This form is used for documenting multiple property groups relating to one or several historic contexts. See instructions in How to Complete the Multiple Property Documentation Form (National Register Bulletin 16B). Complete each item by entering the requested information. For additional space, use continuation sheets (Form 10-900-a). Use a typewriter, word processor, or computer to complete all items.

A. Name of Multiple Property Listing

Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee

B. Associated Historic Contexts

Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee, 1861-1865

C. Form Prepared by

name/title Philip Thomason/Doug Cubbison
organization Thomason and Associates/White Star Consulting Date 5/24/97
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D. Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this documentation form meets the National Register documentation standards and sets forth requirements for the listing of related properties consistent with the National Register criteria. This submission meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60 and the Secretary of the Interior’s Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation. (____ See continuation sheet for additional comments.)

Signature and title of certifying official Date

Deputy SHPO, Tennessee Historical Commission

I hereby certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved by the National Register as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

Signature of the Keeper Date
Organization of the Nomination

This Historic Context has been written to provide an overview of the Civil War in Tennessee. An introductory section discusses Tennessee's secession, and the military situation at the start of the war. Separate sections are then provided for significant military campaigns which occurred in the state:

- War of the Rivers - Battles of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, and the Corinth Campaign, from February to May, 1862
- Fall of Memphis and the Mississippi River in Tennessee - June, 1862
- Kentucky Campaign of 1862 - War shifts from Tennessee to Kentucky, Summer and Fall, 1862
- The War for Middle Tennessee - Efforts of Union Major General William Rosecrans to advance from Nashville to Chattanooga, Fall 1862 through August 1863, includes Battle of Stones River, and Tullahoma Campaign
- Battle for the Gateway - the Chickamauga, East Tennessee, and Chattanooga Campaigns, September to November, 1863
- Struggle for the Mountains - Longstreet's Knoxville Campaign, October through December, 1863
- The Defense of Tennessee - Railroads, Raids and Redoubts

Additionally, beginning with the first occupation of Tennessee soil early in 1862, another war would occur along the railroads, rivers and roads in Union occupied Tennessee. This involved Federal efforts to keep their supply lines open from Kentucky and other supply depots to the North, and Confederate attempts to sever these lines. These struggles would continue until the very end of the war. This section is entitled, "The Defense of Tennessee, Railroads, Raids, and Redoubts." Because Northern forces constructed substantial earthworks to protect their vulnerable supply lines, many of the remnants of the Civil War in Tennessee consist of remnants of these fortifications.

Statement of Historic Contexts:

Introduction

On June 24, 1861, the state of Tennessee seceded from the United States of America, and declared itself to be "a free, independent government." One month later, on July 22, 1861, Tennessee was formally admitted into the Confederate States of America. Tennessee had not been a hotbed of "fire breathing" secessionists, and a general election had voted against a secession convention on February 9, 1861. Tennessee had only taken this irrevocable step in response to President Abraham Lincoln's April 15, 1861 call for 75,000 soldiers to subdue the rebellious states. Governor Isham G. Harris responded by issuing a proclamation on April 25: "An alarming and dangerous usurpation of power by the President of the United States has precipitated a state of war between the sovereign states of America." Harris denounced Lincoln, noting "the bloody and tyrannical policy of the Presidential usurper" and "his hordes of armed soldiers marching to the work of Southern subjugation." He closed "I respectfully suggest that our connection with the Federal Union be formally annulled in such manner as shall involve the highest exercise of sovereign authority by the people of the state." It is apparent that the citizens of the state were in agreement with Harris, for this time the general election's results were more than two to one in favor of secession. It was only in the mountainous counties of East Tennessee, where a
large planter class did not exist and where strong Union sentiment existed, that organized opposition to secession could be found.¹

At this time, Tennessee was woefully ill prepared for an armed struggle. In January 1861, John Heriges, keeper of public arms, reported that the state arsenal contained 8,761 muskets and rifles, 350 carbines, four pieces of artillery, and a small lot of pistols and sabers, with 1,815 muskets and rifles, 228 pistols and 200 sabers in the hands of volunteer companies. Of the muskets in the arsenal, 280 were percussion, the balance were flintlock, and over 4,300 of them were badly damaged; the carbines were flintlock and unserviceable, and two of the four pieces of artillery were in the same condition.² Governor Harris rapidly instituted measures to increase Tennessee’s state of military readiness, for he recognized that Tennessee was certain to be at the center of the impending conflict.

Because of Tennessee’s nearly 300-mile northern border, it was inevitable that any United States thrust in the west would be initially aimed at Tennessee. Although Kentucky on Tennessee’s northern boundary was considered to be a border state, and had strong States Rights sympathies, it would remain loyal to the United States, thus offering the Union a secure location for organizing and supplying military forces. The three great rivers of the western theater of the war, the Mississippi, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland, all connected Tennessee to the north. The Mississippi River, a critical conduit for northwestern and midwestern commerce, formed the western boundary of the state. The Tennessee River flowed from the Ohio nearly due south, splitting the state into two portions, then leaving the state to loop through northern Alabama before reentering the state at Chattanooga and continuing north to Knoxville and its birthplace in the Great Smoky Mountains. The Cumberland River pointed like a dagger to Nashville and the heart of the state. Additionally, the major north-south railroad line in the west divided at Bowling Green, Kentucky (a mere 25 miles north of the state border). From Bowling Green the Memphis and Ohio Railroad ran to Memphis, while the Louisville and Nashville Railroad was routed through Nashville to the heart of the south. From Nashville, the Nashville and Decatur Railroad ran due south through Franklin, Spring Hill, Columbia, and Pulaski to Decatur, Alabama, where it joined the critical east-west railroad of the Confederacy, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

Running southeast from Nashville, the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, Alabama, and then returned to the state at Chattanooga. Finally, the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad ran from Chattanooga and Cleveland, Tennessee, through Knoxville and across the Appalachian Mountains to connect with the capital of the Confederacy at Lynchburg, Virginia. Any northern invasion west of the Appalachian Mountains would be obliged, from a logistical standpoint, to follow either these rivers or the railroads.


From Fort Henry to Corinth, the War of the Rivers

The defense of the western theater, focused on the northern border of Tennessee, was entrusted to Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston. Johnston was assigned to this position by President Jefferson Davis in September 1861. His left flank west of the Mississippi River was anchored on a string of forts constructed along the Mississippi River from Columbus, Kentucky, to Memphis. The northernmost fort in Tennessee was at Island Number 10 near Tiptonville, Tennessee, supplemented by additional fortifications across the Mississippi River at New Madrid, Missouri. This flank was under the command of Major General Leonidas Polk, whose headquarters was at Memphis. A pair of forts defended the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers as far downstream as suitable terrain could be located. Fort Henry (NR 10/10/75) was located on the Tennessee River, and Fort Donelson (NR 10/15/66) guarded the Cumberland River near Dover, Tennessee. The garrison of these two posts was approximately 5,000 men, and the two forts were approximately twelve miles apart. Protecting the railroad approach were Major General William Hardee’s 14,000 men at Bowling Green, Kentucky. Only a small force of 4,000 men could be spared for eastern Tennessee, where Confederate Brigadier General Felix Zollicoffer initially made his headquarters at Knoxville.

The Federal advance began early in 1862. Zollicoffer, who had been first to advance into eastern Kentucky, was killed and his army, now led by Major General George Crittenden, crushed at Mill Springs, Kentucky on January 19, 1862. Federal gunboats had been regularly reconnoitering Fort Henry, and had discovered it to be poorly sited. The fort was located too close to the Tennessee River, on low ground prone to flooding, and was commanded by higher ground. However, the fort was well constructed and well laid out, and consisted of a five-bastion work mounting seventeen guns protected by additional entrenchments. When the Federal advance would begin in the first days of February, 1862, Fort Henry was flooded and all but untenable.3

On the morning of February 4, 1862 a force under the command of Brigadier General Ulysses Simpson Grant consisting of 17,000 infantry, seven gunboats, and a number of transports approached Fort Henry. The post’s commander, Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, seeing this formidable armada approaching his water logged fortifications, recognized that any defense would be hopeless. Accordingly, he remained behind with approximately seventy artillery men to fight a delaying battle, while the majority of his 2,610 soldiers retreated to join the garrison at Fort Donelson. At 11:00 a.m. Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote’s gunboats commenced their attack upon the fort. The Tennessee River was at flood stage, and three of Foote’s four ironclad gunboats were able to steam directly up to the fort to engage it at pointblank range. Tilghman held out until his artillery men were smothered beneath a wave of iron, and all of their artillery pieces were disabled or silenced. The flag of truce was raised, according to Tilghman, "precisely at 1:50 p.m."4

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3 Three principal sources were used for the early war in Tennessee: Horn, Tennessee’s War; M. F. Force, Campaigns of the Civil War: From Fort Henry to Corinth (New York: 1882; paperback reprint, New York: The Blue and Gray Press); and Thomas L. Connelly, Civil War Tennessee, Battles and Leaders (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979). Hereinafter cited as Force, Fort Henry to Corinth; and Connelly, Civil War Tennessee.

4 Horn, Tennessee’s War, p. 43.
Grant wasted little time in the celebration of his victory, and began moving his forces toward Fort Donelson, stating that "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th". However, the heavy rains that had made his victory at Fort Henry so easy now turned against him, making the roads to Fort Donelson nearly impassable. Foote’s gunboats were also delayed moving back up the Tennessee and down the Cumberland. Finally, Johnston reacted quickly to the fall of Fort Henry by significantly strengthening his garrison at Fort Donelson.

Fort Donelson was a substantial entrenchment located on a bluff high above the Cumberland River. Strong river batteries commanded the river. With the addition of the Fort Henry garrison, Fort Donelson’s defenders consisted of 6,000 men under the command of Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson. Soon reinforcements under Brigadier Generals John Floyd, Gideon Pillow and Simon Buckner poured into the post, swelling its defenders to 15,000 by February 13. Floyd, the senior officer present, assumed command of the post. Meanwhile, Grant had begun the delayed movement of his 17,000 infantry from Fort Henry to Donelson on February 11th. By the evening of February 13, the post was completely invested.

At three o’clock in the afternoon the next day, Foote’s gunboats would assault Fort Donelson as they had Fort Henry. However, the Confederate defenses were on much higher and drier ground, meaning that the gunboats' cannon could only be sufficiently elevated with difficulty, while the Confederate gunners could deliver a plunging fire on the boats. Accordingly, the result would be much different than the assault on Fort Henry. For the next hour and a half, the bluffs and hills resounded with the thundering of many cannon shots. The Federal gunboats were badly outmatched, and were forced to precipitously withdraw. Fifty-four northern sailors were casualties, Foote’s flagship alone had been struck with 59 shots, and Foote himself was wounded. Grant would later write, "I felt sad enough at the time over the repulse."

Grant’s plan had been to employ the same basic stratagem that had worked so well at Fort Henry, for his troops to hold the Confederates in their positions while the gunboats attacked and silenced the batteries in the fortifications. With Foote’s failure, Grant would have to revise his plans. The morning of February 15 Grant met with Foote to discuss the condition of the gunboats. While Grant was otherwise employed, the Confederates had launched an early morning attack to break out of the encirclement.

Although there was confusion and turmoil in the Confederate command, Floyd being inexperienced, and "bad blood" existing between Pillow and Buckner, they recognized that the post must be evacuated or their command would be lost. Accordingly, the decision was made to sortie from their entrenchments. The brunt of the attack fell upon Grant’s right, commanded by Brigadier General John McClernand, and was delivered by troops under the command of General Pillow. The attack was made with determination and experienced success, clearing the intended path of Confederate withdrawal. At the critical juncture, Pillow inexplicably lost his nerve, and pulled back into the fort. A Federal counterattack rapidly followed, and by day’s end the Confederate defenders were

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in a worse position than they had been at dawn, not withstanding the morning’s successes and their hard fighting.

That night, the disheartened Confederate commanders held a Council of War at Pillow’s headquarters, and made the decision to surrender the fort. Floyd and Pillow, however, determined to escape the post, leaving Buckner to make the surrender. A number of other Confederate commanders made their own escape, including Bushrod Johnson and Nathan Bedford Forrest. The morning of February 16, Buckner sent a letter to Grant requesting his terms. Grant's response would gain him eternal fame, "No terms except unconditional surrender can be accepted." Buckner accepted the "ungenerous and unchivalric terms," and Fort Donelson was surrendered.

With the fall of the two river posts, Johnston's defensive line was shattered. Hardee had already evacuated Bowling Green on February 14 as a result of the fall of Fort Henry, and all of Johnston's forces began to withdraw from Nashville to Murfreesboro immediately following Fort Donelson's loss, on February 17 and 18. Nashville itself was occupied on February 24. On Johnston's western flank, Polk pulled back from his exposed fortifications at Columbus, Kentucky. The center of his new defensive position was organized under the command of Brigadier General John P. McCown, and miscellaneous batteries and entrenchments on both banks of the Mississippi. Brigadier General John Pope commanded the nearly 25,000 northern soldiers arrayed against these river defenses. Pope's advanced forces appeared north on March 3, and by March 12 his entire strength was present. McCown chose to evacuate on March 13 rather than fight. Johnston's second-in-command, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard called this "the poorest defense made by any fortified post during the whole course of the war." Pope cautiously approached and for three weeks Flag Officer Foote's thirteen inch diameter mortars (or cannon) attempted to bombard the post into submission. On the night of April 4, Commander Henry Walke ran his ironclad gunboat Carondelet, past the batteries. Two nights later Pittsburg similarly passed the Confederate guns. With the protection of these two gunboats, Federal forces began crossing the Mississippi to cut off the escape which surrendered on April 8. The loss to the Confederacy was substantial, consisting of nearly 7,000 officers and men, 123 pieces of heavy artillery, 35 pieces of field artillery, and substantial military stores. Furthermore, Fort Pillow (NHL 5/30/74) was now the only defense remaining north of Memphis.

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7 Horn, *Tennessee’s War*, p. 76.

8 Force, *Fort Henry to Corinth*, p. 89.
Earlier on March 12, a political move of great importance had occurred. With the capital city of Nashville in Union hands, Senator Andrew Johnson, a staunch East Tennessee unionist, was appointed military governor for Tennessee, and established a Federal government in the state. Confederate Governor Harris and his legislature had been forced to flee to Memphis, and the legislature disbanded there on March 20. For the remainder of the war, Tennessee would be a Union state, in fact if not in the mind of the many of the inhabitants.

Major General Henry Halleck, the overall commander of the Union forces in the west, made the important rail junction of Corinth, Mississippi his next objective. Although a military scholar and author of a well respected treatise on military art and science, Halleck was somewhat pedantic in his movements. Grant, who was attempting to aggressively press his advance forward, had his tenuous communications with Halleck disrupted. Halleck, who considered proper military communications more important than military advances, was seriously disturbed at this event. As a result, Grant was ordered to Fort Henry where he was essentially under house arrest. The Lincoln administration ordered Halleck to either formally charge Grant or to place him back in command. Grant was restored to command, but before he assumed command again, Brigadier General C.F. Smith moved the District and Army of West Tennessee (which was redesignated the Army of the Tennessee after October 1862) to Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, while Major General Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio marched to join Grant at Savannah. Thus, at a time when the Confederate defense of the west had been effectively disrupted, the Federal high command was in turmoil, and their advance was halted not by Confederate force of arms, but rather by timidity of command.

With Grant stationary on the west bank of the Tennessee River between Shiloh Church and Pittsburg Landing, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston had an opportunity to gather new forces, and to attempt to reverse the tide of war in the west which had, to this point, been entirely northern in favor. Johnston and Beauregard worked one of the miracles of the war, and succeeded in concentrating 44,000 soldiers at Corinth by April 11. Johnston would remain in overall command, with Beauregard effectively acting as his Chief of Staff. The four corps of what would become the Army of Tennessee in November 1862 were commanded by generals of renown, Leonidas Polk, John C. Breckinridge, William Hardee, and Braxton Bragg. Johnston and Beauregard strove to organize these regiments and brigades who had never operated together into a cohesive, coherent fighting force. On April 3, the advance toward Grant began.

As historian James Lee McDonough has noted, "The [Confederate] army was lacking in transportation, supplies, organization, and discipline." Furthermore, the roads were narrow and few, heavy rain fell, and Beauregard’s orders were too ambitious for the experience of his army. The result was that the roads and the army became one tangled morass. Johnston’s army took three days to cover twenty miles, but by dawn of Sunday, April 6 the army


was in position to launch the assault. Johnston is reputed to have exclaimed, "Tonight we will water our horses in the Tennessee River".\(^\text{11}\)

Inexplicably, although Johnston's advance had been less than stealthy, Grant's army was completely surprised by the attack. The Confederate advance was inexorable for most of the day. However, Federal resistance continuously stiffened, and was determined and steadfast at isolated locations throughout the day. In particular, the defense of a sunken road by Brigadier Generals Benjamin M. Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace earned the nom de guerre of "the Hornet's Nest." Their defense in the center of Grant's line bought him several critical hours. Beauregard's plan of attack called for the four corps of the army to attack in line rather than columns, separated by approximately 1,000 yards. Although it was apparently Johnston's intent that his attack should separate Grant from his base, the attack was delivered in such a manner that it drove Grant to his base of strength, rather than away from it. Finally, Beauregard directed reinforcements from the rear to "the sound of the guns," thus ensuring that Confederate reserves would be tangled up in the heaviest fighting rather than maneuvering to continue the advance.\(^\text{12}\) Johnston himself was mortally wounded leading a regimental charge into the attack. The result was that the Confederate advance lost most of its impetus, and units became badly disorganized and intermingled. By late afternoon, although Grant's army had sustained a tremendous blow and had been driven as many as four miles in some places, Grant had formed a viable defensive line close to the center. Two Union gunboats arrived to provide their support, and the Confederate attack was finally halted at dusk.

Buell's army came up during the night, Major General Lew Wallace brought forward his division, and thus reinforced Grant launched a vigorous counterattack at dawn. By nightfall of April 7 Grant and Buell had recovered all of the ground lost the day before. Johnston was dead, and the Army of the Mississippi was in full retreat. Casualties were severe on both sides. Grant had present on the field of battle on Sunday approximately 33,000 men. He would be reinforced by 20,000 of Buell's men and Wallace's division of 6,500 men. Grant's army would sustain more than 12,000 casualties. Johnston's army of 77,000 men lost nearly 11,000 men.\(^\text{13}\) It was, by far, the bloodiest battle of the war to date. One southern writer would state, "The South never smiled again after Shiloh"\(^\text{14}\) (Shiloh National Military Park, NR 4/27/79).

\(^{11}\) McDonough, *Shiloh*, p. 84.

\(^{12}\) Marching to the "sound of the guns" was an old Napoleonic phrase.


\(^{14}\) McDonough, *Shiloh*, p. 225.
Stunned by the severity of the contest, Halleck arrived personally on April 11 to assume command of Grant's and Buell's forces, brought over Pope's Army of the Mississippi from the Mississippi River, and began a characteristically slow, cautious approach to Corinth. Halleck began his advance from Shiloh Church on April 29, closing up on the west border by May 2 and then inching his way forward, and constructing heavy entrenchments at the end of each advance. Halleck's caution was somewhat puzzling, since he outnumbered Beauregard by greater than two to one. Halleck's army entered the state of Mississippi on May 2, and Corinth fell on May 30. It had taken Halleck a full month to advance twenty miles, but the vital railroad junction was his.

The Fall of Memphis

As a result of Halleck's concentration of forces, Pope's command had been transferred to participate in the advance on Corinth, leaving only Foote's gunboats and transports and a small two regiment infantry brigade on the Mississippi River. With the occupation of Corinth on May 30, Beauregard recognized that West Tennessee could not be held for long. However, the Confederate authorities in Memphis had assembled a fleet of eight gunboats mounting 28 guns, and they were determined to defend the city to the best of their abilities. These boats had sortied from Fort Pillow on May 10, and aggressively attacked the Federal fleet. Two of Foote's ironclad gunboats, Cincinnati and Mound City, were sunk by the agile rebel rams, but the weight of the Federal ordnance damaged four of the southern vessels, and they withdrew after a contest of an hour.

After the fall of Corinth, Fort Pillow was evacuated on June 3-4, 1862. Two days later the Federal fleet arrived north of Memphis. With thousands of spectators lining the banks of the Mississippi River, the intrepid Confederate fleet launched another whirlwind attack on the Union fleet now led by Flag Officer Charles Davis. In a swirling maelstrom of cannon fire, with boats of both fleets wildly maneuvering in attempts to ram the enemy's vessels, the Confederate fleet was crushed. Three of the rebel ships were sunk, and four were severely damaged and abandoned, while Davis' heavier vessels sustained trifling damage and casualties. Two infantry regiments had accompanied Davis, and they occupied the city that day.

Kentucky Campaign of 1862

With the fall of Memphis, all of the state of Tennessee west of Nashville was in United States hands, and eastern Tennessee was strongly sympathetic to the United States. Frustrated at the collapse of the defense of the state, Confederate President Jefferson Davis replaced Beauregard with his personal friend Braxton Bragg. Meanwhile, the Federal command also experienced changes, as Pope and Halleck were promoted to higher commands in the

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15 Halleck was a student of Professor D. H. Mahan of the U. S. Military Academy. Mahan emphasized the use of field fortifications to survive, and overcome on the battlefield, the effects of modern weapons. Halleck's book on tactics and strategy was strongly influenced by Mahan. Halleck, Military Art and Science, and Professor D. H. Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortifications (1836).

16 Details on the fight for Memphis are provided by F. V. Greene, Campaigns of the Civil War: the Mississippi (New York: 1882; paperback reprint, New York: The Blue and Gray Press), pp. 11-17.
east. Grant was charged with the capture of Vicksburg and opening the Mississippi, which would occupy his forces through July of 1863. Buell was ordered to consolidate his forces at Corinth, from there to push east, rebuilding the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and occupy Chattanooga. Federal garrisons were maintained at and around Corinth (Siege and Battle of Corinth NHL, 5/6/91). Bragg, determined not to remain on the defensive, organized an aggressive offensive into Kentucky. During the late summer and fall of 1862, the seat of war would move into Kentucky, although a number of Confederate cavalry raids on Union outposts and lines of communication did occur in Tennessee.\(^{17}\)

As a result of Bragg’s aggressive strategy, Buell was diverted to pursue Bragg. A dismal performance at Perryville, Kentucky on October 8 and in pursuit of Bragg resulted in Buell being relieved of his command. Bragg, meanwhile, having lost his nerve at a critical juncture in Kentucky, returned his army to defend Middle Tennessee. Major General William Rosecrans, who had performed superbly defending Corinth that fall, was given command of the Army of the Ohio (which in late October was redesignated the Army of the Cumberland) that was concentrated at Nashville. Rosecrans arrived at Nashville on November 17, and began planning to continue Buell’s interrupted campaign, the advance along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad to Chattanooga.\(^{18}\)

**The War for Middle Tennessee - Stones River Campaign\(^ {19} \)**

Before Rosecrans could commence his advance, a number of difficulties would have to be resolved. First, the Confederate cavalry was far superior to his in training, leadership, and horseflesh. Second, the Louisville and Railroad would have to be repaired to support his advance. Third, because of a dry summer, the Cumberland River was too low to support an advance. In fact, one Confederate preacher would enjoin his maker, “O Lord, do not raise the Cumberland sufficient to bring upon us those damn Yankee gunboats.”\(^ {20} \)

By late December, Rosecrans was ready to move. Fall rains had swollen the Cumberland River, he had accumulated five weeks of supplies in the new depots at Nashville, and Bragg had sent much of his cavalry on

\(^{17}\) Confederate cavalry operations will be separately discussed in the section entitled "The Defense of Tennessee-Railroads, Raids, and Redoubts."


\(^{19}\) Typically, the Confederacy named battles for the nearest town or manmade structure, while the United States named battles for the nearest topographical feature. Accordingly, the Confederate term for this battle is Murfreesboro, while the Union designation is Stones River. This historic context will use the U. S. National Park Service designation of Stones River (NR 10/15/66).

raids into Kentucky and West Tennessee. With conditions favorable for an advance, Rosecrans started his three corps moving forward on December 26. Rosecrans advanced with Major General Alexander McCook forming his right wing, Major General George H. Thomas the center, and Major General Thomas Crittenden the left. Bragg, informed that Rosecrans was advancing, established a defensive position on very questionable ground northwest of Murfreesboro. There was no prominent terrain feature on which to anchor his defense, and Stones River split the center of his line.

Hardee's and Polk's Corps were formed south of Stones River, while Major General John C. Breckinridge's reinforced division of Hardee's Corps comprised Bragg's right flank east of the river. As a measure of Bragg's thoughts and intentions, his general orders to the army on December 27 provided detailed instructions to his subordinate commanders. Although these orders provided a contingency in the event of a withdrawal, there were no instructions in case of an advance. Bragg would have approximately 38,000 men present, while Rosecrans could count 47,000 within his ranks.

On the evening of December 30, both armies were aligned with their pickets in loose contact, and Rosecrans and Bragg prepared to execute their plans. Similar to the situation at the Battle of First Manassas earlier in the war, both commanders planned to turn their opponent's right flank. Seeing Breckinridge's reinforced division isolated across Stones River, Rosecrans instructed Crittenden to advance and use his numerical advantage to crush Breckinridge. Thomas would then support his attack, and together they would drive Bragg away from his base at Murfreesboro. McCook would be responsible for holding the right flank against all contingencies. Bragg likewise intended to strike the right flank of the Army of the Cumberland, with Hardee delivering the preliminary blow, then being joined by Polk. Breckinridge was to hold the right. Bragg would land his punch first.

At dawn on the last day of the year, Hardee's veteran fighters struck McCook's lines with sledgehammer-like blows. McCook's regiments and brigades, except for Brigadier General Philip H. Sheridan's division, fought piecemeal, and by noon Hardee had advanced nearly driving fragments of broken Federal units before them. Brigadier General William Hazen's brigade had formed a strong defensive position in a small patch of woods between the railroad and the pike, known as "the round forest" or "Hell's half acre," and Hazen would be the bulwark upon which the Federal resistance stiffened. Rosecrans set up new defensive positions perpendicular to his original line. For the remainder of the day, Hardee and Polk launched desperate assaults upon the re-established northern line, without success. On the previous day, some of Bragg's cavalry had struck Rosecrans' rear, up the pike towards Nashville, where they played havoc with the Union supply trains. Darkness ended the fighting for the day.

On the first day of 1863, the day that Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation took effect, the two sides made minor adjustments in their positions. Both Bragg and Rosecrans had suffered heavy casualties, and neither was particularly enthusiastic to renew the contest. Bragg considered another attack, but Rosecrans' new position had proven impossible to break, and there was no reason to think that another series of attacks on the Federal right and center would prove successful. On January 2, Bragg determined to make one more attempt. This time, he would use Breckinridge's reinforced division, to turn the Union left flank. Breckinridge, viewing the northern

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21 Cozzens, *No Better Place to Die*, pp. 59-60.
defenses and open fields across which his division would have to advance, protested vigorously to Bragg, convinced that any such advance would be hopeless. Bragg, never one to accept advice and ever ready for an argument issued perfunctory instructions, and Breckinridge began the attack at 4:00 p.m., one hour before sunset. Breckinridge experienced initial success, maneuvering four brigades upon a single a number northern brigade commanded by Colonel Samuel W. Price. Federal commanders upon this flank blundered, which permitted Breckinridge to break through the initial Union defenses. His troops, flushed with victory, raced to cross Stones River to attack the rear of the Yankee army. Rosecrans and Crittenden reacted promptly. Captain John Mendenhall, Crittenden’s chief of artillery, played a critical role. Within minutes he massed 45 pieces of artillery on the west bank of Stones River, and when Breckinridge’s rebels began to cross the river they were literally blown out of the water. A vigorous counterattack by Crittenden’s reorganized soldiers reclaimed all of the ground that Breckinridge had paid such a terrible price in blood for. The Confederate defeat was overwhelming, one officer claiming "I have never seen troops so completely broken in my military experience." When Breckinridge saw that the brigade which he had raised in Kentucky had lost nearly a third of its strength, he would cry, "My poor Orphans! My poor Orphans!"

The next day, January 3, Bragg sought the counsel of his generals. The verdict was unanimous, that the army was shattered, was incapable of further offensive action, and would not be able to withstand a determined Federal attack. Bragg, knowing that Rosecrans had been reinforced, decided to withdraw. By 11:00 p.m. on the 3rd the Army of Tennessee withdrew through Murfreesboro to assume new defensive positions near Duck River.

This battle northwest of Murfreesboro was one of the bloodiest of the war. Both Bragg and Rosecrans lost nearly a quarter of their strength. A Union participant, writing in the early 1880s, provided perhaps the best summary of the battle of Stones River:

It is difficult to determine which to admire the more, the heavy, quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right, with all the dash of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final victory; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops that had been driven from the field early in the morning, were reformed under the eye of the commanding general, met and threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the cannons mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day. One was like the resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of destruction, the other the grand sturdy


23 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, pp. 190-196.
The War for Middle Tennessee - Tullahoma Campaign

After his withdrawal from Murfreesboro, Bragg took up new defensive positions north of the Duck River, constructing extensive and strong fortifications. Rosecrans, whose Army of the Cumberland had suffered terrible casualties at Stone's River, was not inclined to resume offensive operations until his army had restored its strength. Bragg also displayed little interest in taking the offensive, rather his energies were focused on in-fighting within the Confederate command structure. Thus, the two armies remained in place for approximately six months. Rosecrans, although inactive, was expending much effort in his preparations. First, he had to devise a plan to penetrate through the terrain at Shelbyville, which was better suited to offensive operations, but Bragg could easily counter any attack there by simply withdrawing towards Chattanooga on interior lines. The gaps led directly to the center of Confederate strength. On the Confederate right, had the most challenging terrain, but an advance on that flank would compromise the viability of Bragg's entire defensive position. Rosecrans' plan was for one of his four corps, that of Major General Gordon Granger, to move on Shelbyville as a deception. McCook would move his corps initially as a secondary ruse, but he would be in position to support the main thrust. Rosecrans' primary attack would be executed by the corps of Thomas, who would attack through to seize the town of Manchester and turn the Confederate right flank.

The commander of the Army of the Cumberland carefully formulated his plans, expending considerable efforts to gather intelligence on the Army of Tennessee, and simultaneously instituting plans to deny such information to the enemy. Rosecrans was also reluctant to pass his plans on to Washington, for fear that they would be leaked. He trained and equipped his army in a meticulous, painstaking manner, leaving nothing to chance. When his army moved, every last detail would be in place.

Meanwhile Bragg, through no fault of his own, was weakened by orders to send one cavalry division and five infantry brigades of his command to the relief of Vicksburg, then threatened by U. S. Grant. In all, Bragg would


lose 11,300 men to the Mississippi campaign, at a time when he would need every soldier for the defense of Middle Tennessee.26

Rosecrans' advanced units began moving on June 23, and the entire army was in motion by the next day. As if in protest to the cessation of the long truce, heavy rains accompanied the forward movement. One Confederate officer would record that he believed the name Tullahoma was derived from the Latin words tulla, meaning "mud," and homa, meaning "more mud." An Illinois soldier commented that it was "no Presbyterian rain," but a "genuine Baptist downpour."27 Rain or not, the Federal advance moved aggressively forward.

McCook moved his corps into Liberty Gap on June 24, and Brigadier General August Willich's brigade cleared the pass of Confederate defenders and established a defensive position. Confederate Major General Patrick Cleburne's division attempted to retake the gap, but were repulsed by a tenacious defense backed up by the full strength of McCook's corps. This deception served to focus Bragg's attention on his center, while Rosecrans' major effort was moving on the Confederate right.

The lead element of Thomas' corps was Colonel John T. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, consisting of 1,200 men armed with breech-loading, repeating Spencer rifles. Wilder was accompanied by Captain Eli Lilly's 18 Indiana Battery. Wilder's brigade drove Confederate cavalry rapidly through the gap, and established a strong defensive position south of the gap, where they began to prepare breastworks. The only Confederate infantry in position to respond to this move belonged to Brigadier General William Bate's brigade. In heavy rain that day Bate launched a hasty attack on Wilder's mounted infantry.

It was the first battle in the war in which an entire unit had been armed with breech-loading repeating rifles, and the firepower delivered by Wilder's men was devastating. Bate's brigade was halted, literally, "dead in its tracks." Bate, believing that he had encountered a force far stronger than his own, suffered 146 casualties out of 650 men engaged (22.5% casualties). Wilder suffered less than 50 casualties out of his brigade.28

With Hoover's Gap secure, Thomas' Corps poured through, racing for Manchester. When Bragg received word of the collapse of his right flank on June 26, he ordered his army to withdraw south of Duck River. Bragg's cavalry, commanded by Joseph Wheeler and Nathan Bedford Forrest, was hard pressed to cover the retreat. At Skull Camp Bridge over the Duck River (south of Shelbyville), Wheeler's cavalry suffered a severe reverse attempting to defend a river crossing, resulting in the loss of 50 killed and 500 captured.29

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Rosecrans maintained the pressure on Bragg, sending Wilder’s Brigade on another lightning raid to Dechard, in Bragg’s rear. With his right flank exposed and Yankee cavalry romping through his route of retreat, Bragg turned his army south and raced for Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee River on July 4. In eleven days, and at a cost of only 570 casualties, Rosecrans had driven all southern forces south of the Tennessee River.\(^{30}\) Bragg himself would admit, “I am utterly outdone…. This is a great disaster.”\(^{31}\)

**Battle for the Gateway - The Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and East Tennessee Campaigns**

When his command reached the Tennessee River, Rosecrans again utilized a series of maneuvers, keeping Confederate forces pinned at Chattanooga in expectation of an assault, while he crossed at a number of locations.\(^{32}\) Once across the Tennessee, two corps of Rosecrans’ army marched across Lookout Mountain, while a third occupied Chickamauga, to continue the attack into Georgia. While Rosecrans was again outmaneuvering Bragg, the Union command sent another small column to liberate East Tennessee. Under the command of Major General Ambrose Burnside, the Ninth Army Corps occupied Knoxville on September 3, finally liberating the Unionist part of East Tennessee from a Confederate government that they considered oppressive. Of perhaps greatest import, Burnside’s occupation of Knoxville cut the strategic East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad at a critical time. Specifically, in response to Rosecrans’ advance, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had determined to detach two divisions of General James Longstreet’s Corps from the Army of Northern Virginia, and send it by rail to Bragg’s succor. When Burnside cut the railroad through Knoxville, however, Longstreet had to use a longer and more circuitous route through the Carolinas and Georgia. As a result, three infantry brigades and the artillery of Longstreet’s Corps would arrive too late to participate in the battle of Chickamauga (Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, NR 10/15/66).

Along West Chickamauga Creek on September 18-20 Rosecrans and Bragg tangled in a general engagement, and Rosecrans would suffer a great defeat and be forced to withdraw into Chattanooga. Bragg’s army suffered heavy casualties, and his pursuit of Rosecrans has been described by one historian as being "dilatory."\(^{33}\) The Army of Tennessee arrived in front of Chattanooga on September 23, and promptly laid siege to the city and Rosecrans’ army.

\(^{30}\) Connelly, *Civil War Tennessee*, p. 68.

\(^{31}\) Horn, *Tennessee’s War*, p. 189.


\(^{33}\) Tucker, *Chickamauga*, p. 376.
Bragg did not have enough soldiers to fully invest the city, nor did he have sufficient engineering tools and artillery to properly lay siege to Chattanooga. Accordingly, he determined to cut the principal supply lines into Chattanooga, thus forcing the Federal army to leave the town or starve. The Army of the Cumberland’s supply base was located at Bridgeport, Alabama. From Bridgeport, four possible supply routes led to Chattanooga. The first was the Tennessee River itself. The second and third were the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and a wagon road that roughly paralleled it. These routes were controlled west of Chattanooga by Lookout Valley, at the western base of Lookout Mountain. Braxton Bragg charged Longstreet’s Corps with securing Lookout Valley, for as long as it was occupied by Confederate forces no supplies could reach Chattanooga by these three direct routes. This left a wagon trace of nearly sixty miles, traveling a circuitous route north from Bridgeport, across the Cumberland Plateau, across the Sequatchie Valley and east over Walden Ridge, and eventually south to Chattanooga. This route was poorly maintained, over innumerable steep mountain ridges that claimed a heavy toll on supply wagons and their teams. Furthermore, the round trip distance was so great that forage for each wagon’s team, and rations for the drivers, absorbed a substantial portion of a single wagon’s capacity. As if all of this wasn’t enough, a devastating raid by Wheeler’s cavalry and heavy rains in October exacerbated the Army of the Cumberland’s supply situation.  

Bragg faced numerous difficulties as well. His army was suffering from serious morale problems, in part because of a scarcity of rations, but primarily because his soldiers felt that their sacrifices at Chickamauga had been in vain because of Bragg’s failure to exploit their victory. Most of Bragg’s generals felt the same way. On October 4, 1863 twelve of Bragg’s senior commanders, including Longstreet, D. H. Hill and Simon Bolivar Buckner signed and submitted to President Jefferson Davis a petition calling for Bragg’s removal. Davis himself traveled to the Confederate positions on Missionary Ridge above Chattanooga to resolve the situation, which he did by supporting Bragg and relieving or censuring those officers that had criticized Bragg. The result was to throw the leadership and organization of the army into even greater confusion.

In late September, Bragg determined to utilize his cavalry to sever the Federal supply route, and accordingly dispatched his cavalry under Joseph Wheeler, and cavalry from north Alabama under Brigadier General Philip Roddey. Wheeler experienced some initial success, destroying a Federal wagon train, but then his undisciplined command fell apart. Various inebriating liquids found their way to Wheeler’s cavalymen, and the result was among the most ineffective cavalry raid of the war. One of Wheeler’s regiments deserted en masse, and his command was defeated, broken, routed, and shattered. Wheeler managed to escape across the Tennessee River into northern Alabama on October 9, without a command for all practical purposes. As for Roddey, he had managed to cross the Tennessee River, but after momentarily obstructing the Cowan Tunnel and little else.

Following rapidly upon these setbacks was the arrival at Bridgeport of the Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps from the Army of the Potomac, which had been transferred by railroad through Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland. These two corps were commanded by Major General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker, a corps commander of skill and talent.

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Of even greater importance, Major General Ulysses S. Grant had been summoned from the Mississippi River to take command, and restore the situation of the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga. Grant immediately relieved Rosecrans, replacing him with Major General George H. Thomas, and prepared to open a more direct line of communications between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, Alabama. The Army of the Cumberland was feeling the pinch of more than a month’s short rations, and its soldiers and animals could not hold out indefinitely on the rations and forage that were reaching it. To evacuate Chattanooga was unthinkable, for that would nullify nearly a year's campaigning. Additionally, the forage situation had reduced the army's transportation to the point that an evacuation would have to leave behind the army’s sick, wounded and heavy ordnance, even if the army could break through the Confederate army's commanding position. However, the Army of the Cumberland still had enough strength left to help itself, and with the arrival of Hooker’s detachment from the Army of the Potomac, Grant determined that the time had come to act. He ordered Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland to seize Brown’s Ferry across the Tennessee River, west of Chattanooga. At the same time, Thomas was directed to order Hooker to march east from Bridgeport with the Eleventh Corps and John W. Geary’s Division of the Twelfth Corps, to open the railroad, river and wagon routes through Lookout Valley to Brown’s Ferry.

The movement began on October 27. That night Brigadier General William B. Hazen’s Brigade seized Brown’s Ferry across the Tennessee River. The next day, October 28, Hooker’s troops swept Lookout Valley of all Confederate defenders, thus opening the supply line that would come to be known as "The Cracker Line" to the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga. Bragg, who blamed Longstreet for the failure to safeguard Lookout Valley, ordered Longstreet to restore the situation immediately. Longstreet determined to launch a night attack with his two divisions under the command of Major General Lafayette McLaws and Brigadier General Micah Jenkins. McLaws was unable to participate in the attack, and Jenkins made the attack on his own. Jenkins’ South Carolina Brigade under the command of Colonel John Bratton attacked the Federal rear guard consisting of Brigadier General John White Geary’s "White Star" Division (the Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps) at Wauhatchie Junction. Geary decisively repulsed Bratton, inflicting severe casualties on his brigade, and Jenkins’ covering forces were similarly battered by the Eleventh Army Corps near Brown’s Ferry. The result was a defeat for Longstreet’s Corps, and supplies began to flow into Chattanooga. The siege had been lifted. 35

Grant had also summoned Major General William T. Sherman and a portion of the Army of the Tennessee to Chattanooga. While supplies and reinforcements flowed into Chattanooga, Grant prepared a blow that would drive Bragg back into Georgia. While Grant’s strength grew on a daily basis, Bragg remained lethargic. His only strategy seemed to be to eliminate those officers who had expressed a lack of confidence in his leadership and to detach Longstreet’s corps, reinforced by Bushrod Johnson’s division, and Wheeler’s cavalry to defeat Burnside’s army and recapture Knoxville.

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35 Cubbison, "Geary at Wauhatchie."
By November 23, Grant was ready to move. His first action was to seize of the center of the Federal positions around Chattanooga. Thomas' Army of the Cumberland had been in the habit of holding daily parades and drills, but on November 23 the agenda was changed slightly. Thomas' soldiers included in their parade that day, and they easily drove off the surprised and complacent Confederate defenders.

The next morning, November 24, Hooker seized Lookout Mountain. Having had more than three weeks to survey what appeared to be an impregnable position, Hooker organized a sound tactical plan. Utilizing a division each from the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Cumberland, and the Army of the Tennessee, Hooker sent Geary's division on a swing far to the south. Meanwhile, Hooker had kept the Confederates fully occupied through a series of carefully planned ruses. Ascending Lookout Mountain to the foot of the palisades without resistance, Geary's "White Stars" turned north, surprised, and rolled up the Confederate flank. When the sun rose on November 25, it would reveal the national colors flying from the summit of Lookout Mountain. Thomas' troops in Chattanooga cheered the stirring sight, and then it was their turn.

Grant intended for a double envelopment attack to crush Bragg's lines. Hooker was to descend from Lookout Mountain, cross Chattanooga valley, and attack Bragg's left flank at Rossville Gap. Sherman, who had crossed the Tennessee River from the mouth of Chickamauga Creek with his Army of the Tennessee, was to assail Bragg's right flank. Finally, Thomas was to seize a line of rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge to keep Bragg's center occupied. It didn't work out quite that way.

Sherman ran into a series of deceptive hills and had the misfortune to find one of these - Tunnel Hill - occupied by what was arguably one of the best fighting divisions in the Army of Tennessee, that of Major General Patrick Cleburne. Sherman's men bravely pressed their attack, but they made no progress against determined opposition by Cleburne's troops on favorable ground. Hooker, on Grant's right, discovered that the bridge across Chattanooga Creek had been burned by the Confederates, and many hours were lost crossing this significant obstacle. But when Thomas' men occupied the rifle pits, they made the unanimous decision to continue the advance to the top of the ridge on their own initiative. Grant was surprised, and asked Thomas who ordered the assault. Thomas, who knew his men well, simply replied that once they got moving, that they could not be stopped. To explain the Confederate defeat at Missionary Ridge in the simplest and most accurate terms, the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland could not be stopped. The Army of the Cumberland was out for revenge for their defeat at Chickamauga, and revenge they got. By nightfall of November 25, Bragg's army had been shattered and driven in disorder from the field. The remnants fled south, seeking safety on the ridges around Dalton, Georgia. Patrick Cleburne's men fought a successful rearguard action at Ringgold, Georgia, on November 27, the final fighting of the campaign.


37 Cist, The Army in Cumberland, p. 262.
The Army of the Cumberland was in no condition to press the pursuit, and Grant established his picket lines at Taylor’s Ridge and White Oak Mountain in Georgia for the winter while he and Sherman prepared for a spring advance to Atlanta. The Army of Tennessee, spent the winter around Dalton without Bragg who resigned his command after the Missionary Ridge debacle. Bragg would be replaced by General Joseph Johnston. The Army of Tennessee would not re-enter the state for which it was named for nearly a year.

**Struggle for the Mountains - The Knoxville Campaign**

Following the debacle in Lookout Valley in late October, Bragg and Longstreet, long at loggerheads, reached the point of no return. To resolve their many disagreements, the decision was made to detach Longstreet with his two division corps, reinforced by Bushrod Johnson’s division and Wheeler’s cavalry corps from the east to march on Knoxville and Burnside’s army there. Longstreet started moving his force slowly north early in November, and by November 14, Longstreet faced his first challenge of the campaign. To proceed any farther, Longstreet would have to cross the Tennessee River. He chose a point near the town of Loudon as his crossing point. Burnside had a small outpost of his Ninth Army Corps located across the river, and brisk skirmishing commenced as Longstreet’s vanguard endeavored to cover the construction of a pontoon bridge.

Burnside, observing that all of Longstreet’s force was present, determined not to risk a general engagement with such a strong command. Accordingly, he decided to withdraw to the fortifications at Knoxville, thus drawing Longstreet farther away from Bragg. Longstreet, conversely, wanted to force Burnside to fight at the earliest opportunity. For the next three days the armies raced for Knoxville. A major confrontation occurred at Lenoir Station and Campbell Station on November 16. A portion of Brigadier General Micah Jenkins’ division suffered severely at Campbell Station under Federal artillery fire, and confusion and misunderstanding within the division resulted in a bitter personal feud between Jenkins and his senior brigade commander, Brigadier General Evander Law.

Burnside conducted an effective withdrawal to Knoxville, and occupied already formidable fortifications which had been greatly strengthened. Knoxville’s entrenchments were substantial, fronted by deep ditches, with telegraph wire strung at ankle level as an abatis. The center of Burnside’s position was Fort Sanders, located on an eminence on the northwestern portion of the city. Fort Sanders was a substantial regular fort, 125 feet by 95 feet in dimensions, and occupied a critical salient in the defensive line.

Longstreet did not possess heavy artillery to conduct a lengthy siege on such substantial breastworks, and determined to storm the northwestern salient at Fort Sanders. McLaws’ division launched an assault at dawn on November 29. McLaws’ soldiers could not cross the ditch of the fort, and were slaughtered in a deadly crossfire of musketry, artillery, and grenades. The attack was a disaster, and Longstreet would later prefer charges against McLaws for alleged failures of command during the planning and execution of the assault, resulting in a further deterioration in the morale in his command. To add insult to injury, on the same day that Longstreet’s assault on Fort Sanders failed, the news of Bragg’s disaster at Missionary Ridge reached Longstreet. Longstreet had no

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38 The primary reference for the Knoxville campaign is Maury Klein, "The Knoxville Campaign" Civil War Times Illustrated Volume X, Number 6 (October, 1971), pp. 4-42.
choice but to retreat. This was a decisive battle and defeat for the Confederate forces and, along with the defeat at Chattanooga, resulted in most of East Tennessee being under Union control.

Longstreet's men were clothed in summer uniforms that had not been replaced since early September, rations in the sparsely populated region were scarce, the weather was frigid cold and windy, snowing with freezing rain, and the population was unfriendly to the Confederate cause. Longstreet was forced to move rapidly, because General Sherman with a formidable force was en route from Chattanooga with the mission of rousing the Knoxville siege. Longstreet's men suffered severely.

Major General John G. Parke's Union forces pursued Longstreet as he retreated. Parke sent Brigadier General J.M. Shackleford with 4,000 cavalry and infantry to seek out Longstreet. Longstreet, who had abandoned Knoxville on December 4, reached Rogersville on December 9, and determined to attack and crush the Union forces at Bean's Station. Three Confederate columns and artillery skirmished with Shackleford's pickets at Bean's Station on December 14. The resulting battle lasted throughout the day until the Union forces retreated through Bean's Gap to Blain's Cross Roads. Longstreet pursued them, but found them well-entrenched, resulting in both sides withdrawing from the area. Bean's Station is considered the end of the Knoxville campaign.

Longstreet placed his command into winter quarters at Morristown, Tennessee, on December 22. The campaign had cost Longstreet nearly 1,400 casualties, twice Burnside's losses, and had resulted in discord and controversy within his command. Much of the remainder of the state was now under the administration of Lincoln's military governor, Andrew Johnson, who was occupying the capitol in Nashville for a second straight year. When Longstreet re-joined Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the spring, all of Tennessee would then be in Union possession.

That next spring, Tennessee would be in the backwaters of the war as the Union military effort shifted to the capture of Atlanta. The logistics of this campaign would depend upon the railroads and cities of Tennessee. With Sherman and his army located in northern Georgia, his lifeline ran through Middle Tennessee. Supplies from throughout the United States poured into Sherman's primary logistical depot at Nashville. From there, the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad carried heavily laden rail cars to Sherman, with the railroad being run in one direction (south) through LeVergne, Smyrna, Murfreesboro, Christiana Station, Fosterville, Bell Buckle, Wartrace, Normandy, Tullahoma, Decherd, Cowan, and Anderson to Stevenson, Alabama. From Stevenson, the railroad traffic shared a single line, crossing the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, Alabama, continuing east over an impressive trestle bridge at Whiteside Gap, past Wauhatchie Junction, through Lookout Valley and past Lookout Mountain, and into Chattanooga, where the Western and Atlantic Railroad carried the supplies south through Ringgold, Tunnel Hill, Dalton, Resaca, Big Shanty, and Marietta in Georgia, and other familiar names of the spring and summer campaigns. The railroad's return route followed the identical path north and west to Stevenson, Alabama, at which point it followed the Memphis and Charleston Railroad roughly west through Scottsboro, Woodville, Paint Rock, Huntsville, Madison Station, Belle Mina, and to Decatur, Alabama. At Decatur the returning railroads cars turned north on the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, passing through Athens, crossing the Elk River on a long trestle, and continuing through Pulaski, Columbia, Spring Hill, Franklin, and Brentwood on the way to Nashville. This rail line was critical to Union military operations in the west.
The Defense of Tennessee - Railroads, Raids and Redoubts

Beginning from the moment when forces of the United States Army entered the state of Tennessee, two separate and distinctive wars were fought within its boundaries. The first was the war of major campaigns, large armies, general engagements, and grand strategy. The second war was one of railroads, raids, and redoubts.

As the Union army advanced inexorably into and through Tennessee, it had to establish lines of logistic support. These lines of communications and supply sometimes followed wagon roads, but most frequently followed railroads or rivers. To defend these vulnerable but important routes, small garrisons were established at critical locations. Cavalry would be used to patrol the area between these posts, most of which were protected with earthworks and blockhouses. Along these railroads and rivers would flow rations, fodder, quartermaster supplies, medical equipment, ordnance and armament, the materiel of war. The Union military effort depended upon these stores, and it was only natural that severing these lifelines would be major missions for Confederate raiders. When organized Confederate forces did not pose a threat, irregulars known as “bushwackers” were always present, often fighting for a personal cause rather than the Confederate cause.

Many of these posts were fortified. The extent and specifics of these entrenchments varied widely depending upon the inclinations of the specific commander and unit, the amount of time the post was occupied, the importance of the post, the terrain, available materials and equipment, and what type of attack was expected. Generally, wooden blockhouses were constructed to command particularly important structures such as bridges and water towers, while earthworks would be constructed around the post and on key terrain.39

The Union garrisons of these posts consisted of cavalry, infantry, infantry that had been mounted, and artillery. A large percentage of these soldiers by mid-1864 were newly freed African Americans, who had enlisted in a number of United States Colored Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery regiments. Recognizing that these new freedmen represented a considerable source of manpower, regiments were raised throughout the Union held state. Typical of these regiments was the 14th United States Colored Infantry, organized at Gallatin, Tennessee in the fall of 1863. Throughout most of 1864, they served on garrison duty around Chattanooga, Tennessee, and were engaged in a brief skirmish near Dalton, Georgia in mid-August 1864. Their first general engagement was at the defense of Decatur, Alabama in late October 1864. Their white officers were impressed with the quality of

39 Comprehensive discussions of earthworks are provided in Fred M. Prouty and Gary L. Barker, A Survey of Civil War Period Military Sites in West Tennessee (Nashville, Tennessee: Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Archaeology, Report of Investigations No. 11, 1996, Hereinafter cited as Survey of West Tennessee; and Samuel D. Smith, Fred M. Prouty, and Benjamin C. Nance, A Survey of Civil War Period Military Sites in Middle Tennessee, (Na
their men, and their determination to fight for freedom. Colonel Thomas Morgan, when he told one of his recruits that he might lose his life, received the simple reply "But my people will be free."  

Although it was often boring, lonely duty, these garrison soldiers had an important role to play. The Record Book of Company C, 83rd Illinois Infantry provides a typical month in the life of the company while engaged in patrolling, scouting, and escort activities from Clarksville, Tennessee:

May 23, 1864- Sergeant Chaffee and 15 men started for Nashville, Tenn. in charge [of] drove of Government Cattle.
May 26, 1864- Sergeant Chaffee and squad return from Nashville.
June 8, 1864- Sergeant Leslie and 20 men gone towards Fort Donelson on Telegraph Line.
June 9, 1864- Sergeant Leslie and men returned.
June 17, 1864- Corporal Hawkins and 4 men gone towards Hopkinsville on telegraph line. Sergeant Leslie and 15 men under Lieutenant Clark start for Garrettsburgh, Kentucky.
June 22, 1864- Sergeant Chaffee and 25 men on a Scout with Lieutenant Clark, Co. A, 83rd Illinois.

Examples of other typical mounted duties derived from the Company Book are:

January 11, 1864- Lieutenant Stephenson returned with squad of men from Company with prisoners.
March 12, 1864- Sergeant Chaffee and six men start for Nashville with Government Horses.
January 27, 1865- Corporal Wiggins and 8 men gone as escort to Forage Train.
March 11, 1865- Sergeant Shirley and 20 men gone to Hopkinsville, Kentucky as escort to wagon train.
February 21, 1865- Sergeant Leslie and 10 men gone to Hopkinsville, Kentucky as escort [for] Colonel Murray.
January 10, 1865- Lieutenant Gamble and 10 men in pursuit of Guerrillas. Killed one.

As to what these men thought of their Confederate and "bushwacker" opponents, on August 5, 1864 an 83rd Illinois Soldier wrote his home newspaper:

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About one hundred and thirty of the regiment are mounted. For more than a year these men have been continuously in the saddle, hunting guerrillas, robbers, rebel soldiers, and the basest filth that rises on society while in the crucible of war.\footnote{43} The most effective and well known Confederate raiders were Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan, but there were many others. Morgan and Forrest cooperated together in one of their earlier raids on Nashville on November 6, 1862, although this was not the first attempt to destroy the Federal supply lines and their garrisons for either of them.\footnote{44}

To attempt to chronicle every one of the ensuing skirmishes would be nearly impossible, for there were literally hundreds of such actions. Many of these were small, some involving only a dozen men on each side. Some actions would be up to brigade level, and others would even be larger. However, a brief description of several representative engagements will suffice as a narrative of their accomplishments and failures.

July 13, 1862 - Nathan Bedford Forrest led his cavalry brigade against a major outpost of the Union army at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. By marching his small force back and forth, and around in a great circle Forrest convinced the Federal officers that they were facing a considerable force, much larger than their own, and they correspondingly surrendered. Forrest’s haul was 1,200 northern officers and soldiers, and a quarter of a million dollars worth of United States property.\footnote{5}

February 3, 1863 - A large force of cavalry commanded by Joseph Wheeler, including Forrest’s brigade, attacked the northern garrison at Dover, Tennessee (near abandoned Fort Donelson). In a day-long fight, the 83rd Illinois Infantry successfully defended their earthworks, inflicting heavy casualties on the Confederates. When Union gunboats and reinforcements appeared, Wheeler withdrew, his attack a failure. Of greater importance, Forrest and Wheeler had an argument, and Forrest refused to ever serve under Wheeler again.

March 5, 1863 - A brigade of Federal infantry under the command of Colonel John Coburn was ordered to proceed on a reconnaissance in force, south from Franklin, Tennessee in the direction of Spring Hill, Tennessee. Coburn’s brigade marched beyond range of its supporting forces, and encountered Confederate Major General Earl Van Dorn’s corps, including a cavalry brigade commanded by Forrest, at Thompson’s Station. The northern soldiers fought bravely but were outnumbered and outflanked. When they ran out of

\footnote{43} Letter from A. Carothers, Jr., from Clarksville, Tennessee, August 5, 1864, to "the editors", \textit{Oquawka Spectator}, August 25, 1864, p. 1.

\footnote{44} Horn, \textit{Tennessee's War}, pp. 120-123.

\footnote{45} McDonough, \textit{Bloody Winter in Tennessee}, pp. 3-10.
ammunition they were forced to surrender. Coburn's losses were 48 killed, 247 wounded, and 1,151 captured or missing. Confederate casualties were only 357.  

April 12, 1864 - Forrest's cavalry division attacked a Union garrison on the Mississippi River, at Fort Pillow, Tennessee. The Federal garrison consisted of both white and United States Colored soldiers. Utilizing his cavalry as mounted infantry, Forrest's men swarmed over the fortifications to capture the fort, and in the resulting melee it was later claimed that many of the African-American United States soldiers were slaughtered after they tried to surrender. This proved to be one of Forrest's greatest tactical victories, but also one of his most controversial.

September 21- October 6, 1864- In an attempt to break Sherman's railroad line, Forrest launched one of his most successful raids into north Alabama and Middle Tennessee. In Forrest's own words:

> During the expedition I captured 86 commissioned officers, 1274 non-commissioned officers and privates, 67 government employees, 933 negroes, besides killing and wounding in the various engagements about 1000 more, making an aggregate of 3360, being an average of one to each man I had in the engagements. In addition to these I captured about 800 horses, seven pieces of artillery, 2000 stands of small arms, several hundred saddles, fifty wagons and ambulances, with a large amount of medical, commissary and quartermaster's stores, all of which have been distributed to the different companies. The greater damage done to the enemy was in the complete destruction of the railroad from Decatur to Spring Hill, with the exception of the Duck River bridge. It will require months to repair the injury done to the road.

Forrest's casualties for all of these accomplishments was only 47 killed and 293 wounded, a total of 340.  

October 29- November 10, 1864- Having completed one raid into Tennessee, Forrest turned around and re-entered the state on his famed West Tennessee raid. Again, his official report noted:

> We reached there on November 16th [Tuscumbia], after an absence of over two weeks, during which time I captured and destroyed four gunboats, fourteen transports, twenty barges, twenty-six pieces of artillery, and $6,700,000 worth of property, and captured one hundred and fifty prisoners. General [Abraham] Buford, after supplying his own command, turned over to my chief quartermaster about nine thousand pairs of shoes and one thousand blankets. My loss during the entire trip was two killed and nine wounded.  

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47 Horn, *Tennessee’s War*, p. 271.

Hood’s Middle Tennessee Campaign

Following the evacuation of Atlanta, Georgia, on September 6, 1864, Confederate fortunes in the West were at a lower point than at any other time in the war. In a desperate attempt to reverse the advantages gained by the successful Federal summer campaign, Confederate General John Bell Hood, Commander of the Army of Tennessee, began a series of maneuvers in late September against the Union line of supply and communications running from Atlanta through northwest Georgia, north Alabama, Middle Tennessee, and into Nashville.

John Bell Hood had risen from the rank of lieutenant in the Confederate Army to that of lieutenant general by the spring of 1864. Hood had gained prominence through a record of determined assaults and hard fighting, and his reputation as an aggressive, determined warrior was rightfully deserved. Hood had performed superbly as a division commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. However, his relatively low academic standing at West Point suggested that he was not blessed with an imposing intellect. Additionally, he had sustained two grave wounds during the course of the war, a crippled left arm at Gettysburg, and the loss of his right leg at Chickamauga. His performance as a corps commander with the Army of Tennessee under General Joseph Johnston had been less than stellar.

Nevertheless, because of his reputation as a fighter, President Jefferson Davis hand-picked Hood as the successor to Joseph Johnston in mid-July 1864. Promoted to the temporary rank of general, Hood had dutifully assumed the offensive in a flurry of hard pressed attacks around Atlanta that accomplished little, except for incurring excessive casualties upon his own army. Hood was easily outmaneuvered in late August by Federal commander William T. Sherman, and Atlanta was evacuated on September 1.

Hard marches and occasional hard fighting in late-September and throughout October had failed to convince Sherman to abandon Atlanta or achieve any gains of substance. October 31 found Hood’s Army at the Tennessee River crossing at Tuscumbia, Alabama. Here, heavy rains and a dismal supply situation had further delayed him for three long weeks. Thus, the objectives of Hood’s subsequent operations were born in his frustration to save Atlanta through a summer of desperate fighting, or regain it through a fall of maneuver. From Tuscumbia, Hood determined to continue his campaign into Middle Tennessee.

Hood intended to interpose his 38,000 man army between the 30,000 men of Major General John M. Schofield’s Union Fourth and Twenty-Third Army Corps located in and around Pulaski, Tennessee, and the 30,000-man garrison of Nashville under Schofield’s immediate superior, Major General George H. Thomas. Hood was confident that he could defeat the two Federal forces in detail, resulting in the capture of the major Northern supply depot at Nashville. With dual victories to bolster his reputation, and with his army re-armed and equipped at Union expense, Hood could then continue the offensive into Kentucky and Ohio. Hood surmised that such an incursion into Federal territory would result in a Confederate resurgence and a Northern panic, diverting resources from the siege of Petersburg in Virginia, and prompting a recall of Sherman’s forces from Georgia.

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49 Confederate strategy and campaign movements for this campaign are drawn primarily from Thomas L. Connelly, Autumn of Glory, the Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1971), pp. 476-502.
Hood's initial series of flanking maneuvers forced Schofield to precipitately retreat from Pulaski to the Duck River crossings at Columbia, Tennessee. Encouraged by this first step of the campaign, Hood determined to march his army around Schofield's left (eastern) flank and seize the turnpike in Schofield's rear at Spring Hill. Forrest's cavalry had the first role in this maneuver and crossed the Duck River five and ten miles upstream at Huey's and Davis' fords on November 28. In a series of brilliant feints and fights, Forrest drove the Union cavalry towards Franklin and away from Schofield, effectively removing the Yankee horsemen from the scene. Having accomplished this, Forrest turned toward Spring Hill. 50

Leaving Stephen D. Lee's corps and the bulk of the artillery on the south bank of the Duck River to hold Schofield's attention at Columbia, Hood's remaining two corps marched east to cross the Duck at Davis' Ford, approximately five miles east of Franklin. Hood had succeeded in slipping around Schofield's flank, and began the race to Spring Hill on the Davis Ford Road, a badly rutted country road abandoned even by local farmers. 51

Although Hood had a lead in the "Spring Hill Races," Schofield had not been completely deceived. 52 Receiving early morning reports that Hood's infantry was crossing the river, Schofield telegraphed Thomas at Nashville and received orders to withdraw to Franklin to protect the Harpeth River crossings there. Schofield accordingly started his withdrawal by sending his 800 wagons and most of his artillery up the Columbia-Nashville Turnpike with a guard of Brigadier General George Wagner's division, the whole under the command of Major General David S. Stanley.

Early in the afternoon, about 12:30 p.m., the lead elements of Wagner's division began entering Spring Hill from the southwest. Colonel Emerson Opdycke's veteran brigade moved through the town, and occupied a ridge north of Spring Hill. Colonel John Q. Lane's brigade came next, and continued Opdycke's line east of town. Brigadier General Luther P. Bradley's brigade assumed the critical defensive position on a knoll south of town. The 103rd Ohio Infantry and a section of Company A, 1st Ohio Light Artillery were placed across the Columbia-Franklin Pike. Eighteen artillery pieces were emplaced on a prominent ridge on the southern outskirts of the town. With Major General Patrick Cleburne's division of Major General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham's corps in the advance, Hood gave Cleburne and Cheatham definitive orders to cooperate with Forrest's cavalry, and "take possession of and hold that pike at or near Spring Hill." Cleburne's division moved west, from the Rally Hill Pike, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Cresting the large hill just west of the pike, they crossed a light strip of woods and moved into an open field. Their line of march took them across the front of Bradley's brigade, which raked the exposed right flank of Brigadier General Mark Lowry's brigade with "a very destructive fire and somewhat staggered them in front." Lowry's brigade had been stunned by the violence of Bradley's initial fire, but many of Bradley's men were inexperienced and poorly drilled recruits in their first fight, and they were

50 Cavalry operations on this campaign are effectively covered in Thomas R. Hay, "The Cavalry at Spring Hill" Tennessee Historical Magazine, Volume VIII (1924-1925), pp. 7-23.


opposed by hardened veterans who were arguably among the toughest fighters in an army of fighters. As Daniel Govan and Hiram Granbury wheeled their brigades and came on line with Lowry, Cleburne’s division moved forward en mass, and the result was inevitable.

Cleburne’s advance rolled north in pursuit of Bradley’s retreating brigade, which fled north of McCutcheon Creek to establish new lines at the southern edge of town. Cleburne’s pursuit was brought to a sudden halt by a massive volleys from the artillery and the 103rd Ohio Infantry positioned across the Columbia-Franklin Pike. Cleburne’s veterans pulled up short and sought cover under an intense and deadly barrage from the well positioned Union artillery. It was now nearly 5:00 p.m., sunlight had faded into sunset (sunset was 4:49 p.m.), and Cleburne had run into unexpectedly heavy opposition. He called for support and instructions.

Hood established his headquarters at the Absalom Thompson House (NR 9/9/79) near the Rally Hill Pike. In the post-twilight darkness, the Confederate plans began to quickly fall apart. Hood appeared to be confident that Forrest held the pike north of Spring Hill, and thus was not unduly concerned with cutting the pike south of town. To add to the confusion, division commanders also began to receive conflicting orders from Hood and Cheatham. While Cheatham’s orders were aimed at an assault on Spring Hill to the north, Hood continued to issue orders directly to Cheatham’s divisions orienting their actions west toward the pike. After a number of confused attempts at continuing their advance, the Confederate army sat down for the night, cooked supper, and went to sleep. Hood’s soldiers were understandably exhausted, having marched more than fifteen miles on unbelievably bad roads. A feeble attempt would be made by Forrest late that night to cut the turnpike north of Spring Hill at Thompson’s Station, but the appearance of Federal infantry at the vanguard of Schofield’s column rapidly cleared the road. Confederate activities halted for the night as an inexplicable lethargy settled over their commanders.

While the Confederates rested on their laurels, real or imagined, the Federal army performed a well-planned and well-executed, albeit late, retreat. Schofield and his subordinates made their headquarters in the saddle, and issued clear, certain instructions. All that evening and past midnight the Federal wagons, artillery, and long columns of infantry marched north toward Franklin on the dark macadam road. By dawn the last blue-clad soldiers had marched north from Spring Hill. Opdycke’s Brigade of Wagner’s Division covered the withdrawal. The Union army may have lost the race to Spring Hill, but they had escaped the trap unscathed.

The morning of November 30, 1864 found Schofield’s army at Franklin, occupying the breastworks thrown up by the Union forces in the late winter and spring of 1863, covering the approaches to the town and the crossings of the Big Harpeth River. John Bell Hood awoke to discover that the Union army had slipped through the trap, and he was infuriated. A Confederate staff officer wrote that "He is as wrathy as a rattlesnake this morning, striking at everything." In a morning breakfast at the Nathaniel Cheairs Home (Rippavilla, NR 7/19/96), Hood lashed out angrily at this commanders, heaping abuse upon them and condemning their failures.

53 While in Spring Hill, Schofield made his temporary headquarters at the McKissack Home on Main Street.

54 Sword, Embrace An Angry Wind, p. 156.
When Hood concluded berating his commanders, the army continued its march north. Climbing Winstead and Breezy Hills astride the Columbia-Nashville Pike just south of Franklin, Hood was surprised to discover that Schofield remained in Franklin. The reason was the 800 wagons of the two army corps. There were three crossings of the Big Harpeth River at Franklin, a ford, a railroad bridge, and the remnants of a wagon bridge. The railroad bridge could not be crossed by horses and wagons until it was planked, the sides of the ford were steep and would have to be improved, and the wagon bridge would have to be reconstructed. Accordingly, Schofield had no choice but to defend Franklin until the wagon train could cross the Big Harpeth River. Schofield's 30,000 men occupied entrenchments previously constructed on high ground south of Franklin, with both flanks anchored on the Big Harpeth River. They rapidly improved their works, adding headlogs and a formidable abatis. 55

Hood's combat experienced officers and men carefully viewed the Federal position and were impressed with its strength. They were therefore amazed when Hood issued orders for a general assault. Forrest proposed a flanking movement, but Hood was concerned that this would be his last chance to defeat Schofield in detail, before he could join with Thomas behind the fortifications of Nashville. Additionally, Hood was in no mood for flanking movements. He well recognized that this was his last opportunity to strike Schofield, and he would not let the opportunity pass.

At approximately 4:00 p.m. the Confederate advance began. Two brigades of Wagner's division were lightly entrenched forward of the main Federal line and were both outnumbered and outflanked by the Rebel main line. These brigades were badly broken, and were driven back in confusion to the Federal main line near the house of Fountain Carter. The Union soldiers occupying these works were understandably loath to fire on their own men, and the result was that their lines were broken at the Carter House. For a brief, critical moment it appeared as if Hood's assault would succeed, but a veteran brigade commanded by Ohio's Colonel Emerson Opdycke smashed into the attackers around the Carter House, and drove them back in turn.

Nowhere else did the Confederate soldiers achieve a breakthrough. The Federal fire was deadly accurate, heavy cannon emplaced in Fort Granger on a knoll north of the Big Harpeth River swept the open fields, and the abatis was impenetrable. The attacks were bravely continued until long after dark, but the only accomplishment was one of the largest casualty rates of the war. Of Hood's 20,000 infantrymen engaged, it has been estimated that nearly 7,000 were casualties. Schofield's casualties were barely a third of Hood's, being 2,326. 56 By the end of November 30, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee was no longer a cohesive, viable fighting force (Winstead Hill, Fort Granger, the Carter House, and Carnton comprise the Franklin Battlefield, NHL 10/15/66).

55 Account of Franklin is derived from three sources: Sword, Embrace An Angry Wind; William R. Scaife, Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, The March to Oblivion (Atlanta, Georgia: 1986); and James Lee McDonough and Thomas L. Connelly, Five Tragic Hours: The Battle of Franklin (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983). Hereinafter cited as Scaife, Hood's Campaign for Tennessee.

56 Scaife, Hood's Campaign for Tennessee, p. 33; and Sword, Embrace An Angry Wind, p. 269.
After Schofield's wagon trains had crossed the Big Harpeth River, his infantry and artillery could also be withdrawn. By 2:00 a.m. the withdrawal was complete, and Schofield's army continued moving north to Nashville. The devastated Army of Tennessee followed slowly in his wake, arriving on the hills south of Nashville on December 2. For the next two weeks, Hood's battered army would "lay siege" to Nashville.

It was a curious siege. Hood's army numbered only 21,000 men. They were far too few to surround and invest the town. They lacked the artillery, tools, and manpower to properly besiege the town. They could not prevent additional supplies and reinforcements from reaching Thomas, and two divisions of hardened western veterans detached from the Army of the Tennessee in March 1864 and under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson Smith arrived on November 30. Hood further blundered when he detached Nathan Bedford Forrest with most of his cavalry and a reinforced division of infantry to besiege a Federal garrison holed up in Fortress Rosecrans northwest of Murfreesboro. 57

Thomas' major problem was re-organizing and re-equipping his cavalry, which had either been dismounted during the fall, or had been roughly handled by Forrest north of the Duck River. Furthermore, many of Thomas' soldiers had been on garrison duty in Middle Tennessee and northern Alabama, and they were not organized into brigades or divisions. Thomas had barely made his preparations for an attack on Hood when the weather turned terrible. On December 8 a severe ice storm struck the area, coating streets and bridges with a thick layer of ice. The ice was accompanied by frigid temperatures and cutting winds. Hood's soldiers, not properly equipped for even a summer campaign, suffered terribly.

When the ice melted, Thomas began his attack. Hood occupied a range of hills south of Nashville, extending from His troops were but lightly entrenched, and were badly over-extended. The first shot was fired from Fort Negley on December 15 to announce the advance, and the bulk of Thomas' attack fell on Hood's left. Although a diversionary assault by Major General James B. Steedman's command, including two brigades of United States Colored Infantry, was repulsed on Hood's right flank, Hood's left flank was crushed in heavy fighting. Thomas' right flank alone contained more men than Hood's entire army.

The night of December 15, Hood withdrew his army to a more consolidated position (NR 12/30/69). Hood's left flank was anchored on an eminence today known while his right flank was anchored on a hill due north of Thomas' attack was slow to develop. On the Union left (east) flank Steedman's division would launch another gallant attack. So


58 Shy's Hill is named today for Colonel William Shy of Tennessee, who was killed in the fighting there. Hood's defensive positions basically ran south of and parallel to the modern Battery Lane.
determined was this assault, although only a diversion, that Confederate Brigadier General James T. Holtzclaw would praise the valor of these black soldiers in his official report. 59

The final assault would be delivered by A. J. Smith's rugged veterans, known as "Smith's Gorillas." The Confederate defenses had been hastily constructed in the dark, and the defending units had been shuffled around frequently. When Smith's men stormed the hill the Confederate defenders only had time to fire one volley, and the blue coats were upon them. The Rebel defense collapsed, and the inexorable Union advance rolled up Hood's line. By nightfall, the Army of Tennessee only existed as a fleeing mass of men, without order, morale or discipline.

A series of skirmishes were fought from Nashville south to the Tennessee River, as Major General James Wilson's cavalry and several corps of Thomas' army pursued the remnants of the Army of Tennessee out of the state for which it was named. Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry fought a series of rear guard actions from Columbia to the Tennessee River, and these actions enabled the survival of a remnant of Hood's army. The retreat would end at the Tennessee River in Alabama on December 28, 1864. Much of what little was left of the Army of Tennessee would eventually be sent to North Carolina to attempt to check and defeat Major General William T. Sherman's advance through North Carolina.

With the destruction of the Army of Tennessee, the last organized Confederate force in Tennessee ceased to exist. Isolated small raids and ambushes continued in rural areas, more criminal in nature than military, but for all effective purposes the Civil War in Tennessee had ended. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1865 the veterans returned home to rebuild a state ravaged by war and military occupation, a task that took decades.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: Battlefield - Small Engagement

DESCRIPTION

Battlefields are those areas which were the site of fighting or engagements between Union and Confederate forces. Battlefields may be representative of small engagements or large engagements. A small engagement refers to a minimum contest between a relatively small number of troops (at least 1,600 total troops engaged).\(^6\) These encounters include skirmishes and engagements of insignificant strategic importance. These sites are widespread across the state but they generally left little definable archaeological evidence. Due to the large number of skirmishes across Tennessee, only a limited effort was made to survey and identify all of these sites. Small engagements may also include actions which were larger than skirmishes and involved thousands of troops, but resulted in proportionally few casualties. These engagements may have strategic significance or be illustrative of raids incidental to larger campaigns. Both small and large engagement sites may also contain earthworks, fortifications, and other related property types.

During the Civil War, Tennessee was largely a rural, agrarian state and most small engagements occurred amidst farmland or woodlands. This rural landscape was characterized by farmsteads with dwellings and associated outbuildings such as barns and smokehouses. Corn, wheat, cotton, and livestock were common farm products of West and Middle Tennessee and cultivated fields and pastures dominated much of these regions. In East Tennessee, the broad valleys of the region were generally characterized by small farms. Upland areas throughout the state were dominated by large stands of timber. Small crossroads communities often provided services such as general stores, grain mills, and blacksmith shops. Nashville, the state's largest city, boasted a population of 17,000 residents but only Memphis and Knoxville could also be described as cities. Most county seats and other communities in the state consisted of populations of less than 1,000 residents and significant industrial development was confined to Nashville, Memphis, and Knoxville.\(^6\)

The historic rural character of the state was largely retained until the mid-20th century when suburbanization of the larger cities affected the surrounding countryside. Extensive suburban development took place in the counties surrounding Nashville, Memphis, Knoxville, and Chattanooga. The rural landscape was also transformed near smaller cities such as Jackson, Clarksville, and Johnson City. Most Tennessee residents now live in urban, rather than rural areas, and manufacturing has surpassed farming as the state's primary economy.

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\(^6\) Survey of West Tennessee, p. 40.

\(^6\) Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, Tennessee, A Short History, p. 298.
The retention of this rural historic character varies for each engagement site. Factors affecting the rural landscape include a site's distance from urbanized areas, affects of modern road systems such as interstates, the proximity of industrial parks and industries, and changes in traditional farming practices. Engagement sites may also display the loss of Civil War-era buildings and their replacement by late 19th or 20th century dwellings and farm outbuildings. In West Tennessee, five engagements were identified which were identified as these types of small engagements. These include: __________ and; 40LA50, an engagement at Fort Pillow.

_The engagement at Fort Pillow were not examined as part of this study;_}

In Middle Tennessee, a total of 14 small engagement sites were noted, however, most of these were incidental to other larger battlefield sites which were recorded. Small engagements which exceeded skirmishes included sites associated with The War for Middle Tennessee, Hood’s Middle Tennessee Campaign, and numerous cavalry raids. In addition to the ___________ the War for Middle Tennessee resulted in

Of the remaining West Tennessee sites, ___________ was examined for National Register eligibility as part of this study. Due to the modern intrusions within the core area of the conflict, this site was determined to no longer retain sufficient integrity to meet National Register criteria. ___________ the engagement at Fort Pillow were not examined as part of this study.

In McNairy and Hardeman Counties in October of 1862. Following their defeat at the Battle of Corinth in Mississippi, Confederate forces retreated towards the northwest. Federal forces attempted to cut off their retreat near ___________ Union troops pushed back the lead elements of the Confederate army and advanced across pursuit. Additional Confederate brigades arrived to check the Federal advance until an alternate route could be found to continue the retreat. ___________ retains much of its historic landscape character including cultivated fields and woodlands in the core area of the fighting. The bridge site itself is owned by a chapter of the Sons of Confederate Veterans and this site was listed as a National Historic Landmark on 5/16/91 as part of the "Siege and Battle of Corinth Sites" district nomination. Due to the significance of this battle and the site’s high degree of integrity, a National Register nomination was prepared for a larger area ___________
small engagements at Hoover's Gap and Liberty Gap in Rutherford and Bedford Counties in June of 1863. The Union army under the command of William S. Rosecrans moved south from Murfreesboro in an attempt to outflank Confederate General Braxton Bragg's army centered around Shelbyville. Rosecrans moved elements of his army through several gaps of the upland Highland Rim area to mask his flanking maneuver through Hoover's Gap. Some of the severest fighting took place at Liberty Gap where Confederate brigades under Major General Patrick Cleburne opposed the Union divisions under Major General Alexander McCook. The Confederate forces were pushed south through the gap where they mounted a counterattack. With the successful advance of the Union army through nearby Hoover's Gap, Cleburne's brigades were forced to retreat. The Liberty Gap Battlefield continues to maintain much of its rural historic landscape. The core battlefield area is characterized by wooded hills and cultivated lowlands with intrusions consisting of 19th and 20th century farmhouses and outbuildings. The Liberty Gap Battlefield retains sufficient integrity to meet National Register criteria and a nomination accompanies this cover document.

While Liberty Gap was being forced, the main Union effort took place at nearby Hoover's Gap. A Union cavalry brigade defeated Confederate forces protecting the gap and opened the way for Rosecrans to outflank Bragg's army. Although of historical significance, the Hoover's Gap Battlefield no longer retains sufficient integrity to meet National Register criteria. The construction of Interstate 24 in the 1960s resulted in the removal of a large section of hillside which was a pivotal point in the fighting. The interstate right-of-way and interchange at the gap also extends through the primary core area of the battle and is a major visual and audible intrusion. Due to the extent of alterations to its historic landscape, Hoover's Gap no longer possesses its sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

Hood's Middle Tennessee Campaign of 1864 resulted in engagements at Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville. Of these, a section of the Franklin Battlefield is presently listed on the National Register. The survey of Middle Tennessee sites identified a core area of the battlefield at Spring Hill as meeting National Register criteria. This battlefield is the site of an engagement between John Bell Hood's Confederate army and the Union forces under the command of John M. Schofield. Located just south of the community of Spring Hill in Maury County, this engagement resulted in the failure of Hood to defeat Schofield's army as it retreated towards Nashville. The primary section of the battlefield continues to retain integrity of its historic landscape and meets National Register criteria. A National Register nomination for the Spring Hill Battlefield has been prepared independently of this study.

Throughout the Civil War, cavalry raids took place in Middle Tennessee resulting in numerous small engagements. One of the most notable in Middle Tennessee was the Battle of Harisville in Trousdale County. At Harisville, Confederate troops under Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan attacked a Union cavalry encampment on the north bank of the Cumberland River. Morgan led this raid on a snowy winter day in December of 1862 and the Union forces were completely surprised and captured. The core battlefield area is located just south of Harisville on property which continues to retain its historic landscape features. This
battlefield retains sufficient integrity to meet National Register criteria and its nomination accompanies this multiple cover document.

In East Tennessee, the ongoing archaeological survey has identified the locations of several small engagements. This survey is incomplete and it may be that future investigations will identify sites which meet National Register criteria.

**NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE:** Battlefield - Large Engagement

**DESCRIPTION**

In a recent study, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission identified 38 principal battle sites in Tennessee, second only to Virginia. These battles are considered to have had a substantial impact on the campaigns and outcome of the Civil War. In Tennessee, a *large engagement* is considered to be an action involving many army and corps level troops and resulting in thousands of casualties. All of these comprise National Military Parks and are as follows:

- Shiloh National Military Park, Hardin County, Tennessee, NR 10/15/66
- Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, Hamilton County, Tennessee, NR 10/15/66
- Stones River National Battlefield, Rutherford County, NR 10/15/66
- Fort Donelson National Military Park, Stewart County, NR 10/15/66
- Franklin Battlefield, Williamson County, NR 10/15/66

All of these large engagement sites in Tennessee are presently listed on the National Register of Historic Places. No additional examination of these sites for boundary revisions or identification of associated sites was completed as part of this study. A sixth major battle was fought in Tennessee at Nashville in December of 1864. This battle was also of strategic importance and resulted in thousands of casualties. Due to extensive urban development, no major battlefield park was established at this site.

**SIGNIFICANCE**

Battlefields may be nominated under criterion A, B, and/or D for their significance in the areas of military history and historic archaeology. Battlefields will be associated with campaigns and engagements of strategic importance or which affected the outcome of the Civil War. These battlefields will be significant for their role in the Civil War from 1861 to 1865.

Battlefields will be significant primarily under criterion A for their association with the history of the Civil War. Tennessee was one of the primary battlegrounds of the Civil War and six large engagements were fought within
the borders of the state. In addition to the large engagements, Tennessee also contains numerous small engagement sites which were of strategic importance during the war. Battlefields significant under criterion A will have a strong association with the pivotal campaigns of the Civil War in Tennessee or exemplify notable actions or engagements which had a direct bearing on the evolution and course of the Civil War.

Battlefields may also be significant under criterion B for their association with notable soldiers and/or civilians whose specific actions within an engagement affected its outcome, or had a major effect on the advancement of military science such as innovative tactics and weaponry. Establishment of significance under criterion B will be difficult since the careers of notable military leaders and civilians also took place outside the borders of Tennessee and their significance often encompasses more than one engagement. For example, Generals Ulysses S. Grant, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and George Thomas all achieved fame for their contributions to engagements within Tennessee. However, these same generals also achieved similar recognition for their association with the Civil War in other states. For most military and civilian leaders of the Civil War, their significance will be based on their entire careers, rather than on their contribution solely to one engagement.

Similarly, the significance of a military leader’s innovative tactics or use of weaponry must also be evaluated in terms of their entire career rather than on the basis of one engagement. General Nathan Bedford Forrest has been identified by several authors as utilizing innovative tactics in the Battle of Parker’s Crossroads. However, other authors have mentioned similar tactics used by Forrest at the Battle of Brice’s Crossroads in Mississippi and in other engagements. Civil War literature is replete with debate concerning the tactics used by commanders versus those used by subordinate commanders. The extensive scholarly research conducted on the Civil War, and differing viewpoints on the contributions of its military leaders, renders establishment of criterion B significance difficult for most engagements.

Under criterion D, battlefields will be significant for their information potential in understanding the course and outcome of the Civil War. Archaeological remains on battlefields can provide important information on troop movements, tactics, location and duration of events during the battle, and interpretive artifacts. Although extensive literature exists for many battlefields in Tennessee, the archaeological record can also be significant in yielding, or potentially yielding, important information providing a better understanding of a battle or engagement.

In recent decades, the archaeological potential of battlefields has received increased attention. Excavations at the Little Bighorn Battlefield in Montana in the mid-1980s, provided the basis for a much more accurate account of the battle than previously known. The archaeological record of the battlefield identified the progression of the battle, the types of arms and ammunition used, and the tactics utilized by both combatants. Later studies of Mexican War and Civil War battlefields provided similar types of information. In Tennessee, recent excavations at the Carter House yielded information on troop positions and the progression of the fighting during the 1864 Battle of Franklin.
These studies suggest that Tennessee's battlefields retain the potential to provide important information through the archaeological record. Categories of archaeological information potentially available at battlefields include:

1. Military artifacts such as ammunition, bayonets, rifles, knapsacks, and canteens associated with infantry.
2. Military artifacts such as ammunition, artillery rounds, rifles, saddles, tack, containers, and other accouterments associated with cavalry and artillery.
3. Domestic artifacts carried by soldiers into battle including clothing, eating utensils, photographs, and medicines.
4. Burials including large gravesites and individual interments.
5. Encampment sites associated with pre- or post-battle activity such as trash pits.
6. Post-war artifacts such as reunion medals and pins associated with Confederate and Union veterans associations.

Within the context of the Civil War, a number of research questions may be addressed by this archaeological information. These research questions include:

> What were the troop movements during the engagement? At what locations on the battlefield were specific units? Do the archaeological deposits reflect the written accounts of the engagement?

> Where did the most intensive fighting occur? In what areas of the battlefield is evidence of the engagement most pronounced and is this in accordance with written documentation?

> What types of ordnance was used by the two armies? What can the expended ammunition reveal concerning the types of arms used by the infantry, cavalry, and artillery?

> What types of burials took place immediately after the engagement and how do they differ from later reburials?

> What domestic items did soldiers carry with them and take into battle? How were these items dispersed during the engagement?
If pre- or post-encampment sites are associated with the battlefield, what can these sites tell us about everyday camp life for soldiers.

What can post-War relics associated with veteran’s organizations tell us about the frequency and duration of late 19th century and early 20th century reunions and visitation?

Battlefields in Tennessee have the potential to yield information concerning these types of research questions through the archaeological record. Other research questions may also be developed as through ongoing and future archaeological investigations.

**REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS**

The Tennessee Division of Archaeology completed field investigations of each section of Tennessee as part of this study. Division staff consulted historical records and site visits in order to ascertain the location of potentially eligible sites. Using National Register criteria, the Division staff identified a number of sites which were "... relatively well preserved and are likely to contain intact archaeological deposits that have the potential for providing significant information about specific types of Civil War troop activities." Well preserved sites were those which were felt by the staff to retain integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, association, and workmanship.

Battlefields may meet registration requirements if they possess sufficient character and integrity to retain their sense of time and place from their period of significance. An actual battlefield site and its surroundings must be largely intact. Most Civil War engagements in Tennessee were fought in rural areas amidst scattered farmsteads, woodlands, and cultivated fields or pastures. The retention of this historic rural character is a key component in the identification and eligibility of battlefields. A battlefield’s "core area" as defined by the National Park Service or Tennessee Division of Archaeology, must retain the majority of its historic landscape elements to be eligible for the National Register. The following evaluations of integrity were applied when assessing potentially eligible battlefields.

**Location** - A battlefield retains integrity of location if it is the place where the historic battle or engagement took place. The survey utilized historical research and on-site archaeological investigations to identify the locations where the actual battles occurred.

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62 *Survey of West Tennessee*, p. 49.
Association - A battlefield retains integrity of association if it is the place where the battle or engagement occurred. Battlefield areas were extensively documented through survey efforts.

Setting - Battlefields will retain integrity of setting if the physical environment of the battle or engagement is largely intact. The majority of traditional land uses such as cultivated fields and woodlands need to remain intact in order for battlefields to retain integrity. Modern road systems, such as highways and, especially interstates, will not result in the overall loss of integrity of the battlefield if the road system(s) encompasses less than ten percent of the core battlefield area. In addition, the impact of the road system(s) is dependent on where it is located in relationship to the battle, the scale of the road system(s) with respect to the nominated property, the importance of the battle, and the extent and placement of development along the road system(s). Because of the potential for the impact of modern road systems(s) on battlefield sites, the integrity of each battlefield considered for nomination that has such an intrusion must be evaluated more intensively than a potential battlefield nomination without modern road system(s).

Traditional land uses should be retained and may include farmsteads at their Civil War locations even though the dwellings and outbuildings have been replaced with post-bellum properties. Less than 10% of a battlefield's total core area should consist of non-contributing landscapes or non-contributing properties.

Battlefield memorials such as statuary or markers will not affect the historic setting as long as they are minimal in number and of small size and scale.

Feeling - To retain integrity of feeling, the collective land area of a battlefield will have the ability to convey its sense of time and place from its period of significance in the Civil War. Modern intrusions such as buildings and structures, road systems, or extensive alterations in land use may be present as long as they are scattered and are not concentrated within the core area of the battlefield. The essential historic land characteristics must be present and major changes in topography such as removal of hillsides or infilling of watercourses would likely result in a loss of integrity.

Design, Materials, and Workmanship - These evaluations of integrity generally refer to structures or architectural resources, and in most instances, will not apply to battlefields.
Criterion A Requirements

The property must be directly associated with engagements in the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The property's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The property must have a strong association with the pivotal campaigns of the Civil War in Tennessee or exemplify notable actions or engagements which had a direct bearing on the evolvement and course of the Civil War.

In addition to the battlefield site itself, individual buildings or structures may also be eligible under this criteria if they were in existence at the time of the engagement and were utilized militarily by one or both forces. Such uses may include headquarters, short-term hospitals, or military prisons. These buildings and structures must retain sufficient architectural character and integrity to retain their sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

The property must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its historic landscape features. The historic landscape of the battlefield must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era. Battlefields must retain a majority of the landscape elements which were present during their period of significance such as cultivated fields or woodlands. Intrusions such as post-Civil War buildings and roadways may be present as long as they are minimal in number or, are concentrated in areas which were not pivotal to the significance of the battle.

Battlefields identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion A include:

...is significant under criterion A as the final engagement of Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest's raid into West Tennessee in December of 1862. The battle represents the culmination of Union efforts to capture Forrest's command. Forrest's tactics in this raid and battle have been described as the "dawn of lightning war." During the battle, Forrest utilized speed, a dispersal of forces, and innovative use of horse artillery. These efforts proved successful and Forrest managed to disengage from superior Union forces attempting to cut off his retreat. Forrest's escape was a significant blow to Union strategy in the Western theater of the Civil War. Forrest proved to be one of the most able Confederate cavalry leaders of the war and he played a major role in later campaigns.

is significant under criterion A as the final engagement of the pivotal Corinth campaign. The Battle of Corinth, Mississippi was fought on October 3rd and 4th between Union forces under Major General William S. Rosecrans and Confederate forces under Major General Earl Van Dorn. Van Dorn's attack on Union forces at Corinth was repulsed and he was forced to retreat westward towards northwest Mississippi. Union troops moved east from Bolivar, Tennessee to cut off Van Dorn's battered army. Although the initial Union attacks pushed the Confederate army back across the river, another crossing was found and Van Dorn's army was able to disengage and successfully continue their retreat into Mississippi. Had the Union forces been able to capture Van Dorn's command, it would have removed one of the major Confederate armies in the Western theater and opened the way towards capture of Vicksburg.

is significant under criterion A as representative of one of the most successful cavalry raids in Tennessee. Cavalry raids were utilized by both armies to capture supplies, disrupt communications, gather information, and inflict damage on opposing forces. Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan's raid on Hartsville, Tennessee resulted in the capture of an entire Union brigade of over 2,000 men. Morgan utilized stealth and surprise to achieve his victory and the raid enhanced his reputation as a cavalry leader. As a result of the raid, Morgan was promoted and assumed a larger role in Confederate cavalry operations. Morgan played important roles in several campaigns until his death in 1864.

is significant under criterion A for its role in the Tullahoma Campaign in June of 1863, which were attacked by the Union army under Major General William S. Rosecrans. The reaction of Confederate General Braxton Bragg to these attacks was one of confusion, and within days the Union army forced Bragg to retreat from. Although the engagement resulted in few casualties, it played a significant role in masking Rosecrans' main attack. As a result, Bragg was forced to retreat from Middle Tennessee and the Tullahoma Campaign is regarded as one of the most successful Union campaigns of the Civil War.

**Criterion B Requirements**

The property must be directly associated with engagements in the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The property's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The property must be associated with notable soldiers and/or civilians whose specific actions within the engagement affected its outcome, or had a major affect on the advancement of military science such as innovative tactics and weaponry.
The property must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its historic landscape features. The historic landscape of the battlefield must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era. Battlefields must retain a majority of the landscape elements which were present during their period of significance such as cultivated fields or woodlands. Intrusions such as post-Civil War buildings and roadways may be present as long as they are minimal in number or are concentrated in areas which were not pivotal to the significance of the battle.

No battlefields surveyed as part of this study have been identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion B.

**Criterion D Requirements**

The property must be directly associated with engagements in the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The property's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The property must have surface or potential subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding the engagement or battle.

The property must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its historic landscape features. The historic landscape of the battlefield must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era. Battlefields must retain a majority of the landscape elements which were present during their period of significance such as cultivated fields or woodlands. Intrusions such as post-Civil War buildings and roadways may be present as long as they are minimal in number or, are concentrated in areas which were not pivotal to the significance of the battle.

Battlefields identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion D include the Parker's Crossroads Battlefield, the Davis Bridge Battlefield, the Hartsville Battlefield, and the Liberty Gap Battlefield.
NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE: Earthworks

DESCRIPTION

Earthworks were constructed in association with offensive and defensive operations throughout Tennessee. Many of the surveyed earthworks were built along transportation routes to defend railroads and bridge crossings. Others were built to defend strategic points such as urban areas and encampment sites. Earthworks may also be associated with a specific campaign or engagement.

Soldiers used picks and spades to build high earthen walls to provide protection from the enemy. These earthworks often were built five to six feet in height and reinforced with stones or logs. Interior ditches allowed soldiers to stand and be protected by the earthen walls while outer ditches made scaling the earthwork more difficult. Due to their exposure to the elements, all of the surveyed earthworks have eroded to some degree. The majority of those inventoried retained discernible walls and outlines of their original designs. The most intact display much of their original wall heights and overall workmanship and design. Earthworks were inventoried in both urban and rural areas.

In the Division of Archaeology survey of West and Middle Tennessee, earthworks were defined as field fortifications constructed primarily of earth. Six subcategories or components were identified as part of this survey. These are as follows:

1. Entrenchment
2. Redoubt
3. Redan
4. Lunette
5. Cremaillere or Indented Line
6. Earthwork (Undetermined Type)

An entrenchment, or breastwork, consists of a ditch and parapet, often hastily constructed under battle conditions.\(^6^4\) Troops would dig entrenchments to afford protection of defensive positions and the earth parapet wall was often reinforced with logs or stones. When soldiers constructed more permanent entrenchments they often added features such as redoubts or redans. Entrenchments are the most common earthwork inventoried in West Tennessee. Most of West Tennessee was evacuated by Confederate troops in 1862 and the bulk of the entrenchments were built by the Union occupation forces. In Middle Tennessee, half of the surveyed entrenchments were built by the Confederate forces which occupied much of the area until 1863.

\(^{64}\) *West Tennessee Survey*, p. 30.
Entrenchments of ditches and parapet walls encompass many of the surveyed sites across the state. In West Tennessee is a railroad guard post which includes several lines of entrenchments as part of the site (40MY95). These entrenchments consist of ditches which average two feet in depth and are oriented towards the nearby railroad. In Middle Tennessee, a series of interconnecting entrenchments and redoubts are located at the community (40WM106). This entrenchment is one of the longest identified in the survey and connects three hillsides in an east/west direction.

The ongoing survey in East Tennessee identified entrenchments at three sites which comprise sections of fortifications meeting National Register criteria. In Bradley County, elements of Sherman's army built a series of entrenchments on the ridges overlooking their camps (40BY120/121). These entrenchments were built on the military crest of the ridges to provide defensive positions in the vicinity of their camps. Entrenchments retaining the highest degree of integrity are those located at (40MY111). These entrenchments are clearly visible and some sections are reinforced with stone. These entrenchments are included within the nominated property for the Blue Springs Encampment and Fortifications National Register nomination.

At the vital bridge crossing of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad at (40JE41), a series of earthworks include entrenchments on the north side of the Tennessee River. Site 40JE41 includes an entrenchment which extends north from (40JE41). This entrenchment is readily visible and is a shallow ditch which overlooks the bridge. This entrenchment is part of a series of fortifications built (40BY120/121). This entrenchment is included within the nominated property for the.

A redoubt generally refers to an earthwork enclosed on all sides and often resembles a square on level terrain. On a hilltop the redoubt usually conforms to the contour or topography of the summit and can take on any enclosed shape or form. Redoubts were often built as part of larger earthworks and to defend strategic points and transportation routes. Redoubts surveyed in Tennessee are often part of larger railroad guard posts.

Numerous redoubts were identified throughout Tennessee as part of the archaeological study. In West Tennessee, four redoubts were recorded. Three of these were built by Union troops to guard supply lines while the fourth was built by Confederate forces as part of Fort Wright on the Mississippi River. Of these redoubts, Fortification in McNairy County is a representative example of this type of earthwork (40MY111). This redoubt was built in 1863 to protect (40MY111). The redoubt is square in shape and has a gorge on the west wall. The redoubt has not been altered and retains its

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65 Ibid, p. 34.
original form and plan. A National Register nomination for the (multiple property cover document). In Middle Tennessee, a total of eighteen Federal redoubts were recorded. Of these, six were built as part of railroad guard posts, seven were built as part of larger fortifications, and the remaining five were built to defend hilltops or remote outposts. A redoubt was built as part of the railroad guard post on a hilltop overlooking the (40GL54). This redoubt was built to conform with the contours of the hillside and measures approximately 59 by 78 feet. The redoubt is well defined and retains much of its original form and plan. The redoubt is included in the boundary of the (site) and a National Register nomination accompanies this multiple property cover document.

Williamson County are three redoubts which are connected by a continuous entrenchment line (40WM106). These redoubts extend across three hillsides north of this community with redoubts located on all three hills. The western redoubt also contains an inner square redoubt at the crest of the hill. All three redoubts have well defined walls and a stone-lined magazine is also located within the central hill. These redoubts are included in (nomination) which accompanies this multiple property cover document.

In East Tennessee, the ongoing archaeological survey identified several redoubts along transportation routes. At (site) redoubts were built to protect these strategic railroad bridges. Just east of the river, two redoubts were built commanding the eastern approaches to the bridge (40LD212/234). The redoubt which comprises Site 40LD212 is square in shape and measures approximately 80 feet by 80 feet with a low berm on the west elevation. A Civil War-era map of defenses shows the redoubt as pentagonal in shape and the remnants of the berm correspond with the extended pentagonal location. This redoubt retains much of its form and plan and its walls are well defined. The remnants of the redoubt at Site 40LD234 are not as well defined but its overall form and plan remain visible. Both redoubts are included as contributing structures to the (nomination).

Other redoubts are part of the defenses erected at the crossing of the (site). Located on the south bank of the river, three redoubts from 1863 were identified which displayed various states of integrity (40LDKN177). Site "A" is the most intact of these redoubts and it measures 200 by 100 feet, and has interior walls extending to ten feet in height. Site C is another well defined redoubt and is circular in design measuring 60 by 70 feet. Site B consists of a circular depression and only its outline remains visible. These redoubts are included in the property for the (nomination).

in Greene County, an elliptical shaped redoubt was surveyed on a hillside at the south entrance of the gap. This hillside commanded the approaches of (site) and this redoubt
was built to defend the narrow defile. The walls of the redoubt extend 360 feet and are approximately three to six feet in height. At the community of Claiborne County, a similar circular redoubt was built on a hillside overlooking the community. This redoubt measures 150 by 125 feet and has walls which extend up to five feet in height. A section of the wall on the west side of the redoubt has been removed but the majority of its original form and plan remain evident. The redoubts retain sufficient integrity of design and nominations for these fortifications have been prepared and accompany this multiple property cover document.

A *redan* refers to a small V-shaped earthwork with two faces and a rear opening, also known as a "gorge." Redans were used to provide cover for camps, advanced positions, roads and bridges. Redans which have survived to the present appear to be few in number with only three redans recorded in West Tennessee and three recorded in Middle Tennessee. In East Tennessee, an intact example of a redan was surveyed as part of the nominated property. This redan is located on the top of a hill on the north side of the Tennessee River. This redan is approximately 90 feet in length and has walls which vary from six to eight feet in height. This redan remains well defined and is included as part of the nominated property.

A *lunette* is an earthwork that is similar to a redan in function and appearance with the addition of two flanks. Two lunettes were recorded in West Tennessee: a Confederate example at Fort Pillow and a Federal example in Fayette County. In Middle Tennessee, five lunettes were surveyed including two which are ancillary to the redoubt. In East Tennessee, a well preserved lunette was identified as part of the fortifications at the railroad crossing. This lunette is located on a hill on the east side of the and measures 150 by 100 feet, and its outer walls extend up to twenty feet in height. The lunette is one of the most representative examples of this fortification surveyed in Tennessee and it is included within the nominated property.

A *cremaillere* (indented) line is an earthwork placed between two advanced works that are too far apart to protect each other as well as the space between them. A cremaillere line forms salients and angles which allow infantry and artillery cross fire in front of the advanced works. This type of earthwork is rare in Tennessee and only one example has been identified through the archaeological surveys. This cremaillere line (40LK54) is located in West Tennessee in Lake County. This line is associated with the fortifications.

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constructed as part of the Confederate defense at Island Number 10 on the Mississippi River. The line was built in 1862 and originally extended from a redan on the river approximately 3,500 feet eastward where it ended at a bayou. The line was abandoned by Confederate forces when they fell back and surrendered at Tiptonville. Cultivation and levee construction has reduced the line to approximately 1,350 feet in length, but the remaining section is easily discernible and retains sufficient character and integrity to meet National Register criteria. The National Register nomination for the Cremaillere Line Fortification of Lake County accompanies this multiple property cover document.

Earthworks (undetermined type) is a category reserved for remnants of earthworks which are poorly preserved or have been extensively altered. These earthworks have been substantially reduced and their original form and outline cannot be discerned. In West Tennessee, three poorly defined earthworks were surveyed, and in Middle Tennessee seven sites were included in this category. It is expected that the ongoing survey of Civil War sites in East Tennessee will also identify earthworks within this category.

SIGNIFICANCE

Earthworks may be nominated under criterion A, B, C, and/or D for their significance in the areas of military history, engineering, and historic archaeology. Earthworks were built during the Civil War primarily to defend strategic areas or positions. The defensive strategy adopted by both armies included the guarding of important communities, transportation routes, and supply points. The earthworks built in Tennessee are illustrative of tactics and planning which influenced the course and outcome of the Civil War. They are also illustrative of the military engineering of the Civil War in terms of the design, form, and construction of fortifications.

Earthworks may be significant under criterion A for their association with the military history of the Civil War. Earthworks are physical remains which illustrate the offensive and defensive strategic planning of both Union and Confederate forces. They are often the only surface evidence of an engagement or long term defensive position, and provide important information to understanding specific actions or campaigns of the Civil War. Earthworks may be significant under criterion B for their association with notable soldiers and/or civilians who are directly associated with the site. Such persons would have achieved their significance from their contributions to the military history of a specific site or through their contributions to a significant advance in engineering. Significance under this criteria is considered to be unlikely due to the transient occupation of earthworks by military units. The evaluation of significant individuals of the Civil War is also based more upon their overall careers rather than on actions at specific locations or engagements.

Earthworks may be significant under criterion C if they are particularly notable and intact examples of a specific earthwork type, or are a rare or unusual example of a fortification. Earthworks eligible under criterion C must possess a high level of integrity, be a notable example of military engineering, or represent a rarely built type of
a fortification. All earthworks inventoried in the state have been altered to various degrees by natural erosion. Others have been altered through manmade actions such as cultivation, mining, or building construction. The inventory of Civil War sites in Tennessee suggests that the number of earthworks which possess high levels of integrity are minimal, and those retaining such characteristics may be significant as illustrative of military engineering designs and construction techniques.

Under criterion D, earthworks will be significant for their information potential in understanding the course and outcome of the American Civil War. Historic archaeological remains such as earthworks can provide important information on fortification construction and defensive and offensive planning and tactics. Artifacts which may remain at earthworks can provide data on the soldiers stationed at the site and information on their day-to-day activities. Categories of archaeological information potentially available at earthworks include:

1. Military artifacts such as ammunition, bayonets, rifles, knapsacks, and canteens associated with infantry.

2. Military artifacts such as ammunition, artillery rounds, rifles, saddles, tack, containers, and other accouterments associated with cavalry and artillery.

3. Domestic artifacts associated with nearby encampments including clothing, eating utensils, photographs, and medicines.

4. Tools and other equipment used in earthwork construction and design.

Within the context of the Civil War, a number of research questions may be addressed by this archaeological information. These research questions include:

> What was built versus what were typical earthwork designs of the period? How did earthwork designs on paper translate into actual designs constructed under wartime conditions?

> How were earthworks physically constructed? What materials were used for the foundation, walls, embrasures, etc.? How were they drained to prevent flooding during heavy rains?

> How was artillery utilized with the earthwork in terms of numbers, platform locations, and firing direction. Where were powder magazines located and how were they built?

> What earthworks may exist which were not typical or standardized designs and why were they built?
What were the locations and relationship of encampment sites with the earthworks. Were encampments within the earthwork or outside the earthwork nearby? If occupied during the winter, were huts constructed and if so where?

What can refuse or trash pits associated with an earthwork's occupation tell us about the units stationed at the site and their everyday camp life?

Earthworks in Tennessee have the potential to yield information concerning these types of research questions through the archaeological record. Other research questions may also be developed as through ongoing and future archaeological investigations.

**REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS**

As in the case of battlefields, the Tennessee Division of Archaeology completed field investigations of earthworks in each section of Tennessee as part of this study. Using National Register criteria, the Division staff identified well preserved sites which retained integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, association, and workmanship. Earthworks may meet registration requirements if they possess sufficient character and integrity to retain their sense of time and place from their period of significance. Earthworks possess integrity if their historic landscape features and surroundings are intact and if there are no associated significant intrusions. The following evaluations of integrity were applied when assessing potentially eligible earthworks.

**Location -**

An earthwork retains integrity of location if it is the place where it was originally built and utilized during the Civil War. The survey utilized historical research and on-site archaeological investigations to identify existing earthworks.

**Association -**

An earthwork retains integrity of association if it is the place where the earthwork was constructed. Earthwork locations were extensively documented through survey efforts.

**Setting -**

Earthworks will retain integrity of setting if its physical environment is largely intact. The majority of traditional adjacent land uses such as cultivated fields and woodlands need to remain intact in order for earthworks to retain integrity. Modern intrusions such as buildings or structures should not be located within the circumference of the earthwork itself. Earthworks will retain integrity of setting if adjacent intrusions are minimal in number and in their size and scale relative to the earthwork.
Feeling - To retain integrity of feeling, the collective land area of, and around the earthwork, will have the ability to convey its sense of time and place from its period of significance in the Civil War.

Design - The essential outline or design of an earthwork must be present. Due to their construction materials, most earthworks will show evidence of natural erosion. An earthwork will retain integrity as a structure if there are substantial above-ground remains. An earthwork can also retain integrity as a site if its original design is discerned through surface or below-surface archaeological investigations.

Materials - To retain integrity, earthworks will display their original construction materials such as earth, stone or brick. Due to their exposure to the elements, natural erosion of earthen walls will result in varying losses of original material.

Workmanship - To retain integrity, earthworks will display much of their construction techniques and overall form and plan.

Criterion A Requirements

The earthwork(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The earthwork’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The earthwork(s) must have a strong association with the strategic planning or specific campaigns of the Civil War, or illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics which are representative of the evolvement and course of the Civil War.

The earthwork(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. The earthwork must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

Earthworks identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion A include the Big Pond Fortification, the Cremaillerle Line, the Wray’s Bluff Fortification, the Triune Fortifications, the Elk River Fortifications, the Tazewell Fortification, the Bulls Gap Fortification, the Loudon Fortifications, and the Strawberry Plains Fortifications.
Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee

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**Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee**

Name of Multiple Property Listing

The fortifications consist of redoubts which were built to guard adjacent roads or railroads. The redoubts are some of the best preserved in the state and are illustrative of the significant role the major roads and railroads played during the Civil War. These roads and railroads were utilized to facilitate troop movements and provide sustenance and supplies. Following their occupation of Tennessee, the Union army constructed these fortifications to protect these essential routes from Confederate attack.

are significant under criterion A as some of the state's best preserved railroad guard posts from the Civil War. All four were built to protect bridges and trestles at important river crossings. Bridges and trestles were the most vulnerable points along a railroad and their destruction could affect the movement of armies for extended periods of time. To protect these crossings, Union and Confederate engineers constructed a series of redoubts, blockhouses, stockades, and other entrenchments. These crossings were defended during most of the war and the protection of the supply lines affected the outcome of the Atlanta Campaign and other operations.

is significant under criterion A as the only extant physical site associated with the construction of fortifications on both sides of the Mississippi River. On the Tennessee side of the river, a redoubt and cremallere line was built to guard the eastern approaches. The inept defense and loss of resulted in the loss of much of West Tennessee and the surrender of Memphis. Due to the changes in the river channel and levee construction, is the only physical reminder of this important conflict.

**Criterion B Requirements**

The earthwork(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The earthwork's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The earthwork(s) must have a strong association with the strategic planning or specific campaigns of the Civil War, or illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics which are representative of the evolvement and course of the Civil War.

The earthwork(s) must be associated with notable soldiers and/or civilians whose specific actions at the earthwork were of particular significance in the military history or engineering of the Civil War.
The earthwork(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. The earthwork must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

No earthworks surveyed as part of this submittal have been identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion B.

**Criterion C Requirements**

The earthwork(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The earthwork’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The earthwork(s) must have a strong association with the strategic planning or specific campaigns of the Civil War, or illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics which are representative of the evolvement and course of the Civil War.

The earthwork(s) must be a particularly notable example of a specific earthwork type, a notable example of military engineering, or represent a rarely built type of earthwork.

The earthwork(s) must retain a high degree of integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. The earthwork must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

Earthworks identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion C include the [only inventoried example of this type of fortification in Tennessee. This type of earthwork was an indented line which provided infantry and artillery crossfire on advancing troops. The construction of this type of earthwork may have occurred in other sections of the Confederacy, but is the only example known to exist in Tennessee. A section of this line extending approximately 1,350 feet remains at the site. This large section retains a high degree of its design, materials, and workmanship.]

[are also significant under criterion C due to their scale and intact features. The fortifications consist of three redoubts connected by an entrenchment line, and represent one of the largest such fortification in Middle Tennessee. The site is unusually intact and retains a high degree of workmanship and design. The redoubt walls and entrenchment line were built of earth and stone and these materials remain readily visible.]
Criterion D Requirements

The earthwork(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The earthwork's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The earthwork(s) must have surface or potential subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding earthworks constructed during the Civil War.

The earthwork(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. The earthwork must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

An earthwork may still retain integrity despite partial excavations and surface collections, if it retains substantial potential in its remaining sections to yield important information on the Civil War. A completely excavated, or leveled and plowed earthwork, will no longer retain sufficient integrity to provide such information.

Earthworks identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion D include the Big Pond Fortification, the Cremaillere Line Fortification, the Wray’s Bluff Fortification, the Triune Fortifications, the Elk River Fortifications, the Tazewell Fortification, the Bulls Gap Fortification, the Blue Springs Encampment and Fortifications, the Loudon Fortifications, and the Strawberry Plains Fortifications.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE - Other Fortifications

In addition to the earthworks built during the Civil War, other types of fortifications were constructed by both armies in Tennessee. These fortifications were also built to defend strategic points such as transportation routes and cities and towns. Fortifications were built in both urban and rural areas and consisted of walls of earth, stone, and/or logs. A number of these fortifications were inventoried at railroad and road bridge crossings and this property type may also contain earthworks. Those which survive generally have discernible outlines and identifiable site elements. Four subtypes of this property type were identified during the survey and include:

1. Fort
2. Railroad Guard Post
3. Stockade
4. Blockhouse
In Tennessee, a number of forts were constructed by both Union and Confederate forces across the state. Forts are defined as a large enclosed fortification sometimes supported by outer works such as lunettes and redans, or inner works such as blockhouses. In West Tennessee, seven forts were identified in the survey. Three of these were previously known including Fort Pillow, Fort Wright, and Fort Pickering. Forts Pillow and Wright were constructed on the Mississippi River by the Confederates while Fort Pickering was built by the Union forces to fortify Memphis. Four previously unrecorded forts were built by the Union army to protect transportation routes following their occupation of West Tennessee in 1862. In West Tennessee, Fort Pillow is the most intact of these Civil War period forts and was listed on the National Register 4/11/73.

In Middle Tennessee, the Confederate army constructed Forts Henry and Donelson in 1861 to defend the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Both forts were captured in February, 1862 by the Union army under the command of Ulysses S. Grant. Fort Donelson has been preserved as a National Military Park and was listed on the National Register in 1966. Much of the Fort Henry site is now eroded and submerged under the Tennessee River (Kentucky Lake). The Fort Henry Site was listed on the National Register 10/10/75.

Also in Middle Tennessee, a series of forts were built to protect transportation routes and the capitol city of Nashville. Following its occupation of Nashville in 1862, Union engineers built a series of forts on high points encircling the city. Urban growth and development has eradicated almost all traces of these forts with the exception of Fort Negley southeast of the downtown area. Fort Negley is a star-shaped fort of earth and stone walls. Although sections of the fort were rebuilt in the 1930s, it retains much of its original form and plan and was listed on the National Register 4/21/75.

To the south of Nashville, the Union army also constructed large forts to protect transportation routes at Franklin and Murfreesboro. At Franklin, Fort Granger was constructed in 1862 to protect the bridge crossing of the Harpeth River and the fort later played an important role in the Battle of Franklin. This well preserved fort was listed on the National Register 1/8/73. At Murfreesboro, the Union army built Fortress Rosecrans in 1863 to defend the vital crossing of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad over the Stones River. Fortress Rosecrans was one of the largest forts built in Tennessee during the Civil War and sections of this fortification remain extant. The Fortress Rosecrans Site was listed on the National Register 6/7/74.

In East Tennessee, the ongoing survey may identify forts which retain sufficient integrity and significance to meet National Register criteria. Known forts are those constructed to defend Knoxville including Fort Sanders and Fort Dickerson. Most of the Knoxville forts have been razed for urban development but there may be sites which possess sufficient integrity of form and plan to meet registration requirements for National Register listing.

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A railroad guard post refers to fortifications that protected vulnerable points such as a bridge or trestle, and included stockades, blockhouses, and/or earthworks such as redoubts and entrenchments. Stockade are simple square shaped enclosures with bastioned corners. The stockades built during the Civil War were generally of vertical log construction with loopholes for firing. These fortifications were often strengthened by outer ditches and earth added to the exterior walls. Before the introduction of the blockhouse in 1864, stockades were built one of the primary defensive works built adjacent to railroads.

Blockhouses are defensive works associated primarily with railroad guard posts and were introduced in 1864 to provide greater defensive strength than stockades. Blockhouse construction used heavy vertical or horizontal timbers in the walls, and roofs of wood covered with dirt. Single below-grade entrances led to the interior of the blockhouse and the walls were loopholed for firing. Blockhouses were often built at either end of a railroad bridge or trestle.

The West Tennessee survey identified eleven sites believed to be railroad guard posts which include three redoubts, two entrenchments, two forts, two blockhouses, and two undefined works. In West Tennessee is a representative example of a defensive entrenchment built by the Union army as a railroad guard post (40MY95). Constructed in 1862, this earthwork was built to protect the crossing of the railroad. This site consists of two sets of entrenchments on a hillside overlooking the railroad. Associated features include a possible blockhouse site and rifle pits. Although somewhat eroded, this entrenchment retains sufficient character to meet National Register criteria and a nomination for accompanies this multiple property cover document.

in McNairy County is representative example of a redoubt built as part of a railroad guard post (40MY111). This redoubt was built in 1863 to protect the adjacent railroad. The redoubt is square in shape and has a gorge on the west wall. The redoubt has not been altered and retains its original form and plan. A National Register nomination for accompanies this multiple property cover document.

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70 West Tennessee Survey, p. 39.

71 West Tennessee Survey, p. 39.

72 Ibid.
In Middle Tennessee, a total of 37 railroad guard posts were inventoried which included various redoubts, stockade sites, and blockhouse sites. In Middle Tennessee, a representative example of a railroad guard post is the J(40GL54). These fortifications were built at the hillside overlooking the bridge and is well defined. The blockhouse site is located just east of the bridge on the north side of the river. A stockade and additional blockhouse are known to have also existed at this crossing, however, these sites have yet to be identified. A National Register nomination for the accompanies this multiple property cover document.

The survey of East Tennessee is ongoing but several railroad guard posts have been identified. The most significant of these are the bridge crossings of the was of strategic importance during the war and both armies built redoubts and other fortifications. Existing fortifications include two redoubts, an intact redan, and an encampment site. This railroad guard post retains much of its integrity and its elements are included in the Redoubts, entrenchments, and a lunette still remain at the railroad guard post at the crossing of in Knox and Jefferson Counties. Located on the east and west bank of three redoubts, a lunette, and several entrenchments retain integrity and are included within the property for the National Register nomination.

SIGNIFICANCE

Fortifications may be nominated under criterion A, B, C, and/or D for their significance in the areas of military history, engineering, and historic archaeology. Fortifications such as forts and railroad guard posts were built during the Civil War primarily to defend strategic areas or transportation routes. The defensive strategy adopted by both armies included the guarding of important communities, transportation routes, and supply points. The fortifications built in Tennessee are illustrative of tactics and planning which influenced the course and outcome of the Civil War. They are also illustrative of the military engineering of the Civil War in terms of their design, form, and construction.

Fortifications may be significant under criterion A for their association with the military history of the Civil War. Fortifications are physical remains which illustrate the offensive and defensive strategic planning of both Union and Confederate forces. They are often the only surface evidence of a short-term or long-term defensive position, and provide important information to understanding specific actions or campaigns of the Civil War.

Fortifications may be significant under criterion B for their association with notable soldiers and/or civilians who are directly associated with the site. Such persons would have achieved their significance from their contributions to the military history of a specific site or through their contributions to a significant advance in engineering. Significance under this criteria is considered to be unlikely due to the transient occupation of fortifications by military units. The evaluation of significant individuals of the Civil War is also based more
Fortifications may be significant under criterion C if they are particularly notable and intact examples of a specific type, or are a rare or unusual example. Fortifications eligible under criterion C must possess a high level of integrity, be a notable example of military engineering, or represent a rarely built type.

Under criterion D, fortifications will be significant for their information potential in understanding the course and outcome of the American Civil War. Historic archaeological remains such as fortifications can provide important information on their construction and defensive and offensive planning and tactics. Artifacts which may remain at fortifications can provide data on the soldiers stationed at the site and information on their day-to-day activities. Categories of archaeological information potentially available at fortifications include:

1. Military artifacts such as ammunition, bayonets, rifles, knapsacks, and canteens associated with infantry.
2. Military artifacts such as ammunition, artillery rounds, rifles, saddles, tack, containers, and other accouterments associated with cavalry and artillery.
3. Domestic artifacts associated with nearby encampments including clothing, eating utensils, photographs, and medicines.
4. Tools and other equipment used in fortification construction and design.

Within the context of the Civil War, a number of research questions may be addressed by this archaeological information. These research questions include:

> What was built versus what were typical fortification designs of the period? How did fortification designs on paper translate into actual designs constructed under wartime conditions?

> How were fortifications physically constructed? What materials were used for the foundation, walls, embrasures, etc.?

> How was artillery utilized with the fortification in terms of numbers, platform locations, and firing direction. Where were powder magazines located and how were they built?

> What fortifications may exist which were not typical or standardized designs and why were they built?
> What were the locations and relationship of encampment sites with the fortifications. Did soldiers camp primarily within blockhouses and stockades or were camp sites located outside of these fortifications. If within these fortifications, what were the living conditions like in these close quarters?

> What can refuse or trash pits associated with a fortification’s occupation tell us about the units stationed at the site and their everyday camp life?

> Many Union fortifications in the state were occupied by African American troops after 1863. What were the differences in everyday camp life and domestic artifacts than those of white troops?

Fortifications in Tennessee have the potential to yield information concerning these types of research questions through the archaeological record. Other research questions may also be developed as through ongoing and future archaeological investigations.

**REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS**

The Tennessee Division of Archaeology completed field investigations of fortifications in each section of Tennessee as part of this study. Using National Register criteria, the Division staff identified well preserved sites which retained integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, association, and workmanship. Fortifications may meet registration requirements if they possess sufficient character and integrity to retain their sense of time and place from their period of significance. Fortifications possess integrity if their historic landscape features and surroundings are intact and if there are no associated significant intrusions. The following evaluations of integrity were applied when assessing potentially eligible fortifications.

**Location** - A fortification retains integrity of location if it is the place where it was originally built and utilized during the Civil War. The survey utilized historical research and on-site archaeological investigations to identify existing fortifications.

**Association** - A fortification retains integrity of association if it is the place where the earthwork was constructed. Fortification locations were extensively documented through survey efforts.

**Setting** - Fortifications will retain integrity of setting if its physical environment is largely intact. The majority of traditional adjacent land uses such as cultivated fields and woodlands need to remain intact in order for fortifications to retain integrity. Modern intrusions such as buildings or structures should not be located within the
circumference or immediate location of the fortification itself. Fortifications will retain integrity of setting if adjacent intrusions are minimal in number and in their size and scale relative to the fortification.

Feeling - To retain integrity of feeling, the collective land area of, and around the fortification, will have the ability to convey its sense of time and place from its period of significance in the Civil War.

Design - The design, outline or site of a fortification must be present. A fortification will retain integrity as a structure if there are substantial above-ground remains such as forts. Other fortifications such as blockhouses or stockades will retain integrity as sites if their original design is discerned through surface or below-surface archaeological investigations.

Materials - To retain integrity, fortifications will display their construction materials either above or below the surface. In the cases of blockhouses or stockades, the original wood walls will no longer be present. However, the site should have minimal disturbance and the potential to reveal construction materials and methodology.

Workmanship - To retain integrity, above-ground fortifications will display much of their construction techniques and overall form and plan. For surface or subsurface remains, workmanship will not be applicable.

**Criterion A Requirements**

The fortification(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The fortification's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The fortification(s) must be representative of forts and railroad guard posts and illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics of the Civil War.

The fortification(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. They must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.
Fortifications identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion A include the following:

All of these five sites were built by the Union army to protect adjacent railroads or railroad bridges. The railroad played a major role in the overall strategy of the Confederate and Union armies and was an essential component in the success of the Tullahoma and Atlanta Campaigns. Many of the Confederate cavalry raids in Tennessee were designed to disrupt rail traffic and burn strategic bridges. In turn, Union forces were widely dispersed throughout the state to protect the railroads from attack. Fortifications such as railroad guard posts are important physical reminders of this offensive and defensive strategy during the Civil War.

**Criterion B Requirements**

The fortification(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The fortification’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The fortification(s) must be representative of forts and railroad guard posts and illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics of the Civil War.

The fortification(s) must be associated with notable soldiers and/or civilians whose specific actions at the fortification(s) were of particular significance in the military history or engineering of the Civil War. The fortification(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. They must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

No fortification(s) surveyed as part of this submittal have been identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion B.

**Criterion C Requirements**

The fortification(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The fortification’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).
The fortification(s) must be representative of forts and railroad guard posts and illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics of the Civil War.

The fortification(s) must be a particularly notable example of a specific fortification type, a notable example of military engineering, or represent a rarely built type of fortification.

The fortification(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. They must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

No fortification(s) in this submittal were identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion C.

**Criterion D Requirements**

The fortification(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The fortification's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The fortification(s) must be representative of forts and railroad guard posts and illustrate offensive or defensive planning and tactics of the Civil War.

The fortification(s) must have surface or potential subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding fortifications constructed during the Civil War.

The fortification(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its physical remains and surrounding historic landscape features. They must possess sufficient integrity of these qualities to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

A fortification may still retain integrity despite partial excavations and surface collections, if it retains substantial potential in its remaining sections to yield important information on the Civil War. A completely excavated, or leveled and plowed fortification, will no longer retain sufficient integrity to provide such information.

Fortifications identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion D include the
ENCAMPMENTS refer to either short-term or long-term camp sites or winter quarters occupied by the Confederate and Union armies. During the Civil War, training camps and winter quarters were located in rural areas on open farmland or cultivated fields. Cities and towns were associated with vices such as drinking and gambling, and rural encampments offered a more controlled environment for soldiering. Camp sites needed to be large enough for the training and drilling of large numbers of soldiers and to accommodate hundreds or thousands of tents or temporary huts. Long-term camp sites inventoried during the survey were sited to be close to dependable sources of water, and close to supply routes such as a railroad. The survey found a number of these encampment sites retained their historic landscape character.

Short-term encampments are those utilized for a limited period of time, certainly less than a week, as troops moved from one location to another. In West Tennessee, twelve short-term encampments were identified and in Middle Tennessee, four were inventoried. Long-term encampments are those which were occupied for periods of weeks or months. These include sites associated with training camps and the winter quarters of both armies. In West Tennessee, a total of 36 long-term encampments were surveyed, while in Middle Tennessee 32 were inventoried. The ongoing survey of East Tennessee has identified a number of both short-term and long-term encampments.

Two of the most notable of the encampments identified during this survey are in Middle Tennessee and the in East Tennessee. is located in Sumner County and it was established in 1861 to serve as a training camp for Confederate volunteers (40SU107). The camp was established adjacent to and just south of the Kentucky state line. Due to problems with sanitary conditions, three different sites were occupied by The second site of this camp is just north of the community of Portland, and it still retains much of its historic landscape character. This site consists of cultivated fields and woodlands which surround the Cold Spring, a large spring which supplied water for the camp. A nomination for the accompanies this multiple property cover document.

Bradley County was established in January of 1864 to serve as winter quarters for General William T. Sherman’s Union army (40BY120-143). The site was adjacent to the south of the county seat of Cleveland. The site was chose due to its proximity to the railroad, ample water supply from nearby springs, and strong defensive positions afforded by the area’s ridges and hills. Entrenchments were built along the tops of the ridges and campsites were established along the valley floors. Thousands of troops wintered here from December of 1863 until April or May of 1864.

73 Ibid, p. 42.
Much of the has been developed into residential subdivisions in recent years. However, a significant encampment and entrenchment site in the and on adjacent ridges continues to retain much of its historic landscape character. A National Register nomination for the accompanies this document.

**SIGNIFICANCE**

Encampments may be nominated under criterion A, B, and/or D for their significance in the areas of military history and historic archaeology. Encampments will usually be significant under National Register criterion A for their role in the military history of the Civil War. Encampments are primarily sites which were used as training camps, short-term and long-term camps during campaigns, short-term and long-term camps associated with defensive positions, and camps used as winter quarters. Encampments of particular significance will be those which were the site of important, long-term training camps, long-term defensive positions, or winter quarters. At training camps, recruits learned the fundamentals of military life and were trained into cohesive units. Long-term defensive positions may include encampments as part of their overall significance. In winter quarters, soldiers continued their training and units were often reorganized.

Encampments may be significant under criterion B for their association with notable soldiers and/or civilians who are directly associated with the site. Such persons would have achieved their significance from their contributions to the military history of a specific encampment. Significance under this criteria is considered to be unlikely due to the transient occupation of encampments by military units. The evaluation of significant individuals of the Civil War is also based more upon their overall careers rather than on actions at specific locations.

Under criterion D, encampments will be significant for their information potential in understanding the history of a site and its role in the Civil War. Historic archaeological remains at encampments can provide important information on the soldiers stationed at the site and information on their day-to-day activities. Categories of archaeological information potentially available at encampments include:

1. Military artifacts such as ammunition, bayonets, rifles, knapsacks, and canteens associated with infantry.
2. Military artifacts such as ammunition, artillery rounds, rifles, saddles, tack, containers, and other accoutrements associated with cavalry and artillery.
3. Domestic artifacts including clothing, eating utensils, photographs, and medicines.
4. Burials including large gravesites and individual interments.
Within the context of the Civil War, a number of research questions may be addressed by this archaeological information. These research questions include:

> How were troops sheltered during their occupation of the camp site? If occupied during the winter, were temporary huts built? What were their size and dimensions?

> What can the refuse and trash pits and other archaeological record reveal about everyday camp life? What did soldiers consume? What were their day to day activities?

> How does the archaeological record support or differ from written accounts of camp life?

> The mortality rate in encampments was high due to various diseases. Are there burials associated with encampments? Were all remains removed to other cemeteries after the Civil War?

Encampments in Tennessee have the potential to yield information concerning these types of research questions through the archaeological record. Other research questions may also be developed as through ongoing and future archaeological investigations.

**REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS**

The Tennessee Division of Archaeology completed field investigations in each section of Tennessee and identified sites which were felt to retain integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, association, and workmanship. Encampments may meet registration requirements if they possess sufficient character and integrity to retain their sense of time and place from their period of significance. An actual encampment site and its surroundings must be largely intact. Most Civil War encampments in Tennessee were located in rural areas amidst scattered farmsteads, woodlands, and cultivated fields or pastures. The retention of this historic rural character is a key component in the identification and eligibility of encampments. An encampment must retain the majority of its historic landscape elements to be eligible for the National Register. The following evaluations of integrity were applied when assessing potentially eligible encampments.

**Location** - An encampment retains integrity of location if it is the place on which it was sited. The survey utilized historical research and on-site archaeological investigations to identify the locations where encampments took place.

**Association** - Integrity of association is retained if it is the place where the encampment was located. Encampments were extensively documented through survey efforts.
Setting -

Encampments will retain integrity of setting if its physical environment is largely intact. The majority of traditional land uses such as cultivated fields and woodlands need to remain intact in order for encampments to retain integrity. Modern road systems will not result in an overall loss of integrity of setting if the road area encompasses less than 10% of the total encampment area.

Traditional land uses should be retained and may include farmsteads at their Civil War locations even though the dwellings and outbuildings have been replaced with post-bellum properties. Less than 10% of an encampment’s area should consist of non-contributing landscapes or non-contributing properties.

Memorials such as statuary or markers will not affect the historic setting as long as they are minimal in number and of small size and scale.

Feeling -

To retain integrity of feeling, the collective land area of an encampment will have the ability to convey its sense of time and place from its period of significance in the Civil War. Modern intrusions such as buildings and structures, road systems, or extensive alterations in land use may be present as long as they are scattered and are not concentrated within the site of the encampment. The essential historic land characteristics must be present and major changes in topography such as removal of hillsides or infilling of watercourses would likely result in a loss of integrity.

Design, Materials, and Workmanship - These evaluations of integrity generally refer to structures or architectural resources, and in most instances, will not apply to encampments.

Criterion A Requirements

The encampment(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The encampment’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The encampment(s) must be of particular significance in the Civil War as the site of a long-term training camps, defensive positions, or winter quarters.
The encampment(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its immediate site and surrounding historic landscape features. Encampments must retain historic landscape patterns such as cultivated fields, woodlands, and water sources. Intrusions should be minimal and encampments must possess sufficient integrity to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

Encampments identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion A include the site in Sumner County, and the site in Bradley County, which is significant as one of the major training camps for Tennessee soldiers during the first year of the Civil War. Over 10,000 soldiers were organized into fourteen regiments of infantry at the camp. The drilling and training of troops was essential to the formation of the Southern armies, and most soldiers became part of the Army of Tennessee. The site was adjacent to an important railroad supply point and much of the arms and material needed for the Atlanta Campaign was stockpiled here over the winter. Training and drilling of troops took place throughout the winter and entrenchments were built to guard the railroad from Confederate attack. The broad valleys and steep ridges of the site afforded a strong position for Union troops to consolidate and refit before initiating the Atlanta Campaign in April of 1864.

**Criterion B Requirements**

The encampment(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The encampment’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The encampment(s) must be of particular significance in the Civil War as the site of a long-term training camps, defensive positions, or winter quarters.

The encampment(s) must be associated with notable soldiers and/or civilians whose specific actions at the encampment(s) were of particular significance in the military history of the Civil War.

The encampment(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its immediate site and surrounding historic landscape features. Encampments must retain historic landscape patterns such as cultivated fields, woodlands, and water sources. Intrusions should be minimal and encampments must possess sufficient integrity to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

No encampment surveyed as part of this submittal have been identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion B.
Criterion D Requirements

The encampment(s) must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.

The encampment’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

The encampment(s) must be of particular significance in the Civil War as the site of a long-term training camps, defensive positions, or winter quarters.

The encampment(s) must have surface or potential subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding aspects of military life and encampment sites of the Civil War.

The encampment(s) must retain integrity of setting, location, feeling, and association of its immediate site and surrounding historic landscape features. Encampments must retain historic landscape patterns such as cultivated fields, woodlands, and water sources. Intrusions should be minimal and encampments must possess sufficient integrity to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

Encampments identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion D include the Camp Trousdale Site in Sumner County, and the Blue Springs Encampment and Fortifications in Bradley County.

NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE - Military Hospitals and Other Military Components

DESCRIPTION

Additional property types identified in the survey included military hospitals and other military components. Military hospitals refer to buildings used on a short-term or long-term basis to house sick and wounded soldiers. Short-term military hospitals are generally associated with a specific engagement and were used due to their proximity to the fighting. Both rural and urban buildings are associated with this property type but most inventoried short-term hospitals are rural dwellings or sites. Long-term hospitals in Tennessee were located primarily in cities and towns where consistent convalescent care and ample supplies were readily available.

None of the surveyed buildings in Tennessee were originally constructed to serve as a military hospital. Instead, those buildings identified in this property type were dwellings, public buildings, and commercial buildings which were utilized either as make-shift hospitals following an engagement, or properties acquired to serve as convalescent hospitals for long-term care. Short-term military hospitals include the sites of field hospitals where
wounded soldiers were brought for initial treatment. Once soldiers received medical attention at the field hospitals they would be transported to larger divisional hospitals to the rear. These tent hospital locations were transient in nature and consist of sites with no above-ground remains.

Short-term military hospitals were also those buildings which were used to house wounded soldiers due to their proximity on or directly adjacent to battlefields. These were often private residences which temporarily sheltered sick and wounded soldiers. Those properties associated with this use are generally frame and brick dwellings constructed between 1840 and 1860. Many were built in the Italianate and Greek Revival styles which were popular for larger homes in Tennessee during these decades. An example of this property type is the Williamson County (40WM92) which is listed on the National Register as part of the Franklin Battlefield (NR 10/15/66).

Two short-term military hospitals are included as contributing buildings to nominated properties which accompany this multiple property submission. Within the boundary of the Liberty Gap Battlefield is the which, according to tradition, housed wounded soldiers following the battle. This one-story frame dwelling was constructed ca. 1845 and was built in the Greek Revival style. Although presently abandoned, this dwelling has not been extensively altered and retains much of its character from the Civil War era. Within the boundary of the Bulls Gap Fortification is the built ca. 1850 with influences of the Greek Revival style. Tradition states that this dwelling was used as a hospital following the various engagements at Bulls Gap. The dwelling is located directly within the gap, retains much of its Civil War era form and plan, and is included as a contributing building to the property.

Long-term military hospitals were established in Tennessee's larger cities to provide convalescent care to those wounded and sick. Most buildings which remain from this property type were appropriated by the Federal army for use as hospitals in Memphis and Nashville. These buildings are of brick construction and were built between 1840 and 1860. While a few private residences were used as long-term hospitals, most buildings appropriated as hospitals were churches or large, multi-story commercial buildings. In Memphis, (NR 2/11/71) and its grounds were used as a large hospital complex between 1863 and 1865 (40SY532). This brick dwelling is listed on the National Register for its architectural and historical significance. In Nashville, six buildings were identified as long-term military hospitals including (NHL 4/19/97) in addition to the six properties in Nashville, Coffee County was also used as a long-term military hospital during the Civil War (40CF227).

SIGNIFICANCE

Military hospitals may be nominated under criterion A, B, and/or D for their significance in the areas of military history and historic archaeology. Military hospitals will usually be significant under National Register
Military hospitals may be significant under criterion B for their association with notable soldiers and/or civilians who are directly associated with the site. Such persons would have achieved their significance from their contributions to the military history of a hospital. Significance under this criteria is considered to be unlikely due to the transient nature of units and their medical staff at specific locations. The evaluation of significant individuals of the Civil War is also based more upon their overall careers rather than on their actions at specific locations.

None of the military hospitals surveyed in Tennessee were originally built as hospitals and criterion C will not be applicable under the Civil War context. Properties may be eligible under criterion C for their architectural style under contexts unassociated with the Civil War.

Under criterion D, military hospitals may be significant for their information potential in understanding the history of a site and its role in the Civil War. Historic archaeological remains at military hospitals can provide important information on the soldiers who occupied the site and information on their day-to-day activities. Categories of archaeological information potentially available at military hospitals include:

1. Military artifacts such as ammunition, bayonets, rifles, knapsacks, and canteens associated with infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
2. Medical artifacts such as medicine bottles and surgical instruments.
3. Domestic artifacts including clothing, eating utensils, and photographs.
4. Burials including large gravesites and individual interments.

Within the context of the Civil War, a number of research questions may be addressed by this archaeological information. These research questions include:

> How long were military hospitals occupied? What troops received medical attention at the site and does this correspond with the casualties noted in the written record?

> What types of medical treatments were performed at these hospitals and what can this reveal about the state of mid-19th century medicine?
Do burial sites remain which contain human remains such as amputated limbs? What can this tell us about the associated engagement and medical practices during the Civil War?

Does the archaeological record confirm the use of a dwelling as a short-term military hospital? Military hospitals in Tennessee have the potential to yield information concerning these types of research questions through the archaeological record. Other research questions may also be developed as through ongoing and future archaeological investigations.

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

The Tennessee Division of Archaeology completed field investigations of military hospitals in each section of the state as part of this study. Using National Register criteria, the Division staff identified well preserved sites which retained integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, association, and workmanship. Military hospitals may meet registration requirements if they possess sufficient character and integrity to retain their sense of time and place from their period of significance. The following evaluations of integrity were applied when assessing potentially eligible fortifications.

Location - A military hospital retains integrity of location if it is the place where it was utilized during the Civil War. The survey utilized historical research and on-site archaeological investigations to identify existing military hospitals.

Association - A military hospital retains integrity of association if it is the place where its short-term or long-term use took place.

Setting - Military hospitals will retain integrity of setting if its physical environment is largely intact. For temporary sites, traditional land uses such as cultivated fields and woodlands need to remain intact. Modern intrusions such as buildings or structures should not be located within the immediate location of the military hospital site. For dwellings, integrity of setting will remain if the property retains much of its physical environment from the Civil War era. For rural properties, traditional land uses such as woodlands or cultivated fields should be present and nearby intrusions should be minimal. For urban properties, the commercial streetscapes should remain intact.

Feeling - To retain integrity of feeling, the property will have the ability to convey its sense of time and place from its period of significance in the Civil War.
Buildings used as military hospitals will retain the majority of their design characteristics from their period of significance. This will include retention of their Civil War era form and plan and architectural style.

To retain integrity, buildings used as military hospitals will display the majority of their Civil War era construction materials such as original exterior walls, fenestration, and porches.

To retain integrity, buildings used as military hospitals will display much of their Civil War era construction techniques and craftsmanship.

**Criterion A Requirements**

A military hospital must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee. Buildings used as short-term military hospitals must be located within the immediate vicinity of an engagement. There should be written accounts or substantial oral tradition of a building’s use as a short-term military hospital. Long-term military hospitals should be identified through official records or written accounts of the Civil War.

A military hospital’s period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).

A military hospital must retain integrity of its Civil War era appearance. If a building or structure, it must retain sufficient architectural integrity to identify it from the Civil War era. This includes retention of the majority of its Civil War era materials, design, form, plan, setting, location, feeling, and association. If a site, the military hospital location must retain historic landscape patterns such as cultivated fields, woodlands, and water sources. Intrusions should be minimal and sites must possess sufficient integrity to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.

Military hospitals identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion A include the Liberty Gap Battlefield. Both of these dwellings represent short-term military hospitals which are associated with nearby engagements. These ante-bellum dwellings were utilized for several weeks to shelter wounded and sick soldiers. The appropriation of nearby dwellings for hospitals enabled soldiers to receive immediate medical treatment which greatly enhanced their chances for survival. These type of hospitals also sheltered the wounded and sick from the elements which also helped to reduce the death rate. The use of short-term hospitals was essential in providing medical attention when it was most needed and this assisted in maintaining the troop strength of both armies.
United States Department of the Interior  
National Park Service  

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES  
CONTINUATION SHEET  

Name of Multiple Property Listing  

Criterion B Requirements  

A military hospital must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.  

A military hospital's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).  

A military hospital must be associated with notable soldiers and/or civilians whose specific actions at the site were of particular significance in the military history of the Civil War.  

A military hospital must retain integrity of its Civil War era appearance. If a building or structure, it must retain sufficient architectural integrity to identify it from the Civil War era. This includes retention of the majority of its Civil War era materials, design, form, plan, setting, location, feeling, and association. If a site, the military hospital location must retain historic landscape patterns such as cultivated fields, woodlands, and water sources. Intrusions should be minimal and sites must possess sufficient integrity to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.  

No military hospitals surveyed as part of this submittal have been identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion B.  

Criterion D Requirements  

A military hospital must be directly associated with the American Civil War within the boundary of the State of Tennessee.  

A military hospital's period of significance must be within the beginning and end of the American Civil War (1861-1865).  

A military hospital must have surface or potential subsurface cultural or archaeological deposits that, if studied, are likely to yield information important to understanding aspects of military life and encampment sites of the Civil War.  

A military hospital must retain integrity of its Civil War era appearance. If a building or structure, it must retain sufficient architectural integrity to identify it from the Civil War era. This includes retention of the majority of its Civil War era materials, design, form, plan, setting, location, feeling, and association. If a site, the military hospital location must retain historic landscape patterns such as cultivated fields, woodlands, and water sources. Intrusions should be minimal and sites must possess sufficient integrity to provide a sense of time and place from the Civil War era.
Military hospitals identified as meeting registration requirements under criterion D include the John T. Myers House within the boundary of the Bulls Gap Fortification, and the Granville Pearson House within the boundary of the Liberty Gap Battlefield. It is possible that archaeological remains may be present within the immediate vicinity of these properties which have the potential to yield information concerning their use and occupation during the Civil War.

**NAME OF PROPERTY TYPE - Other Military Components**

*Other military components* refer to Civil War related buildings, sites, and objects such as headquarters, boat wrecks, military prisons, powder magazines, signal stations, military industrial sites, and railroad depots. National Register nominations which accompany this multiple property submittal do not include any of these components which comprise this property type. Additional studies of military components within this property type may result in the identification of National Register-listed or -eligible properties. If such properties are identified, amendments to this multiple property submittal will be completed and this property type discussed in detail.
United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
CONTINUATION SHEET

Section _G_ Page _72_

_Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee_
Name of Multiple Property Listing

GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

The geographical area of this multiple property documentation form is the boundary of the state of Tennessee.
SUMMARY OF IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION METHODS

The submittal of the "Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee," is the result of almost ten years of study by the Tennessee Historical Commission and Tennessee Division of Archaeology. Concerns over the lack of information on existing Civil War sites in Tennessee led to a concerted effort by both agencies to identify and record Civil War related properties across the state. To complete this project, these agencies chose a three phased survey effort beginning with an inventory of Middle Tennessee, and followed by surveys of West Tennessee and East Tennessee. Completion of the Middle Tennessee survey was given the highest priority due to the larger number of sites in this section of the state and the potential loss of sites through increased urbanization.

The Middle Tennessee survey was completed in 1988 and 1989 through the efforts of both agencies. Administration of the project was assisted by the Tennessee Historical Commission and the actual field work and archival research was completed by Fred M. Prouty and Benjamin C. Nance under the general supervision of Samuel D. Smith, Division of Archaeology Historical Archaeologist. Potential Civil War sites were identified through historical research of primary and secondary source materials, interviews with knowledgeable Civil War authorities, and relic hunters. On-site field surveys were then completed at identified sites throughout the Middle Tennessee area. The results of this project were detailed in 1990 in the report, *A Survey of Civil War Period Military Sites in Middle Tennessee.*

According to the introduction to the survey report “The 1988-1989 survey of Civil War sites was designed as a thematic survey. For several years it had been apparent that this particular site category was unusual in that it was simultaneously of great interest to a large number of relic collectors but was greatly under-represented in the state-wide site file maintained by the Division of Archaeology. Previous to the 1988-1989 survey, only eleven Civil War Period military sites had been recorded for the entire Middle Tennessee area, with similarly low numbers for the rest of the state.” Since Tennessee is second only to Virginia in the number of battles, the potential for finding and recording sites was vast. David Wright’s 1982 MA thesis “Civil War Field Fortification, An Analysis of Theory and Practical Application” (Middle Tennessee State University) served as a starting basis of information for the survey.

The Middle Tennessee survey, and the later West and East Tennessee surveys, began with intensive archival research. The Tennessee State Library and Archives proved very helpful for official records. Locally published county histories were informative for specific information about sites in their respective counties. Relic collectors were a primary source for confirming or locating many of these sites. In the introduction to the survey report, it states “From the beginning of this project it was planned to make as much use as possible of informant information concerning sites and artifacts. This approach worked better than anticipated. A number of very knowledgeable informants willing to help with the project, and the recording of sites progressed at a greater than expected rate.” Nearly all of the sites visited during the three Civil War surveys were well-known to local collectors. A large number of the sites had been collected over the years and continue today to reveal
n numerous artifacts associated with the Civil War. Examples of the types of artifacts recovered and still being recovered include an assortment of ferrous and non-ferrous metal, projectiles, ordnances, equipage and organic materials (leather footwear, cloth fabrics, wood, “hard tack,” baked foods, bone, etc.)

Probable site types were formulated during the initial phase of the archival and survey work. Property types were formulated using three principal sources: 1) *A Complete Treatise on Field Fortifications, with the General Outlines of the Principles regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defence of Permanent Works* by Dennis Hart Mahan (1836, Wiley and Long, 1968 reprint by Greenwood Press); 2) *Military Dictionary* by Colonel H.L. Scott (1864, Van Nostrand); and 3) “Civil War Fortifications, An Analysis of Theory and Practical Application.” (Masters thesis, Middle Tennessee State University, 1982). During the course of the survey it became evident that both “minor battlefield” and “short term encampments” were not priority site types for additional research or survey. By eliminating these sites, it was possible to concentrate on a smaller number of property types and obtain more information on each site. (See property types for a discussion of the final types surveyed.) The intended results of the first survey, and the two additional surveys, was for the results to be used as a context for evaluation of Civil War sites in Tennessee. The site categories were identified as listed in the National Register (often as a component of a property listed as a building or structure), those that had probable National Register eligibility, those sites that needed additional work to determine eligibility and sites that were probably not eligible for listing in the National Register. For the Middle Tennessee survey twenty-two sites were included in properties already listed in the National Register, thirty sites were probably eligible, fifty-three needed additional work, and thirty-six sites were determined not eligible.

Civil War archaeology continues to evolve as more sites and techniques are tested. Recent cases have shown that traditional testing methodology is not always accurate for assessing Civil War site significance and integrity. Standard sampling strategies, coupled with metal detector surveys, can provide some understanding of battlefield artifact patterns. However, these techniques still have only a limited ability to uncover sites. As remote sensing equipment improves and the archaeological profession becomes more comfortable with using non-traditional methods for site survey and evaluation, the archaeological record will be better documented. Further difficulty in assessing battlefield sites is shown in a quote from a paper given at the January 1998 meeting of the Society for Historical Archaeology meeting: “After the Battle of Gettysburg, a reporter for the New York Herald wrote: ‘The Air, the trees, the graves are silent. Even the relic hunters are gone now. And the soldiers here never awake to the sound of reveille.’ [Angle 1947:449]” (Slaughter and Sterling 1998:3)

Numerous publications within the last few years have shown the diversity of methods used to determine the integrity of battlefield sites. Among these are *Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of Little Bighorn* Douglas D. Scott, et al., University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), *Soldiers and Citizens: Civil War Actions Around Latimer’s Farm, Cobb County, Georgia* (Southeastern Archaeological Services, Inc., Athens, Georgia, 1990), *Fort Negley 130 Years Later: An Archaeological Assessment* (Panamerican Consultants, Inc., Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1994), *Archaeological Investigations at Camp Nelson: A Union Quartermasters Depot and Hospital in Jessamine County,*
Assessment of the site eligibility was made based on the historical record, the importance of the site to Tennessee, the potential for information to be learned from the site and site integrity. No testing was done for the sites but all sites were visited and walked over by historic archaeologists. Some property types had visible remains of earthworks, while other sites had no above ground resources. When there were no extant historic features on a site, integrity was considered based on the use of the land over time (whether modern activity had diminished the potential for artifact recovery) and information from local relic collectors. In a sense, the relic collectors who shared information with the surveyors had acted as "investigators" or "samplers" for the sites. Those sites that provided evidence of having recently collected artifacts, were considered to be potentially eligible if they met the criteria and could answer research questions.

All of the nominated sites were considered to be potentially eligible for their local significance - for their impact on the communities where they were situated. If the use of the site during the Civil War, whether as a battlefield, encampment, or earthworks, could be shown to have an impact broader than the local region, statewide significance was considered. This project did not consider assessing the properties for national significance. Most nationally significant sites are included in the National Park Service's system of military parks (Shiloh, Stones River, Fort Donelson).

Some of the areas that were surveyed and considered for nomination contain noncontributing above ground resources or modern road systems. These noncontributing elements were assessed based on their relationship to the acreage of the resource, how important the resource was, the visual impact to the resource and if the modern development had impacted the potential for archaeological remains of the resource. A 1996/1997 report for the Rutherford County Planning Commission (Community Planning and Research, Inc.) states that "Because the key battlefield roads have changed very little in their alignments and dimensions since the time of the battle, they have survived as tangible artifacts of the battle...." (Executive Summary). This statement can be considered a starting point for evaluating the impact of a road system. For example, an important battlefield may have a modern road system with adjacent development (i.e., Parker's Crossroads). The greater portion and/or most significant portion of the battlefield should be extant. The battlefield site should still convey a historic sense of time and place overall. Although a portion of it will have been negatively impacted by the modern development, the overall integrity of the resource must be considered.

The State Review Board requested that there be a percentage of noncontributing land/road systems considered acceptable. They felt that ten percent was an acceptable amount and this was added to the registration...
requirements. In addition, most of the road systems today, although modern in appearance, are sited over or very close to the historic roads used during the Civil War.

The 1992-1993 project in West Tennessee was the second archaeological survey to identify Civil War military sites conducted by the Division of Archaeology and the Tennessee Historical Commission. This survey was conducted using the same methodology as the Middle Tennessee Survey. Fred M. Prouty and Gary L. Barker completed the fieldwork, archival research, and report under the general supervision of Samuel D. Smith, Division of Archaeology Historical Archaeologist. The survey identified eighty-nine Civil War period military sites in West Tennessee, eighty-four of which had not been surveyed. The results of this project were presented in 1996 in the report, A Survey of Civil War Period Military Sites in West Tennessee.

Seven of the sites surveyed in West Tennessee were already listed in the National Register, usually for reasons unrelated to the Civil War importance of the site. Fort Pillow and Shiloh National Military Park were included in this group. The report noted that twenty-three sites were potentially eligible for listing in the National Register based on archival information and field surveys. Again, relic collectors were a source of information regarding the possibility of intact archaeological remains. This information was used in assessing the site integrity and potential for the National Register. Fifty-three sites were noted as needing additional information and archaeological testing to assess National Register information. Six sites were considered to have been so greatly impacted by new developments or collecting that they no longer retained integrity and were not considered for nomination. Eighty-eight percent of the sites in West Tennessee were Federal earthworks.

In 1996, survey efforts were undertaken to identify Civil War period military sites in East Tennessee. This survey effort continued into 1997 and completion is anticipated to take place in 1998. As in the case of the previous two surveys, this project is being completed by the Division of Archaeology and the Tennessee Historical Commission. The site surveyors met with the staff of the Tennessee Historical Commission and the consultant to assess sites in East Tennessee for National Register nomination. The surveyors also went on site visits with the staff and consultants during the preparation of the nomination. The same methodology used in the prior two surveyors is being used for the East Tennessee survey.

As a result of these survey efforts, a number of properties were identified as potentially eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places for their historical and/or archaeological significance. In 1996, the Tennessee Historical Commission issued a request for proposals to prepare a Multiple Property Documentation Form for Civil War period military sites, and fifteen individual nominations. For geographical equity, five sites were to be nominated from each of the three sections of the state. The consulting firms of Thomason and Associates of Nashville, Tennessee, and White Star Consulting of Madison, Alabama, were selected to complete this scope of work.
All of the nominated properties included in this submittal were identified as potentially eligible during the previous and ongoing surveys. To confirm their eligibility, each site was visited by the consultant, staff of the Tennessee Historical Commission and, in some cases, staff of the Division of Archaeology. At each site, concurrence was reached regarding its eligibility or non-eligibility. Since there were more eligible sites than the contract called for, nominated sites were based on their geographic location (five sites per grand division of Tennessee), the rarity of the site type in the state, and their significance to the state. Sites that had previously been listed in the National Register, even if they were listed for non-Civil War importance, were not considered for this grant. If eligible, each site was recorded in accordance with National Register standards and boundaries were delineated. Historical research was completed on eligible sites utilizing official records and the vast body of scholarly literature and studies on the Civil War.

This submittal represents the first comprehensive National Register evaluation of Civil War period military sites in Tennessee and includes fifteen properties which are among the most significant identified in the survey efforts. With the completion of the East Tennessee survey and continuing research efforts throughout the state, additional sites within the Civil War context are anticipated to meet National Register criteria.

Ed Bearss, the former Chief Historian of the National Park Service and renowned Civil War historian reviewed and edited a first draft of this context. His comments proved valuable in revising the document.
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Historic and Historic Archaeological Resources of the American Civil War in Tennessee


