food and forage for the animals was more difficult to buy. Prices of most items increased. The surrounding counties in Maryland and Virginia were stripped of their coal, wood, and agricultural resources.

The Confederates continued to improve their hold on the Potomac River. By mid-December, an estimated 37 heavy guns commanded the river with numerous field guns and rifle-musket fire in support. Any ship running the blockade had to pass six miles of guns, which meant that even the fastest ship was under fire for at least an hour. In addition, the steamer City of Richmond (George Page), based in the narrow creeks along the Potomac, was threatening unguarded ships on the river.

Despite the danger, the bravest civilian captains and a few Union ships continued to pass the batteries. The favorite method was to sail at night under cover of darkness. The Union ships also had an unknown advantage; that is, the poor shooting of the Confederate gunners. The South had a severe shortage of trained artillerymen when the war began, and many of the gunners along the Potomac were infantrymen who had little or no artillery training. Even practice did not make perfect.

Across the river, the Federals actively sought to harass the Confederate batteries. A two-gun battery was built to fire on the Evansport battery. In November the Union artillerymen bombarded the battery, making the open areas around the Confederate guns almost impossible to be in during the day. Although numerous shells were fired, only a few men on both sides were wounded. The unexploded shells became camp curiosities for the soldiers.

Attempting to foil the Confederate guns, the Federals would tow the slower ships past the batteries with tug-boats. The schooner Fairfax was being towed by several tugs when the ropes broke opposite Shipping Point, stranding Fairfax. The Confederates captured her with her load of hay and cement. On November 14 a schooner was halted by lack of wind across from Cockpit Point. This ship was hit three times by Southern shells, causing the crew to abandon her and swim to the Maryland shore. A party of Confederates boarded the vessel and set her afire. As they returned to shore, a small boat with several Massachusetts soldiers boarded the ship, doused the fire, and towed the ship to a safe harbor on the Maryland side of the Potomac. In January 1862 the
captain of the steamer Mystic stopped across from the Shipping Point Battery and dared the guns to hit his ship. Eighty-seven shells were fired without a single one striking the vessel. With the aid of pre-dawn darkness and a confusing series of lanterns used to fool the battery gunners, the warship Pensacola ran past the batteries in January. Only 20 shots were fired at the ship and most of those were fired in desperation after she had passed the guns.

The Cockpit Point Battery was also tested in January by Anacostia and Yankee. These two ships anchored in what was believed to be a blind spot for the battery guns. From their anchorage north of the battery, they lobbed shells into the gun emplacements. The ships had some success, but two of the battery guns were able to hit the ships. There was little loss on either side. Still, the potential threat of the batteries was enough to discourage most commercial shipping.

Through the winter, the Northern politicians in Washington were becoming more and more anxious for movement from McClellan’s army. The Union general resisted all efforts from the administration, feeling that a major engagement on the upper Potomac would yield little in the way of strategic results. He believed that the Potomac blockade should be ignored since Washington could be supplied by way of Baltimore. President Lincoln continued the pressure to open the river, and McClellan ordered Hooker to begin planning, with the navy, for a joint assault on the batteries. Aided by balloon reconnaissance, Hooker was convinced that the guns could be taken. McClellan, however, continued to delay any real action on the Potomac. On March 8, 1862, a frustrated President Lincoln issued a direct order to the Union general that contained provisions for "an immediate effort to capture the enemy’s batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay." McClellan, however, would never have the opportunity to carry out this order.

On March 9, Union pickets on the Maryland shore noticed none of the usual activity in the batteries across the river. The positions were shelled with no response. Landing parties soon established that the positions had been abandoned. Unbeknownst to the Federals, General Johnston had abandoned the river positions and withdrawn his army to more defensive positions closer to Richmond.
He was afraid of being caught in Northern Virginia if McClellan moved past him by water to attack Richmond.

On March 7, the Confederate units along the river had received orders to withdraw the next morning, carry away as much equipment as they could, and destroy what was left behind. The heavy guns were set on fire to destroy their wooden carriages. Additionally, the gun tubes were packed with sand and mud so that they would explode when the fire reached the powder charges. Because the guns were packed too loosely, only a few were actually destroyed.

The Federals found the camps littered with personal items, with some of the huts still containing tables set for uneaten meals. On March 10 Hooker had 1,000 soldiers at work destroying the batteries. The captured cannons were salvaged by the navy and taken to the Washington Navy Yard. Many of the rifle-pits were torn down, and more than 800 shells and dozens of pieces of camp equipment were carried back across the river.

After the Confederate withdrawal from Northern Virginia, the war in Virginia shifted to the vicinity of Richmond. General McClellan began his Peninsular Campaign to capture Richmond in April. In late spring General Robert E. Lee was appointed to command what would become the Army of Northern Virginia. After a series of battles, McClellan was soundly defeated, and in early July, he pulled back to the James River.

As the war near Richmond progressed, however, Prince William County became vitally important to the Union. Any Federal army fighting to the south had to be supplied by either the Potomac River, which forms the eastern border of the county; the Telegraph Road, which is just inland from the Potomac; or the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which is in the central and western portion of the county. These supply lines were vulnerable to attack, and even the threat of disruption caused major concern at the highest levels of the Union command.

The county was too large for the Union army to garrison every road or town. One solution was to establish a permanent line of cavalry pickets. This line began near the outer limits of Fairfax County and, roughly following the Telegraph Road, extended through Prince William County and into Stafford County to the south. The picket line consisted of small groups of cavalry guarding all the major
roads and intersections and larger cavalry units based in camps located within supporting range of the picket posts. The area of Prince William County beyond the purview of the picket line cavalry was controlled by patrolling cavalry units. They moved through the countryside periodically in order to gather intelligence on enemy movements and to establish a presence of Federal control.

The first months of Federal occupation were quiet ones for the Union troops. The roving patrols mainly chased stray Confederates who had deserted or were home on leave. There was little or no organized resistance to the Union cavalry.

**Battle of Second Manassas**

On June 26, 1862, the Federal Army of Virginia was created, with Major General John Pope as its commander. Pope’s responsibility was to control the region north of Richmond and west to the Shenandoah Valley. His first task was to divert Confederate forces from the ongoing battles around Richmond. After concentrating his army near Warrenton, on July 12 he mobilized his troops to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad, the Confederate’s supply line to the Shenandoah Valley. General Robert E. Lee learned of the move and reacted immediately. Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and 18,000 men were sent by rail to block Pope’s advance. On July 19 they were at Gordonsville. Pope had missed his chance at the railroad.

The two forces warily eyed one another, but avoided a general engagement. By early August, Lee had determined that the Union army around Richmond would soon be withdrawn and decided that the time was ripe to strike before Pope could be reinforced. On August 7 Jackson, with an additional division sent by Lee, advanced on Pope north of the Rapidan. Pope hurriedly tried to concentrate his army to meet the Confederate advance and on August 9 fought Jackson at Cedar Mountain. The battle saw the Federals pulling back and Jackson’s people in possession of the field.

At Richmond, Lee received intelligence that the Federal army was withdrawing from Richmond, thus freeing the rest of his men to join Jackson against Pope. By August 15 most of Lee’s Confederate army was moving north. The odds now were almost even. Pope’s army numbered about 55,000; Lee’s about 50,000. The Federals, however, were exposed, having a long, tenuous supply line to Manassas.
Junction. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad line was Pope’s main source of supply, and could be broken at any number of places. If Pope could hold his forward position until reinforcements from McClellan could arrive, however, he would still be in a position to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad. Pope withdrew his army over the Rappahannock River on August 20, and, in spite of considerable skirmishing, held his line against Lee for five days. Within a week, Pope could expect reinforcements to bring his army to more than 100,000 men, enough to defeat Lee soundly.

On August 22-23 Brigadier General J. E. B. Stuart raided the Union rear at Catlett’s Station, where he confirmed that the Federals were en route to join Pope and that Pope’s supply line was vulnerable. This information was quickly reported to Lee. Lee knew that if he were to defeat the Northern army and prevent the combining of a massive Federal force, he had to act immediately.

On August 25 Lee divided his army, sending 24,000 men under Jackson’s command on a flanking march around Pope’s army. Jackson was to end up in Pope’s rear, where he could cut the Union’s Orange and Alexandria Railroad supply line. The remainder of the army would stay at Pope’s front in order to keep him from learning of Jackson’s maneuvering. In two days, Jackson’s flanking column moved 51 miles, destroying Pope’s supply line at Bristoe Station on August 26. Jackson then marched to the main Union supply depot at Manassas Junction, where he met little resistance and captured huge supplies of much needed food and equipment. Pope now had no choice but to withdraw towards Washington.

Pope could have concentrated his entire army, which had a superiority in numbers, on Jackson, crushed him and then turned back on Lee. Jackson’s activities at Bristoe Station, however, delayed any action by Pope because he was trying to assess the situation. Union forces attacked the Confederate forces left at Bristoe Station on August 27. The Confederate troops withdrew to rejoin Jackson, and the next day Jackson’s units hid behind a railroad cut between Sudley Church and Groveton. Pope spent the day looking for Jackson but to no avail. Lee’s leading elements under Major General James Longstreet were now approaching Thoroughfare Gap, less than a day’s march from Jackson.

Jackson knew that once the Confederate army was combined, Pope would probably withdraw again, this time to Centreville, and await
the rest of his reinforcements, which would make the Union army practically unassailable. He decided to force the battle at Manassas, while the odds were somewhat more even. On the evening of the 28th, he attacked a passing Union column, which resulted in a bloody but indecisive engagement. Jackson’s attack accomplished his goal, however, when Pope deployed his army to attack Jackson the next day.

Not knowing of Longstreet’s approach, Pope was confident of an easy victory. He assaulted the Confederates at 7:00 A.M. on August 29 and continued to attack all day. He threw three corps at Jackson. The piecemeal attacks came close to breaking Jackson’s line, but by nightfall, the Confederates still held their position. Pope regarded the day as a great success for his men. He knew that the enemy had been badly battered during the day, and he felt Jackson now had no option but to retreat. He ordered his men to pursue the Confederates the following day and claim victory for the North. He did not know that Longstreet had joined Jackson and that he was facing the entire Confederate army.

Pope found Jackson still in his front on August 30 and made plans for a crushing final assault. The Union forces attacked in the afternoon, almost breaking through Jackson’s center, but they were repulsed. Lee, waiting for the perfect moment to reveal his presence, ordered Longstreet’s men to counterattack. Pope, despite repeated warnings, refused to protect his left flank. This is where Longstreet struck. The Confederate attack rolled over the Union defenders like a tidal wave. A makeshift Federal line held onto Chinn Ridge long enough for Pope to build a line on Henry Hill, which held until nightfall. Recognizing the futility of continuing, Pope then withdrew the Union army from the battlefield under the cover of darkness.

Pope’s army retreated to Centreville in better order than that of McDowell’s the previous year. This time, Lee followed up the victory by advancing into Maryland. For the first time, the war was to be fought on Union territory.

The victory at Second Manassas cost the South almost 10,000 men out of an army of only 55,000. Lee’s movement into Maryland signaled a major shift in Confederate war policy. Confederate leaders had come to realize that the war would be long and arduous and that assistance from European powers would not come from simply holding
their own territory. They had to go on the offensive. For the North, the Battle of Second Manassas was another terrible disappointment and another embarrassment abroad. The 14,462 casualties were a terrible price to pay for a defeat. The resolve of the Union leaders for victory, however, was only strengthened.

Lee’s apparent objective in the North was the Northern rail center at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. His invasion of the North would end on September 18th, after the Battle of Antietam. Although it held its ground in the battle, his army suffered serious casualties. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia returned to Virginia. In the coming months, the Army of Northern Virginia and Army of the Potomac would battle in the vicinity of Fredricksburg.

With the defeat of Pope’s army at the Battle of Second Manassas, Prince William was again, at least theoretically, in Confederate hands. The Confederate army did not remain long, however. A Union cavalry expedition through Bristoe Station on September 25, 1862, met with no opposition. For the remainder of 1862 Prince William County was under the watchful eye of the Federal cavalry. There was a skirmish at Bristoe Station on October 24, but this was the last one of the year.

**Battle of Bristoe Station**

In early 1863 the principal eastern armies were positioned to the southeast around Fredericksburg, and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad was no longer the major supply route for either army. Federal patrols occasionally passed through Bristoe, but no major actions occurred in the area until the summer.

At that time, the armies, on their way to Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863), moved through Northern Virginia. After the Confederate army’s dramatic defeat, the armies again marched south. Lee’s army based itself around the town of Culpeper and in Madison County to the west. The Army of the Potomac, now commanded by Major General George G. Meade, followed Lee’s army southward and positioned itself on the north side of the Rappahannock River near Warrenton. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad again became a primary supply route. Both armies rested during the remainder of the summer.

In early September the Confederate high command detached two divisions of Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s corps from the
Army of Northern Virginia and redeployed these troops by rail to the western front near where the states of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama meet. Longstreet left on September 9, reducing Lee’s army by about one-third and leaving Lee to face a far more numerically superior enemy. Lee’s mission until Longstreet returned was to keep the Federal army occupied so that they could not reinforce the western armies. At the same time, he was not to lose any ground in Virginia.

The two armies skirmished for the rest of September. The U.S. War Department then learned of the transfer of Longstreet. In response, it detached two Union corps from the Army of the Potomac on September 25 and sent them west. Lee began positioning his remaining forces to prevent additional Union troops going west. The Union army still outnumbered the Confederate army 75,000 to 45,000, but Lee took the offensive. On October 10, 1863, the Confederate army began a movement around the Union right flank. This was the beginning of the Bristoe Campaign. In order to avoid what had happened to Pope the previous year, Meade began withdrawing his army north eastward towards Manassas Junction.

October 11-13 were days of maneuvering for both armies. Taking circuitous routes across country to conceal their movements from Union signal stations, the two Confederate corps marched to Culpeper and then to Warrenton. The Union army had the advantage of interior lines and withdrew directly north eastward along the railroad to avoid being cut off from their supply line to Washington. Jeb Stuart’s cavalry shielded the Confederate advance and at the same time harassed the retreating Federal troops.

At 10 A.M., on October 14, Lieutenant General A. P. Hill’s Third Corps reached Greenwich en route to Bristoe Station. There they found evidence of the Federal line of march. The camp fires of the Army of the Potomac still smoldered. Hill ordered his men to pursue the Federal column. As the Confederates continued their march to Bristoe Station they noted abandoned blankets, knapsacks, and other equipment littering the road, indicating that the Union soldiers were not far away.

As the Confederate column neared Bristoe Station, General Hill rode ahead to locate the Union infantry. He halted on the high ground north of the station and observed the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac camped across Broad Run just to the east of Bristoe
Station. Hill ordered his lead division, commanded by Major General Harry Heth, to quicken its march. The division was only one and one-half miles from the station. Nearing the high ground overlooking Bristoe Station, Heth deployed three brigades in line of battle and waited for two other brigades of his division to form a reserve. Hill, afraid the Federals would detect his advance and escape, ordered Heth to advance the three brigades then on the field and attack the enemy at once.

As Heth's three brigades neared the open ground overlooking Broad Run, Hill deployed Poague's battalion of artillery to fire on the unsuspecting Federals. The artillery pieces wheeled into action; their first shots signaled the opening of the Battle of Bristoe. The Fifth Corps infantry on the plain across Broad Run had watched the artillery going into position but believed the guns were Union. The sound of shells passing overhead convinced them otherwise. As one of their own batteries returned the fire, the Fifth Corps infantry moved towards Manassas Junction and safety.

General A. P. Hill observed the retreat and ordered Heth's men to advance and strike the Federals while they were disorganized. The three lead brigades broke into the open fields and moved toward Broad Run. The Confederates expected an easy battle and advanced. Shouts changed to cries as they were struck by a bombardment of rifle-musket fire from the vicinity of the railroad tracks.

Unbeknownst to General Hill, the Federal Second Corps under the command of Major General Governeur K. Warren was marching on the far side of the railroad to join the Fifth Corps, which had been waiting on the other side of Broad Run. Some of Warren's lead units had started to cross the run when the Confederate artillery opened up on the Fifth Corps. Warren realized the danger of his position and directed his men to form a line of battle behind the railroad track, which formed a natural fortification and shielded his troops.

Heth reported to Hill that a strong enemy force was now on his flank, but Hill was caught up in the pursuit of the retreating Fifth Corps and believed other units of his corps now approaching the battlefield would protect the Confederate flank. He ordered the advance to continue. The Confederates in the lead recognized the disastrous consequences of a farther advance but pushed forward anyway.
The two Confederate brigades, which were composed of about 4,000 North Carolinians, changed their line of advance and attacked toward the railroad. Three brigades of the Second Corps (about 3,000 men) awaited them, backed by three artillery batteries. The North Carolinians were generally unaware of the presence of the Federal infantry hidden behind the railroad embankment, but saw the batteries on the hills beyond and ran quickly forward to engage the guns before they could cause too much damage to themselves. The Federal infantry calmly waited behind the railroad until the North Carolinians were at point-blank range and then raised up and at a range of only thirty to forty yards poured a devastating volley into the Confederate battle line. Both Confederate brigade commanders were wounded almost immediately, as were many of the field officers. Colonel E. D. Hall of the 46th North Carolina took command of Brigadier General John R. Cooke’s brigade knowing that his men must either move forward or retreat, for as every second passed, more fell. The regiment led the brigade forward, but as the regimental historian later wrote, "The point from which we started was distinctly marked; at least four, and in some cases ten men from each company were lying dead or wounded in that line (Clark 1901:442)." The regiment got within twenty steps of the railroad but were ordered back because the rest of the regiments of the brigade had not followed.

Brigadier General William W. Kirkland’s Brigade was not as exposed as Cooke’s and actually managed to seize a toehold on the embankment. The 11th and part of the 47th North Carolina regiments captured several prisoners and drove the rest of the Federals back from the railroad. Finding themselves alone, however, they withdrew across the deadly field. Other individual Confederates mounted the embankment and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Union soldiers. They were soon overcome. A sergeant of the 19th Maine Infantry shot one of these Confederates at only his rifle length away, and then bayoneted another as he tried to mount the embankment. One North Carolinian was able to get over the embankment and bayonet a member of the 1st Minnesota before becoming a casualty himself. Both Kirkland’s and Cooke’s brigades began to retreat up the open hill they had just so boldly come down. The 44th North Carolina Regiment of Kirkland’s brigade, had to be ordered three times to withdraw before giving up the field. Other Confederates hugged the ground until a lull in the firing. They then threw down their weapons and ran as future prisoners to
safety behind the railroad. In only 15 to 20 minutes, the first Confederate attack had been bloodily repulsed. More than 1,300 men in grey had fallen in the assault, compared to about 600 Federals.

As the two brigades withdrew, the reinforcements that Hill had promised to protect the right flank arrived and attacked to the right of the North Carolinians. Two brigades of Major General Richard H. Anderson’s division broke the Union line on the railroad in a wooded area but were driven out by rapidly arriving Federal reinforcements. Both commanders then began to consolidate their positions as more men arrived on both sides. As evening fell, Warren had his corps in position around Bristoe Station, using the railroad line as his main defensive position. Hill drew his corps up opposite Warren. Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell’s corps, with whom General Lee was traveling, arrived at Bristoe Station late in the afternoon, thus completing the concentration of Lee’s army. No offensive action was taken, however, and the Federals were allowed to withdraw during the night to Centreville to join the main body of the Union army.

Lee, recognizing the strength of the Federal’s position, declined pursuit. He made his headquarters at Bristoe until October 17. The men killed at Bristoe Station were buried on the ground where they fell. The North Carolinians were buried in individual graves on the hillside where they had fought, but identifying those who had fallen was a difficult task. One Confederate later wrote, "a few we could only find some pieces of the body such as a hand or three fingers. Sometimes a foot, or part of a foot, sometimes a whole arm, or half the head, and bodies mangled in every conceivable condition (Clark 1901:442)." A newspaper correspondent wrote of finding "a large number of broken muskets, knapsacks, etc., strewn over the ground. One patch on the side of the hill is red with graves. They are chiefly North Carolinians; so say the slabs at the head of the graves." All of the bodies that could be identified were later removed to North Carolina, but many still remain under the field today.

After destroying the railroad from Bristoe to the river to delay Meade’s return to the region, Lee withdrew his army to the Rappahannock River on October 18. The Army of Northern Virginia would never again see the familiar fields of Prince William County. Because of threats from Mosby’s Rangers, the railroad in Prince
William County remained under close Union guard for the remainder of the war.

Moisby's Confederacy and Union Occupation

In December 1862, following the Confederate victory at Fredericksburg, Major General J. E. B. Stuart had decided to probe the Union defenses in northern Virginia. He ordered Brigadier General Wade Hampton to organize a cavalry raid on the Federal supply line in Prince William County. The purpose of the raid was to distract the enemy during an anticipated battle at Fredericksburg and to gather information on the strength of the Union supply line.

Hampton had been stationed in Prince William County during the previous winter and knew the road network well. On December 10, Hampton rode into the county at the head of 250 men. On the morning of the December 12, the Confederate cavalry charged into the town of Dumfries, taking the garrison by surprise. More than 50 Union cavalrymen surrendered and 24 wagons were captured. On December 17 Hampton again rode into the County from the Rappahannock River, this time with almost 500 men. That night he camped at Cole's Store (near present-day Independence Hill) in Prince William county. The following morning Hampton struck the Federal pickets on Neabsco Creek, capturing the post and eight supply wagons.

Having pierced the Union line undetected, Hampton moved against the town of Occoquan. He divided his command into three columns. They hit the town at the same time, capturing a supply train of loaded wagons that were preparing to cross the Occoquan River. In addition, the column that had taken the Telegraph Road captured every picket post along the road. A Federal cavalry regiment was alerted to the Confederate raid and pushed across the ford above the town, but not before Hampton had retired with his spoils of war. The Confederate cavalry camped that night at Cole's Store and returned to the main army the following morning. Hampton brought 150 prisoners and 20 wagons with him as evidence of the success of the raid.

Having learned of the ease of penetrating the Federal supply line, Stuart was determined to duplicate the feat. On the afternoon of December 26, he personally led 1,800 cavalrmen with four cannon
into Prince William County. The following morning, he struck the Union supply line in three places. A detachment under Hampton’s command was sent towards Occoquan, while two other detachments cut the Telegraph Road above and below Dumfries.

The attack caught the Federals by surprise, and again many Federal cavalry pickets were captured. The victorious Confederates swept into the town of Dumfries, where they unexpectedly encountered stout resistance. The Union commanders had learned from Hampton’s raids a few days before and had stationed a brigade of infantry in Dumfries to support the picket line. Stuart’s first reaction was to attack and capture the town. Upon determining the strength of the Union defenses, however, he decided to bypass the Federal infantry. He occupied the Union troops with skirmishes and artillery exchanges until nightfall and then withdrew. Hampton in the meantime had captured the Federal pickets that had been placed at Cole’s Store and had charged back into the town of Occoquan, scattering the Union defenders back across the Occoquan River and into Fairfax County. That night Stuart had his entire command at Cole’s Store. The prisoners and captured wagons were sent back towards the army, and Stuart planned for the next day. The Federals now had warning and had ample time to prepare a response to the raid.

On the morning of December 28, Stuart moved his cavalry toward Bacon Race Church. A detachment of the 2d South Carolina Cavalry was sent ahead to disperse the Union cavalry pickets station there before the main cavalry force arrived. The South Carolinians soon encountered the Federal pickets and found a large force of Union cavalry supported by two artillery pieces holding the church. The South Carolinians engaged the Union cavalry, expecting their own reinforcements to arrive at any moment. The reinforcements never came and the Confederates had to withdraw to avoid capture.

After dispatching the 2d South Carolina Cavalry to capture Bacon Race Church, Stuart rode north past Greenwood Church where he unexpectedly found about 300 Federal cavalrmen drawn up in line of battle across his path. These Union horsemen had tracked Hampton from Occoquan and had expected to find only a small raiding party of Southern horsemen, not more than 1,000 Confederate cavalrymen. Stuart quickly ordered the 1st Virginia Cavalry to charge the Federals, who broke and rode for safety after a brief struggle. The chase went on for more than two miles. The Federals then made
a brief stand at Selectman’s Ford. The 5th Virginia Cavalry charged across the rocky ford and dispersed the enemy without losing a man. The road was now open into Fairfax County.

Stuart ordered his entire force across the river and sent two scouting parties to Occoquan and Wolf Run Shoals before continuing north. By nightfall the Confederates had occupied Burke’s Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Stuart continued his raid through Fairfax County and on December 29, recrossed the Rappahannock River having lost scarcely a man. Once again, the Federal high command was reminded of the vulnerability of its supply line.

Stuart did not intend to leave the Union lines in Northern Virginia alone. He returned to the main army at Fredericksburg, but left behind a captain named John Singleton Mosby. Mosby and his nine men were instructed to continue disrupting the Union supply lines. Mosby had continuously asked Stuart for permission to operate behind enemy lines and it was finally granted. Partisan bands had operated in all theaters of the war with varied success. Although Stuart did not expect much from this small detachment, he had created the beginning of what was to become the most effective partisan force of the Civil War.

The partisan groups generally had a strong romantic appeal for the general public of the Confederacy. Many military leaders, however, felt that such bands only distracted men and resources from the main war effort. Nevertheless, a Partisan Ranger bill had been passed by the Confederate government legitimatizing this form of warfare. Proponents of the bill argued that small bands of mobile, mounted men could tie down large numbers of a numerically superior enemy. Mosby began to put this idea into practice in Northern Virginia in January 1863.

He led his nine men on small raids on isolated picket posts in Fairfax County, choosing only those that were most exposed and where there was little risk to his men. The isolated posts were virtually indefensible to Confederate attack, but had to be maintained to complete the Union cavalry screen. Stories of Mosby’s success spread, bringing new recruits. They were supplied with captured Union arms, equipment, and horses. In early 1863 Mosby’s command was loosely organized and composed mostly of soldiers on leave, local men who had a high sense of adventure, and
men home on convalescent leave. He had few men who were regular
members of the command. Mosby, nevertheless, refused to enlist
deserters or men who belonged to other military branches. In doing
so, Mosby eliminated any question about the legitimacy of his unit
and the form of warfare he practiced.

Mosby’s early operations took place in Fairfax County from bases in
Fauquier and Loudoun counties. In April 1863 the situation changed
as Major General Joseph Hooker, now in command of the Army of the
Potomac, sent a force of cavalry to occupy Warrenton, in Fauquier
County. Once Warrenton was safely in Union hands, Hooker began to
use the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to supply his army. Stuart
ordered Mosby to interrupt the Union supply line on April 26, just
as Hooker was preparing for the Battle of Chancellorsville.

The Federals guarding the railroad knew that the Confederate
partisans would try to break the supply line. In anticipation,
they had stationed strong parties of infantry, cavalry, and
artillery at all the most vulnerable locations along the tracks.
In Prince William County, the strongest defenses and garrisons were
placed at Union Mills where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad
crossed Bull Run. Other smaller bridges were also guarded. Major
General Julius Stahel commanded the rail guards, which were
composed of more than two brigades of cavalry with supporting
artillery.

The garrisons were too strong for Mosby and his men to capture by
force. Instead, he tore up the unguarded sections of the track
between Catlett’s Station and Bristoe Station. He tried to burn
the railroad bridge over Kettle Run just to the west of Bristoe
Station, but a large infantry guard aboard a train saved the
bridge. The following week, Mosby and 25 of his men rode to harass
the Telegraph Road supply line. They were intercepted by a Union
cavalry patrol one mile from Dumfries, which they routed in a
short, bloody engagement. Having been detected, Mosby abandoned
his plan and returned to Fauquier County.

On June 1 Mosby ambushed a train near Catlett’s Station, firing on
it with a newly acquired mountain howitzer. The raid was
especially dangerous as there had been cavalry camps established
about every two miles in the area due to the previous raid.
Federal cavalry camped at Bristoe Station were soon in pursuit of
Mosby, whose escape was slowed by the bulky cannon. A hand-to-hand
struggle occurred and he lost one of his bravest men, Captain Bradford Smith Hoskins, late of the British army, who was now serving in the Confederate military.

Charles Green, a citizen of nearby Greenwich, took a wagon loaded with ice and brandy to the battle area (just west of the County line) and assisted the wounded of both sides. He took the mortally wounded Hoskins to his home along with another Confederate officer. The Englishman was buried at Greenwich Presbyterian Church. Mr. Green placed a monument over the grave at the request of Captain Hoskins’s father, an English churchman.

For much of the summer of 1863, Mosby’s men were occupied by the passing of the armies of both sides to Gettysburg and then back again. Although they were forced to remain in hiding much of the time, Mosby’s people managed to provide General Lee with information on Union army movements and capture Union stragglers. In August the Federal supply line was again on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Mosby continued his captures of Union pickets and poorly guarded wagon trains. The rail line was too closely guarded in Prince William County for Mosby to attack it directly. He did, however, capture several Federals on the Manassas battlefield on August 21.

The Union rail guards learned to fortify the vulnerable points along the line and to position their cavalry units effectively so that they could respond at a moment’s notice to a Confederate attack. In addition, an infantry guard was placed on each train. After the June 1 attack, Mosby generally focused on less guarded targets. Mosby also began to send trusted officers out on separate missions, a tactic that spread the guerrilla attacks over the entire northern Virginia region.

Skirmishes were reported near Bristoe Station and between Centreville and Warrenton on September 12. On September 24, another raid was made against Bristoe Station, but the Confederates were unsuccessful at breaking the supply line because General Meade had placed detachments of his infantry corps along the tracks. There were skirmishes at Brentsville Courthouse on November 26 and 29, but with negligible results. In 1864, there was a cavalry skirmish on February 1, and again on March 16 when Confederate partisans under the overall command of Colonel John S. Mosby attempted to interrupt the Union supply line at Bristoe Station. A
military action at Bristoe Station also occurred on April 15, 1864, when three members of Mosby’s command ambushed the Union pickets of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry above the station on Broad Run, killing one Federal and capturing four horses. These raids, however, had little effect on the Union’s flow of supplies to the front.

In the summer and fall of 1864, the emphasis of the war shifted to the Shenandoah Valley and most of Mosby’s operations moved to the west as well. The principal Union armies in the east were now around Richmond. Supplies to that army were being brought in by water and were safe from capture. Although skirmishes still occurred between roving Union cavalry patrols and Confederate partisans, the war in Prince William County was winding down. On November 11, 1864, there was an engagement at Manassas Junction between the cavalry of both sides, which resulted in only minor casualties.

Because of the scarcity of food and fodder, many of Mosby’s rangers were compelled to leave Northern Virginia during the winter months of 1864-1865. Major General Phillip H. Sheridan, in an attempt to rid the Mosby Confederacy of Mosby, had ordered the Union forces to "consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills, and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region" (Jones 1972:234). Only homes were to be left intact.

The contribution of Mosby’s command, which eventually grew to eight companies, cannot be measured by the numbers of Union casualties or the supplies captured from 1863 through 1865 in Northern Virginia, although they were substantial. The real importance of the Partisan Rangers was that, because of their effectiveness, many Union soldiers were required to remain in Northern Virginia to hold open the Northern supply lines. These were soldiers who could have been fighting for the North on the front lines. The use of guerrilla warfare against a numerically superior enemy was one of the contributions of the Civil War to modern warfare, and no one practiced this art of warfare with greater skill than John S. Mosby.

The Federal soldiers who occupied Prince William County could take satisfaction from the fact that although they were fighting against the best Confederate partisan commander, they fulfilled their
mission by keeping the supply lines open. In doing so, they often paid the price in blood.

In the last few months of the war, little fighting occurred in Prince William County. On February 18, a Union patrol of 100 men of the 8th Illinois Cavalry moved through the county unopposed, picking up Confederate stragglers. They burned the camp site of a group of Mosby’s men, and returned with 15 prisoners who were captured during the night while sleeping in local homes.

The last shots fired in the county may have occurred on April 10, the day after the surrender of Lee’s army at Appomattox. One of Mosby’s companies was surprised by a Union cavalry detachment of the 8th Illinois Cavalry while they were on a raid in Fairfax County. The Confederates were chased into Prince William County across Wolf Run Shoals (near Bacon Race Church). The Federals halted their pursuit at the ford. A parting shot fired over the river signaled the end of the war in Northern Virginia. Mosby surrendered on April 21, 1865, in Loudoun County.

Research Topics

Bruce Catton (1982:595), in his Picture History of the Civil War wrote, "Here was the greatest and most moving chapter in American History, a blending of meanness and greatness, an ending and a beginning. It came out of what men were, but it did not go as men had planned it." Hundreds of thousands died and it destroyed a way of life in the South and changed the way of life in the North forever. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, there has been little scientific study of or concern for the physical remains of the Civil War.

The scientific study of historic properties dating to the Civil War period can contribute to an improved understanding of the chronology and events of that war. To date, almost all information relating to the war has been derived from study of historic documents. The Civil War has not been viewed from the perspective that the properties themselves can provided. Archaeological investigations can supplement, confirm, and even correct the Civil War historical record. This is especially true for historic properties in Prince William County, because most of the Confederate records from the early part of the war no longer exist.
In addition to providing data about the chronology and events of the war, the scientific study of Civil War sites can lead to a better understanding of the processes that formed and encompassed the entity called the Civil War. These processes can be studied by addressing a combination of research topics, including the technology, sociology, ideology, and logistics of warfare, especially of the Civil War. Research questions developed within the context of these research topics are the link between the archaeological data (data sets) and the research topic. For example, research questions related to the technology of warfare could focus on the weapons available and actually used. They could also deal with methods of combat; for example, naval versus cavalry engagements. Research questions concerning the design and methods of constructing batteries, entrenchments, and regimental camps could also fall under the heading of technology.

The sociology of warfare is a multi-dimensional research topic. Social groupings, including military and civilian, and their interactions can be studied at many levels of abstraction. Identification and evaluation of institutions and social organizations inside the military and out would be important to the study of the sociology of warfare of the Civil War. Research questions could focus on, for example, how the civilian social organization and structure is reflected in the organization of the regimental or brigade camps. Camps dating to the earlier periods of the war, and especially Confederate camps, could be of particular interest. The Confederate soldier often joined a regiment that had been formed locally and included a number of his friends and relatives. If he were an officer, he usually brought a slave with him; and it was not unusual for wives and families to stay in the vicinity and visit him regularly. As the war progressed and moved across the landscape, these practices declined.

The ideology of warfare refers to the body of theories or concepts about warfare and how it should be conducted. It is the most abstract research topic, especially when one's data base is archaeological deposits. Nevertheless, this is an important and valid research topic. The layout of camps, for example, can be a reflection of ideology tempered by technology. A change in the physical organization of the camps over time could be indicative of a shift in the notion of how the war should be fought or at least how the soldiers should organize themselves. Initially, Mosby's tactics raised the issue of whether or not his guerrilla form of
warfare was "real" warfare or simply hooliganism. It was an issue that both the Confederate and Union armies had to address. By the end of the war, Mosby's tactics were readily used by both armies. An archaeological study should show that the relative number of cavalry camps increased after Mosby became active in northern Virginia and that the cavalry units became more mobile.

The logistics of warfare involve the procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military supplies, facilities, and personnel. Logistics are obviously a very important part of warfare. A broken or ineffective supply line can be the downfall of an army. Examples of relevant research questions would include those on transportation methods or food distribution.

Even though they may not necessarily contain sufficient data sets to yield important information on the Civil War, archaeological investigations of some Civil War period sites can produce data that are specifically useful to the archaeologist. In recent years, archaeologists have paid particular attention to studying site formation processes. Study of many of the Civil War sites could contribute to a better understanding of these processes. Also, much of archaeology revolves around the identification of artifacts and the determination of the age of sites based on the presence of artifacts. Chronological or technological information gleaned from artifacts removed from the context of a Civil War site may be useful in investigating historic sites of unknown age or function.

Based on the Historical Context, the following associative property types have been identified for Prince William County: 1) the Battles of First and Second Manassas, 2) the Potomac River Blockade, 3) the Battle of Bristoe, and 4) Mosby's Confederacy and Union Occupation. Individually, each of these property types represents a series of related Civil War activities or events in Prince William County that were important to the overall course of the Civil War. In addition, each property type generally corresponds to a specific time period or phase of the Civil War and a definable geographical region of the county. Taken together as a whole, these property types illustrate the Civil War history of the county. Each of the property types will be discussed in detail below.
F. Associated Property Types

I. Name of Property Types: The Battles of First and Second Manassas

II. Description:

This property type consists of historic properties that are associated with the Battles of First and Second Manassas. Properties associated with these two battles have been grouped under the same property type for four reasons, including: 1) many of the known properties are associated with First and Second Manassas, 2) properties linked with these battles are in usually the same region of the county, 3) the kinds of properties associated with each battle are the same, and 4) First and Second Manassas historic properties date to the earliest phase of the Civil War. Examples of historic properties include battlefields, forts, military headquarters, government buildings, sites of military engagements or features (e.g., the unfinished railroad bed) important to the outcome of either of the battles, defensive entrenchments, supply stations, hospitals, military camps, and civilian homes that were directly affected by the battles. In addition, given the nature of these battles, it may be appropriate to include as yet unidentified Civil War cemeteries in this property type.

Historic properties directly associated with this property type and of Confederate origin will have been constructed and/or used from April 1861 to March 1862 or in August 1862. Properties affiliated with only Union activities and this property type will date from March 1862 through August 1862. In many cases, it is almost impossible to separate the Confederate and Union sites because the Union military often occupied the sites built and used by the Confederate troops. In addition, it is not unusual to have a historic property that was built by the Confederates and later occupied by Union troops, reoccupied by the Confederates around the time of the Second Battle of Manassas. With some exceptions, historic properties associated with this property type will be located in the north central region of Prince William County. Many of the properties will be associated with both battles.

The battlefields of First and Second Manassas overlap to a great extent. The present-day Manassas National Battlefield Park
encompasses most of what were the actual battlefields, especially the First Manassas battlefield. Defensive forts, which were built largely by slaves, ringed Manassas Junction. There were two types of military headquarters—the battlefield headquarters and headquarters occupied by the military command before and after the battles. During the Battle of First Manassas, Confederate General Johnston had his headquarters at Portici and Union General McDowell appears to have moved around the battlefield instead of establishing a base of operations. Confederate General Beauregard’s headquarters shifted back and forth from the battlefield to Wilmer McLean’s home at Yorkshire. Before and after the first battle, the Confederate military command used Liberia as their headquarters. During the Battle of Second Manassas, General Robert E. Lee established his headquarters on Stuart’s Hill, and General Pope based himself near the Stone House.

Sites of engagements or features important to the outcome of the two battles can be illustrated with the following examples. The engagement or battle of Blackburn’s Ford on July 18 forced McDowell to modify his attack plans, giving the Confederate forces time to reinforce and consolidate their troops. The unfinished railroad bed is a feature that provided Confederate General Jackson with a strong defensive position during the Battle of Second Manassas. Entrenchments, which were manned by various state regiments, were built primarily near fords across Bull Run and the Occoquan River. The reported Confederate supply stations were at Manassas Junction and Bacon Race Church. Beverley Mill, near the western county line, was converted into a meat-packing station, and it supplied Johnston’s Confederate army with meat. Many homes, barns and churches, particularly those near Manassas Junction and the battlefields, were taken over by the two armies and used as hospitals. Although many structures served as hospitals, only a few are documented. Two, for which some documentation exists, include the McLean Barn and the Ben Lomond house. Considerably more work needs to be done in order to identify, record, and evaluate historic properties that served as hospitals.

The Confederate army began gathering at Manassas Junction shortly after Virginia’s secession from the Union on April 17, 1861. Units, which were usually organized by state of origin, established their camps in and around the railroad junction. Numerous military units also set up camp along the south side of Bull Run and the Occoquan River, the Confederate’s first line of defense. The first
camps they lived in were probably built as summer camps (which implies that the camp structures would have been of a temporary nature). As winter approached, winter camps were constructed, often away from areas used as summer camps. Sturdy, permanent living quarters and other military facilities were built in winter camps.

The integrity of the properties associated with the Battles of First and Second Manassas is variable. The battlefields, for the most part, have a high degree of integrity. Of the 15 Confederate forts that surrounded Manassas Junction, only Mayfield Fort is extant. The military headquarters sites on the Manassas National Battlefield Park, such as Portici, are being preserved. Liberia is being preserved, but surrounding development may destroy its setting. The exact location of the McLean House used by Beauregard has not been determined. The fate of Stuart's Hill, Lee's headquarters during Second Manassas, after being hotly debated, has been decided in favor of preservation. Beverley Mill, the meat-packing station, is the only supply station that is known to exist. The Bacon Race Church foundations have been removed recently, and the site seems to have been graded. Manassas Junction supply station area has been built upon. Of the two hospitals identified above, only the Ben Lomond House is in fairly good shape. The massive and unusual stone foundation of the McLean Barn is still standing, but the wooden structure above is gone. The site is being used as a local trash dump.

The integrity of the military camps and entrenchments is also variable. Those closest to Manassas have ceased to exist and those on the outskirts of the city are currently being threatened by development. The construction of homes is becoming increasingly common along Bull Run and the Occoquan River. By far, the best-preserved camp area associated with this property type (or any other property type in the above Historical Context) is Camp Carondolet (the area is locally known as Camp Wigfall), which is east of Manassas and south of Bull Run. Many Confederate regiments, including those from Louisiana, located their winter camp at or near Camp Carondolet. This area may be threatened by development soon.

Five historic properties in Prince William County that are already in the National Register of Historic Places are included in this property type. The first, of course, is Manassas National
Battlefield Park, which encompasses most of the First and Second Manassas battlefields and includes more than 30 contributing structures, buildings, sites, or objects. The second National Register property is Liberia. This home served as the headquarters for the Confederate military command before and after the Battle of First Manassas. It was also the headquarters of Union general, McDowell, for a few weeks during June 1862, which was only a month before Second Manassas. President Lincoln and Confederate President Jefferson Davis also visited Liberia. The third property is Beverley Mill, the meat-packing station for the Confederate army until March 1862. Ben Lomond is the fourth site that is in the National Register. The house is reported to have been used as a hospital during both battles, and graffiti written by the soldiers is visible on the wall adjacent to the stairs. The fifth and last property is the Old Hammill Hotel, which is part of the Occoquan Historic District. Colonel Wade Hampton, the cavalryman charged with defending the Occoquan portion of the Confederate defensive line and guarding the supply station at Bacon Race Church, made his headquarters at the Old Hammill Hotel.

III. Significance:

In April 1861 Virginia left the Union. In May General Beauregard was chosen to command the Confederate army then forming at Manassas Junction. He had direct orders to stop any Federal attack. The Confederates adopted a defensive strategy. Although the commanding Union general, Winfield Scott, wanted to force the Confederacy to surrender by blockading their supply routes, President Lincoln chose to adopt a more aggressive stance. In June he ordered an advance on Manassas Junction, with the ultimate goal being Richmond. On July 16, General Irwin McDowell and his 35,000 men began their southerly advance. At that time it was the largest military force ever assembled in North America.

Beauregard was aware of the Union's plan and had managed to assemble a force of 22,000 at Manassas Junction. When McDowell started southwest, Beauregard called for reinforcements. Unbeknownst to the Union leaders, General Johnston left the Shenandoah Valley with his 12,000 men to join Beauregard. On July 18 McDowell attacked the Confederate forces guarding Blackburn's Ford. He was easily repulsed and withdrew. He spent the next two days scouting the rest of the Confederate line, having decided
against a direct attack near Blackburn’s Ford. This Union delay gave Johnston the time he needed to reach Manassas Junction.

The new Union plan of attack was to flank the left of the Confederate’s defensive line, which was near Sudley Church. The Union troops attacked the morning of July 21. Unfortunately for them, their movements had been observed by Captain Alexander, who was commanding the Confederate signal station on Signal Hill. Confederate regiments on the left flank were warned, and they went to meet the invading Union troops. The Battle of First Manassas was under way. The struggle continued all day. About 4 P.M., however, the Union attack began to lose momentum. The Union soldiers were exhausted and fresh Confederate troops were beginning to take up positions on the battlefield. Jubal Early’s and Kirby Smith’s brigades struck the Union right flank at 4:00 P.M. and overwhelmed the Federals. Panic spread and the Union soldiers began their retreat towards Washington.

The Battle of First Manassas, the first battle of the Civil War, resulted in 1,982 casualties for the Confederate army and 2,896 casualties for the Union army. Both armies learned that they had a long and bloody war ahead of them. The Confederates withdrew from northern Virginia in March 1862 and the Union military moved in to occupy many of their sites, especially the fortifications.

In June 1862 General John Pope became commander of the Federal Army of Virginia. In early August Lee decided he had to attack before Pope could be reinforced. On August 25 Lee divided his army, sending 24,000 men under Jackson’s command on a flanking march around Pope’s army. Jackson succeeded in cutting Pope’s supply line near Bristoe Station on August 26. On August 28 Longstreet and his troops were at Thoroughfare Gap, less than a day’s march from Jackson. That evening Jackson attacked an unsuspecting Federal column. Pope, now knowing the location of Jackson’s army, attacked early on August 29. The battle continued all day, with Pope believing he was the victor. Jackson, however, was still at his front on August 30. Pope attacked that afternoon. Waiting for the right time, Lee sent Longstreet’s men to counterattack. Unaware of Longstreet’s presence, Pope had failed to protect his left flank. The Union troops were almost overwhelmed. Under the cover of darkness, the Union army withdrew towards Washington.
The Second Battle of Manassas resulted in almost 10,000 Confederate casualties and 14,500 Union casualties. The Confederate victory signaled a major shift in the Confederate war strategy. Realizing that the Confederacy was unlikely to get the support of European powers by simply holding their territory, Confederate leaders had decided to adopt an offensive strategy. Lee’s army pursued the retreating Union troops into Maryland. The South’s invasion permitted the North to modify its public war policy, which had been the reunification of the country. President Lincoln shifted the focus of the war to the emancipation of slaves. This helped to forestall Great Britain’s and France’s entry into the war on the side of the Confederacy.

IV. Registration Requirements:

In order for a historic property to be a member of this property type, it may qualify under Criterion A, B, or D.

**Criterion A Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with the First or Second Battle of Manassas.
- The property must have been constructed or used from April 1861 through September 1862.
- The property must have above-ground features of sufficient integrity to illustrate clearly the property’s function in and association with the battle of First or Second Manassas.

**Criterion B Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with the battle of First or Second Manassas.
- The property must have been constructed or used from April 1861 through September 1862.
- The property must be directly linked to a person whose actions were critical to the development and outcome of the battle of First or Second Manassas (e.g., General Robert E. Lee and General Stonewall Jackson).
The integrity of the property must be of a sufficient degree that the property's association with the battle of First or Second Manassas and the important person can be clearly illustrated.

**Criterion D Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with the First or Second Battle of Manassas.

- The property must have been constructed or used from April 1861 through September 1862.

- The property must have subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits (or above-ground deposits) that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding the battles of First or Second Manassas.

- The archaeological remains of the property must have a degree of integrity (usually measured in terms of projected undisturbed intra-site patterning of data sets [i.e., archaeological features and artifacts]) that is sufficient to address the research topics identified for each kind of historic property on Table I.
### TABLE I

**PROPERTY TYPES, HISTORIC PROPERTIES AND RESEARCH TOPICS**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Property Type</th>
<th>C/E</th>
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<th>I</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>SF</th>
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C/E = Chronology/Event    T = Technology    S = Sociology    I = Ideology
L = Logistics            SF = Site Formation    AS = Artifact Studies
I. Name of Property Type: The Potomac River Blockade

II. Description:

The Potomac River Blockade property type consists of historic properties associated with the 1861-1862 Confederate blockade of the Potomac River and Washington, D.C. Properties representative of the blockade include gun battery complexes overlooking the Potomac River and the facilities associated with operating, maintaining, and defending those battery complexes. In the case of the Potomac River blockade, which was set in motion in August 1861 and ended in March 1862, the facilities include fall and winter camps for the Confederate troops, headquarters for the commanding generals of the blockade, hospitals, at least one supply station, small gun emplacements, and entrenchments. In addition, City of Richmond (George Page) was an important part of the blockade.

The most important properties associated with the blockade were the large gun batteries located along the banks of the Potomac River in Prince William County. The six-mile stretch of shoreline where the Confederate blockade batteries were built was selected because of its distance from Washington and its proximity to Maryland’s shore and the main river channel. There were four principal batteries: Evansport, Shipping Point, Cockpit Point, and Freestone Point. Evansport and Shipping Point batteries were on land that is now part of Quantico Marine Base. Cockpit Point Battery is on the Cherry Hill peninsula and Freestone Point Battery is on the peninsula occupied by Leesylvania State Park. Smaller gun emplacements, which were intended to supplement and back up the large batteries, are known to have been located along the Potomac River shoreline and inland on the peninsulas. George Page was based in Quantico Creek, where she could be hidden from Union observers. Her function was to cruise the river and intercept small ships attempting to run the blockade, and to shell the Maryland shore when the opportunity arose.

The commanding general of the Potomac Blockade (and the defense of the Occoguan region), Brigadier General W. H. C. Whiting, was headquartered in the eastern part of the County, probably near or in Dumfries. The exact location of his headquarters has not been determined. There were small camps near the large batteries, but most of the thousands of troops supporting the blockade were in
large camps about three to five miles inland from the batteries. These camps were close to the Telegraph Road, which ran in a north-south direction through eastern Prince William County. They were also near to where the Telegraph Road crossed Neabsco, Powells, and Quantico creeks. Regiments from these camps conducted picket duty for the batteries and rushed to their assistance when there was a threat of Union troops landing on Prince William County's shore. Some of the regiments built fall camps and winter quarters. Other regiments arrived later and just built winter camps. In winter camps permanent or, at least semipermanent, structures were built to house the troops.

Whether or not there were other locations is unknown, but it is known that several buildings in Dumfries served as Potomac Blockade hospitals. They included the mill (60+ beds), the Henderson House (about 45 beds), and a church (about 40 beds). Disabling and life-threatening diseases, especially measles, were probably the Confederate army's most significant problem during the first year of the war. The blockade hospitals primarily housed the desperately sick rather than wounded soldiers. The main supply station for the Potomac blockade was at Bacon Race Church, considerably to the west of the batteries. In all likelihood, there was also a major supply station near Dumfries, but no reference to one has been found.

Entrenchments are the last example of a type of Potomac Blockade support facility. Entrenchments were dug on the hillsides overlooking the points where the Telegraph Road crossed the major drainages. Their function was to shield riflemen, who were placed there to protect the Confederates if they were forced to retreat from the Potomac River batteries and to stop, or at least hinder, any Union troop moving south towards Richmond.

Of the four large batteries, only two remain—Cockpit Point and Freestone Point. Both have a high degree of integrity. The other two batteries have been destroyed by construction. The locations of the smaller gun emplacements have not been determined. Those that remain are probably on Cherry Hill peninsula, which has been subjected to relatively little development. (This is likely to change in the near future.) According to several accounts, George Page was purposely sunk in Quantico Creek when the Confederates left northern Virginia in March 1862. Divers have reported finding the remains of the ship, but so far they have not provided
sufficient information to demonstrate that what they have found is George Page.

Most of the camps, particularly the winter camps, have been disturbed. According to the official records there were about ten camps with troops directly supporting the batteries and the blockade. Relic hunters, of course, have sought out these sites, which have or are still yielding valuable Civil War relics. The impact from relic hunters, however, has been minor, especially when compared to other site disturbing activities. The best-preserved and most elaborate camp was that of the 6th North Carolina Infantry. It was not as close to the Telegraph Road as some of the other camps and its location was unknown until the 1960s when relic hunters found it. A large subdivision has since obliterated the camp. Housing subdivisions have also destroyed several other Potomac Blockade camps known to local relic hunters. Several of the camps have been disturbed by road construction, particularly of Interstate 95, which is just west of where the Telegraph Road ran (now Highway 1). The disturbance of Civil War blockade camps from highway-related activities was probably inevitable since the camps were purposely built near the major north-south road through Prince William County. The destruction of camps due to highway construction and adjacent development is likely to continue. One camp is reported to have a high degree of integrity below the ground surface, but this has to be confirmed by a systematic archaeological study. The exact location of several blockade camps has not been determined.

As noted above, General Whiting’s headquarters has not been identified. Further research may determine specifically where the mill and church hospital were located. The headquarters and hospitals would have been in fairly substantial structures. Even if the structures no longer exist (which is likely), subsurface remains may be present and could be investigated archaeologically. The Henderson House, the other hospital, is extant, but has been physically altered since the Civil War. The Bacon Race Church foundation, which was the only structural feature of the Civil War church/supply depot that remained, has recently been removed, and the site appears to have been graded flat. The entrenchment above the crossing of Neabsco Creek is intact.

Currently, there are no properties in the National Register of Historic Places that are included in this property type.
III. Significance:

In August 1861 orders were issued for the construction of the battery at Evansport. This was to become the southernmost Potomac Blockade battery. The batteries were to be commanded and operated jointly by the Confederate navy and army. The existence of Freestone Point Battery, which was the most northerly battery, was confirmed by the Union navy on September 25, 1861. On October 15, 1861, the Evansport Battery and nearby Shipping Point batteries made their presence known by firing on two Union ships. The last of the large Potomac River batteries, Cockpit Point, which is located between Freestone Point and Shipping Point, made its existence known a few days later, on October 18. George Page joined the blockade in late October.

Although the large gun batteries were of paramount importance to the success of the Potomac Blockade, they could not, and did not, function in isolation. Thousands of Confederate troops were relocated to the eastern edge of Prince William County to support these batteries and, in some cases, to man them. In turn, medical and supply facilities had to be set up to support the large number of troops backing up the batteries.

With the Potomac River batteries becoming active, on October 17 Commander Craven of the U.S. Navy was forced to advise that no supplies be sent to Washington, the capital of the Union, via the Potomac River. The citizens, politicians, and most of the U.S. Army of the Potomac, which was stationed there, were compelled to rely on the other supply routes into the city, particularly the single-track railroad from Baltimore. The blockade not only inconvenienced the residents of Washington and embarrassed the administration and President Lincoln, it helped legitimize the Confederacy in the eyes of the world, including Great Britain and France. The continuing frustration resulting from the blockade eventually contributed to President Lincoln's decision to take a more active role in directing military operations. He issued a military order on March 8, 1862 (against the wishes of the army's commanding general) instructing the U.S. army and navy to capture the batteries. Even then, under a cover of secrecy, the Confederate army was withdrawing from all of northern Virginia to more defendable positions closer to Richmond.
The Confederate Potomac Blockade sites, with one possible exception, are all located in Prince William County. The properties associated with the Potomac Blockade that remain today in the county have a direct link with that event. Taken together they represent that event of the Civil War in its totality. The only site outside of Prince William County and in Virginia that might be linked, at least indirectly, to the blockade is the Aquia Battery just to the south in Stafford County. It was this battery, which was not actually built to command the river, that gave the Confederate military the idea of setting up a blockade. Although outside of the above Historical Context, Union sites that may be linked to this property type in the future include General Hooker’s Divisional Camp, the site where an observation balloon was first flown for military purposes (i.e., to map the batteries and the location of their support troops), and Budd’s Ferry landing, all of which are in Maryland.

IV. Registration Requirements:

In order for a historic property to be a member of this property type, it may qualify under Criterion A or D, or both.

**Criterion A Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with the Civil War event called the Potomac Blockade.

- The property must have been constructed or used during the period of the blockade (August 1861-March 1862).

- The property must have above-ground features of sufficient integrity that these features illustrate the property’s function in and association with the Potomac Blockade.

**Criterion D Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with the Civil War event called the Potomac Blockade.
The property must have been constructed and/or used during the period of the blockade (August 1861–March 1862).

The property must have subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits (or above-ground deposits) that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding the event called the Potomac Blockade.

The archaeological remains of the property must have a degree of integrity (usually measured in terms of projected undisturbed intra-site patterning of data sets [i.e., archaeological features and artifacts]) that is sufficient to address the research topics identified for each kind of historic property on Table I.

I. Name of Property Type: Battle of Bristoe Station

II. Description:

The Battle of Bristoe Station occurred on October 14, 1863. This property type presently includes one kind of historic property: a battlefield. It is the Bristoe Station Battlefield located in central Prince William County. The small community of Bristow is within the boundaries of the battlefield, which is more than 1,000 acres in size. None of the present-day structures are believed to have stood during the Civil War. The integrity of the overall battlefield and its setting is excellent. Development threatens this historic property.

Structural remains of buildings that were on the battlefield at the time of the Civil War would appropriately be included in this property type. The presence of such remains, however, has not been documented. Remnants of the Bristoe railway station, which may exist in archaeological deposits, would be of particular interest. The Dodd House, which was near the station, was reportedly standing during the October 1863 battle. There were other "ruins," but even their general location is unknown. In all likelihood, except for the battlefield itself, archaeological studies will be required to document historic properties in this property type.
The battlefield does have a known Civil War cemetery within its bounds. Soldiers of the 10th Alabama were buried there in 1861. In addition, hundreds of soldiers (especially North Carolinians) were buried on the battlefield after the Battle of Bristoe Station. Some were removed following the war, but how many is unknown. Exactly where the soldiers are buried is also uncertain, although the general location of where most died is documented.

Bristoe Station and Manassas are the only Civil War battlefields in Prince William County. Currently, no property listed in the National Register of Historic Places is included within this property type.

II. Significance:

The Battle of Bristoe Station was the last major military engagement of General Lee's Confederate army in Northern Virginia. The battle took place on October 14, 1863, a few months after the Battle of Gettysburg. More than 100,000 men, Union and Confederate, participated in the Bristoe Campaign. General A. P. Hill, whose corps was in advance of the main Confederate army, initiated the battle. Hill, however, had misread the strength and positioning of the Union army—almost an entire corps was out of sight behind the Orange and Alexandria Railroad embankment. He had also assumed the Confederate reinforcements were close behind his corps and would arrive momentarily at the battlefield. General Robert E. Lee and the remainder of the Confederate army did arrive on the battlefield, but not in time to prevent what amounted to a slaughter of his leading troops. In a very short period of time, the Confederates suffered 1,300 casualties and the Union army lost about 600 men. Most of the Confederates who died were North Carolinians from General Cooke's and General Kirkland's brigades. That night, General Governor K. Warren withdrew the Second Army Corps from the Bristoe Station area under the cover of darkness. The next day, Lee, upon viewing the battle ground where the dead lay, curtly instructed Hill to "bury these poor men and let us say no more about it."

The Union victory at Bristoe Station forced the war into central Virginia, where a series of battles would eventually result in the defeat of General Lee and his Confederate army. The strengths and weaknesses exhibited by both armies and their leaders at the Battle
of Bristoe Station would become even more evident as the Civil War progressed to its conclusion.

In addition to the Battle of Bristoe Station, a very significant engagement occurred within the area encompassed by the Bristoe Battlefield. On August 26, 1862, General Jackson’s army captured Bristoe Station and cut the Federal army’s supply line to Washington. On the following day, General Hooker was sent to reconnoiter the Bristoe area and became engaged in fighting with elements of Jackson’s army, who had been left behind for that purpose. The Confederates, when hard pressed, eventually withdrew to join up with Jackson, who was already moving towards the Manassas battlefield. Hooker was reinforced by General Pope on the 28th and pushed ahead as far as Centreville, where that evening Pope learned of the fight between Jackson’s and Brigadier General Rufus King’s troops at Brawner’s Farm.

IV. Registration Requirements:

In order for a historic property to be a member of this property type, it may qualify under Criterion A or D, or both.

Criterion A Requirements

- The property must be directly associated with the Battle of Bristoe Station.
- The property must have been constructed or used in October 1863.
- The integrity of the property must be such that the property’s association with the Battle of Bristoe Station can be clearly illustrated.

Criterion D Requirements

- The property must be directly associated with the Battle of Bristoe Station.
- The property must have been constructed or used in October 1863.
The property must have subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits (or above-ground deposits) that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding the Battle of Bristoe Station.

The archaeological remains of the property must have a degree of integrity (usually measured in terms of projected undisturbed intra-site patterning of data sets [i.e., archaeological features and artifacts]) that is sufficient to address the research topics identified for each kind of historic property on Table I.

I. Name of Property Type: Mosby's Confederacy and Union Occupation

II. Description:

This property type consists of historic properties that are directly associated with the Union army's occupation of what was called Mosby's Confederacy. Union forces assumed control over Prince William County in March 1862, after the Confederate army had repositioned itself closer to Richmond. Except for a couple of brief periods (i.e., shortly after the battles of Second Manassas and Bristoe Station), Union troops occupied the county until the end of the war in 1865. It is impossible at this time to identify all of the types of historic properties that may be included under this property type. Although the list is incomplete, the following kinds of historic properties are likely candidates: fortifications (often earthen) built (or used) to protect supply lines, bridges (which were the most vulnerable points along a supply line), cavalry skirmish sites, cavalry camps, churches, commercial buildings, and houses.

As the main armies moved south, the roads and railroad through the county became important parts of the primary supply system of the Union army. To protect these supply lines, the Federals built fortifications and/or guard structures near vulnerable points, which were usually where the railroad crossed the creeks and rivers. As a result, railroad bridges became prime military targets during the Civil War. Excellent examples of these kinds of sites include the Orange and Alexandria Railroad bridge piers over
Bull Run and the blockhouses built on the slopes above the bridge to protect it from the Confederate raiders.

With a few exceptions, most military engagements during the Union occupation consisted of cavalry skirmishes. The exact location of most all the documented skirmishes, even those involving Colonel John S. Mosby and his Confederate rangers, has not been conclusively determined. The Union cavalry had base camps, and they certainly established temporary camps along their patrol routes. As yet, however, no cavalry camps associated with the Union occupation have been identified. Temporary camps of Mosby and his men also have not been located. Cole’s Store is often mentioned in the documents as a place where Confederate cavalry troops camped during their raids into the county. Only the general location of the store is known. Archaeological investigations may provide more specific locational information.

When the Union forces physically occupied an area, they often took over the buildings, especially churches. They used them for all sorts of purposes, but it is known that many in Prince William County became hospitals or stables. The churches were often burned when the Union occupants left. Most commercial buildings, such as stores and taverns, remained in the owner’s possession; the clientele just changed. Buckland Tavern is presently the only building in the county known to have been a functioning tavern during the Civil War. Residences, especially the larger ones, were often taken over during and after battles for use as hospitals or military headquarters. Between the battles, Prince William County’s citizens (many left) generally continued to reside in their own homes. They had the added task, however, of feeding the occupying army and the Confederate partisans, in addition to their own families.

Although historic properties of this property type will be found throughout Prince William County, they will tend to be located near major state highways that traverse the county (these roads approximate the location of most Civil War period roads) and along the route of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.

The integrity of properties in this property type vary. The railroad bridges over the creeks have since been replaced, but the bridge piers for the bridge over Bull Run, which was the most important bridge, are intact. Earthen fortifications are known,
but their purpose needs to be documented before their integrity can be assessed. Almost by definition, cavalry skirmish sites will be somewhat problematic. Skirmishes were usually short-lived and spread over a large area. One would expect little, if any, evidence of the activity to be on the ground. At the same time, since skirmishes seldom represent historical turning points of the Civil War, it is unlikely that a skirmish site could be nominated under only Criterion A. Cavalry camps, as compared to infantry camps, were more temporary. As a result, it may also be difficult to find a Union cavalry camp with a high level of integrity.

Greenwich Presbyterian Church is the only church in the County that is known to have been unmolested by Union troops. The practices of the Union soldiers almost guarantee that the structural integrity of a church dating to the Civil War will be diminished. The degree of structural integrity retained by commercial buildings and houses dating to the Civil War is most dependent on their owners redecorating activities over the past 125 years. Archaeological deposits with a high degree of integrity, on the other hand, may be present even though the structure(s) has been significantly modified or even destroyed. Most barns and storage buildings were probably burned during the winter of 1864/1865 by Union troops carrying out General Sheridan’s orders.

At least one cemetery is included in this property type. It is associated with Greenwich Presbyterian Church and is where Captain Bradford Smith Hoskins is buried. He was a well-known, colorful Englishman who rode with Mosby. In general, however, cemeteries would not be included in this property type.

Two properties that are listed in the National Register of Historic Places are included within this property type. The first is Buckland Tavern. General George Custer of the Union cavalry was roused from his meal at the tavern to participate in what has been called the "Buckland Races," an extended cavalry engagement. The second is St. Paul’s Episcopal Church in Haymarket. Haymarket was burned by Union troops on November 5, 1862, but this church was spared. Instead, it was stripped of its pews and used as a stables. Upon their departure, the Union cavalry torched the church. Only its walls were left standing.
III. Significance:

Prince William County was occupied by Union forces for most of the Civil War. As the war moved south, however, the Potomac River, major roads, and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad became vital to the survival of the Union army. Success or failure depended largely on the security of these routes of supply and communication, which Colonel John S. Mosby and his rangers attempted to disrupt. Mosby essentially introduced and conducted a new, and very effective, form of partisan warfare during the latter part of the Civil War. Because of Mosby’s effectiveness, the Union army was required to keep a significant portion of its military forces in Northern Virginia and away from the principal battlefields.

IV. Registration Requirements:

In order for a historic property to be a member of this property type, it may qualify under Criterion A or D, or both.

**Criterion A Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with Mosby or Union occupation of Prince William County.
- The property must have been constructed or used from March 1862 through April 1865.
- The property must have above-ground features of sufficient integrity that these features clearly illustrate the property’s function in and association with Mosby or Union occupation of the county.

**Criterion D Requirements**

- The property must be directly associated with Mosby or Union occupation of Prince William County.
- The property must have been constructed or used from March 1862 through April 1865.
The property must have subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits (or above-ground deposits) that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding the Mosby Confederacy or Union occupation of the county.

The archaeological remains of the property must have a degree of integrity (usually measured in terms of projected undisturbed intra-site patterning of data sets [i.e., archaeological features and artifacts]) that is sufficient to address the research topics identified for each kind of historic property on Table I.
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