


CORREZ

**United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service**

**National Register of Historic Places
Multiple Property Documentation Form**



New Submission Amended Submission

A. NAME OF MULTIPLE PROPERTY LISTING

Battle Sites of the Red River War in the Texas Panhandle, 1874-1875.

B. ASSOCIATED HISTORIC CONTEXTS

The Red River War of 1874-1875 and the displacement of the Southern Plains Indian Tribes from the Texas Panhandle.

C. FORM PREPARED BY

Name/Title: Brett Cruse, Archeologist

Organization: Texas Historical Commission

Street & Number: 1511 Colorado

City or town: Austin

Date: February 20, 2001

Telephone: (512) 463-6096

State: TX Zip: 78701

D. CERTIFICATION

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this documentation form meets the National Register documentation standards and sets forth requirements for the listing of related properties consistent with the National Register criteria. This submission meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60 and the Secretary of the Interior's Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation. (See continuation sheet for additional comments.)

Signature and title of certifying official
State Historic Preservation Officer, Texas Historical Commission

6-24-01

Date

State or Federal agency and bureau

I hereby certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

Erika Martin Seibert
for Signature of the Keeper

8/13/01

Date

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STATEMENT OF HISTORIC CONTEXT

Name of Context: The Red River War of 1874-1875 and the displacement of the Southern Plains Indian Tribes from the Texas Panhandle.

This context encompasses the late-nineteenth century activities of the United States Army in the Panhandle of Texas. These activities were aimed at removing the various American Indian tribes from the region, a goal that was accomplished by the end of 1875. A long history of conflict had developed between the Southern Plains Indian tribes, which included the Comanche, Kiowa, Southern Cheyenne, and Arapaho, and the Texans and Americans as the “whites” continued their incessant push to claim the western frontier. During the Civil War the Southern Plains tribes took advantage of the fact that the state forces and Confederate troops that had provided some measure of protection for westward-bound settlers were now withdrawn from the frontier to fight the Federal army back east. As a result, the frontier settlement line in Texas was driven back more than a hundred miles as the Indians threw greater effort into their attempts to reclaim territory they saw as rightfully theirs (Fehrenbach 1994:452). Indian activities viewed by the Anglo settlers as “depredations” continued to increase, as did the pleas from the settlers for Congress to do something to control the Indians.

Congress, hoping for a permanent and bloodless end to the chaos, responded by creating an Indian Peace Commission in 1867 and charged it with resolving the problems by negotiation. During the week of October 21-28, 1867, the commission held a conference with the Southern Plains tribes on Medicine Lodge Creek about 85 miles south of Fort Larned, Kansas. The goal of the conference was to establish a comprehensive treaty with the Southern Plains tribes that would end the hostilities and ensure a lasting peace. While the whites wanted peace, they made it clear there could be no real bargaining. In fact, the terms offered by the whites were an ultimatum. If the Indians agreed, they would get presents and annuities; if they did not, there would be a renewed war that the commission representatives threatened would destroy the tribes (Fehrenbach 1994:477).

According to the terms of the treaty, the Indians were to live on two reservations established in Indian Territory in what is now western Oklahoma (Figure 1). The reservation in the southwest was for the Comanches and Kiowas, while the one to the north was for the Cheyennes and Arapahos. The tribes were to be given guns and ammunition for hunting, and seeds and instruction in farming. They would be taught how to build houses and would be furnished schools and a doctor. Annuity goods would be furnished them for thirty years. In return, the tribes were required to cease all warfare against the whites and not interfere with the roads, railroads, and forts that would be constructed in their country. Significantly, the treaty went on to state that the Indian tribes “*yet reserve the right to hunt on any lands south of the Arkansas River so long as the buffalo may range thereon*” (Bureau of Indian Affairs 1868). The Indians understandably took this to mean they could continue to hunt buffalo in all the area south of the Arkansas River, including southern Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, wherever the buffalo went.

At the end of the conference the Medicine Lodge Treaty was signed by ten of the Indian chiefs, but it was destined for failure. Though many of the Indians voluntarily moved to the reservations and tried to live by the terms of the treaty, they found it almost impossible to do so because the U.S. government did not live up to its end of the bargain of furnishing adequate food and supplies to the Indians. The Indians were used to subsisting largely on fresh meat, but they were issued only limited supplies of salt pork and cornmeal. The government had planned to furnish seeds and tools to the Indians for three years, and the rations had been intended as supplementary to the diet the Indians were supposed to produce themselves. However, the Indians had no interest in learning to farm,

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and they were hostile to the idea of taking up any kind of labor except hunting. In general, neither the goods nor the projected life at the reservations was attractive to the Indians, and they immediately began to drift away. Within a year, two-thirds of the reservation Indians had gone back to hunting on the buffalo plains, paying no attention to their imposed boundaries (Fehrenbach 1994).




Figure 1. Southern Plains Indian tribes during the Red River War and locations of the Indian reservations.

Three years after the Medicine Lodge Treaty went into effect, a series of events took place that brought the uprising of the Southern Plains Indians to a head and sealed their fate. In the fall of 1870 a young New Englander named Josiah Wright Moar came west and founded the business of hunting buffalo for hides. Within a matter of months buffalo hides were in such demand by eastern tanners that hundreds of hide hunters rushed to the plains to

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take part in the suddenly lucrative business (Rogers 1969). Railroads penetrated deeply into the buffalo range at numerous points and were carrying away buffalo hides by the thousands to the eastern markets. Dodge City, in southwestern Kansas, became the center of the trade. In 1873 alone, the three rail lines serving Dodge City carried away over 750,000 hides, and the figure for the three years 1872-1874 totals an incredible 4,373,730 buffalo killed. That figure was for the rail exports alone; other sources added at least 1 million more to the total (Dodge 1877 quoted in Miles 1896:159).

The Indians to the south found the wanton slaughter of the buffalo disdainful, but they made no concerted effort to stop it as the depredations were confined to lands north of the Arkansas River. As per the terms of the Medicine Lodge Treaty, land to the south of the Arkansas River was considered Indian hunting grounds, and the hide hunters respected the boundary, at least in the early years of the treaty. Only after the northern Kansas buffalo were gone did the hunters venture south of the Arkansas River into the Indian hunting grounds. The buffalo hunters slaughtered the buffalo by the thousands and in one season's kill obliterated the southern Kansas herds on which the Cheyennes and Arapahos subsisted (Haley 1998). By 1873 the buffalo hunters were making continuous raids on the herds south of the Arkansas River. The Indians, now fighting within their own territory, became less and less capable of fending off the ever-increasing tide of buffalo poachers.

The Army, which was supposed to be patrolling the Kansas-Indian Territory boundary to see that nobody crossed, chose to look the other way. General Philip Sheridan summed up the prevalent view of the Army when he lectured a session of the Texas legislature in 1875 to defeat a conservation bill that would have preserved the buffalo from extinction. The buffalo hunters *"have done more in the last two years to settle the vexed Indian question than the entire regular army has done in the past thirty years. They are destroying the Indians' commissary....Send them powder and lead, if you will; but, for the sake of lasting peace, let them kill, skin, and sell until the buffaloes are exterminated. Then your prairies can be covered with speckled cattle and the festive cowboy, who follows the hunter as a second forerunner of an advanced civilization"* (quoted in Gard 1959:215).

By 1873 the buffalo hunters had decimated the buffalo herds as far south as the Canadian River in the Texas Panhandle. This meant that the Indians had lost all control over what had been the reservation given them at Medicine Lodge (Haley 1998), and they began to panic at the juggernaut of buffalo hunters that was so rapidly destroying their very means of survival. With no major retaliation yet inflicted by the Indians, the buffalo hunters began to make plans for the 1874 hunt on the Canadian. By now it was obvious to the hunters, and to the Indians, that the Army had no intention of stopping the hunters from crossing into the Indian territories. As far as the Indians were concerned, all the buffalo south of the Arkansas River were theirs. With the buffalo hunters having already devastated the herds north of the Canadian, the heat for revenge among the Indians was high. The presence of white hunters among the last herds of buffalo on the Southern Plains would likely touch off a war with the Indians, but the buffalo hunters were willing to risk it.

In the spring of 1874 the buffalo hunters who had waited out the winter in Dodge City decided it was time to move south in force. The general feeling among the hunters was that if they all went south together the Indians would be less likely to attack them. To accommodate the hide men and ease the supply problem, one of the Kansas robe and meat traders, A. C. "Charlie" Myers, agreed to pack up his entire business and move south with the hunters, to open a supply store and market center for their hides there in the Texas Panhandle (Rathjen 1973). Myers established his trading post, Adobe Walls, [REDACTED]. He built a stockade, corral, and storehouse and was soon followed by Charles Rath, who set up business in a sod house. Tom O'Keefe established a blacksmith shop, and James Hanrahan opened a saloon (Baker and Harrison 1986).

The sudden swarm of white hunters onto the Panhandle buffalo range could hardly have had any other

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effect than to infuriate the Indians, who demonstrated their objections with swift clarity. Two hunters, Dave Dudley and Tommy Wallace, apparently were caught asleep in a camp [REDACTED]. Their companion, Joe Plummer, away at the time of the attack, returned to find his associates killed, scalped, otherwise mutilated, and Dudley's corpse pinned to the ground by a wooden stake driven through the abdomen. In the camp of Anderson Moore [REDACTED] an Englishman, John Jones, and a German known as "Blue Billy" were killed. The survivors, Plummer and Moore, brought word of the tragedies to Adobe Walls (Dixon 1927).

By late spring of 1874 the situation with the Indians was on the verge of exploding into an outright war. Among the Indians there was talk of war and killing and of driving the white man from the land. During the spring of 1874 a leader and prophet for the Indians emerged in the person of Isa-tai of the Quahadi band of Comanches. Isa-tai claimed he could bring the dead back to life and that he was immune to the bullets of the white man. He also claimed that he could vomit forth at will wagonloads of cartridges (Richardson 1933). Isa-tai's medicine was viewed as being very strong, and he was doing his best to incite a war against the whites. Because the majority of the Indians now saw themselves as being in a desperate situation with the only alternative to starvation being war, it took little persuasion by Isa-tai to convince the Indian leaders that they must strike back at the whites. Thus, the plan was made that the Indians would attack and destroy the new settlement of buffalo hunters at Adobe Walls (Haley 1998).

In the early morning hours of June 27, 1874, some 300 Indians, led by Isa-tai and Quanah Parker, attacked the Adobe Walls post (Berthrong 1963). The Indian plan was to catch the whites by surprise and simply overpower them. What the Indians did not count on, however, was the skillful marksmanship of the hunters or the long-range accuracy of their Sharps rifles. Not only did the hunters manage to repel the Indians, they killed a number of them. So surprised were the Indians by their own lack of success, they began to fall back and by the afternoon had almost completely withdrawn and were firing only sporadically (West 1963). For all their effort and all their losses, the Indians had killed only three of the hunters. For the Indians, the tactical purpose in attacking Adobe Walls was to kill the white hunters. The broader purpose of the attack was to halt the slaughter of the buffalo herds. The Indians failed on both counts.

Word of the attack on Adobe Walls spread quickly over the buffalo range, and panic spread just as quickly among the buffalo hunters. The Adobe Walls merchants quickly loaded their inventories and returned to Dodge City, with many of the hunters following them. However, their fear of the Indians did not last long, and within a few months most of the hunters were again killing large numbers of buffalo on the Texas plains.

Conditions continued to worsen on the reservations, and many of the Indians who were still there now left to join with the renegade bands who had returned to the Texas plains. As the buffalo hunt proceeded, the frustration of the Indians mounted, and marauding bands periodically fell upon isolated hunting parties (Rathjen 1973). The increasing realization that their access to ancestral lands was diminishing encouraged many of the Indians to strike at the whites. The realization that the buffalo, their main source of survival, was quickly disappearing forced them to fight. After Adobe Walls the Indians spread out over the plains of Texas for one final grasp at the old ways of life. For them, this brought military retaliation, defeat, and confinement to the hated reservations (West 1963).

Following the attack on Adobe Walls, the military made plans to finally subdue the Southern Plains tribes once and for all. Known by historians as the Red River War, the primary objective of the military campaign of 1874 and 1875 was the removal of the Indian groups from this area of Texas and the opening of the region to Anglo-American settlement. General Philip Sheridan later characterized the military operations as "*not only comprehensive, but...the most successful of any Indian Campaign in this country since its settlement by the*

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whites" (quoted in Carter 1935:525). It was General Sheridan along with General William T. Sherman who laid the basis for an offensive campaign against the Indians in early July 1874, and the Secretary of War implemented it on July 20. The policy called for enrollment and protection of innocent and friendly Indians at their reservations, and pursuit and destruction of hostile Indians without regard for reservation or departmental boundaries (Leckie 1963:198).

Without a doubt, from a military point of view the campaign was masterfully planned and executed. The offensive utilized five military columns converging on the general area of the Texas Panhandle and specifically upon the upper tributaries of the Red River where the Indians were believed to be (Figure 2). The strategy aimed at full encirclement of the region, thereby eliminating virtually all gaps through which escape might be made. From Fort Dodge, Colonel Nelson A. Miles, the overall field commander of the campaign, moved southward toward the Washita River and the headwaters of the Red River; Lieutenant Colonel John W. Davidson marched westward from Fort Sill; Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie led the Fourth Cavalry northward from Fort Concho; Lieutenant Colonel George P. Buell moved westward from Fort Richardson; and, finally, Major William R. Price led the Eighth Cavalry eastward across the Panhandle from Fort Union. The plan called for the converging columns to maintain a continuous offensive until a decisive defeat had been inflicted on the Indians.

Over the course of the next ten months, the military would engage the Indians in perhaps as many as 25 battles and smaller skirmishes across the Texas Panhandle. In none of the battles could the Indians claim victory. They were simply outnumbered and overpowered by the superior weapons and supplies of the U.S. Army. The Indians were refugees in their own land; the buffalo were already hunted out in most of the war zone, and the Indians, deprived of meat and hides, were helpless when the swift military attacks destroyed their camps and winter stores. The military campaign known to history as the Red River War officially ended in June of 1875 when Quanah Parker led his band of Quahadi Comanches into Fort Sill and surrendered. By then, the majority of the tribes had long since become prisoners.

With the end of the war, farmers and ranchers moved in quickly to claim the territory that just a few short years before had been the domain of the free-roaming Indians. Within a few months and years, the cattlemen and farmers had enclosed the entire region, roads and rails crossed the land, and Anglo-American settlement began.

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


Figure 2. Military Columns of the Red River War.

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Battle Sites of the Red River War in the Texas Panhandle, 1874-1875

ASSOCIATED PROPERTY TYPES: Battle Sites of the Red River War

Description

This property type includes two locations where the U.S. Army engaged in battle with the Southern Plains Indians during the Red River War campaign. These battle sites include the Battle of Lyman's Wagon Train site and the Battle of Sweetwater Creek site. Both of these battles were important events of the Red River War and helped influence the eventual outcome of the war.

Because of the types of tactics and maneuvers that were utilized by the military during the war in response to the "guerrilla" warfare tactics of the Southern Plains Indians, the Red River War battle sites have distinctive characteristics. In warfare, the Southern Plains Indians would generally divide into small groups and spread out over the surrounding terrain to strike from various concealed locations. This attack tactic was designed to force the enemy to also break into small groups that would be more vulnerable to attack. In response, the military, which had relied heavily on infantry during the Civil War, utilized cavalry units much more extensively to battle the Plains Indians. Though the military used some infantry during the Red River War campaign, most of the troops were cavalry.

What resulted from the engagements between the Southern Plains Indians and the cavalry units were fast moving, running battles that often covered large areas. Artifacts left on the battlefield will generally occur in low densities except where the fighting may have been particularly intense. Despite the relatively low density of artifacts, distinct patterns should be present and will reflect the offensive and defensive positions of the battle participants. The Battle of Sweetwater Creek is an example of this type of battle.

Exceptions to the running battles are those engagements where military supply wagons or some unit other than the cavalry was involved in the battle. An example of this is the Battle of Lyman's Wagon Train, where the military supply wagons came under attack and the wagons were forced to stop and circle into a defensive position. Thus the engagement became a stationary, rather than a running, battle. As such, the battle was confined to a much smaller area and the artifacts deposited at the battle occurred in much higher densities. Distinct artifact patterns and clusters of specific artifact types identify Indian and military positions at the battle.

Significance

Battle sites have the potential to shed light on conflict between warring groups. In the case of each of the sites discussed above, their significance lies in their ability to yield information about the nineteenth-century conflict between two very different cultures—the Southern Plains Indians and the Euro-Americans. The Red River War battle sites represent the physical remains of clashes between these two distinctively different cultures. They represent the last attempts by the Indians to hold on to their traditional ways of life before being defeated and removed forever from their homeland to the reservations and prisons of the United States military.

This property type is significant to the study of the history of the U.S. Army's pursuit of the Southern Plains tribes and the Indian's response to that pursuit. A variety of research topics may be addressed with the investigation of sites of this property type. For example, the sites offer opportunities to study the late 19th century material remains and weapons of the Southern Plains tribes as compared with those of the post-Civil War U.S. Army. These sites may also provide information concerning intrasite patterning, ethnic heritage, and firearms identification and use.

As discussed in detail in the individual site nomination forms, the archeological investigations of the battle sites have served to corroborate, in some cases, the historical accounts of the battles, while in other cases, the

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investigations bring into question some of the accounts. The most apparent discrepancies have to do with the apparently inflated estimates of the number of Indians involved in the battles, and it appears that the Indians that were at the battles were not as well armed as the military accounts suggest.

The sites included in this nomination represent only two of the several battles known to have occurred in the Texas Panhandle during the Red River War. They represent the few sites of this property type to be documented by archeological survey. The archeological investigations of the sites have provided a clearer regional perspective of the battles. Without a doubt, the Red River War was the single most significant event in the opening of a large portion of western Texas and the Southern Plains to settlement. Once the Indian barrier was removed, the westward expansion by the Euro-Americans continued unimpeded.

Registration Requirements

National Register Criteria: A and D

Areas of Significance: Archeology (historic aboriginal), Ethnic Heritage (Native American), Military.

Data Requirements: In order to be eligible in the area of ethnic heritage (Native American) the properties should provide an important link to one or more Native American groups. For each of the battle sites in this nomination, it can be demonstrated through historic documents and military reports precisely which Native American groups participated. At the Battle of Lyman's Wagon Train and the Battle of Sweetwater Creek the primary tribes were Kiowa and Comanche (Lyman 1874, Archaubeau 1963).

In order to be eligible in the areas of archeology (historic aboriginal) and military, the properties should contain artifacts and/or features that can be attributed to specific historic aboriginal groups or military activities. Military artifacts may include ammunition, firearms, and other equipment such as cans, horseshoes, buttons, and buckles of the appropriate age. Historic aboriginal artifacts may include various weapons and tools such as metal arrowpoints and fleshers, items of decoration such as conchos and tinklers, or other functional items such as awls, brads, and cooking pots.

Each of the sites should also retain integrity as demonstrated by location, setting, materials, feeling, or association. For integrity of location, it must be demonstrated that the site being nominated is the actual location where the battle occurred. For integrity of setting, the landscape should be intact and appear essentially as it did at the time of the battle. Under Criterion D, integrity of materials refers to the presence of artifacts or features at the site, the completeness of the artifact or feature assemblage, or the quality of artifact or feature preservation. According to the National Register guidelines, a property has integrity of feeling if its features in combination with its setting convey a historic sense of the property during its period of significance. Integrity of feeling enhances a property's ability to convey its significance under all of the criteria. Finally, a property retains integrity of association if it is the place where the event occurred and the location is sufficiently intact to convey that relationship to an observer.

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GEOGRAPHICAL DATA

The battles of the Red River War occurred primarily in a large area of what is now the Texas Panhandle. Battles are known to have occurred in the following counties: Armstrong, Briscoe, Carson, Donley, Gray, Hemphill, Hutchinson, Randall, and Wheeler. The precise locations of some of the battles are not known. See the individual nomination forms for specific boundary delineations of the individual properties.

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SUMMARY OF IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION METHODS

This multiple property nomination of Red River War battles sites is based upon a 1998 and 1999 archeological survey of the sites conducted by the Archeology Division of the Texas Historical Commission. The purpose of the survey was (1) to attempt to precisely locate and document the more significant battle locations of the Red River War; (2) to evaluate the integrity of, and establish boundaries for, each of the investigated sites; (3) to evaluate the heritage tourism potential of each of the investigated sites; and (4) to nominate the sites to the National Register of Historic Places. Based largely on archival research, seven battle sites were targeted for the investigations. These include the Battle of Red River site, the Battle of Lyman's Wagon Train, the Battle of Sweetwater Creek, the Battle of Adobe Walls, the Battle of Buffalo Wallow, the Battle of Palo Duro Canyon, and the Battle of Baldwin's Wagon Charge. Of these, access was not granted from the landowners for the Battle of Palo Duro Canyon site or the Battle of Baldwin's Wagon Charge site, and, consequently, these were dropped from the project. Insufficient data was gathered during the investigations to confirm the location of the Buffalo Wallow battle and it is not included in this nomination. The Battle of Adobe Walls site was listed on the National Register in 1978. One of the property owners of the Battle of Red River site objected to the NRHP nomination and, consequently, this site was excluded from this multiple property nomination. The remaining two properties form the basis of this multiple property nomination.

The archeological methods used during the investigations were similar to those that have been used effectively at other battle sites (Scott et al. 1989). The approach involved several steps. First, the archeological team, equipped with metal detectors, systematically scanned the study area for metal artifacts. When the metal detectors indicated the presence of a metal object buried in the ground or on the surface, that place was marked with a surveyor's pin flag. The metal object was then excavated and, if it appeared to be related to the battle, it was assigned a unique identification number. Each artifact was then mapped in place and collected. At the Lyman Wagon Train site we used a Total Station Electronic Distance Measurer to record the precise location of each artifact and to record topographic readings. At the Battle of Sweetwater Creek site, because of its large size, we were not able to use the Total Station. Instead, we used a Trimble Pro XRS Global Positioning System receiver with sub-meter accuracy to record the location of each collected and numbered artifact. The data collected with the Total Station and the GPS was then imported into the SURFER[®] software mapping program to produce precise maps showing the location of each battle-related artifact. Digital Elevation Model (DEM) map files were downloaded from the U.S. Geological Survey website (www.cr.usgs.gov) and also imported into the SURFER[®] program to create topographic maps of the individual battle sites. By conducting this type of intense pedestrian survey across the battle sites and precisely mapping each battle-related metal artifact, precise site boundaries were established and very detailed artifact distribution maps were generated. Each battle site was located on USGS topographical maps, photographs were taken, and site data forms were completed.

The properties in this nomination are considered excellent examples of battle sites associated with the Indian Wars that took place on the Southern Plains in the late 19th century in general, and with the Red River War that occurred in the Texas Panhandle in particular. The sites have yielded data important to our understanding of the events of the Red River War, and they retain integrity of location, setting, materials, feeling, and association. These integrity requirements are based on a knowledge of the individual properties gained during the archeological investigations conducted at the sites.

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