National Register of Historic Places
Multiple Property Documentation Form

A. Name of Multiple Property Listing

Spanish-American War in Puerto Rico

B. Associated Historic Contexts

Naval and Land actions in the Island of Puerto Rico, April–August 1898.

C. Form Prepared by

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D. Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this documentation form meets the National Register documentation standards and sets forth requirements for the listing of related properties consistent with the National Register criteria. This submission meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60 and the Secretary of the Interior's Standards and Guidelines for Archeology and Historic Preservation. (See continuation sheet for additional comments.)

Lilliane D. Lopez, Architect
Signature and title of certifying official December 23, 1999

Puerto Rico State Historic Preservation Office
State or Federal agency and bureau

I hereby certify that this multiple property documentation form has been approved by the National Register as a basis for evaluating related properties for listing in the National Register.

Signature of the Keeper Date 2/18/00
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SPANISH AMERICAN WAR IN PUERTO RICO

E. **STATEMENT OF HISTORIC Contexts**

**Introduction**

This multiple property nomination is a study of the cultural resources on the island of Puerto Rico associated with the Spanish-American War. For 113 days in the spring and summer of 1898, the United States waged its first overseas war with a European state. This war, generally referred to as the Spanish-American War, was a worldwide conflict that would gain for the United States island possessions in the Far East, the Pacific, and the Caribbean. In the Caribbean, the primary military objective of the United States was the defeat of Spanish forces on the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Cuba, for tactical naval reasons, would be the first Spanish Caribbean possession invaded by the United States. The liberation of the Cuban people from the Spain was the primary goal at the start of the war. However, war planners and politicians, such as Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, appreciated the importance of the island of Puerto Rico to the United States. Early in the war, Senator Lodge stated in a May 24 letter to Theodore Roosevelt, “Porto Rico is not forgotten and we mean to have it”. Roosevelt replied the next day, stating that no peace settlement should be made that did not include provisions for Cuban independence, detachment of the Philippine Islands from Spain, and annexation of Puerto Rico (Trask 1981:341). The blockade and destruction of the Spanish fleet at the Santiago de Cuba Bay, and the investment by United States land forces of that town, would occupy most of the time and effort of the United States military in the Caribbean. With the destruction of the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898, and the surrender of Spanish land forces in Santiago, Cuba on July 17, 1898, the full attention of the United States Army and Navy became focused on Puerto Rico.

From April 25 until July 25, 1898, the United States Navy was the sole American military power responsible for engaging Spanish forces on Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American War. The Navy tried to enforce a blockade of the island ports, bombarded the city of San Juan, intercepted and sank a Spanish blockade-runner, and was involved in a minor naval engagement with Spanish ships off the coast of San Juan. The invasion and occupation of Puerto Rico by United States military land forces would only take up the last nineteen days of the war, from July 25 until August 12, 1898, when the Peace Protocol ending the war was signed. In comparison with the campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines, the relatively small loss of life, rapid advance of the United States troops and the general welcome by the inhabitants made the Puerto Rico Campaign the most successfully executed and directed land engagement of the Spanish-American War.
The Spanish-American War was a war of several “firsts” for the United States. It was the first planned projection of American military power overseas with the intention of securing and retaining possessions in the Far East, the Pacific, and Caribbean. It was a war that brought together the people of the American North and South in the post-Reconstruction period, by means of the Presidential appointment of former Confederate generals to command Federal forces in the Cuban campaign, and the mustering of state militia units from the South into federal service. It was the first American war conducted using the Navy, rather than the Army, as the principal strategic military instrument of United States policy objectives. It was the first modern war for the United States in terms of equipment—armored battleships, observation balloons, telephones, repeating firearms, and Gatling guns—and transportation of great masses of war materiel and troops for thousands of miles by rail and steamship. It was also the first war that provided practically instant media coverage to the American public by means of telephone, telegraph, illustrations, photography, newspapers, and motion pictures.

In contrast, it could be said that for Spain, the Spanish-American War was a war of “lasts”. It was the last defense, both internal and external, of the remains of a worldwide, four hundred-year-old empire, which the Spanish still dreamed of recovering. It was a war that saw the exacerbation of political and social divisions between the peninsular Spanish and the remaining colonial Spanish, who took the issue of their self-definition to the point of rebellion and war. It was a war that saw the destruction of Spain’s illusions of world power by the economic, political, technological and military realities of a new age in world politics.

Puerto Rico is the only former Spanish territory in the Caribbean gained, and still held, by the United States since the Spanish-American War. As such, the properties associated with the Puerto Rican Campaign of the Spanish-American War have unique value in terms of their historic association with the historic processes of the United States, Spain and Puerto Rico.

This Multiple Property Documentation Form (MPDF) will facilitate the identification, evaluation and registration of extant cultural resources associated to the Spanish-American War in Puerto Rico. Associative Property Types related to the Puerto Rican Campaign of the Spanish-American War include, amongst others, Landing Areas, Bombardment and Battle/Skirmish sites, Flag Raising Sites and Staging Areas. Many of the properties discussed in the historic context have already been nominated individually or as part of other multiple property nominations to the National Register of Historic Places (see Section H).
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HISTORIC BACKGROUND

United States -- Spain Relations (1776-1868): American and Spanish interests in the Caribbean

The United States traditionally had good relations with the Spanish government, which had supplied manpower, arms, and money to the Americans equal to that of the French during the American Revolution (Thomson 1976). In the context of its historic confrontation with England over the colonial possessions in the Caribbean, the Spanish government encouraged friendly ties between the United States and its own possessions, to the extent of protecting American corsairs fleeing a pursuing English frigate in 1777, by hoisting the Spanish colors on the American ships as they lay in the harbor of Mayagüez, Puerto Rico (Negroni 1992:311-312). The subsequent development of strong commercial ties was rapid, and its importance was such that, when the Spanish government imposed controls on the United States trade with its Caribbean possessions, the American reaction included expressions favoring annexation of Puerto Rico and Cuba. In 1783, American Secretary John Adams called for the political annexation of Puerto Rico and Cuba; while four years later, Thomas Jefferson expressed himself in similar terms. However, these last expressions concerning expansionism manifested a desire to include the entire hemisphere under the aegis of the new republic (Negroni 1992:312; Cruz Monclova 1979: I, 169-170).

The 1795 “Friendship, Limits and Navigation” treaty provided for the establishment of reciprocal consulates, though it was not enacted until 1815 – the collected dispatches of the American consuls in Puerto Rico remain an important source of information regarding the continued relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico throughout the 19th C. The goods acquired as a result of this treaty figured importantly in the commerce that helped to sustain Puerto Rico during the English attack in 1797, while the continued increase in commerce during the first quarter of the 19th C. seemed to allay American thoughts of annexation.

The first quarter of the 19th C saw distinct, if complementary, internal political processes in Spain and the United States. The wars of independence in Latin America would deprive Spain of most of its overseas possessions, which became countries in their own right, and, throughout the rest of the century, affected Spanish policy towards its few remaining colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. In the United States, territorial expansion was seen as the key to its development, and the burgeoning aspirations to hemispheric power found their expression in the “Monroe Doctrine”, which stated "that the American continents, by the free and
independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers" (The History Net July 10, 1977:2). It seems clear that both these processes were linked in the American political mind, and fundamentally influenced relations between the United States, Spain and the future balance of power in the Western Hemisphere.

By 1823, the United States expressed its continued interest in the status quo in the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, when Secretary of State John Quincy Adams stated “the United States would not see with pleasure that Cuba or Puerto Rico should pass into the possession of any other power” (Cruz Monclova, 1979:I:170). This sentiment was again expressed in 1825 by Secretary of State Henry Clay (Ibid:I:207). One year later, at the Panama Congress convened by Simón Bolívar to discuss, amongst other points, the possibility of a military expedition to end Spanish dominion and determine the political destiny of Puerto Rico and Cuba, the United States representatives opposed any action that would alter the political destiny of the islands. (Ibid.:I:185). The ever-increasing volume of trade confirmed the American interest in these islands: by 1832, the United States was Puerto Rico’s biggest market, and by 1851, 42% of the island’s exports went to American ports; in comparison, only 6.75% went to Spain’s market (Ibid.: I, 200, 315).

The 1840’s and 1850’s saw an increase in the animosity between Spain and the United States over the issue of hegemony in the Caribbean, as related to Puerto Rico and Cuba. In his inaugural speech in 1845, newly elected President Polk declared that the acquisition of possessions outside the United States could be of vital interest to the country. Another incident in 1850, the imprisonment in Puerto Rico of the crew of the shipwrecked American schooner North Carolina, strained relations between Spain and the States, in addition to prompting then-governor of Puerto Rico Juan Manuel de la Pezuela (1841-1851) to reorganize the military defenses of the island, anticipating another “pirate expedition” organized by the United States (Ibid.:I: 334-335). With the progressively discordant participation of the American press and public expressions by prominent figures calling for the outright annexation of the islands given the obvious incapacity of Spain to govern them, the relations between the countries became increasingly difficult. One particular event was the 1854 meeting of the American ministers to Spain (Pierre Soulé), France (James Buchanan) and England (John Mason) in Ostende, and who, identifying with President Pierce’s expansionist policies and the events of the time, issued a public Manifesto declaring that the United States should offer Spain $120 million for Cuba, and if denied, should declare war on Spain and take the island. Notwithstanding its interest, the government in Washington disavowed all three
ministers, given the energetic response in Europe and the objections of Spain, France and England, in addition to
the general lack of interest by the American people. However, then-governor of Kansas, Robert J. Walker, wrote
to President Pierce that: “...Cuba! Cuba and Puerto Rico, if possible, should be the cry, the sign of your
administration; and it shall be enveloped in a halo of glory...” (Ibid.:I: 352). The issue of annexation was openly
debated on the U.S. Congress floor between 1859 and 1861, invoking the “Manifest Destiny” doctrine, but any
further discussion was interrupted by the events leading to the Civil War (Ibid.:I: 510-511). However, by 1867,
Secretary of State Charles Seward, following the prevailing strategic naval wisdom that the United States should
possess a station for refuge and provisions in the Caribbean, presented the Spanish government in Madrid with
an offer to buy the islands of Culebra and Culebritas, off the east coast of Puerto Rico. By this time, Spanish
opinion regarding the aggressive displays of American expansionism already considered armed conflict with the
United States as imminent (Ibid.:I: 511-512).

Setting the Stage for the Spanish-American War (1868-1894): The First Cuban Revolt and Reform
When studying the events that occurred between 1868 and 1898, it is important to understand the circumstances
of the Spanish regime and the reasons for the different reactions in Puerto Rico and Cuba to these events. The
social, political and economic turbulence in Europe and Spain during the early to mid-19thC was reflected in
often-contradictory policies, which caused Spain to lose its economic, social and political monopolies over the
colonies. On the other hand, the era fostered changes to the traditional commercial patterns in the colonies,
notably in the sugar industry, where the small sugar farms (ingenios) were gradually replaced by larger
agricultural production centers, exemplified by the more technologically advanced and mechanized sugar central
towards the end of the 19thC, and which were owned largely by foreign capital, including French and American.
Depending on their particular relationship to the developing economic changes, the nascent, liberal bourgeoisie
class that came into being in Cuba and Puerto Rico at the time quite vocally expressed its opposition to, or
support of, Spanish policies. The polarization of the political debate in the 19th C, paralleled by similar processes
in Spain, reflects the increasing friction between these new ideas and groups, which included conservative
Spanish monarchists, reformists who favored autonomy within the Spanish empire, separatists who wished for
independence as a country or part of a Caribbean federation, and those who wished for annexation to the United
States. Thus, by the middle of the 19th century, the fundamental economic, social and political patterns that
would influence the events that followed had assumed their particular expression in Spain, Cuba and Puerto
Rico.
The situation reached a crisis point in 1868, when violent revolts took place in Spain (La Gloriosa), Cuba (Grito de Yara) and Puerto Rico (Grito de Lares). On September 23, 1868, the separatist revolt and attempted coup in Lares, Puerto Rico, led by Manuel Rojas and other separatists against Spanish authority, was firmly put down within a few days, and the leaders exiled (Wagenheim 1993:114-116). For the next thirty years, the Spanish government imposed order in Puerto Rico by establishing a constant military presence with well-distributed military posts throughout the island, and instituting repressive policies such as the ill-famed componte (1887). Eventually, this artificial order based on might rather than justice began to rankle the population of Puerto Rico, even after the granting of autonomy in 1897 (Jacobsen 1899:20). In spite of the fact that the revolutionaries did not win in 1868, the occasion served as a powerful catalyst for other groups. Between 1868 and 1898 numerous schemes to foment revolution in Puerto Rico came to naught, but hundreds of Puerto Ricans fought for Cuban independence in the Second Cuban Revolt of 1895 (Delgado 1964; Nofi 1996:228). During the war of 1898, this would be contrasted by the fact that Spain called up some of the best Puerto Rican militia units for service in the increasingly unpopular war in Cuba. During the American attack on San Juan Hill, the Rough Riders would engage Puerto Ricans loyal to Spain in combat (Nofi 1996:333).

However, it was the first Cuban Revolt, begun in October of 1868, that first sparked debate in the United States to recognize the Cuban insurgents, but motions to this effect were defeated. In 1869, after the end of the Civil War, the United States offered to buy Puerto Rico and Cuba for $150 million. Spain’s refusal was greeted with a storm of protest in the American press, while the exiled Cuban rebels in New York fed the American press with stories of Spanish cruelty in the war (Negroni 1992:314). The period of the first Cuban Revolt (1868-1878) was marked by the growth of popular feeling against Spain in the United States. Cuban rebels had established a junta, or government in exile in New York, where funds were raised to outfit ships to carry arms to the rebels in Cuba (Millis 1931:11; Nofi 1996:25). In 1873, this activity almost led to war between Spain and the United States, when the Spanish vessel Tornado captured the American-registered ship Virginian in international waters. On board the Virginian were over 100 Cuban rebels and a large quantity of guns and ammunition for fighting the Spanish. Before this incident could be mediated, the Spanish governor of Santiago de Cuba, General Juan Burriel, shot fifty-three of the men of crew and passengers, including the captain, Joseph Fry. At least four of the men shot were decapitated, and their heads displayed on spikes (O’Toole 1984:39-44). War between the United States and Spain was averted only by the intervention of Sir Lambton Lorraine, captain of the British man-of-war Niobe in Santiago de Cuba, who managed to retrieve the survivors of the Virginian (Millis 1931:15;
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Cruz Monclova 1979:II: 349). The Spanish government issued an apology and paid reparations to the families of the dead men (Nofi 1996:26). In Puerto Rico, these events prompted governor Primo de Rivera to meet with local press leaders and recommend, "...in light of the imminence of an armed conflict between Spain and the United States..." that all political debate be postponed, and efforts were made to rouse public opinion to reject any possible external aggression the island might be subject to (Cruz Monclova 1979:II: 350). The governor's reaction, though not official Spanish policy, reflects the perceived inevitability of war with the United States.

By 1874 the United States and Spain had signed a "Friendship Protocol" which, for the moment, halted the friction between the two nations (Negroni 1992:314; Cruz Monclova 1979:II: 349-354). In January of 1876, Alfonso XII became the King of Spain and provided the leadership to implement a negotiated solution to the conflict in Cuba (Nofi 1996:26). General Martínez Campos, the military governor of Cuba, induced the rebels:...

...to lay down their arms by a promise of amnesty and of the concession to Cuba of the same governmental system as that enjoyed by Porto [Puerto] Rico. At nightfall on February 10, 1878, the "Pact of Zanjón" was signed in a ruined farmhouse in Camaguey; the [rebel] chieftains immediately departed to inform their scattered bands that they were to turn in their arms, an emissary was dispatched to New York to notify the junta, and the Ten Year War was over. It developed later that when the Pact of Zanjón was signed neither side knew what the governmental system enjoyed by Porto Rico really was! (Millis 1931:16).

The signing of the "Pact of Zanjón" in 1878 effectively removed one of the main irritants to the relations between Spain and the United States. However, an end to the war did not end anti-Spanish feeling in the United States, which was constantly fed by sensationalist, even fictional newspaper articles, led by William Randolph Hearst's Journal and Joseph Pulitzer's World (Millis 1931:42-43). By 1879 the start of the so-called "Little War" (Guerra Chiquita) in Cuba revived the interest of the United States in the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean, but the brief duration of this conflict convinced the United States that Spain had the upper hand in Cuba.

Interest in annexing the islands never really disappeared, arising again in 1891, when the United States Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, declared that the United States "should annex the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico" (Negroni 1992:315; Cruz Monclova 1979:VI: 223). The United States press continued its anti-Spanish attacks up to the eve of the outbreak of hostilities in the Spanish-American War, where statements of this nature were commonplace and formed an integral part of any article concerning Spain (Negroni 1992:315).
By January 1892, the efforts of Cuban exile leader José Martí to unify and organize the Cuban exiles had culminated in the founding of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano) or CRP, whose stated objective was to achieve "the absolute independence of Cuba and to foment and aid that of Puerto Rico" (Rosario Natal 1989:87). The creation of the CRP encouraged the founding of the Club Borinquen, which brought together exiles who sought independence for Puerto Rico. The historic connection between Cuban and Puerto Rican separatism since the beginnings of the 19th C. was fomented by the writings of prominent Puerto Rican thinkers such as Eugenio María de Hostos, Lola Rodríguez de Tió and Ramón Emeterio Betances besides Martí himself, and shaped the revolutionaries’ conviction that the independence of both islands was one and the same problem (Rosario Natal 1989:88). However, the Club Borinquen’s efforts were subordinated to the main goal of the CRP, the independence of Cuba (Rosario Natal 1989:91), a situation which would definitively affect Puerto Rican separatism through to 1898 and afterwards.

In June of 1893, aware of the tense situation in Cuba, the Liberal Spanish government of Prime Minister Práxedes Mateo Sagasta presented a proposal for extensive reforms regarding Cuba and Puerto Rico to the Spanish Parliament (Cortes), which included making the islands provinces of Spain, the decentralization of the public administration and administrative reform (Rosario Natal 1989:42). In Spain, the measure provoked a storm of opposition from conservatives, while moderates, reformists and liberals gave it only lukewarm support since the measure did not go far enough in its reforms. The project was defeated by the vigorous opposition led by conservative Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, also supported by the conservatives in Cuba (Partido Unión Constitucional) and Puerto Rico (Partido Incondicional Español), who expressed the fear that the project would establish a provincial delegation that would overrule the Governor in Cuba and displace the interests of the government in Spain (Rosario Natal 1989:45-47).

A year later (1894), Sagasta’s government presented another reform proposal that, although including concessions to the conservative opposition, was essentially the same as the one presented the year before. As the specter of renewed fighting in Cuba became more real to both conservative and liberal politicians in Madrid, the compromise represented by the proposed reforms gained support (Rosario Natal 1989: 47-48).
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War Becomes Inevitable (1895-1898): Revolution, Reform and Autonomy

On February 24, 1895 the Second Cuban Revolt erupted with the Grito de Baire. The revolt, planned by Cuban revolutionary exiles in the United States under the leadership of Jose Martí, had inadvertently been aided by the United States government, which had imposed heavy tariffs on that island (Nofi 1996:28). Led by General Máximo Gómez, one of the military commanders of the First Cuban Revolt, the revolutionaries realized they did not possess the military strength to defeat the Spanish and win their independence. Therefore, the strategy of the Second Cuban Revolt was to avoid major battles with the Spanish Army and wage a guerrilla war of short quick attacks, which through attrition would wear down the Spanish resolve. Key to this strategy was the destruction of the sugar economy of Cuba, which made the island so valuable to the Spanish and foreigners. Cuban revolutionaries were soon burning the cane fields and sugar factories of plantations run and/or financed by Americans. American business and political interests became allied in support of the Cuban rebels’ independence movement, or any measures that would preserve American investments in the Cuban sugar fields. It was General Gómez’s hope the destruction of American businesses would lead to American intervention on the side of the rebels.

The outbreak of rebellion in Cuba caused indignant public and parliamentary reaction in Spain, making the concession of any reforms impossible, and causing the fall of Prime Minister Sagasta’s Liberal government and the formation of a new Conservative government led by Cánovas del Castillo. The Spanish public was gripped in such a euphoric wave of war fever that it was impossible for the Spanish government to implement any reforms until the rebellion was crushed by force of arms. In a display of patriotism, both liberals and conservatives in Puerto Rico vied against each other in claiming to be the most loyal to Spain, though the former did so with the hope of proving that Puerto Rico was deserving of receiving the benefits of reform, without having to wait for the resolution of the war in Cuba. However, it became clear to the liberals in Puerto Rico that the Spanish Parliament was exclusively interested in quelling the rebellion in Cuba, not reforming their colonial system (Rosario Natal 1989: 53-55). In other words, what mattered to Spain was preserving its hold over Cuba.

In the separatist ranks, it became apparent to the exiled Puerto Rican leaders of the Club Borinquen that, due to the war, the Cuban Revolutionary Party’s priority would now be exclusively Cuba, and Puerto Rico would be relegated to secondary importance. The inability of the Club Borinquen to promote the Puerto Rican cause from within the CRP led them to officially found the Puerto Rican Section (Sección Puerto Rico) of the party. This
way, it was hoped that the unity of the Puerto Rican and Cuban causes could be promoted within the CRP, and valuable support for armed revolt in Puerto Rico could be obtained.

Initially, the general opinion in Spain was that the war in Cuba would only last a few months, while the so-called “bandits” responsible for the revolt were dispersed. This illusion was dispersed when the rebel generals Antonio and José Maceo, and José Martí and Máximo Gómez disembarked in Cuba in April of 1895, and Spain had to confront the fact that it faced a true revolution. Even with the death of José Martí in May, by late 1895 the failure of General Martínez Campos, appointed by Cánovas to deal with the insurgence in Cuba, became clear.

In January of 1896, the Spanish government appointed General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau to destroy the Cuban rebels by military means. He vigorously pursued this goal by arranging the mass movement, or “reconcentration”, of the Cuban peasants into government-controlled camps to prevent them from aiding the rebels. Crops and farm animals outside these camps were destroyed to cut off supplies to the rebels. Unfortunately, the Spanish government did not have the means to care for these people. The crowded and confined conditions of the reconcentration camps, and Spanish inability to provide adequate care, soon led to starvation and epidemics. It has been estimated between 200,000 and 400,000 Cubans died over the next two years in the reconcentration camps. Stories of the suffering of the Cuban people were disseminated to the American public by the Cuban Revolutionary Party established in New York, and greatly exaggerated by the “Yellow Press” papers of Joseph Pulitzer’s *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst’s *New York Journal*, who called General Weyler “Butcher Weyler” (Nofi 1996:30-31).

In August of 1896, Spain was faced with another colonial revolt in the Philippines. The Spanish were forced to divide their forces between these two colonial holdings on opposite sides of the world (Perez 1983:82). Both the military and private populations of Spain rebelled. In Madrid, Seville, and Zaragoza, the citizens began to stage demonstrations against both wars (Perez 1983:84). The Spanish soldiers were actually refusing to board ships sailing for Cuba (Perez 1983:85). Spain was on the brink of civil war. By 1897, the French banks that Spain secured financing from had canceled Spanish credit pending a resolution to the Cuban campaign (Perez 1983:87). All of these conflicts weakened Spain’s position in Cuba as men and money were diverted to differing causes.
Autonomy

The Autonomist Party in Puerto Rico had been founded in 1887. However, the difficulties posed by the repressive political environment (e.g., the 1887 Componte) and infighting within the party prevented it from pursuing its stated objective: increased autonomy for Puerto Rico within the Spanish empire. The party’s resurgence in the 1890’s is largely owed to the energetic leadership of Luis Muñoz Rivera and, encouraged by Sagasta’s Liberal party’s attempted reforms of 1893 and 1894, had culminated in 1896 with a political alliance between Sagasta’s Liberal party and the Puerto Rican Autonomist party. The agreement called for the alignment of the Puerto Rican party with Sagasta’s Liberal party, in exchange for support for Puerto Rican autonomy should Sagasta’s party come to power in Spain. As events would turn out, the autonomy that Puerto Ricans had so assiduously negotiated for would become involved in the growing international crisis over Cuba.

The failure of General Weyler’s 1896 campaign in Cuba, together with the increasingly difficult political situation with the United States, led Spanish Prime Minister Cánovas to consider introducing reforms in order to attempt controlling the Situation in Cuba. The lull in the fighting caused by the death of Cuban revolutionary leader Antonio Maceo in December of 1896 allowed for the introduction of these reforms, which were also meant to induce the United States to relieve some of its diplomatic pressure on Spain. However, these reforms fell short of satisfying either the liberals in Spain or the expectations of the United States government, since they did not change colonial rule significantly. Cánovas’ attempts to expand the scope of the reforms was interrupted by his unexpected assassination on August 8, 1897 (Rosario 1989:147-153, 158).

While McKinley’s inaugural speech early in 1897 had stated that the United States would never intervene in Cuba until all peaceful means had been attempted, the American view to preventing war was the need to grant true liberal reforms to the Cubans (Rosario Natal 1989:155-156). Public support for a manifesto issued in July of 1897 by Sagasta’s Liberal Party, which included autonomy for Cuba and Puerto Rico, marked a turn around in Spanish public opinion, since autonomy was presented as a means of achieving different objectives: pacifying Cuba; securing peace with the United States; and saving the national honor (Rosario Natal 1989:156-157). Together with the unexpected assassination of Cánovas, this sequence of events assured Sagasta’s rise to Prime Minister, and the consequent approval of autonomy for Cuba and Puerto Rico. The decrees formally establishing autonomy were issued on November 25, 1897. The United States, now represented by newly appointed Minister to Spain General Stewart L. Woodford, agreed to give the Spanish government what it decided was a reasonable
amount of time in which to test autonomy in Cuba and Puerto Rico. However, they also made it clear intervention was a course of action open to the United States should Spain's efforts fail to restore order in Cuba (Nofi 1996:37-38). These events, together with the dismissal of General Weyler in Cuba, turned out to be a case of too little too late for the Cuban rebels, whose aspiration for independence had broken out into war and gained too much momentum to be pacified by autonomy. On the other hand, for Puerto Rico it was more than the autonomists had believed possible in such a short time, and the ample popular support for autonomy on the island paved the way for the installment of an autonomous government by February of 1898.

The Road to War: the Loss of the Maine and Preparations for War

For the United States, several factors influenced the immediate events prior to the Spanish-American War. Recovering from the Civil War, the settlement of the western states and emerging from the Reconstruction, the newly unified country began to look outside its borders to determine its place in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was seen as the formula by which the United States could assume the role of protector of democracy (and American interests) in the Western Hemisphere, in addition to justifying its territorial expansion. The inability of Spain to control the destruction of American-owned sugar plantations and other interests by Cuban revolutionaries made it the natural target for the expansion of American influence. The popular indignation in the United States over about what were perceived as human rights violations in their Caribbean “backyard”, and the open sympathy for the Cuban rebels, was aided and abetted by communications technology—telegraph, film, newspapers and photography— that offered the American people almost daily access to the conditions in Cuba and Puerto Rico. This perception is confirmed by the Republican Party platform of 1896 which, in contrast to the Cleveland administration’s neutral position regarding the Cuban revolt, left little doubt of the sympathy that existed in the United States for the Cuban rebels, and that the political party in power felt that military intervention was becoming inevitable if order could not restored in Cuba (Alger 1901: 1-2).

The United States had continuously pressed the government in Madrid to grant autonomy to its Caribbean possessions as a means of stabilizing the Cuban situation. However, the Cuban rebels rejected the offer of autonomy, while conservative elements among the Spanish civilians and military in Havana had rioted against autonomy and American interference in Spanish affairs in early January of 1898. As a physical form of demonstrating America’s concern about protecting American business interests and lives in Cuba, in January 1898 the USS Maine was sent to Havana for a “friendly visit” (Freidel 1958:8), at the urging of the American
Consul-General in Havana, Fitzhugh Lee. Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, of the Maine, knew that the visit was to be an exercise in diplomacy and psychology and planned accordingly. In order to make a grand entrance, Sigsbee waited until Havana harbor was awake before making his appearance (O'Toole 1984:24). In a reciprocal action, the Spanish Prime Minister Sagasta sent the Spanish armored cruiser *Vizcaya* on a similar courtesy call to the harbor of New York (Millis 1931:95).

In Captain Sigsbee’s estimate the presence of the Maine had the desired effect. Trask quotes Sigsbee as saying,

> In my opinion the arrival of the Maine has caused the United States Government to dominate the situation. It has reduced to absurdity the warnings and implied threats published from Spanish sources previous to the arrival of the vessel (1981:25).

This complacency would be the downfall of the Maine and its crew. According to Albert A. Nofi, these diplomatic efforts and naval visits only were a lull between the two countries before the war:

> By the end of 1897 a war between the U.S. and Spain over Cuba was virtually inevitable. The U.S. had committed itself to ending the suffering- and financial catastrophe - which afflicted the island, a matter that could only take place if the insurrection came to an end. But that was not going to happen, for Spain would not grant the island independence, nor would the Rebels accept anything less (1996:41).

After riding at anchor in Havana harbor for almost a month without incident, the Maine suddenly exploded on February 15, 1898 at 9:40 PM, killing over 260 of the crew. While there was never any proof that the Spanish were involved in the sinking, the American government and public, stirred into frenzy by the American “Yellow Press” became increasingly vocal in their distrust of the Spanish. After rejecting a Spanish request for a joint investigating committee, the United States appointed a six-member Naval Court of Inquiry on the sinking of the Maine, presided by then Captain William T. Sampson (Clements 1907:27).

Puerto Ricans followed the events surrounding the Maine with a sense of anxiety as Cuba, overnight, became the center of a clash between titans representing two different and colliding worlds, and which might threaten their recently gained autonomy. On the other hand, for the exiled separatist movement the war provided the perfect instrument (and timing) for the island to obtain its independence from Spain. All of a sudden, the United States seemed to become the answer to their problem. Dr. Julio Henna, a leader of the Puerto Rican Section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, felt that this was the perfect time to make an approach to the United States’ government. On March 10, 1898 Henna met for the first time with President William McKinley. His petition...
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was quite simple: the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the United States’ war plans against Spain. Interested by the proposal, the President asked Henna to meet with Theodore Roosevelt, at the time Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Accordingly, Henna met with Roosevelt and provided military information concerning Puerto Rico that was to help the Americans if they decided to invade. Geographical and infrastructure data was also handed over on that occasion. In spite of Henna’s interest, Roosevelt shortly confessed to him that: \textit{We have not given a single thought; I do not to have a single thing on it [the island]. All our activities are concentrated on Cuba, future theater of our operations.} (Rivero 1922:18)

This stated lack of interest did not stop Henna. On March 14, he submitted additional information to Roosevelt related to the general infrastructure of the island, available equipment and defensive apparatus. He also stated that he wanted to accompany the invading forces as Civil Commissioner of Puerto Rico and that other Puerto Ricans from New York wished to accompany the invading forces. Some time later, Henna held an interview with Senator Cabot Lodge during which he specifically asked the senator to intervene in their favor before the President. However, he was able to personally deliver this message, for he met for a second time with McKinley on March 21. Impressed by Henna’s willingness to help and with the amount of information he provided, the President asked Henna to meet with a Colonel Wagner of his staff. The result was the so-called Wagner Plan, which proposed that 12,000 men land in San Juan, where the invasion would start. Although Henna had previously favored a single attack either at San Juan or at Bahia Honda (Guánica), he proposed an alternate plan to Wagner: a simultaneous invasion at five different places (4,000 men at San Juan; 2,000 at Humacao; 2,000 at Ponce; 2,000 at Mayaguez; and 2,000 at Arecibo).

The U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry on the sinking of the \textit{Maine}, tendered its report to Congress on March 28\textsuperscript{th} (Clements 1907:27). The Court of Inquiry concluded,

- That the loss of the \textit{Maine} was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew.
- That the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines; and,
- That no evidence had been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the \textit{Maine} upon any person or persons [Abbot 1898:846].
On the other hand, a Spanish Court of Inquiry found that an internal explosion—probably in the forward coal bunkers—was the cause of the loss of the Maine (Millis 1931:129; Nofi 1996:43). The only other formal investigation of the sinking of the Maine, carried out in 1976 by U.S. Navy Admiral Hyman Rickover, confirmed the finding of the Spanish court (Rickover 1976). In spite of the fact that the Spanish Regent Queen telegraphed a formal message of sympathy to the United States government, the Americans promptly accused the Spanish of being responsible for the incident. Popular opinion, readily outraged, interpreted the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry’s findings as an indictment of the Spanish regime in Cuba—"Remember the Maine!" soon became a catch phrase of the time and the upcoming war (Freidel 1958:8).

Writing after the war, Miles argued that not many in the United States wanted to go to war, such as Secretary of State John Sherman, who “was decidedly opposed to it [the war], and deemed it absolutely unnecessary.” In turn, he believed that:

“The sending of the battleship Maine to Spanish waters was most unfortunate at the time...I have never believed that the disaster was caused by the Spanish government nor its officials or agents. They certainly had no motive for such a crime, and every reason to avoid it...I believe that the disaster resulted for internal rather than external causes.” (Miles, 1911:269)

Military Preparations

After two decades of modernization, the United States Navy was in a position to take action outside the borders of the country almost immediately. Although Congress had set the level of the Regular Navy at 12,500 officers and men, the Navy could call on 15 states that had naval militia. During the war in 1898, both the USS Yosemite and the Dixie would be crewed by naval militia from Michigan and Maryland, respectively, in what would be the first active service of what would later become the United States Naval Reserve (Nofi 1996:217-218).

While the U.S. Navy was modernized and expanded in the last decades of the 19th century, the American Army had been severely downsized since the end of the Civil War. By 1895, General Nelson Appleton Miles had been appointed Commanding General of the Army, a position considered largely honorary since President Grant’s administration. Ambitious and independent, Miles did not take his duties lightly. He worked tirelessly to improve the standing of the regular Army and provide better training for the state militia infantry, artillery and cavalry units. However, in January 1898, Democratic Representative George B. McClellan, Jr. stated that the
United States Army was outdated, under trained, and lacked reserve ammunition. (Cosmas 1971:5). Cosmas adds that:

"...the Army in 1897 had an authorized strength of only 25,000 officers and men, insufficient even to keep its 25 infantry, 10 cavalry and 5 artillery regiments at their minimum peacetime strength. In fact, two companies of each infantry and cavalry regiment existed only on paper (1971:5-6).

There were concerns about the quality of American volunteer troops, but the status and training of Spanish troops were unknown to the American army. In a German report published by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence after the Spanish-American War, German Naval Commander Hermann Jacobsen reported that the Spanish volunteer troops of 1898 had been neither well trained nor equipped.

It is questionable whether the (Cuban and Puerto Rican) volunteers, when it comes to actual fighting, will prove efficient. In the first place, their equipment are very defective, and, besides, their training is not sufficient to fit them for war. It may be stated as a general thing—and this applies to the regular troops as well—that the training is not adapted to war purpose. I witnessed, for instance, a drill of coast artillery (at San Cristóbal in San Juan on May 11, 1898) where the movements of loading and firing were practiced. Projectiles, cartridges, etc., were lacking at the drill. The guns were not aimed, there was no sighting. That was one day before an actual bombardment occurred at that place (by American vessels commanded by Admiral Sampson). It is very evident that such gun crews cannot do very efficient work. In only a few of the coast towns did target practice take place, and then only to a very limited extent (Jacobsen 1899:10).

As the American troops were undergoing training for future combat in the Caribbean, conditions in Cuba were very poor for the Spanish troops. Spanish regiments in Cuba were manned with troops unable to purchase better assignments. Many of the Spanish troops in Cuba were little more than young boys (minimum recruitment age was 19) who, being relatively untrained, would often surrender at the first indication of conflict. In addition, by this time the rebel Cuban forces had earned the respect, and even fear, of the Spanish troops – their dreaded, suicidal machete charge struck fear into even the most battle-hardened veterans. In addition, the underfed and inadequately housed Spanish troops in Cuba lived in conditions that favored epidemic diseases, and were generally not up to the challenge of fighting the Americans. However, conditions in Puerto Rico were far more favorable, because of its climate, geography and the lack of armed and organized rebellion (Perez 1983:74-78; Espadas 1997).
In the United States, the role of supporting the Regular Army fell to the state militia or National Guard, composed of a rough collection of infantry units, cavalry troops, and artillery batteries. The Regular Army was well equipped, trained, and commanded, while the state militias were indifferently or poorly outfitted and led. Most of the senior Army officers were veterans of the Civil War and it had been over thirty years since any of them had commanded units larger than a regiment [1200 men] (Cosmas 1971:14). On the eve of the war, it seemed clear that the United States did not have an army in any operational sense of the word.

**War is Declared**

Following the naval report on the sinking of the Maine, public opinion forced President McKinley to transmit an ultimatum to the Spanish government on March 29th, through the American Minister in Madrid, Stewart L. Woodford. McKinley demanded an end to the reconcentration policy, an immediate armistice on Cuba, and accession to Cuba’s independence by arbitration (Nofi 1996:44). The Spanish reply on March 31st was considered ambiguous, and further negotiations would proceed until April 11th, when an exasperated administration in Washington ordered Woodford to curtail discussions with the Spanish, as President McKinley addressed Congress on the situation. The U.S. Congress then approved a resolution, in the form of an ultimatum calling for Spain to: 1) fully retreat from its colonies; and 2) completely renounce to its authority over Cuba. Approved by the House of Representatives (311 to 6) on April 13th and by the Senate (42 to 35) on April 16th, the resolution gave the Spanish government until April 23rd to comply with these conditions, or Congress would give President McKinley authorization to mobilize troops and occupy Cuba. On April 20th, the President signed the war resolution from Congress. As soon as the Spanish Minister in Washington, Luis Polo de Bernabé, received a copy of the resolution, he requested his passport from U.S. Secretary of Foreign Relations John Sherman and left the country via Canada, entrusting all of Spain’s affairs to the Austro-Hungarian embassy. By the time the American Minister in Spain, General Stewart L. Woodford, received a copy of the resolution that he was to deliver to the Spanish crown, on April 21st, diplomatic relations between the two countries had been severed. Woodford, as had his peer in Washington, asked for his passport and left for Paris, entrusting American affairs to the British embassy. On April 22nd, McKinley called for 125,000 volunteers, and the American fleet prepared to leave Key West in Florida, to begin the first phase of the American plans for war with Spain— the blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico (Millis 1931:143-5).
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Spanish and American Fleet Movements, April/May 1898

Even before of the diplomatic formalities of the declaration of war took place by April 23rd, both the United States and Spain’s military had been planning for the likely war to come for some time. During the last decades of the 19th C. the United States Naval War College planners were establishing new priorities for possible American military actions. Amongst others, the theories of naval strategist Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan had influenced the modernization of the United States Navy in the last two decades of the 19th C. Made public after the war, Mahan’s comprehensive plan for American world power based on maritime supremacy and overseas trade clearly outlined the strategic objectives and priorities which American military plans for the Spanish-American War followed closely (Cosmas 1971:36). Briefly, the only way to conduct the war with Spain efficiently was by: 1) blockading the Spanish Caribbean islands; 2) sinking Spanish fleets sent to protect the islands; and 3) only then landing troops on the islands. The strategic position of Puerto Rico in Caribbean was also appreciated by the American military. It was widely considered as advantageous to the United States as to seize the island and make it a forward base to protect the envisioned Panama Canal. Originally, General Nelson A. Miles had proposed that the United States first invade Puerto Rico to serve as an advance Caribbean base from which to move on Cuba (Millis 1931:237). However, this plan was abandoned until the Spanish Atlantic fleet could be found and destroyed (Nofi 1996:82). Mahan also wrote that Puerto Rico

“...would be invaluable to the mother country [Spain] as an intermediate naval station and as a base of supplies and reinforcements for both her fleet and army...if left in her undisturbed possession, it would enable her practically, to enjoy the same advantage of nearness to the great scene of operations that the United States had in virtue of our geographical position” (Trask 1981:339).

The Hunt for Cervera: Blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico

One of Spain’s first moves concerning the theater of war in the Caribbean was to order the grouping of its famed Atlantic fleet at the islands of Cabo Verde, under the command of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete. This fleet, composed of modern ships made in Europe that were much faster than the American ones, was truly a formidable enemy. However, the superior artillery of the American Navy counterbalanced the Spanish fleet’s advantage in terms of speed. Thus, as Spain positioned its fleet, the United States Navy moved to achieve its strategic objectives, as dictated by its pre-war planning: establishing a blockade of the island colonies and destroying the Spanish fleet. As General Miles succinctly expressed it: “The war was strictly a naval problem at first.” (Miles 1911:272).
On April 18, the Spanish fleet, composed of the battleships Infanta Maria Teresa and Cristóbal Colón, the cruisers Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo, the transatlantic Ciudad de Cádiz and a squadron of destroyers, including the Terror, Furor and Plutón, reached the Portuguese Cabo Verde Islands. Handicapped by serious shortcomings in personnel, equipment, armaments and rations, Cervera believed that the fleet should not be exposed to any fighting until these deficiencies were addressed. The Spanish government in Madrid paid no attention to his urgent messages regarding the state of the fleet. Spurred by Portugal’s declaration of neutrality in the conflict, Cervera had to leave San Vicente on April 29th, and was ordered to reach Puerto Rico to reinforce that relatively defenseless position as soon as possible, since a large amount of Spanish troops were already stationed in Cuba. Washington, in turn, was following Cervera’s movements closely. As soon as the Spanish fleet’s destination became apparent, the American government took appropriate action: between May 4th and 5th, the fleet sailed from Key West to Puerto Rico via Cuba, and the USS Yale was ordered towards Puerto Rico to reconnoiter for Cervera. Sampson’s fleet, composed of the battleships USS Indiana and USS Iowa, the battleship cruiser USS New York, the monitors USS Amphitrite and USS Terror, the protected cruisers USS Montgomery and USS Detroit, the torpedo boat USS Porter, the tugboat USS Wompatuck, the coal ship Niagara and two private yachts carrying members of the press, was to reach Puerto Rico via Cuba.

On the other side of the globe, the Spanish empire in the Pacific had already suffered a serious defeat. At first under orders to create a series of diversions near the Philippine Islands, the superior American fleet under Admiral Dewey forced its entry into the port of Manila. The ensuing naval engagement on May 1st resulted in the destruction of the entire Spanish Pacific fleet. In spite of the fact that the American troops under Dewey were not prepared for landing and direct combat, they did manage to force a Spanish surrender. News of the Philippine disaster devastated Spain.

Arriving off the entrance to San Juan harbor before dawn on the 12th of May, Sampson’s squadron engaged in the bombardment of the fortifications, city and bay in an effort to find out if Cervera’s fleet was there. After a few hours, Sampson departed for Cuba once again. On that day, the elusive Spanish fleet arrived in Martinique, where Cervera received the news that Puerto Rico and Cuba were surrounded by the American blockade. Leaving the destroyer Terror under repair in Fort-de-France, Cervera sailed to Curacao in search of coal to fuel his ships. Leaving Curacao the 15th, Cervera arrived in Santiago harbor on the 19th, where the steamer Reina
Mercedes was in port. That very same day, an American squadron including the USS Columbia, Minneapolis, Harvard, St. Louis and Yale left Key West towards Cienfuegos in Cuba, where they believed Cervera’s fleet would go. This squadron formed part of the force that intercepted the British coal steamer Restamel on May 25th, headed for Santiago with coal for Cervera’s fleet. By May 28th, the American squadron, now comprised by the USS Marblehead, Iowa, Brooklyn, New York, Oregon, Merrimac, Texas, Massachusetts, Yankee, New Orleans, Vixen, Suwanee, Dolphin, and Porter had confirmed Cervera’s presence in Santiago and effectively blockaded the harbor entrance (O’Toole, 1984; Millis 1931:231-235)

By May 25th, the first 2,500 troop contingent of an American army of occupation had left San Francisco, California on the USS Charleston and three transports headed for Manila, some seven thousand miles away (Millis 1931:226). On the way to Manila, the American fleet would make stops to capture Guam, claim Wake Island, and annex the Hawaiian Islands, all before undertaking the occupation of the Philippines. These actions created America’s colonial empire in the Pacific and Far East, which would have significant implications for the United States in the next century.

The Santiago Campaign

With the Spanish fleet bottled up in Santiago de Cuba, an improvised invasion force, the V Army Corps, made up of Regulars and Volunteer units and based at Tampa, Florida, under the command of General William R. Shafter, was ordered south to Santiago de Cuba. The harbor facilities at Tampa were inadequate for a modern army, and many delays were experienced before Shafter was able to leave his headquarters at Henry Plant's Tampa Bay Hotel (designated an NHL in 1976) on June 14th (Millis 1931:249).

In actual fact, the American invasion of Cuba had begun with the landing of a small Marine force at Guantánamo Bay on June 10th. The occupation of the bay was considered necessary for the fleet, since it would provide a safe haven for the blockading American fleet stationed off Santiago de Cuba in the event of foul weather. The bay area also became an important coaling base for the American fleet blockading Santiago de Cuba (Millis 1931:259).

On June 22nd, the first elements of Shafter’s army landed just east of Santiago de Cuba on Daiquiri Beach. Following the Battles of Las Guásimas on June 23rd and San Juan Hill on June 30th, the American Army and
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Cuban revolutionary troops invested the town of Santiago de Cuba. To make matters worse, an outbreak of malaria also occurred at this time in Cuba. It is important to remember that the Cuban revolutionaries had been fighting Spain since 1895, as a result of which Cuban commerce, agriculture and infrastructure were in a complete state of collapse. The situation can best be described as one of ruin and desolation, framed by hunger, tropical diseases and death. This was the stage that was set as the Americans came upon Santiago. The malaria epidemic was so widespread that even the American troops were affected by it. In addition to their not being formally trained combat troops, they had no experience in terms of weather conditions, adequate medicines or supplies. It can be said, without the shadow of a doubt, that the Americans faced a very serious situation, bordering on the desperate while at Santiago. Their situation, however, paled in comparison to the Spanish one.

As Santiago was not only cut from supplies from both land and sea but also subjected to constant American bombardment, life within the city indeed became a daily torture. Admiral Cervera, unwilling to surrender the fleet, initially refused orders from the commander of the city garrison to escape from the harbor in what amounted to a suicide mission. Faced with the possibility of being trapped in the harbor when Santiago fell to the American land offensive, he finally acceded and, on July 3rd, he led his fleet out of the harbor and ran the gauntlet the American blockaders had prepared. The result was the sinking or beaching of every vessel of the Spanish Atlantic fleet. The effect of this event was disastrous for Spanish morale, and sealed victory for the United States in Cuba. Negotiations for the surrender of all Spanish forces in eastern Cuba commenced and were nearly completed when General Miles arrived in Santiago on July 11th with forward elements of his I Corps reinforcements. As it turned out, Miles’ fresh troops would not be needed for the campaign in Cuba, as the Spanish formally surrendered on July 17th, finally freeing troops for the invasion of Puerto Rico.
First months of 1898 in Puerto Rico (January-June)

The peaceful conditions in Puerto Rico in late 1897 and early 1898 had encouraged the establishment of autonomous government, which was welcomed and supported by the majority of the population. However, delays were caused by sharp divisions within the autonomous movement, which were finally overcome by allowing a coalition to form a provisional governing cabinet on February 11, 1898. The agreement reached would allow the provisional cabinet time to organize and hold formal elections for the Chamber of Representatives, slated for March 27, 1898. While the overwhelming electoral victory of the Fusionistas (led by Muñoz Rivera, see section on Autonomy) over the conservative elements of the Autonomist party caused the latter to abandon the governing coalition, the extent of popular support for autonomy was undeniable, and paved the way for the establishment of the first democratically elected local government in Puerto Rico’s history (Rosario Natal 1989:169, 173).

On the eve of the declaration of war between Spain and the United States, there were approximately 18,000 Spanish troops in Puerto Rico, divided between approximately 10,000 volunteers and 8,000 Spanish regulars, stationed at different points on the island (Hermann 1907:14; Rivero 1922: 46-47). Considering the volunteer troops of doubtful value due to their lack of training, it was clear to Governor Macías that the 8,000 regular Spanish troops would be insufficient to properly defend the island against an American invasion force. Advised by the Spanish government of the probable outbreak of hostilities, Macías requested additional troops, materials and provisions from Spain. This request was rejected, and Macías was directed to request the needed reinforcements from the Captain General (military commander) in Cuba. On April 21, when diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were terminated and a state of war existed between both nations, Macías was again informed not to expect immediate help from Spain and instructed to use whatever forces available to him on the Island to defend its territorial integrity and the national honor. That day he issued a decree that suspended the individual guarantees granted by the Autonomous Charter given to Puerto Rico in 1897, followed by a second decree on April 22 declaring that the Island was in a state of war, and curbing the publication of any information concerning the organization and movements of naval and land units. (Rivero 1922:37-38; Cruz Monclova 1979:225-226). On April 23, the Governor issued a patriotic exhortation to Puerto Ricans to defend
the island and their shared heritage against the aggression of the United States, trusting that Spain would come to
their aid (Rivero 1922:40; Cruz Monclova: 1979:227; Jacobsen 1899:11; Trask 1981:338, footnote 4). While the declaration of war had been enthusiastically received by the general population in Puerto Rico, in a display of patriotic fervor that echoed the one in Spain, the suppression of the individual guarantees granted by the Autonomic Charter was disconcerting. Even so, plans proceeded towards convening the Chamber of Representatives elected in March, though this had been delayed due to the outbreak of hostilities.

Although the censorship of information concerning the war was understood and accepted as necessary, rumor and the bits and pieces of information that filtered into the island from outside sources fed the desire for news. In addition, Governor Macías opted to fabricate news that was favorable to the Spanish cause as a way of upholding morale. This situation heightened the uncertainty about the events of the war, which exacerbated the general anxiety. In one instance, a supposedly secret cable from Cuba was circulated on April 24, informing that the Cuban revolutionaries lead by Máximo Gómez had marched into the capital to lay down their weapons shouting “Viva España” (Rosario 1989: 183; Rivero 1922: 536-537). On May 2 another “cable” published in the newspaper La Gaceta relayed the news that the Spanish fleet in Cavite (Philippines) had defeated ships of the U.S. fleet. On both occasions the information caused widespread rejoicing and celebration when received, but when the truth became known, morale was crushed (Rosario 1989:183; Rivero 1922:540-541).

Notwithstanding this situation, the Autonomous Cabinet and local political parties all made patriotic exhortations to the citizens to defend the country against the foreign invaders. Over a thousand men joined the volunteer militia while in the towns throughout the Island local defense leagues were organized. Doctors, practitioners, senior citizens, and prominent women enlisted with the Red Cross to help establish hospitals, prepare ambulances and other valuable services. (Rivero 1922:49).

Another major concern for the Spanish authorities was maintaining order in the rural areas of Puerto Rico, where the majority of the population, comprised mostly of peasants and lower-income classes, was concentrated. Large-scale changes in the world market towards the end of the 19th century had stimulated the predominance of cash crops, such as sugar cane and coffee, in the local agricultural economy. As a result, by 1898 local subsistence and food crop production had decreased notably, which in turn required the importation of higher-priced foodstuffs and basic staples needed to feed the population. Together with the economic instability created
by deteriorating relations between the United States and Spain, this trend led to food shortages even before war was declared. The situation was aggravated by a severe drought during the first four and a half months of 1898, and became critical when food prices rose dramatically after war was declared, making it extremely difficult for the majority of the islanders to obtain adequate food supplies (Picó 1987: 41; Rosario Natal 1998:19). Even in the best of times, this sector of the population lived a precarious existence, living from pittance wages and receiving little, if any, medical attention. In addition, the measures implemented by the island authorities to solve the immediate problems faced by the population--such as providing seed for planting food crops--were insufficient, moreover since they were hamstrung by the lack of resources redistributed for war preparations (Rosario Natal 1998:48-49). By the beginning of the campaign in Puerto Rico, the shortages, drought and higher prices had brought famine and disease to the island. Although the U.S. Navy blockade on Puerto Rican ports was blamed at the time for the limited supply, it has been shown that this was not the case, since the blockade was ineffective in interdicting commerce in other ports besides San Juan. Some have argued that the price increases were due to speculation by merchants in order to profit from the situation (Rosario Natal 1998:29-36).

Puerto Rico Blockade

The American campaign in Puerto Rico would be preceded by the imposition of a naval blockade, primarily on the port of San Juan. All throughout April and into early May American warships would briefly appear and disappear on the horizon north of San Juan, and the locals began referring to them as tres chimeneas (three chimneys – a reference to the vessels’ three funnels) or fantasmas, or phantom ships. These blockade ships would appear at any moment of night or day to capture and, if necessary, sink any vessels attempting to enter or depart San Juan. The U.S. Navy attempted to keep at least one cruiser in sight of San Juan harbor entrance at all times. The USS Yale, St. Louis, and St. Paul were the ships mainly employed in this blockade duty of Puerto Rico (Rivero 1922:65). However, the blockade was not absolute and ships continued to slip into Puerto Rican seaports.

Not only could commerce blockade-runners enter San Juan, but also the ports of Arecibo on the north coast, Aguadilla and Mayagüez on the west coast, Ponce, Arroyo, and Guánica on the south coast, and Fajardo and Humacao on the east coast of the island, which were free of blockading American ships. During the blockade several ships were stopped, searched, and sometimes impounded. On May 8th, the USS Yale captured the Spanish cargo steamer Rita with a coal shipmate en route from St. Thomas to San Juan. Commander N. C. Wise
sent the *Rita* to Charleston, South Carolina with a prize crew (U.S. Navy Department, 1898:367). The *Rita* later served to transport American troops to Puerto Rico.

The modest naval force defending the port of San Juan consisted of the *Isabel II*, a unprotected cruiser (second class); the *General La Concha*, a cruiser (third class); the gunboats *Ponce de León* and *Criollo*; the *Alfonso XIII*, an ocean liner converted to an auxiliary cruiser; and the torpedo boat destroyer *Terror*, originally attached to Cervera’s fleet but which had steamed to San Juan after undergoing repair in Martinique, slipping through the American blockade. On May 9th, the *Yale* was temporarily driven off station by the armed transport *Alfonso XIII*, armed with 4 12 cm Hontoria guns (Gómez Nuñez 1902:75). The maneuver allowed the approaching blockade-runner *Paulina* from St. Thomas to enter San Juan Harbor (Rivero 1922:72).

**Bombardment of San Juan (May 12, 1898)**

Early in the morning of May 12, a squadron under the command of Rear Admiral William R. Sampson composed of the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*; the armored cruiser *New York*; the protected cruisers *Montgomery* and *Detroit*; the monitors *Amphitrite* and *Terror*, and the torpedo boat *Porter*, and the gunboat *Wompatuck* arrived off the entrance to the San Juan Bay. A description by W.A.M. Goode, a correspondent for the Associated Press, published in “*The Spanish-American War: The Events of the War Described by Eye Witnesses*”, summarizes the approach to San Juan, as seen from the USS *Iowa*:

> “Dawn was breaking, but everything was gray, and our lead-colored vessels cold hardly be distinguished. San Juan lay about three miles ahead, on our port bow. The big hill which forms the eastern arm of the harbor and juts out in front of the city stood out black against the faint light that rapidly creeping up over Porto Rico. A long row of straggling lamps made an illuminated semicircle on the hillside. They marked the course of the old fortification wall. Above and below this wall for about two miles were the enemy’s batteries... Through glasses the detail of the coast could be plainly made out-the rich vegetation, the occasional bare brown spots of rock; the yellow barracks standing beside the Castle of Morro, at the western extremity of the hill and the narrow harbor entrance with the masts of sunken ships sticking up. A small part of the inner harbor was exposed, and a two masted steamer was seen lying at anchor...” (1899:80-81)

The first action taken by the American fleet was to have the tug *Wompatuck*, under he command of Lt. Jungen, a survivor from the *Maine*, to moor a small rowboat “to the westward”, in order to mark shallow water (10 fathom mark) and also the starting point for the ship to shore bombardment. At about 5:15AM, the *Iowa* fired the first shot, following with a full broadside. There was no response from the fortifications, nor any indication of a naval reaction – it must be remembered that the American fleet was still uncertain of the location of Admiral
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Cervera’s Atlantic fleet, and that Sampson had been dispatched to Puerto Rico in search of the Spanish fleet. Jacobsen’s report on the bombardment of San Juan states that Admiral Sampson fired at the forts to make a determination of the strength of the Spanish resistance (1899:14). As Goode says in his description:

“Admiral Sampson had hoped that if there were any Spanish gunboats or any part of the Spanish fleet in San Juan harbor, they would come out to meet our fleet. That hope soon vanished, and nothing was left but to bombard the forts.” (1899:82)

The Iowa had almost finished its first bombing run before there was any response from the Spanish, and by that time the Indiana, New York, Terror, Amphitrite, and Montgomery had begun firing, while the Detroit kept up rapid fire at shorter range. The Spanish reaction was slow to begin, but increased in activity until the end of the engagement. When the Iowa ended its first bombing run, Sampson signaled the squadron to use only the heavier guns, and that the Detroit and the Montgomery, which were armed only with secondary batteries, should retire from the action. (1899:82)

A six-inch shell hit the Iowa after her second run, which resulted in one man wounded. When the Iowa had finished her third run, Sampson signaled the squadron to form a column to the northwest. All ships complied promptly, except for the Terror, which was so occupied with engaging the fortifications with short-range fire that it did not notice the signal immediately. The Iowa left the firing line at 7:45 AM, but it was another half hour before the Terror left San Juan astern. (1899:83). From their vantage point, neither Admiral Sampson nor Captain Evans of the Iowa could assess what damage had really been inflicted on the fortifications. Undecided about whether to return to the attack, Sampson discussed the matter with Evans, who was against another bombardment:

“...You have punished the forts, sir”, said Evans; “there is absolutely no doubt of that. You have no force of occupation. You did not intend to take the town. You may have to meet the Spanish fleet this evening. You are far from your base of supplies. I should think, sir, that the punishment you have administered is sufficient for the present.” (1899:84)

Sampson agreed, and after sending dispatches for Washington to St. Thomas on board the Associated Press yacht Dauntless, the fleet turned east, headed for Key West (1899:84).

In a report published by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence after the Spanish-American War, German Naval Commander Hermann Jacobsen (1899) makes observations concerning the circumstances surrounding the
bombardment of San Juan. He adds that the American squadron made three passes before the fortifications, raining shells on the city, the bay, and the urban sectors of Puerta de Tierra (east of the walled city) and Cataño and San Patricio (on the southern side of the bay). Jacobsen makes a brief description of the disposition of the ships:

Fire was opened immediately after 5 o’clock and continued until about 8:30. Four of the American ships were about two cable lengths [370 meters] north of the island of Cabras, and at equal distances from each other they were describing circles. A boat [the Wampatuck] had been anchored to serve for reference in order to safely avoid shallow places near the island. They came to within 1,500 meters of the Morro, and as each ship passed the castle she fired a broadside. Five of the American ships were fighting farther north with Cristóbal Castle and the eastern batteries of Morro Castle (1899:13).

From the perspective of the defenders, the Spanish had watched the approach of the squadron closely but had not opened fire because they were expecting the arrival of Cervera’s fleet. When fired upon, the batteries along the northern city walls and in the San Felipe del Morro (Morro) and San Cristóbal castles responded. While San Juan was being bombarded, the three infantry Battalions that garrisoned the city left their quarters at Ballajá Barracks, Morro Castle, and the San Francisco Barracks to man the defenses. Jacobsen the following inventory of the troops in San Juan at the time, comprised of:

...500 sailors from the fleet; 450 men of four companies of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico, No. 1; 850 of the Talavera Battalion, No.4; 440 of the San Fernando Battalion, No. 11; 350 of three mobilized companies; 350 volunteers...These were the fighting forces. Besides, there were in the city some cavalry of the Civil Guard and some soldiers who had been assigned to other duties. Of these troops, two companies, one of the Provincial Battalion of Puerto Rico and one of the Talavera Battalion, in all not over 250 men, were defending the fortified position of San Juan (1899:16).

The primary targets of the bombardment were the city fortifications, including the Morro and Cristóbal castles and the wall system, and the bay of San Juan. Almost all the large institutional buildings in the city and eighteen civilian residences were hit during the attack. Among those buildings damaged by the bombardment or fires caused by it were the Asilo de Beneficiencia (Beneficencia Asylum), Real Intendencia (Treasury Building), Asilo de Locos (Insane Asylum), Real Audiencia (Spanish Court), Arsenal de la Puntilla (Arsenal), Casa Blanca, Seminario Conciliar (Seminary), Hospicio de la Concepción (Concepción Hospital), Catedral de San Juan (Cathedral of San Juan), and the 16th C. Palacio de Santa Catalina (La Fortaleza) and Iglesia de San José (San José Church) (Rivero 1922:94). According to an eyewitness, what confronted the defenders was a virtual
“shower of missiles... that passed over their heads; a real steel storm” (Rivero 1922:69). Spanish Artillery Captain Angel Rivero’s detailed account of the bombardment estimates that, of the approximately 1,362 shells fired by the Americans, almost 80% did not explode due to defective fuses, while 20% fell short, 20% hit their targets, and 60% overshot their targets. In reply, the Spanish fired only 441 shells at the fleet. (Rivero 1922: 97, 105). While generally agreeing with Rivero, Jacobsen points out that the Spanish could not inflict real damage on the modern American ships, due to the limited range of their guns (Jacobsen 1899:13-14). He adds that:

Of course the fortification works were injured to some extent, but not one of the guns was put out of action. A few of the buildings visible at a great distance, like the [Ballajá] barracks, the jail, the hotel Inglaterra, and few private residences, suffered from the bombardment. A large number of projectiles fell into the harbor. Some of them even reached the little town of Catano, on the other side of the harbor. The French cruiser “Admiral Rigault de Genouilly”, which was lying in the harbor at the time, as were also three small Spanish gunboats, received a shot in the rigging and smoke pipe (Jacobsen 1899:14).

Sampson lost 2 men killed and 7 wounded, while inflicting 6 dead and about 50 wounded on the defenders and civilians in San Juan (Nofi 1996:71; Rivero 1922:108). It must be noted that the early morning bombardment completely surprised most of the city’s inhabitants, which soon became shock when the majority of the shells fired by the American fleet rained down on the city itself, the bay, and urban sectors of Puerta de Tierra (east of the walled city) and Cataño and San Patricio on the southern side of San Juan harbor (Jacobsen 1899:13). Volunteers, troops and citizens rushed to their assigned positions or to find shelter. The panic led to a massive exodus of civilians out of the city on the main road leading eastward across the San Antonio Bridge, seeking shelter in the nearby areas of Santurce and Río Piedras. The more adventurous and curious of the city’s denizens observed the naval actions from the cover of the city’s northern wall (Rivero 1922:90-91).

The aftermath of the bombardment reflects the perspectives of the different parties. There being no indication that Sampson’s purpose was any other than finding the Spanish fleet, his decision to bombard the forts even though Cervera was not in the harbor seems questionable from a naval perspective. The lack of warning seems to imply that Sampson either was not aware, or did not care, that the city’s civilian population was at risk of being shelled. The Spanish were quite taken aback by this want of protocol as women and children, foreign neutrals, and noncombatants were inside the old walled city. As reported in the Puerto Rico Gazette, the bombardment of San Juan was not carried out in a manner befitting a professional soldier:
"There are no international agreements, it is true, as to previous notice of a bombardment, but in practice the custom prevails among all civilized nations to give notice of the bombardment of a city or fortification. For no Christian soldier, no civilized nation, will want to take the terrible responsibility of butchering defenseless women and children. The soldier fights against those who carry weapons, but not against the weak and the sick" (Jacobsen 1899:13).

The limited damage to buildings and low casualties led the general population to believe that the Spanish defenders had driven Sampson’s fleet off. The report prepared by Spanish artillery Captain Severo Gómez Núñez reflects this understanding of what happened:

The admiral [Sampson] says that he could have taken the place, but when he found that our squadron was not there and that he would have to leave his ships there until the army of occupation arrived, he decided to return to Havana. Our opinion does not coincide with his. To bombard a fortified place is easy; to take it is quite a different matter. It is reasonable to suppose that Sampson was very desirous to take San Juan and make himself popular, but he had not counted on the resistance he encountered, and that is what caused him to desist (Núñez 1899:60).

Governor Macías validated this interpretation when he declared that the Spanish defenses had repulsed the American attack. This news was received with great enthusiasm in Spain and messages of congratulations extolling Puerto Rican’s valor and loyalty were received. (Rosario 1989:184-185).

Testing the Blockade

After the bombardment of San Juan, the attention of the American naval and land forces was concentrated on the campaign in Cuba. However, the blockade was maintained until the campaign in Cuba ended on July 17th, after which all attention would focus on Puerto Rico in the final stages of the war. On May 25th, St. Paul captured the English steamer Restamel, which had left San Juan with 2,400 tons of coal for Cervera’s fleet in Santiago de Cuba. Upon questioning by Sigsbee, the British captain responded that there were two other cargo steamers (of the same British company as the Restamel), both loaded with coal, still inside San Juan Harbor. En route from Martinique to Jamaica, the British steamer Twickenham was captured on June 10th by the USS St. Louis near Puerto Rico, possibly its unofficial destination (U.S. Navy Department 1898:316).

On 22 June, while San Juan regimental bands played inspiring martial music and a great crowd cheered, the Isabel II and Terror, left San Juan Harbor to attack the sole blockading American ship, the St. Paul. It is possible that the attack may have been an attempt to provoke the St. Paul into steaming within range of the San Juan
shore batteries. The St. Paul, a large and fast ocean liner made over as an armed auxiliary cruiser with eight 5-inch guns and eight 6-pounders was commanded by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, previously commander of the Maine (Nofi 1996:166; Rivero 1922:146, 161; Dyal 1996:287, 322).

As the Isabel II could only make 10 knots she was soon forced to retire from the action and return to San Juan for fear of being overtaken by the faster St. Paul. On its own, the Terror attempted a torpedo attack to cover the Isabel II’s retreat. The St. Paul commenced firing on the Terror at 5,400 yards. Small caliber rounds and 5-inch shells from the St. Paul repeatedly hit the Spanish vessel.

The St. Paul stuck the Terror’s steering gear, jamming the rudder. As the Spanish ship turned, giving her starboard side to St. Paul, the latter fired a 5-inch shell that struck Terror about 12 inches above the water line, wrecking the starboard engine and killing five men and wounding several others. The shell exited below the water line on the port side, and the Terror began to sink. Running for port as fast as her other undamaged engine could take her; the ship was in serious danger of capsizing; so her commander beached her on Puntilla shoals (Dyal 1996:287).

In San Juan, the bands kept playing, and the crowds began spreading the rumor that the two Spanish vessels had engaged the entire United States fleet offshore (Wilcox 1898:242). It is within this context that we can probably comprehend the effects on the public morale the sortie by the Spanish torpedo boat Terror against the American cruiser USS Yale. The euphoric crowds were hoping to see another victory for Spanish arms. However, their mood soured when the Spanish torpedo boat was severely damaged in the encounter. In addition, the populace was eagerly waiting for the arrival of the Spanish fleet of Admiral Cervera y Topete. Even though the Spanish fleet’s change of destination can be understood as a military necessity it was still another blow to the Puerto Ricans, who felt that Spain had abandoned them. On June 27 the Governor reported to the Ministry of War that although the colony was at peace its morale had declined considerably, since assistance by the Spanish squadron was no longer expected (Rosario 1989: 189). A dark and oppressive feeling of impending doom permeated throughout all the social classes within the colony.

Among the most renowned blockade-runners in Puerto Rico was the S.S. Antonio López, a transatlantic ocean liner that arrived off the coast of San Juan on June 28th. This ship had left Spain with a valuable cargo of guns, ammunitions and equipment to reinforce the defenses of San Juan. When the blockade-runner tried to enter the bay of San Juan it was confronted by the USS Yosemite. In the pursuit that followed the ocean liner ran aground on reef formation off the coast of Dorado. Three Spanish warships (the Isabel II, General La Concha, and the
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*Ponce de León* came to the rescue of the *Antonio López*. These warships surrounded the stranded ocean liner and kept the U.S. warship at bay while rescue and unloading operations went on. Later on July 16th the USS New Orleans would fire incendiary shells into the ocean liner until it was set ablaze (Rivero 1922:157-163). The wreck of the *Antonio López* was designated a National Historic Landmark in 1998.

**The American Army Moves on Puerto Rico**

About the time of the bombardment of San Juan (May 12th) the American military began to see the need to increase their forces, as most of the Regular Army forces were rapidly being committed to the Cuban campaign and the occupation of the Philippines. All throughout May and June of 1898 volunteer state militia units were mustered into the United States Army. By June, President McKinley was ready to order Miles to invade Puerto Rico, mainly with these fresh troops (Long 1923:200). The increase in available and trained troops would allow for greater speed in the engagement of the Spanish on the island.

In a report sent to Spain at the beginning of July, Governor Macías informed that pro-American propaganda was widespread throughout the towns in the Island. He concluded that public morale had declined and that it would decline even further when news of the destruction of Cervera’s squadron in Cuba became known (Rosario Natal 1989:189-190). The volunteers who, at the beginning of the war, had joined enthusiastically to defend the colony against foreign invaders now left in droves, returning to their homes. By the time the U.S. Army made its landing in Guánica the Spanish Military had disbanded most of the volunteer groups. The defense of the Island would fall to the limited regular units and other institutional forces available.

With the end of the Santiago de Cuba campaign on July 17th, General Miles began to shift the focus of the war to Puerto Rico (Porter 1904:32). As a setting for a military campaign, Puerto Rico did not offer the same conditions as Cuba to the American forces. There was no organized active rebellion against Spanish authority that would support American military intervention, as in Cuba. In contrast, the loyalty of the people of Puerto Rico had been reinforced by the concession of autonomy, which had allowed them to elect their representatives in Puerto Rico and Spain. Furthermore, the island’s forces were stationed in small military outposts distributed throughout the island, potentially making it a difficult campaign. The Puerto Rican campaign was now the highest priority of the McKinley administration, as the Spanish government of Prime Minister Sagasta had approached the French government to serve as a go-between to initiate peace negotiations with the United States.
(Millis 1932:336). If the United States were to claim Puerto Rico in peace talks it was vital to land troops on the island immediately to bolster their claim.

As previously discussed with President McKinley and Secretary of War Alger, General Miles was to coordinate his arrival in Puerto Rico with the 11th and 19th Regular Infantry Regiments jumping off from Tampa, and more volunteers leaving from Charleston, South Carolina and Newport News, Virginia, all to land simultaneously at Cape San Juan near the Fajardo Lighthouse on the northeastern point of Puerto Rico. From there, over 25,000 American troops would march west for sixty miles overland to capture the fortified city of San Juan with the assistance of the U.S. Navy. This was the plan approved by the President and Secretary, before Miles left Washington for Cuba, on 26 June (Nofi 1996:232).

The departure of the troops from the United States for the Puerto Rican campaign experienced much less trouble than those involved in the Cuban campaign, since they left from several ports with good shipping facilities instead of ports like Tampa, whose facilities could only handle relatively small numbers of troops and equipment. Accompanying Miles was General Henry Garretson’s Brigade, consisting mainly of the 6th Massachusetts and 6th Illinois Volunteers, and some additional units. These had left Charleston on July 7th on the transport USS Yale and the cruiser USS Columbia and arrived off Cuba to reinforce Shafter’s V Corps on July 11th, where they were to meet with additional elements of Miles’ I Corps (Trask 1996:346; Nofi 1996:233).

However, Miles was delayed in Cuba by Admiral Sampson’s refusal to detach armored cruisers and battleships to escort Miles’ expedition to Puerto Rico, in addition to the extended negotiations with General Toral. This prompted Miles to move his transports to Guantánamo Bay, but it was imperative that Miles leave soon in order to rendezvous with Major General James Harrison Wilson’s force of 3,571 men of General Ernst’s Brigade. This brigade consisted of the 16th Pennsylvania, 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin, and the remaining elements of the 6th Illinois Volunteer Regiments, and had departed Charleston, South Carolina, on the 20th of July, bound for Cape Fajardo (Rivero 1922:223). While Miles had sufficient transport vessels for moving his troops to Puerto Rico, he was concerned about not having enough armored battleships to protect the troop transports in the event of an attack by Spanish torpedo boats, which had already sallied out of San Juan to attack American warships twice before. Miles cabled his concerns about Sampson to the Secretary of War on July 20th:
The Nueces and Lampasas came in [to Guantánamo, Cuba] last night with engineer corps, artillery train, and 600 troops. There are now ten transports here, ready to move to Porto Rico, including four batteries, light artillery and siege artillery, and other en route. The horses are suffering and some dying from long and close confinement, and the troops are subjected to much discomfort. I have been waiting for Admiral Sampson to furnish proper naval assistance...

(Anonymous 1902:293)

Sampson was preparing for an attack on the Canary and Balearic Islands, and a possible bombardment of coastal Spanish towns if the war was to drag on and he was loath to part with his big ships (Nofi 1996:168). However, a telegram from the President released the ships and the Miles expedition departed from Guantánamo, Cuba for Puerto Rico on July 21st with a mostly volunteer force of about 3,500 men that had been waiting and training for three months to see action (Trask 1981:347-349).

Miles’ command as he left Cuba consisted of 3,145 troops from the 6th Illinois and 6th Massachusetts, plus small units of combat and telegraph engineers, artillery, and a sanitation unit. These men were transported mainly on the USS Yale and USS Dixie, with the battleship USS Massachusetts, cruiser Columbia, and gunboat USS Gloucester providing protection against Spanish torpedo boats in Puerto Rican waters. Overall command of the naval force was under Captain Francis J. Higginson, captain of Massachusetts, which served as the flagship for the Puerto Rican expedition. The bulk of Miles’ troops were on the transports Lampasas, City of Macon, Nueces, Comanche, Unionist, Stillwater, Rita, and Specialist (Rivero 1922:181–182).

However, sometime between the 21st and 24th of July, General Miles changed his mind about landing at Fajardo, proposing to Captain Francis J. Higginson, the senior naval officer present, that the expedition bypass Fajardo, and sail around the island to reach the port of Guánica on the southwest side of Puerto Rico. At the time, Miles gave as reasons for this change the fact that his movement to Fajardo had become known in Puerto Rico; that the deep-water harbor at Guánica provided excellent facilities; that an unexpected landing on the south would achieve strategic surprise; and that the population in the southern parts of Puerto Rico was much more disaffected from Spain than that of the north, and which therefore would more likely rally to the Americans-- all probably based on information supplied by Captain Henry H. Whitney, whose espionage mission in Puerto Rico had concluded a few weeks earlier, and who was now accompanying Miles (Trask 1981: 353-355).
Then a lieutenant, Whitney had been ordered to Puerto Rico in May by the Bureau of Military Information on an espionage mission. Embarking on the USS Indiana, which left Key West on May 5th as part of Sampson’s squadron headed for San Juan, Whitney managed to assume the identity of a reporter en route and transfer to the press yacht Anita, from which he observed the bombardment of San Juan on May 12th. After the bombardment, Whitney left for St. Thomas aboard the Anita, accompanying Sampson’s dispatches to Washington concerning the bombardment, and consulted there with the former American consul in Puerto Rico, Phillip C. Hanna, who had left Puerto Rico at the beginning of May. Whitney informed Hanna that he was to procure information on the ports, defenses and roadways in Puerto Rico, specially in the south of the island. Hanna helped Whitney join the crew of the British cargo steamer Andarose, which arrived in Ponce on May 15th, and which was searched by the Spanish port authorities searching for a reported spy. Whitney had assumed disguise as H.H. Elias of the British Merchant Marine, despite the fact that American newspapers widely reported his supposedly secret arrival. For two weeks he roamed through the towns of Ponce, Guánica (where he discreetly sounded the bay to assess its possibilities as a landing point), Salinas, Yauco and Arroyo. While Spanish authorities apparently knew his identity, a combination of his abilities, their clumsiness and his status as a British subject kept him ahead of any arrest efforts. Arriving in St. Thomas on June 2nd, Whitney was back in Washington by June 8th, where he briefed President McKinley and the assembled Cabinet of the forces in Puerto Rico and their disposition. Rivero (1922) cites a personal letter from Whitney to him, retelling his mission and citing Col. Wagner of the U.S. Military Intelligence Bureau as saying that General Miles’ plans were based on the information from Whitney’s mission. By the 25th of June, Spanish Minister of War Correa cabled Governor Macías in Puerto Rico, telling him that “...the American government has received ample details concerning the defenses of the island, and are making preparations for an invasion.” (Picó 1987:48, Rosario Natal 1989:211-212; Rivero 1922:501-506).

Notwithstanding the sound objections posed by Captain Higginson concerning the ability of his ships to provide adequate offensive coverage of a landing or an established base at Guánica, General Miles’ proposal prevailed (Trask 1981:355). Captain Higginson ordered a change in the course of the fleet south through the Mona Channel and dispatched the Dixie to meet the New Orleans, then on blockade duty off San Juan on the evening of July 24th. The Dixie conveyed orders from Captain Higginson to Captain W.H. Folger of the New Orleans to proceed to Fajardo to direct American ships that would soon be arriving at the original landing point to Guánica.
The *Dixie* turned around and pursued the main invasion fleet which navigating the Mona Channel with its running lights off, arriving before Guánica at 5:20AM on July 25th, 1898 (Rivero 1922:184).

Miles appears to have based his change of landing site on a variety of reasons: 1) the Spanish had prior knowledge of the intended landing at Fajardo from American newspaper articles; 2) Whitney’s spy mission and intelligence from Puerto Rican exiles alerted Miles to strong anti-Spanish attitude among the people in the southern part of the island (where the most recent attempt at rebellion had occurred in Yauco, in March of 1897); and 3) a landing far from strong Spanish forces would provide Miles’ volunteer forces the opportunity to develop confidence in their campaign abilities (Picó 1987:56). In addition, Miles had information from Whitney that barges necessary for landing the invasion force could be found in Guánica and Ponce, but not in Fajardo – barges the U.S. naval force did not have (Rivero 1922:183).

This decision constituted a serious breach of procedure on Miles’ part, since he failed to consult either the President or Secretary of War Alger. In fact, the first news that Secretary of War Alger had of the change in the landing site was on July 26th from the Associated Press, which reported "that General Miles had suddenly changed his whole plan of campaign while in mid-passage" to Puerto Rico, landing at the small port of Guánica on the southwest coast of the island (Millis 1931:336).

Negroni (1992:324-325) refers to three distinct invasion plans for the Puerto Rico Campaign, and notes Rivero’s (1922) excellent analysis of them. Trask (1981) summarizes the stringent post-war criticism of the campaign by naval strategists such as Mahan and Chadwick, and speculates that Miles’ motivation “might have been a desire to minimize the role of the navy during the Puerto Rican expedition”, citing his later opposition to any naval involvement in the campaign. Picó (1987:55-56) says that Miles’ decision had the advantage of delaying any confrontation with the Spanish until his volunteer troops developed some confidence in their campaign capabilities, which agrees somewhat with Miles’ July 30th report to Alger stating that “Ample time will be furnished here [Guánica-Ponce area] for thoroughly organizing the expedition before the march” (Trask 1981:585, note 36).
Landing and Skirmish at Guánica

Early in the morning of July 25th, the Guánica lighthouse keeper saw 13 ships off the bay’s entrance, and sent the following message to the mayor of Yauco: “Inform the Governor that thirteen American warships are in front of the lighthouse”. After alerting the Governor of the presence of the American fleet at Guánica, the mayor of Yauco notified Captain Salvador Meca, commander of the Spanish army detachment stationed in Yauco. As result, the Governor dispatched Captain Meca with one company of the Cazadores de la Patria battalion under his command, some volunteers, a few civil guards and mounted guerrilla to the vicinity of the landing area (Rivero 1922:190).

Meanwhile, after practicing a short reconnaissance, the USS Gloucester entered the bay and landed a small shore party of 2 officers (Lt. Wood and Lt. H.P Huse, commanding) and twenty-eight seamen, at about 8:45AM. This party landed at a small pier, and then spread out to secure the landing area. By 9:00AM they lowered the Spanish flag and raised the American one at the Cabo de Mar (port administrator) structure, when the landing party received rifle fire coming from their right flank, about 300 yards away. While the American landing force responded, the landing boat, armed with a Colt machine gun, positioned itself to dominate the road leading to the town and began firing, although it became jammed almost immediately and was of no use for the rest of the engagement. Huse’s landing party then advanced; on the left flank, Cpl. Lacy and four men took shelter in a stone structure with low walls, a barrel making workshop (taller de toneleros), while Lt. Huse sent Lt. Wood and eight men to the right flank. Huse had been informed by a local inhabitant (the only one who did not flee the area, possibly Simón Mejill) that the Spanish force was comprised of 30 Spanish regular troops, who expected reinforcements from Yauco at any moment. However, Rivero (1922) informs us that the small garrison in Guánica was comprised of eleven mounted guerrillas under the command of Lt. Enrique Méndez López, who began firing on the Americans while hiding behind the last houses in the town of Guánica, close to what is today Calle 25 de Julio (25th of July Street), the road leading from the town to the port area (1922:186, 189). At this point Huse signaled for reinforcements, and proceeded to advance his center along the road. After the firefight had broken out between the two groups, the Gloucester opened fire with its three and six-pounders against the Spanish force. Lt. Huse’s force then advanced towards the town, as the first American infantry forces, from a combat engineer regiment under the command of a Col. Black, were landed. Lt. Méndez López and two of his
men were wounded, and the remainder of the Spanish retreated through the town by way of the road to Yauco. Nofi (1996:238) states that the Spanish left behind four of their number dead. Infantry units that were landed later relieved the landing party, and by 10:00AM the port of Guánica was secured. By this time the Massachusetts had led the transports into the bay and the landing began, using the ship’s boats. Naval personnel seized a number of wooden lighters, which were used by combat engineers to construct a pontoon bridge to facilitate to unloading of troops, in the lee of the bay (Rivero 1922:181-203; Nofi 1996:238). Most of the first troops ashore were the volunteers from 6th Massachusetts and 6th Illinois Regiments, who had spent seventeen days on board their transports (Bunzey 1901:241; Herrmann 1907:13). Two campsites were set up on July 25th, one on the eastern end of the bay and another between the port area and the main town of Guánica. Following Rivero’s earlier account of the Spanish troop movement from Yauco, by this time Captain Meca and his small force were in place on a hill (probably El Caño Hill) close to the Hacienda Desideria, a sugar cane plantation owned by Francisco Mariani, observing the Americans and awaiting reinforcements (1922:190).

The majority of the town’s populace, which had fled to the nearby mountains because of the naval gunfire, returned to their homes during the day. Some locals met with General Miles to renounce their loyalty to Spain and offer their services. Among them were Vicente Ferrer (port administrator), Robustiano Rivera (the lighthouse keeper), Simón Mejill (a barrel maker and the only town resident not to flee when the Americans landed), Juan M. Morciglio (the harbor pilot or práctico del puerto), and the “mayor” (as Guánica was not a town proper, there was no official mayor, but an alcalde pedáneo or alcalde de barrio), Agustín Barrenechea. Morciglio later boarded the USS Massachusetts and piloted the Americans to Ponce, Mejill was named chief of police, and both Rivera and Barrenechea were confirmed to their posts. These five men were the first Puerto Ricans to request American citizenship that same day (Rivero 1922:188-189).

The American writer and poet Carl Sandburg also described the landing at Guánica as a volunteer with Company C of the 6th Illinois Volunteer Regiment. His diary entries reflect the experiences of the non-military volunteers of the Spanish-American War. Writing as a private citizen after the war, Sandburg’s memories are not of the military strategy of landing at Guánica, but rather of the material discomforts that the volunteers endured in camp on the first night in enemy country.

We had set our pup tents [on July 25th], laid our ponchos and blankets on the ground, and gone to sleep in a slow drizzle of rain. About three o’clock in the morning a heavy downpour of rain kept
coming. We were on a slope and the downhill water soaked our blankets. We got out of our tents, wrung our blankets as dry as we could and threw them with ponchos over our shoulders. Then a thousand men stood around waiting for daylight hoping the rain would let down [Picó 1987:42]

While the 6th Illinois endured a wet night, the equally green 6th Massachusetts troops on picket duty north of Guánica opened fire on wandering cattle they mistook for a Spanish Attack. Widespread shooting continued until General Garretson and his staff Officers got the troops in order (Nofi 1996:239).

Battle of Yauco
At about 5:00 PM on July 25th, two additional companies of the Cazadores de la Patria Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Francisco Puig, had joined Captain Meca’s force at Hacienda Desideria. Puig’s force arrived in Yauco by train late in the morning and had been reinforced on the way to Guánica by a group of volunteers from the towns of Yauco and Sabana Grande. Upon reaching Hacienda Desideria, Puig assumed command and established his headquarters there, and then proceeded to position his forces, holding the volunteers back as a reserve and stationing them in the dry Susúa riverbed near the Guánica-Yauco road to prevent a possible flanking maneuver and safeguard his line of retreat. One company of Spanish regulars under Captain Meca took defensive positions in an open patio bordered by strong brick and stone walls, to the south of the main buildings of the Hacienda Desideria and overlooking the road, while another company was positioned in a cornfield to the left of the road, across from Hacienda Desideria. The last company, under Captain San Pedro, was positioned on the heights of El Caño Hill south of Hacienda Desideria, overlooking the approach from Guánica. (Bunzey 1901:191-192; Rivero 1922:191, 193-194).

At about the same time, General Garretson advanced with a force of the 6th Illinois to reconnoiter the Spanish Royal road (old road PR-116) heading northeast toward Yauco, about six miles away, with the intention of advancing and capturing the Yauco rail terminus, which could facilitate reaching the largest town on the island, Ponce. Recognizing that from the heights to his right (Seboruco Hill), from a house owned by Ventura Quiñones, he could dominate the lands surrounding Hacienda Desideria, Garretson ordered Company G to occupy the hill. The Illinois company dug in and sent scouting parties toward the Guánica-Yauco road, which passed by the hacienda. While there are conflicting reports of the sequence of events that followed, it seems clear that, between 9:00PM and 2:00AM, fire was exchanged between the American advance and the Spanish
troops positions on El Caño Hill. This motivated Garretson to send reinforcements from the 6th Massachusetts in two stages: first two companies (L and M) under the command of Commander Darling reinforced the 6th Illinois at Seboruco Hill, and later 5 companies (A, C, E, G and K) under the command of Garretson himself. Before 5:00AM at latest, the American troops were in place and awaiting instructions (Bunzey 1901:200; Rivero 1922:196-197).

With the coming of daylight the vanguard of Companies A, G, and L, of the 6th Massachusetts received orders to move north along the Royal road (Bunzey 1901:220). The American troops advanced while exchanging fire with the Spanish positions before them, and suffered four wounded (Captain Gihon of C Company A, Corporal W.S. Carpenter and Private B. Bostic of Company L and Private J. Drumond of Company K). After a series of exchanges, the Spanish troops abandoned their positions. In the meantime, Col. Puig had received repeated messages from Governor Macías throughout the night of the 25th and early on the 26th, ordering his retreat. At first refusing to obey these orders, Puig pressed the attack by attempting a flanking maneuver against the American positions on the Seboruco hills, at the Quiñones house, which was repulsed by the Massachusetts and Illinois volunteers (Bunzey 1901:220-221; Rivero 1922:198). Meanwhile, Puig attempted to recall the volunteers held in reserve, to no avail. It later resulted that they had abandoned their packs and fled the area during the night and early morning. Faced with the possibility of a flanking attack from the American forces, and with no reinforcements forthcoming, around 10:00AM Puig finally heeded Macías' orders, though reluctantly, and effected an organized retreat, thus ending the “Battle of Yauco”. By the time the advancing American forces reached Hacienda Desideria, they found it abandoned, and the enemy gone (Rivero 1922: 198).

Spanish casualties were four wounded (Lt. Antonio Galera Salazar, Antonio Montes Medina and Vicente Huecar Heno and Juan Oros of the Cazadores de la Patria battalion) and two dead (Blas Martín Ubilla of the flying guerilla corps and Ciprián González of the Patria battalion). There were other, minor losses, but “...of so little importance that they did not figure in the official account” (Rivero 1922:203). Another Spanish soldier that died during the retreat from Hacienda Desideria was found along the road, and buried the next day (July 27th) by Captain Charles Vernou of the 19th Infantry Regiment. Today his tomb is a commemorative marker to the Battle of Yauco, the “Tomb of the Unknown Soldier” (Rivero 1922:203-204).
The story of Puig’s retreat from Yauco to Arecibo is recounted by his second in command, Lt. Rafael Colorado, and is a poignant example of the contradictory and confused events of the war. Arriving in Yauco on the afternoon of the 26th, Puig received a telegram from Macías ordering him to return to Arecibo on the north coast via Adjuntas and Utuado (that is, crossing the mountainous interior of the island), since Macías assured him that the railroad line west towards Ponce had been cut. Indeed, Capt. Higginson had received orders from Miles to destroy the rail line, but had desisted in anticipation that the American forces might be able to use it. Leaving Yauco on the morning of the 27th, Puig’s force began a nightmarish march through Peñuelas, Adjuntas and Utuado on steep mountain roads, beaten by torrential rains that made both men and horses continuously lose their footing and roll back downhill. Bivouacking in the rain, fearing pursuit by American forces, shot at by unknown guerrillas, the difficulties of the march led Puig to decide to abandon his equipment in order to lighten his men’s load. Finally arriving in Arecibo on August 1st, Puig was received by orders from Macías’ second in command, Col. Camó, demanding an accounting for his movements since the Battle of Yauco, and justifying the abandonment of his equipment. Seemingly dissatisfied with the report, Camó allegedly replied that evening, alluding to Puig’s “disastrous march”, and his obligation of honor as an officer. This telegram, states Rivero, later disappeared from Macías’ archives. The following morning at dawn Puig, in full dress, went down to the beach at Arecibo, where he shot himself in the right temple, dying instantly (Rivero 1922: 210-215).

After the Battle of Yauco, Garretson’s entire brigade returned to camp, leaving strong forces on all the roads, which were fortified with trenches, barbed wire and other defenses. The defensive position established by the initial naval landing party just north of the landing site, at a barrel making workshop (taller de toneleros), was also fortified and named Fort Wainwright after the commander of the Gloucester. Military engineers began reconnoitering a hill close to the bay and, with the help of local workers from Guanica, began working on what would later be known as Fort Capron (Rivero 1922:216).

News the landing invasion was received soberly by the Spanish authorities in San Juan, who issued a general order notifying the population about the landing and promising the defense of the territory. Meanwhile, the first news of the landing in Washington was received through New York, where an Associated Press telegram broke the news. Anxiety in Washington was great, given Miles had changed the landing site from Fajardo to Guanica without warning, and his official communication notifying of the fait accompli did not arrive until 9:35PM on the 26th of July (Rivero 1922:206-207).
Occupation of Yauco

On July 27, Gen. Henry ordered a scouting party of 50 men under commander Webb C. Hayes to proceed to Tallaboa (in Peñuelas). Accompanied by Capt. Anderson, Lt. Rokenbach and Lt. Wright, Hayes entered Yauco at 5:00PM, amidst cheers from the population. The party, assisted by guerrilla leader Eduardo Lugo Viña, reached the town hall of Yauco and named Francisco Mejia, a distinguished local resident, as acting mayor, with authorization to form an armed municipal police force to maintain order. Hayes also found that Gen. Roy Stone had already arrived in Yauco with a small force from Ponce, and was busy procuring 25 rail cars and 20 platforms on which to transport the Garretson brigade to Ponce. After agreeing on a plan of action, both Hayes and Stone went to Tallaboa, arriving at 9:00PM on the 28th and finding the station there abandoned and empty. When they returned to Yauco, they found a Lt. Phillips bivouacked in the town plaza with 50 men. On July 29th, with two companies of the 6th Illinois and Lt. Phillips' detachment formed up outside City Hall, commanders Clark (of the 6th Illinois) and Hayes appeared on the balcony together with newly appointed mayor Francisco Mejía. While the population watched in silence, the Spanish flag was lowered, trumpets sounded, the troops presented arms, and the U.S. flag was raised for the first time over a municipal government in Puerto Rico. Mayor Mejia read a statement praising the U.S. government, General Miles and the American troops, ending with "...Long live American Puerto Rico!" (Rivero 1922: 216-218).

Surrender of Ponce

Once Guánica and the rail terminus of Yauco had been secured, Miles determined that the city of Ponce was the next logical step, and the perfect staging area for an American victory in Puerto Rico. In addition to being a major deepwater port, Ponce had the convenience of underwater telegraph cable connections with Jamaica and the West Indies - which would put General Miles and U.S. forces on the island in direct communication with Washington for the first time since they left Cuba on July 21st. Ponce was also a known center of anti-Spanish feeling, which provided Miles with the opportunity to sway more Puerto Ricans to the American side (Nofi 1996:240). The New York Times was one of the first to report on Miles' movement out from the Guánica beachhead and native Puerto Ricans' reaction to the American invasion, with the following piece of July 27th:

The neighborhood of Guánica and Ponce is said to be the section of the island where the opposition to Spanish rule is strongest and where propaganda in favor of accepting the Americans as deliverers instead of as enemies could be most advantageously begun. Gen. Miles has with him some representatives of the Puerto Rican Revolutionary Junta. It is believed that one of his objects is touching near Ponce to establish contact with the insurgent and set on foot a movement
which may result in making the American occupation of the island much easier than it would be if all the efforts of the invaders were confined to fighting their way along. General Miles had a number of conferences with representatives of the revolutionists of the island before he left here, and he is known to have counted on doing as much toward winning over the people of the province by friendly overtures as possible, having regard to the ultimate benefits of such a policy on the permanent American rule, which it is proposed to establish here [Picó 1987:56].

At about 8:00AM on July 27th, Major General James H. Wilson’s 1st Division, comprised of approximately 4000 men and officers of the 16th Pennsylvania, 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin, and two companies of the 6th Illinois under the command of Major General Oswald Herbert Ernst, arrived off Guánica by transport from Charleston, South Carolina. The 1st Division had traveled on the transports Obdam, La Grande Duchesse, #21, #30, and Mobile. General Miles ordered them not to debark, but redirected them by sea to Ponce, where they arrived at dawn on the 28th (Rivero 1922:223-224).

That same day, Miles ordered General Henry’s entire force (Garretson brigade) to join Wilson’s 1st Division in the city of Ponce, though they did not leave until three days later. At 9:00AM on July 30th the brigade left their camping grounds around Guánica and reached the town of Yauco. Next day (July 31st), using the coastal road, the brigade left for Ponce, leaving behind the U.S. military engineers who had started preparing fortifications. Being unaccustomed to the tropical heat, the 6th Massachusetts and 6th Illinois suffered greatly on the march. Many of them fell out of the march from sunstroke, and many others abandoned ammunition, extra clothing, pup tents, and even bayonets. The last of the volunteers struggled into Ponce on August 4th, with less than half of them fit for duty (Bunzey 1901:226-234; Rivero 1922:219-221).

At 1:45 PM, again on July 27th, the small cruisers Dixie, Annapolis and Wasp left Guánica for Ponce. Arriving at 3:00 PM, they maneuvered toward the port and dropped anchor close to the Ponce beach at 5:25 PM. The Dixie and Annapolis directed their guns toward the town while the Wasp covered the pier. Lt. Greenleaf A. Merriam (of the Maryland naval militia), accompanied by ensign George Cabot Lodge (son of U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and nephew of Captain Davis, commander of the naval force), was sent to parley with the local authorities for the surrender of the city of Ponce. Unable to communicate directly with the military commander of Ponce Col. Leopoldo San Martín, they communicated their demand that the city be surrendered or else be bombarded by the ships in port through the British vice-consul, Fernando M. Toro. Claiming that he lacked the authorization to surrender, San Martín telegraphed Macías for instructions while Toro obtained a
delay from American naval commander Davis. While San Martín awaited a response, the consular body in Ponce met and decided to communicate directly with Macías in order to avoid the bombardment of the town. Macías’ answer was the same to both: no surrender. However, Macías sent an additional telegram to San Martín, saying that if he found any defense of the city impossible, he should evacuate his forces as best he could, destroying munitions, supplies and the rail station. When they heard of this message, Toro and his fellow consuls negotiated the surrender of the town with Davis while aboard the Dixie, allowing the Spanish garrison to leave and the municipal government to continue its functions. This agreement, although needing superior approval by Macías and Miles, was signed both by Commander Davis and Vice-Consul Toro, as representative of England and American commercial interests, in addition to doing so in representation of the Spanish military commander of Ponce. However, as soon as he returned to the city, Toro was surprised by the news that Macías had reversed his previous telegram, relieved San Martín of command and replaced him with Lt. Col. Julián Alonso of the Civil Guard, who was ordered not to surrender the city to the U.S. forces. A second intercession by the consular body in Ponce finally convinced the Governor to allow the evacuation of the town by the Spanish troops (Rivero 1922:224-229).

As part of the agreement for the surrender of the city, the Spanish garrison, comprised of three companies of the Cazadores de Patria battalion, a 500-man Volunteer battalion (of which only 2/3 had responded to the call to arms) and the Civil Guard, was permitted to leave unhindered in the early morning hours of July 28th. Part of this force would later defend Coamo and Aibonito against the American advance. An unsuccessful attempt was made to destroy the train station and its material, but because of the rapid response by the local firemen only a few railroad cars were burnt. Most of the Spanish troops, under the command of Lt. Col. Alonso, left towards Juana Díaz with their baggage and supply train. After stopping in Coamo for the night, 2 companies of the column were posted there to defend the town, under the command of Rafael Martinez Illescas. On the morning of the 29th, the rest of the force left for new positions on the heights of Asomante, in Aibonito, arriving there on July 30th (Rivero 1922:230-231).

Meanwhile, at 5:30 AM on the 28th, Lt. Merriam, ensign Lodge and a platoon of marines under Lt. Henry C. Haines secured the Spanish Customs House (Aduana) on the Ponce beach (Playa de Ponce), where Miles’ headquarters was established and would remain for the remainder of the campaign. At 6:00 AM ensign Lodge raised the American flag over the Capitania del Puerto (Harbormaster’s building). By 7:00 AM, both Miles and
Wilson were in port, and Davis handed Miles the formal documents of the surrender. Then both Miles and Wilson disembarked and established their headquarters, while approximately 50 launches landed the troops, which made camp on both side of the road from the port to the city. Regimental histories indicate that the American troops, such as Cavalry Troop A of New York, debarked their horses from the USS Massachusetts and set up camp next to the church at Playa de Ponce, before moving on to camps around the city (Herbert 1939:120; Rivero 1922:234). The general populace received the U.S. forces enthusiastically.

By 10:00AM, the U.S. flag was raised over City Hall. Later that day, General Wilson transferred his headquarters to a house at #6 Mayor Street. Although Miles' headquarters remained in the Custom House, he lodged provisionally at the Hotel Francés, in the town of Ponce proper (Payne 1899:47-51; Rivero 1922:229). In the afternoon, the local officials at the town hall in Ponce received Miles. In this meeting, General Miles made a brief speech where he promised to respect the rights, religion and customs of the inhabitants. Also, he requested that the officials remain at their post to maintain order in the city (Rivero 1922:230).

The reception the American forces received from the general population in Ponce has been described as festive. A correspondent of the Chicago Record describes the mood as follows:

> The entire population participated in the festivities. There was music in the streets and the plazas. The houses were decorated with brilliant colors...and everything that looked like an American flag was used for decorative purposes. Bars of red, white and blue floated on all the balconies and rooftops. The pier, the streets, the rooftops, the balconies were full of men, women and children dressed in their best clothes. Firemen and the volunteers paraded in uniform and petitioned General Miles to be recruited into our army. The general and the members of his retinue received invitations to dine with the public authorities... (Rosario Natal 1989:224).

Conscious of the need to win the support of the population of Ponce and to be seen as a liberator rather than a conqueror, Miles issued the following proclamation that very day:

> To The Inhabitants of Puerto Rico:
> In the prosecution of war against the kingdom of Spain by the people of the United States, in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of freedom, inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of our country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance. They bring you the fostering arm of a free people, whose greatest power is it its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former relations, and it is hoped a cheerful acceptance of the government of the United States. The chief object of the American military forces will be to
overthrow the armed authority of Spain, and to give the people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this occupation. We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring you protection, not only to yourselves, but to your property; to promote your prosperity, and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our government. It is not our purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they conform to the rules of military administration of order and justice. This is not a war of devastation, but one to give all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.

Nelson A. Miles,
Major General, Commanding, United States Army
(Herrmann 1907:33; Rivero 1922:232).

That night, Miles finally sent a reassuring cable to Secretary of War Alger in Washington, after the landings at Guánica and Ponce had been secured and he had established direct communication links with Washington via the underwater telegraph lines in St. Thomas, in the Danish Virgin Islands, ending as follows:

...Spanish troops are retreating from the entire southwest part of Porto Rico. Ponce and its port, with a population of 50,000, are now under the American flag. The population has received the troops and saluted the flag with wild enthusiasm. This is a prosperous and beautiful country. The army will soon be in mountain region; weather delightful; troops the best of health and spirits; anticipate no insurmountable obstacles in future results. Results thus far have been accomplished without loss of a single life (Anonymous 1902:330; Rivero 1922:233).

By keeping the American troops in line and working with the Puerto Rican Commission (Pedro Juan Besosa, Rafael Marxuach, José Budet, Domingo Collazo, Emilio González, Emilio González, Rafael Muñoz, Mateo Fajardo and Antonio Mattei Luveras – also included in the group were Warren Sutton and W. Borda), the U.S. Army was soon able to recruit 2500 Puerto Rican men to serve in the “Puerto Rican Guards”, under the command of Mateo Fajardo (Rivero 1922:269). The Puerto Rican Commission also organized hundreds of local dockworkers to quickly offload the supplies needed by Miles’ forces (Nofi 1996:241-242).

The taking the town of Ponce was a critical turning point in the Puerto Rican campaign for the American and Spanish forces. For the first time the Americans held a major port to funnel large numbers of men and quantities of war materiel into the island. The United States also was able to gain valuable intelligence from inhabitants on the roadways and general disposition of the enemy on the nearby central highlands. On June 30th the major of Guayama sent a letter to General Wilson informing that that morning the garrison had abandoned the town and the citizens feared their return because they could burn down the town. Also, there is record of an interview on
August 1, 1898 between Clotilde Santiago, a wealthy resident of Coamo, and General Wilson, where intelligence was provided on ways to go around Spanish defenses in Coamo on the military road (Picó 1987:60-61).

On July 31st, a third component of the invasion force, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan’s 2,896-strong Independent Regular Brigade, consisting of the 11th and 19th Regular Infantry Regiments, Company A 5th Regular Cavalry, and a Gatling and artillery company, arrived in Guánica Bay from Tampa, Florida. Upon arrival General Schwan received orders to leave part of the 11th Regiment in Guánica and to take the rest of his force by ship to Ponce. Schwan’s command would remain in their camps until August 6th when, from his headquarters at Ponce, Miles ordered Schwan to move his regular brigade and A Squadron of the 5th Cavalry by rail to Yauco, in anticipation of his westward sweep through the island.

**Surrender of Arroyo**

Meanwhile, on the same day (July 31st), Major General John R. Brooke brought the last elements of the Army I Corps to the Port of Ponce. Under Brooke was Brigadier General Peter G. Haines’ brigade, consisting of the 3rd Illinois, 4th Ohio and 4th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiments, H squadron of the 6th Regular Cavalry, Troops A and C New York Volunteer Cavalry, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. Haines’ Brigade remained on their transports for two days before Miles ordered them to land at Arroyo, a small port 60 miles east of Ponce. Arroyo was a coastal town that served the larger, nearby inland town of Guayama. On August 1st, marines and sailors off the Gloucester led the bloodless landing and capture of Arroyo (Nofi 1996:241). A description of the event reads as follows:

> A crowd had gathered on the beach in front of the [Arroyo] customhouse - the entire population apparently – watching the approach of the boat carrying a little white flag. The alcalde and the village priest stood out in front of the crowd on the beach and bowed low to the Americanos. Lieutenant Wood of the Gloucester informed them of the terms of surrender, and after a short parley went up to the customhouse and hoisted the American flag, and [they] seemed to be glad it had come (Brown 1967:413).

During the evening of August 1st, a small Spanish guerrilla force under Captain Salvador Acha reconnoitered the American positions in Arroyo. After a few shots exchanged with the Gloucester’s landing party, the Spanish withdrew northwest to Guayama (Rivero 1922:269-270). The port of Arroyo was secured.
PREPARING STRATEGY

Spain

At the time of the invasion, Spanish troop disposition was still predicated on the distribution of small military outposts throughout the island, an inheritance from the imposition of military order in the last half of the century to quell any rebellion against Spanish authority. On the eve of the war, Governor Macías was aware that he did not have sufficient troops to maintain this control and also defend against a possible invasion, but his requests for additional troops were turned down. In fact, the decision to send Cervera’s fleet to Puerto Rico was specifically to reinforce the island strategic position, since the Spanish government in Madrid had committed its land forces in Cuba since the beginning of the rebellion in 1895. While the destruction of the Spanish Pacific fleet at Cavite on May 1st had heightened the urgent ambition of American imperialism, the destruction of Cervera’s fleet in Santiago on July 3rd and the surrender of Santiago on July 17th left the American military only one final objective to achieve: Puerto Rico. And the urgency was greater, since, by July 18th, Sagasta’s government in Madrid began making overtures towards an armistice through the French government – the same date that Miles was authorized to leave Santiago for Puerto Rico.

Macías’ impression that Puerto Rico, partially by design and partly by circumstance, was left to its own devices was confirmed by the inability of the government in Madrid to effectively supply the island, combined with the impact the destruction of Cervera’s fleet had on the war for Spain. As soon as the Spanish authorities confirmed that Fajardo was to be the primary debarkation point for the invading American forces (that is, before Miles changed his plans without warning), Macías apparently decided to keep the majority of his forces on the northern side of the island, close to San Juan, and Spanish troops began to prepare trenches north of the town of Fajardo, in the vicinity of the Lighthouse. However, once the landing at Guánica had been confirmed as the main disembarkation point for the American forces, the Fajardo garrison was withdrawn to Carolina and its volunteer company dissolved (Rivero 1922:353-354). Together with the almost simultaneous entrenchment of Spanish troops in the areas of Coamo, Aibonito and Guayama, this has been interpreted as a reaction to the realities of the American invasion, and that Spanish strategy would now be focused on protecting the approaches to the main city of San Juan from the south, by establishing defenses in the interior highlands and the central mountainous interior.
United States

With the exception of the abortive naval expedition at Fajardo (August 2nd to the 8th), for the American invading forces the first week of August was generally characterized by the landing of troops and supplies, and the establishment and consolidation of strong encampments around the three captured port cities on the south coast (Guánica, Ponce and Arroyo). The movements by Brooke from Arroyo to Guayama, and Stone’s early advance to Adjuntas and Utuado in anticipation of Henry’s move from Ponce, are considered early movements of their respective campaigns.

By early August, General Miles’ mostly volunteer troops amounted to 9,641 officers and men, in various infantry, artillery, cavalry and support units (Herrmann 1907:14). As supplies and men flowed into the three ports already secured along the southern coast of Puerto Rico (Guánica, Ponce, and Arroyo) General Miles developed an elaborate 4-pronged plan for the envelopment of the island.

FIGURE 1

Chain of Command, Invasion Forces for Puerto Rico (after Negroni and Rivero)

- Lt. Gen. Nelson A. Miles
  Commander in chief
  Commander, 1st Army Corps
- Capt. Francis J. Higginson
  Commander, Naval Forces
  Commander, Provisional Division
  Commander, 1st Division
- Garretson Brigade:
  6th Reg., Illinois Vol’s.
  Reg. Artillery units
  Engineer units
  Sanitation units
  Support units
- Schwan Brigade:
  11th Reg., Regular Inf.
  19th Reg., Regular Inf.
- Ernst Brigade:
  2nd Reg., Wisconsin Vol’s.
  3rd Reg., Wisconsin Vol’s.
  16th Reg., Penna Vol’s.
  6th Reg., Illinois Vol’s.
  Artillery units
  Cavalry units
- Haines Brigade:
  4th Reg., Ohio Vol’s.
  3rd Reg., Illinois Vol’s.
  4th Reg., Penna. Vol’s.
  Puerto Rico Commission
Miles’ plan for the campaign contemplated the following:

- **Brooke’s Column: Guayama-Cayey** -- General Brooke’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade, with General Haines commanding the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Illinois, 4\textsuperscript{th} Ohio and 4\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, and four state militia light batteries, would push out of Guayama northwest through the mountains to meet Ernst at Cayey. From Cayey the two brigades would converge on San Juan, with the U.S. Navy providing support from the sea for the investment of the capital.

- **Wilson’s Column: Juana Díaz-Cayey (Military Road)** -- General Wilson’s 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade, with General Ernst commanding the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} Wisconsin, 16\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania, two Regular Artillery batteries, and Troop C (Brooklyn) New York Cavalry, would advance northwest from Ponce, over the Spanish-built paved military roads. They planned to advance up that road into the central mountain range, taking the towns of Juana Díaz, Coamo, and Aibonito, finally linking up with Hain’s Brigade at Cayey.

- **Henry’s Column: Ponce-Arecibo** -- General Guy Henry’s Provisional Division, consisting of the 6\textsuperscript{th} Illinois and 6\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts, under General Garretson’s direction, would advance straight north from Ponce along a trail identified by Lt. Whitney across the central mountain range to Utuado and then link up with Schwan’s Brigade in the north coastal town of Arecibo (Rivero 1922:349; Nofi 1996:334). These combined columns would move east along the coast to invest San Juan, the capital of Puerto Rico.

- **Schwan’s Column: Yauco-Mayagüez-Arecibo** -- General Schwan’s 1,447-man strong Regular Independent Brigade would advance northwest from Yauco to the western coast, with the intention of capturing the coastal city of Mayagüez. From this point, their objective was to march northwest through the central mountain range, occupying Las Marias and Lares, and meeting General Henry’s forces at Arecibo on the northern coast of the island (Rivero 1922:295).

From all contemporary accounts, the Puerto Rican population was, in the main, not unwilling to accept the American troops, but Miles knew it was psychologically and strategically prudent to not give them any excuse to initiate local resistance to his forces. For this reason, American troops would be kept under strict control to prevent any outrages against the civilian population, and Puerto Rican guides and translators accompanied all of the American units to provide good communication with the islanders.
That is not to say that there was not some resistance by Puerto Ricans fighting with the Spanish in some areas. However, in the majority of the towns taken before the Armistice of August 12th the citizens of Puerto Rico welcomed the American troops. One of the most striking examples of the Puerto Ricans’ dealing with the American army can be found in Richard Harding Davis’ How Stephen Crane Took Juana Diaz, when he worked for William Randolph Hearst’s Journal:

At the close of the Spanish-American campaign, the American forces that landed in Puerto Rico were supposed to be invading a hostile territory. Politically, as a colony of the enemy, the inhabitants of the island should have been hostile, but they were not. They received our troops with one hand open and the other presenting either a bouquet, or a bottle. Our troops clasped both hands. There still remained in many of the towns a Spanish garrison, but from the greater number these garrisons had been withdrawn upon San Juan. As a result, the natives were constantly welcoming scouts and officers of our army on reconnaissance as conquering heroes.

The last major military campaign of the Spanish-American War was set to begin on August 7th. On paper the plan had certain elegance, as the columns swept the enemy toward San Juan. But in practical terms it was somewhat risky. General Miles was dividing his forces in the face of the enemy (Nofi 1996:243).

**Naval Landing at Fajardo (August 2-8)**

The American blockade of Puerto Rico had continued throughout July, and it was common to see warships, transports or coaling ships close to the lighthouse or the shoreline at Fajardo. However, the confirmation of Guánica as the actual landing point for the invading American forces after July 25th had motivated the withdrawal of the Spanish garrison in Fajardo (2 infantry companies, 1 mounted guerrilla volunteer company and some Guardia Civil troops), and the abandonment of the trench works begun in the area north of the town and close to the lighthouse. This left the town protected only by an infantry detachment under the command of a lieutenant, the Guardia Civil and municipal police. (Rivero 1922:353-354).

The monitor USS Puritan had arrived off the northeast coast of Puerto Rico between San Juan and Fajardo and relieved the New Orleans from blockade duty, which proceeded to St. Thomas for coaling on July 31st. The Puritan, under the command of Captain Frederic W. Rodgers, was the largest of a “modern” line of monitors to replace Civil War vessels of this type. This 6,060-ton vessel carried four 12-inch guns, six 4-inch guns, and six 6-pounders (Dyal 1996:271). For reasons that are still unclear, around 4:30PM on August 1st, two armed launches from the Puritan, anchored just off the lighthouse, landed on the beach at some point between the town
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR IN PUERTO RICO

and the lighthouse. After advancing about a half miles towards town, the crew, under the command of LT. H.G. Dresset, quickly reembarked after observing movement of an armed force, capturing two schooners which were later returned. The next day (Aug. 2\textsuperscript{nd}), the Puritan was joined in front of the lighthouse by the USS Amphitrite (a monitor), the USS Leyden (an armed tugboat), and the USS Hannibal (a coaling ship). Under the cover of night, a shore party landed and captured the lighthouse, insisting that the lighthouse keepers were to remain in their service. The following morning around 4:00AM, telegraph officer Joaquín López Cruz telephoned the lighthouse requesting the accustomed report and, overhearing a background conversation where one of the speakers seemed to be speaking English, he had no doubt that the American forces had taken the lighthouse and that someone was trying to destroy the telephone. Hanging up, López Cruz immediately telegraphed San Juan, notifying that the lighthouse had been taken by American troops. He immediately received a response, indicating that the Spanish detachment (25 infantrymen under a lieutenant and the Guardia Civil), accompanied by telegraph personnel, should retreat to Luquillo or Río Grande, destroying the telegraph batteries and carrying the equipment with them. The detachment left promptly the following morning, leaving the town under the protection of the municipal police (Rivero 1922:353-356).

For the next two days, Dr. Santiago Veve Calzada, a local physician, unsuccessfully attempted to have Spanish troops sent from Humacao to safeguard the inhabitants of Fajardo. Preoccupied that the uncertain circumstances would lead to bloodshed in the town, on the morning of August 5\textsuperscript{th} Dr. Veve approached the American marines occupying the lighthouse and requested the town of Fajardo be taken over by U.S. forces. Dr. Veve was conveyed out to the Amphitrite, where he convinced its commander, Captain Charles J. Barclay, and overall commander of the naval forces present, Captain Rodgers, to bring the town under American protection. On the afternoon of August 5\textsuperscript{th}, the Leyden entered Fajardo harbor, and Dr. Veve, Captain Barclay, Ensign Albert Campbell and 14 marines landed on the beach and raised the American flag over the customs house. Heading into town surrounded by a growing crowd, the contingent disarmed the municipal guards as the were met. On reaching City Hall, the American flag was also raised there. During this process, all the municipal employees of Fajardo swore loyalty to the United States and were confirmed at their posts by Captain Barclay; Santiago Veve was named Military Governor of the eastern region of Puerto Rico; and militia force was organized to defend the town, armed with rifles supplied by Captain Barclay's landing party and the guns and machetes taken from the municipal guards, Spaniards and Spanish sympathizers who had fled the town. The convened civil government of Fajardo formally established the circumstances and events leading to its creation in a meeting lasting into the
evening. The militia set up their headquarters at the municipal theatre located in the town, and patrols were set out on the roads leading to Fajardo (Rivero 1922:356-362; López 1998:52).

When the news of the “insurrection” reached the headquarters of Humacao regional military district commander Lt. Col. Francisco Sánchez Apellániz on August 5th, he immediately organized a punitive expedition to Fajardo, which was stopped by orders from San Juan headquarters. However, news of Lt. Col. Sánchez’ intentions reached Fajardo, causing alarm in the population and motivating some to flee the town. Meanwhile, in San Juan Governor Macías ordered his aide-de-camp, Col. Pedro del Pino, to take 200 regulars to Fajardo, arrest the disloyal leaders that had sworn allegiance to the United States and restore order in Fajardo. The force (from the Patria and 3rd Provisional battalions, with 20 mounted Guardia Civil troops) assembled on August 6th at the military camp in Hato Rey, from where they boarded a train from Río Piedras to Carolina. Marching the rest of the way, Col. Pino’s column reached Río Grande, where a mounted guerrilla detachment from the 3rd Provisional battalion, under volunteer Lt. Rafael Colorado, joined the force. After resting in the Río Grande church, the column waded the Río Espíritu Santo and camped for the night on lands owned by cattle rancher Eduardo González. Leaving at dawn on the 7th, the column marched through Luquillo, where they rested and ate, and then proceeded towards Fajardo (Rivero 1922:362-363, 367).

Alerted by informants on August 6th of the Spanish troop movement toward the town, Dr. Veve informed the U.S. forces of the approaching Spanish force and requested reinforcements. However, the naval force did not have a ground force available. Though its not clearly stated in the sources, it seems that the American forces occupying the lighthouse since August 2nd had been withdrawn when the new civilian government was established. However, Rivero cites a report by Lt. Charles U. Atwater, commanding officer of a 28-man marine detachment that re-occupied the lighthouse on the evening of August 6th. In addition, a request was made, on behalf of the citizens of Fajardo, to General Miles, who refused to send troops, indicating that the actions taken by the Navy were unauthorized and not part of the overall land campaign. When Miles’ response, and the news of the Spanish column’s advance, became known in Fajardo, the inhabitants abandoned the town and fled to neighboring towns and outlying wards. Between 500 to 800 people sought shelter near the lighthouse, staying in the open through the night, next to the lighthouse and under the safety provided by the guns of the Amphitrite and recently arrived protected cruisers USS Columbia, and USS Cincinnati. Lt. Atwater’s account of the occupation of the lighthouse states that this group refused to leave even when he informed them that the outlying
ships' artillery would fire in case there was fighting, so great was their fear of the Spanish soldiers. Captain Barclay inspected and approved Atwater's arrangements for sheltering women and children, when he visited the site on the evening of the 7th. Dr. Veve and his officers went to the Amphitrite, where they were well-received (LeJeune 1930:135-137; Rivero 1922:363-364, 374-375; López 1998:53).

On arriving within sight of Fajardo around 4:00PM on the afternoon of August 7th, Col. Pino sent Lt. Colorado and four men on horseback to reconnoiter the town, beach and lighthouse areas. Finding the town deserted, Lt. Colorado climbed a nearby hill and saw American ships anchored off the lighthouse, and the American flag flying over the lighthouse and Customs House. Although he had complete his reconnaissance mission, Lt. Colorado went down to the Customs House, where he ordered some of his men to lower the American flag. At that moment, one of the American ships fired on his position. Seeking shelter from the artillery fire inside the Customs House, one of Colorado's men broke the flagpole and fell as he climbed onto the structure's balcony. Lt. Colorado grasped the American flag and, retreating under fire with his men, returned to the column. After this, the Spanish column entered the town and broke down the City Hall's doors, where they took the other American flag down. After naming a new town mayor, Col. Pino reestablished telegraph communications with the rest of the island. Through August 7th and 8th, the Spanish officers and soldiers took quarters in local residences which, being empty and closed, were broken into. Spanish officers prevented looting by their soldiers, but some minor damage to local homes occurred (Rivero 1922:367-370; López 1998:54).

During the night of August 8th Colonel Pino woke his men and marched the column towards the lighthouse. After arriving around midnight under cover of darkness and the surrounding vegetation, the Spanish troops opened fire on the lighthouse, aiming at the light. Once the attack began, the 28 American marines stationed at the lighthouse returned rifle and machine gun fire. Soon after, the marines turned off the light, a prearranged signal with the U.S. ships that they were to bombard the lighthouse area. After receiving the signal, the American ships aimed their flood lights on the lighthouse and began firing from about 1,800 yards. Shells rained over and around the lighthouse, with one actually blowing a large hole in the structure, without causing any casualties. Once this happened, Lt. Atwater gave the order to turn on the light to stop the bombardment, which ended around 12:30AM, though the gunfire exchanges with the Spanish forces continued for some minutes. Lt. Atwater's report states that the Spanish force suffered three dead and two wounded, and that he had observed them retreating around 2:00AM, ending the engagement). The next morning, the American forces decided to
abandon their position and, embarking the women and children under their care on the Leyden, left the lighthouse with the American flag still waving there (Rivero 1922:370, 375-376). Two marine detachments, under future Marine Corps Commandant John A. LeJeune, then a lieutenant, described the closing acts at the Fajardo expedition.

At daylight [August 9th] the [USS Cincinnati] Marine Detachment landed and on reaching the beach was joined by a detachment of sailors from the Amphitrite commanded by Junior Lieutenant Volney Chase. We advanced cautiously through the thickets and woods to the lighthouse, and although the many piles of empty cartridge cases we found indicated that firing of considerable volume had been conducted by a good sized force, we did not encounter a single Spanish soldier. The refugees said that firing had ceased a short while before daylight and that the attacking force had then withdrawn. We sent the refugees off to the tug [Leyden] and they were taken to the Port of Ponce, which was in the possession of the United States forces [1930:136-137].

As the Americans evacuated the Fajardo lighthouse, the Spanish retired to San Juan, taking the two American flags raised on August 5th and captured by Lt. Colorado on the 7th as trophies, and leaving behind the Civil Guard to maintain order in the town. The Fajardo expedition was the only engagement of the Puerto Rico Campaign where American forces withdrew after conflict with Spanish troops.
THE CAMPAIGN

In anticipation of what would be the last military offensive of the Spanish-American War, the American commanders began to position their troops to the best strategic advantage, following Miles' plan.

Brooke: From Arroyo to Guayama -- Skirmish on the Guamaní Heights

While in Ponce, General Wilson had received a letter from the mayor of Guayama advising him that Spanish troops had abandoned the town on July 30th and requesting that American troops defend the town from any disorder (Picó 1987:60). While accounts vary as to the dates, it seems that, as of August 1st, when American marines were occupying Arroyo without opposition, the Spanish forces posted in Guayama consisted of only 60 infantry troops under commander Reyes. Sent by Macías to investigate the conflicting reports received about the American landing at Arroyo, Cuban campaign veteran and guerrilla commander Captain Salvador Acha arrived in the area of Guayama in the late afternoon. Having found out that Commander Reyes had established camp on the heights of Guamaní, Acha went to see him, relieved him of command as ordered by Macías and joined the 60 infantry troops to his guerrilla force. Towards the evening, Acha led a small guerrilla force into Arroyo where, after exchanging fire with a small American advance force, he reached the Customs House at the port, effected his reconnaissance of the area, and retreated back to Guayama. After attempting unsuccessfully to communicate with Macias, Acha proceeded to establish a defensive perimeter dominating the approaching road from Arroyo, in expectation of the American advance. (Rivero 1922:288)

On August 2nd, the St. Louis arrived with General Brooke, his staff and the 3rd Illinois at Arroyo. By the 3rd of August, Brigadier General Peter C. Haines and the 4th Ohio and 4th Pennsylvania had landed at Arroyo, followed on August 5th with the cavalry and artillery units (Trask 1981:358). The sea off Arroyo was jammed with the transports St. Louis, Massachusetts, Seneca, City of Washington, St. Paul, and Roumanian. The harbor at Arroyo was so shallow and the charts so unreliable that there was constant danger of running aground on a shoal or reef (Brown 1967:413). To facilitate troop landings, the U.S. Army Engineers sank two wooden lighters end-to-end to create a temporary pier (Rivero 1922:271).

On the afternoon of August 4th, Spanish reinforcements arrived from Aibonito and Cayey (one cavalry detachment and two infantry companies from the 6th Provisional battalion), totaling 400 troops, with no artillery,
under the command of Julio Cervera, Macías’ field adjutant. Macías had agreed with evacuating Arroyo and Guayama without opposition, since both towns were exposed to being bombarded by the invasion armada. Commander Cervera’s assistant, Lt. Col. Larrea, inspected and approved Acha’s defensive preparations and instructed him to retreat, at his discretion, towards the strengthened Spanish defenses on the heights of Guamaní, to the north of Guayama. Headquarters were established at the coffee hacienda of Pablo Vázquez (Rivero 1922:273, 289), with the troops deployed along the forward edge of the heights. The Spanish forces’ task was to deny the American forces the use of the first class road that led north from Guayama to the town of Cayey, into the heights they now commanded.

On the morning of August 5th, Company A, the 4th Ohio, supported by the 3rd Illinois and a battery of Sims-Dudley guns manned by Company G of the 4th Ohio, stepped off on the main road from Arroyo to Guayama as the advance guard of the rest of the regiment, under the command of Colonel Alonzo B. Coit (Creager 1899:141-142). Rivero’s account says 9 entire companies of the 4th Ohio began the march under Coit’s command, with companies A, B and C in the vanguard, under the direct command of Major Speaks (1922:274). After an advance of about one mile, the vanguard encountered a French national who told them the Spaniards would be found in trenches about two thousand yards further up the road, near some red flamboyant trees (Creager 1899:146). These were Captain Acha’s troops, which were entrenched on the crest of two small hills running north and south, between which the road from Arroyo to Guayama ran. At this point Creager’s (1899) and Rivero’s (1922:274-276) accounts converge, when the advance spread out in a skirmish line, with company A to the south of the road, while companies B, C and I were to the north, all headed west towards the Spanish positions.

At 10:00 AM, the Americans had just crossed a small stream about 100 yards in front of the two hills, when the Spanish commenced firing on them with Mauser rifles, and the American troops responded. Private John O. Cordner, of Company C, was wounded in the right knee, and Private Clarence W. Riffle, of Company A, suffered a Mauser “bullet passing through the fleshy part of both legs” (Creager 1899). Rivero adds William Valenti, from company D, as wounded in the left foot (1922:276). Over the next half hour, the Americans from their protected position in the river bed increased their firing on the Spanish as more Americans troops were committed to the fight, specifically companies D and I (Creager 1899; Rivero 1922:275). At about 10:30 AM, the reinforced American troops pushed on to and over the crest of the two small hills, dislodging the Spanish,
who now fell back into the town of Guayama. The four-hour American advance was made difficult by "sharp cacti, thick underbrush, swamps, barbed wire fences and (Spanish) defenses". Indeed, the Americans rarely caught sight of the opposing force in this action, and only suffered one additional wound, Private Stewart Mercer of E Company in this advance. From their observation point on "top of the cathedral in Guayama, the Spaniards could see every movement made by the (4th Ohio) regiment", but the weight of American forces decided the contest (Creager 1899:151-153).

The 4th Ohio hesitated as it approached the outskirts of Guayama, in order not to walk into an ambush, but it was soon discovered the enemy had fled north and abandoned the city. The American flag was raised over the City Hall building facing the plaza and the Puerto Ricans came out of their shuttered houses to welcome the Americans (Creager 1899:155-157). Rivero states that the 4th Ohio flag, not the U.S. flag, was raised on this occasion, at about 1:00PM, and that Haines entered the town and assumed command after the ceremony, ordering the 3rd battalion to advance towards the iron bridge on the road north, leading to Cayey. Rivero (1922) notes that the Ohio 4th battalion, under commander Sellars, entered the town of Guayama on the main road itself, at the same time that the advance passed through the town, and continued firing on the Spanish rearguard when it had assumed positions to the north of Guayama. Companies E and I were positioned to the northwest, while a detachment was posted to defend the aqueduct, leaving the 1st battalion in town as a reserve (Rivero 1922:275-276). The Cautino Residence on the town square in Guayama served as military headquarters for the occupying American forces.

Nofi states that the Battle of Guayama “involved two American regiments (4th Ohio and 3rd Illinois) and less than a thousand men on the Spanish side” (1996:243). On the other hand, both Rivero (1922) and Creager (1899) only involve certain companies of the 4th Ohio. Accounting for Spanish casualties (2 dead and 15 wounded), Rivero mentions that the Spanish forces under Acha in this action numbered at most 40 troops (1922:274-276).

While sources disagree on the date (August 8th or 9th) of the mission, it is clear that Col. Coit ordered Captain Walsh to reconnoiter the road towards Cayey with companies A and C, leaving company C at a position two miles beyond the cast-iron bridge Guayama bridge (over the Guamani river). The mission was to be carried out with caution and with the strict purpose of gathering information; combat was to be avoided and the force was to retreat in case of encountering opposition, since it was felt that the Spanish were too strongly entrenched to
attempt an assault. The bridge was located on the road leading from Guayama to Cayey, and ran up through to the Spanish positions. Walsh left Guayama with 110 men at 8:30AM on the morning of the 9th, and the force included Col. Coit, Lt. Darrach, Cpl. Thompson as interpreter, Maximino Lunaris and two other Puerto Ricans as guides – once outside the city they were joined by Major Draw and Lt. Boardman. By 1:30PM they arrived to a point from where they could observe the Spanish troops clearly, approximately 1,500 meters away. A local peasant informed them that just below the Spanish positions there were the remains of two bridges, recently destroyed by the Spanish. Walsh decided to proceed to that position. About 900 meters before the bridges, they found a road caretaker’s house (casilla de peón caminero) from which it was decided that they could observe the Spanish positions on the heights of Guamani. On arriving at the house, a series of volleys were fired from the Spanish positions, causing them to run for cover and wounding several men. As they retreated from the area, they noticed a group of Spanish guerrillas charging down from the hills. Captain Walsh assembled some troops and returned fire to cover their retreat back to Guayama. The troops in town responded by hauling one of the two artillery pieces and firing on the Spanish positions on the heights. American casualties were five men wounded (Creager 1899:164-167; Rivero 1922:277-280).

No further actions are recorded in the period between the 8th and the 12th of August. This was mostly due to the fact that Brooke lacked the transportation needed to move his 20 pieces of artillery and baggage for his 5,590 men. As a result, Brooke was not able to begin his advance until August 12th, when he had finally acquired adequate transport (Nofi 1996:256). It also had become necessary for Brooke to break through and advance to Cayey, in order to meet with Wilson’s column from Juana Díaz, which on the 12th was to attempt to dislodge the Spanish from their positions on the heights of Asomante, between Coamo and Aibonito (O’Toole 1984:356; Rivero 1922:280).

On the 13th of August, the 4th Ohio was sent on a flanking march around some ridges and hills to the west, while the bulk of Brooke’s command – the 3rd Illinois and 4th Pennsylvania, plus four batteries – pinned the Spanish attention to their front. The intention was for the artillery to initiate combat on the morning of the 13th, with the 4th Ohio falling on the Spanish flank after they had become heavily engaged to their front (Nofi 1996:257). Rivero’s account states that Brooke’s forces were comprised by the 3rd Illinois, one battalion of the 4th Pennsylvania, two Sims-Dudley guns and two field artillery pieces, while one battalion of the 4th Pennsylvania was sent to Arroyo and another was held as reserve in Guayama, with two field pieces pointing north toward the
road to Cayey. Rivero adds that the march was very slow, in order to await the agreed upon signal from Haines indicating he was in position to attack the flank. Brooke’s column halted once over the bridge over the Guamaní River, spreading his vanguard and artillery (Rivero 1922:280-281).

Meanwhile, Spanish commander Cervera watched these movements from the heights. He had placed sharpshooters at the windows of the hacienda’s warehouse. To the left, about 80 meters away, there were approximately 200 troops awaiting the attack in trenches. Downhill, from these positions and hidden in a plantain stand were Acha’s guerrillas and the mounted troops of the 6th Provisional battalion. The Spanish troops were resolved to fight, under the leadership of two soldiers of the caliber of Acha and Cervera (Rivero 1922:281).

However, the attack never took place. In one of the more dramatic moments in the war, a courier handed Brooke an urgent telegram from headquarters at Ponce at about 9:00AM, literally seconds before the artillery was to open fire, ordering him to cease military operations at once. Realizing that if he attempted to shout the order to stand down, the gunners, already on edge, might fire anyway, Brooke stepped in front of the guns. Having gotten the men’s attention, he announced that a Peace Protocol with Spain had been signed, and an armistice was in force (Nofi 1996:257; Rivero 1922:281-283).

As soon as the order was received, Brooke’s troops returned to Guayama, while sending a messenger under a flag of truce to Cervera, to inform him of the cessation of hostilities. Haines force was about one and a half miles from the Spanish rear when, at about 2:00PM, a messenger arrived from Brooke, canceling the march and ordering Haines back to camp (Rivero 1922:284). In a later report, Haines would state that:

By all appearances and the reports received from inhabitants we found along the road, we would have fallen on the enemy about two hours later, and believe we would have taken them completely by surprise. Evidently they did not expect us from that direction, since the fields we passed were defensible to the utmost by a small group of determined men (Rivero 1922:284).

White flags were placed further than the bridge on the road to Cayey, and the Spanish troops camped in Cayey, while the American troops camped in Guayama, awaiting further developments.
Wilson: From Ponce to Aibonito -- Battle of Coamo and Combat at Asomante

Maj. Gen. Wilson’s column remained in Ponce from July 26th until August 6th, attending to civilian matters and occupied with reorganizing his division, which was encamped between Ponce and Juana Díaz (Rivero 1922:234-235).

The Spanish force quartered in Coamo was composed of two companies of the Cazadores de Patria Battalion, civil guards and guerrilla (248 men, 42 horses and no artillery) under Commander Rafael Martínez Illescas, who had arrived in town on July 28th with the rest of the Ponce garrison. They had stayed as part of an advance guard to the Spanish positions on the heights of Asomante, near Aibonito (Rivero 1922:231). Since arriving in Coamo, the Spanish had set advanced posts on principal roads, dug trenches in front and inside the town, and blown up bridges (Nofi 1996:70). A pair of mounted guerrillas was posted at a small wooden house with a zinc roof, located on a small hill to the right of the road to the Coamo Baths as lookouts. Considering the positions in Coamo as temporary, Commander Martínez did not take precautions against being flanked by the enemy. Also, an anti-Spanish irregular Puerto Rican guerrilla unit led by Pedro María Descartes hindered Martínez ability to monitor the other roads and paths in the vicinity (Rivero 198:241).

On August 7th, Wilson began moving his troops towards Juana Díaz. The column was composed of General Ernst’s brigade: 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin under the command of Col. Born and Col. Moore, respectively; battery F from the 3rd Artillery regiment and regular troops under Captain R.D. Potts; and battery B from the 4th Regular, under Captain H.R. Anderson. Both batteries were under the command of J.M. Lancaster from the 4th Regiment. The cavalry was comprised of the squadron C of the New York Regiment, under Captain B.T. Clayton and the Signal Corps section was under Captain William H. Lamer. Finally there was the 16th Pennsylvania – these troops had formed an advance column for some days, positioned about 5 and a half miles from Coamo, under the command of Col. W.J. Hulings (Rivero 1922: 235).

Passing through Juana Díaz itself, General Wilson continued his march along the military road to a point approximately seven miles beyond Juana Díaz, and camped on heights that dominated the Descalabrado River (Río Descalabrado) valley. Intelligence provided by Brooklyn’s Troop C New York Cavalry showed that the Spanish had fortified the approach to Coamo with trenches and occupied the Coamo hot spring baths spa (Baños de Coamo), south of the town of Coamo (Fiala 1899:68; Rivero 1922:236).
Battle of Coamo

Wilson spent August 8th probing the defenses of Coamo until he found a "rough but practicable trail which led to the rear of the town, running through the mountains to the west" (Nofi 1996:246). On the evening of the 8th of August, two battalions of the 16th Pennsylvania Volunteers under Col. Hulings were sent on an overnight march to take up a blocking position at the rear of Coamo, on the road towards Aibonito, to entrap the Spanish. While the Pennsylvania units flanked the Spanish positions, Wilson ordered Ernst to march with battery F (3rd Regiment), battery B (4th Regular), Troop C New York Cavalry Regiment, and the 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin over the cast-iron bridge over the Rio Descalbrado at 6:00AM on the following morning, and take up positions to make a frontal assault on the Spanish positions in front of Coamo. Both elements of the column had to be in place by 7:00AM on August 9th to make a coordinated attack (Immell 1900; Rivero 1922:236-237).

At 6:00AM, Captain Anderson’s 3rd and Major Lancaster’s 4th Artillery took up position in an open field south of the road leading to Coamo, and began sighting their guns on a small wooden and zinc roof house used by the Spanish mounted guerrilla as an observation point, about 200 yards to their front, where a spur of the Coamo road turned south to the Coamo Baths. The artillery was positioned on the lands of Clotilde Santiago, a wealthy resident of Coamo who had spoken with Wilson in Ponce on August 1st, advising him of Spanish troop positions in Coamo. They commenced firing at the blockhouse at about 7:00AM, while the Spanish replied with rifle fire, without causing any casualties. Fifteen minutes after being shelled, the wooden structure was on fire. The 2nd Wisconsin, under Col. Born, advanced on the road towards Coamo, while the 3rd Wisconsin, under Col. Moore, waded the Coamo River to the south of the road. The area between the two regiments would be covered by artillery fire until both regiments met. Wilson then ordered Troop C to gallop southeast across open field towards the road to Santa Isabel (port town to the south of Coamo), head for the Coamo Baths, and engage whatever Spanish forces were there. Having done this, Troop C was to retreat to protect the right (southern) flank, and be ready to proceed towards town on the road or by a flanking movement to the East (Fiala 1899:70; Immell 1900; Rivero 1922:237-238).

News of the American troop movement and artillery emplacement reached Lt. Col. Rafael Martínez Illescas close to dawn on August 9th. Surprised by the news, Martínez Illescas had only an hour earlier received reports from his scouts that all was clear. Leaving the breakfast table at the town mayor’s house (known today as the Picó Pomar residence), Martínez Illescas mustered his troops and ordered his command to march towards
Aibonito, retreating from Coamo. Just as the American artillery was firing its first shells at the town, the Spanish column began marching eastwards, using wagons to carry the equipment and supplies to the Spanish positions near the town of Aibonito. Commander Martínez' force proceeded on its march, leaving a rearguard positioned at a road keeper house (casilla de peón caminero) just beyond the cast-iron bridge (Puente Padre Inigo) leading out of town, under the command of Captains Frutos López and Raimundo Hita. At that moment, about 8:00AM, American troops were sighted some 300 meters ahead, and both sides opened fire simultaneously. The 16th Pennsylvania, which had marched all night through the hills north of Coamo, had arrived, one hour later than originally planned. Delayed by rough terrain, they had not able to commence their attack at the prearranged time with the other American units, but their vanguard arrived just in time to prevent the Spanish from retreating. The Spanish troops took cover in the road culverts and behind the trees that lined the roadway. The full strength of the 16th Pennsylvania was not deployed until an hour later, around 9:00AM. About that moment, and just as he was encouraging his men, Lt. Col. Martínez was shot in the heart, dying almost immediately. On seeing Martínez shot, Captain Frutos López, his second in command, ran to his help, but was killed almost instantly in the rifle exchanges between the American flanking force and the Spanish rear guard. With the loss of their commanding officer the Spanish resistance collapsed, and the surviving officer, Captain Hita, ordered his men to surrender and signaled the American troops to that effect. The Americans ceased fire immediately. However, some of the Spanish sergeants, corporals and soldiers shouted that they did not surrender, and crossing the road at a run, escaped uphill on a small road, hours later joining Spanish reinforcements coming down from Asomante (Rivero 1922:242-243).

While the fighting had started on the road towards Aibonito, American troops had entered the town. The 2nd Wisconsin's advance had been delayed by having to detour around a bridge that the Spanish destroyed (Puente Méndez Vigo, included in the National Register of Historic Places), so Cavalry Troop C actually entered Coamo before the infantry, having galloped at top speed north from the Coamo Baths after finding the resort spa abandoned by the Spanish (Fiala 1899:71; Rivero 1922:239). American casualties in the Battle of Coamo were 1 dead and 10 wounded, while the Spanish lost 6 dead, 35 wounded, and 5 officers and 162 men captured (Rivero 1922:243; Nofi 1996:249). After the battle, the bodies of Lt. Col. Martínez Illescas and Captain Frutos López, in addition to three Spanish soldiers, were kept for a short time in the nearby road keeper house before burial.
Troop C pursued the fleeing Spanish column for five and a half miles along the military road, even going around a single-span masonry bridge 4 miles east of Coamo that was partially destroyed by the retreating Spanish. The cavalry was stopped by “Spanish artillery posted at Aibonito Pass, a deeply cut gorge between two steep hills (El Peñón and Asomante) about a mile below the town of Aibonito” (Nofi 1996:250; Rivero 1922:240).

Combat at Asomante

On the afternoon of August 9th, Wilson moved his divisional camp to the north of the Coamo River, and the entire Ernst brigade camped along the valley, sending scouts five miles to the front. Troop C and the 2nd Wisconsin Volunteers traded rifle fire with the Spanish infantry most of the following day, August 10th (Fiala 1899:78-79). Probing the Spanish lines continued all day on August 11th under orders of General Wilson who needed information to deal with the Spanish forces in front of Aibonito (Rivero 1922:256). The Spanish forces consisted of some 1,280 troops, (three companies of Cazadores de Patria Battalion and its mounted guerrillas; 2 companies and mounted guerrillas from the 6th Provisional Battalion; and two provisional companies formed by an assortment of members of the Guardia Civil, police, and volunteers from the 9th Battalion from Ponce), 70 horses and two 8-cm Plasencia field artillery pieces under the command of artillery Captain Ricardo Hernáiz, and were well entrenched at San Gervacio and Colón Hills, above the Asomante heights (Rivero 1922:252-253).

After spending two days reconnoitering the Spanish lines, Wilson again tried a flanking movement on August 12th, using artillery covering fire to mask the movement of the 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin, which occupied Barranquitas that night in the rear off the Spanish right for an attack on August 13th. On the morning of August 12th, Battery F of the 3rd Artillery (six 9-cm field pieces), under the command of Captain R. D. Potts and the supervision of commander J.M. Lancaster of the 4th Regular Artillery, moved up, escorted by elements of the 3rd Wisconsin. Potts’ force reached a road keepers house (Casilla de Peón Caminero #10) from which they could observe the Spanish positions: three pieces were placed beyond the road keepers house, two even further, and the last one about 100 yards in the vanguard, all to the right of the road. Then they began firing in an attempt to silence the Spanish artillery. The sudden silence of one of the Spanish field pieces led the Americans to believe they had been successful, but the Spanish resumed firing with both pieces within 45 minutes. The combined fire by Captain Hernáiz’ artillery and the entrenched infantry’s Mauser rifles forced commander Lancaster to order a retreat from their position, but not before they had exhausted their ammunition. American losses in this engagement were 1 infantry killed (Cpl. Oscar Swanson), 1 mortally wounded (Pvt. Frederick Yought), two
officers wounded (Lt. Hains and Capt. Lee), and 3 wounded troops (Cpl. August Yank, George J. Bunce and soldier Sizces), while the Spanish only suffered one slightly wounded artilleryman (Rivero 1922:256-263).

Other action on August 12th saw two detachments of Troop C work their way north and south of and behind the Spanish positions, returning on August 13th (Fiala 1899:82-85). By late afternoon on the 12th, Wilson was aware of the signing of the armistice agreement. That evening he sent Lt. Col. towards the Spanish lines under flag of truce, with a message for Governor Macías, suggesting a cessation of hostilities to avoid additional loss of life, and the surrender of the Spanish. Spanish officer Nouvilas received the message and promised to have a reply from Macías on the morning of the 13th. In his telegram the following morning, Macías refused to surrender and denied having any instructions from the Spanish government in Madrid. Despite the Spanish refusal, Wilson called off the attack on their positions proposed for the morning of August 13th (Nofi 1996:251, Rivero 1922:259).

Rivero includes an interesting and apocryphal story by Spanish artillery Captain Ricardo Hernández, who commanded the Spanish artillery from its positions on Asomante with great effectiveness. According to Capt. Hernández, after the cease-fire he was commissioned to go to Wilson’s camp in Coamo to deliver a document from Governor Macías to General Miles. Passing through the combat lines until he reached Wilson’s camp in Coamo, Hernández was brought before Wilson and delivered his message. After General Wilson informed him that Miles was in Ponce, Hernández watched as Wilson read and wrote a response to Macías’ message. The following morning, Hernández took it back to Asomante, from where it was sent to Macías. In his account, Hernández supposes it was the agreement for the cessation of hostilities between the local military commanders in Puerto Rico, since from that moment all war operations ceased (Rivero 1922:265).
Henry: From Ponce to Utuado -- Without a Fight

As a prelude to the offensive strategy planned by Gen. Miles, a small contingent of about 30 troops under General Roy Stone and Puerto Rican sympathizers occupied the town of Adjuntas on August 2nd. This force had been sent to improve the wide mountain trail to Adjuntas and Utuado, whose difficulties plagued Puig’s Spanish troops on their retreat from Yauco, into a road that could be used by the forces under General Guy V. Henry traveling to Arecibo by way of Adjuntas and Utuado. Whitney had identified this road during his spy mission in Puerto Rico in May. Early in the morning next day (August 3rd) Roy’s force descended on to the town of Utuado (Pico 1987:62). Guiding and escorting General Stone were many members of distinguished families in the municipality. Close to 5,000 people cheered the American troops with acclamations as they marched along Comercio Street in Utuado. The officers were invited to dances in the residences of prominent families, and Jose Lorenzo Casalduc, the mayor, sent General Miles a letter thanking him for sending General Stone to Utuado (Picó 1987:74-75).

On August 6th Major General Guy V. Henry received orders from Gen. Miles to move to Arecibo (using the mountain road leading to Adjuntas and Utuado) with the Garretson brigade reinforced with regulars from the 19th Infantry. Arecibo would be used as the rendezvous point where his forces would meet with Schwan’s Independent Regular Brigade, and travel by railway to San Juan. However, it was not until August 8th that Gen. Henry’s forces left Ponce for the town of Adjuntas. Despite the improvements made by General Stone’s advance, and the road building efforts made by Henry’s troops to “turn the track into a practicable road”, this movement was very slow because of the road-building equipment the column had to haul along, the incessant rain that plagued the march, and that sickness within the 6th Illinois and 6th Massachusetts had weakened those regiments (Nofi 1996:244). On the evening of the 8th camp was made at the Hacienda Florida, on the road to Adjuntas, where the 6th Massachusetts did not arrive until 9:00PM, and then only because they had used double teams of oxen to pull their cars up the trail. The 6th Illinois was not able to arrive until next morning, since they were transporting the reserve munitions and the rations – all other equipment, including full campaign tents, had been left behind to lighten the load as much as possible. While Henry went ahead and arrived at Adjuntas on the 9th, it wasn’t until the 10th that the main column reached the town, while the baggage train arrived on the 11th.

The journey was so difficult that it had been necessary to abandon the carts and transport everything on mule back. The entire 12th of August was spent reorganizing the supply train, review the troops and inspect weapons and equipment. In six days of marching and road building, this column had marched only ten miles across the
most mountainous part of Puerto Rico. That day, the 19th Regular Infantry battalion marched through Adjuntas, reaching Utuado that day and bivouacking there. On the 13th, General Henry, his staff and 2 battalions of the 6th Illinois arrived in Utuado, having approached carefully by using detachments of Regular Cavalry and Troop B, 2nd Cavalry as a screening force to detect possible Spanish ambushes. Captain C.B. Hoppin (1904) reported that a detachment of Corporal Jetmore, of Troop B actually penetrated as far north as the town of Arecibo on the north coast where Henry was supposed to link up with Schwan. Jetmore’s detachment was fired on by Spanish troops stationed at Arecibo, and the cavalrymen returned to Utuado on August 14th (Hoppin 1904:309-310). Once in Utuado, the weakened force received the order to suspend hostilities due to the armistice. By the 14th the cavalry squadron arrived, while Garretson and the rest of his brigade did not arrive until the 16th (Nofi 1996:257-258; Rivero 1922:349-350).

Henry’s description of his failed effort to reach Arecibo is cited in Rivero’s account of the war, where he mentions that three companies of the 19th Regular Infantry had 43 cases of dysentery, while the sick list had tripled in three days, given the troops’ exposure to the rain. No less than three hospitals had to be established in the latter part of August: one for typhoid patients, whose number peaked at 60, one with 65 beds and another with 20 beds. All of these were for caring for Garretson’s troops stationed in Utuado. According to official reports, fully half of the Garretson brigade was unfit for duty on August 16th. Henry states that “The road built by General Stone from here to Adjuntas will never be practicable for cars in this season, because even though it might be open one day, the next day it disappears”. Finally, Henry explains the occupation of Lares by his troops after the signing of the Armistice, which was seen as a violation by the Spanish authorities and General Miles, as being necessary since it had been evacuated by Spanish forces (Rivero 1922:351, 440).
Spanish Defenses

The port city of Mayagüez on the west coast was the center of operations for the Spanish defenses in the sector. The Spanish garrison stationed there at the beginning of August consisted of six infantry companies and 2 guerrilla units (1 mounted and 1 infantry) of the Alfonso XIII Battalion, the 6th Volunteer Battalion, a field artillery section with 2 Plasencia guns, and an assortment of Guardia Civil, police and remaining volunteers of the dissolved 7th battalion. Altogether, these forces added up to 1,515 soldiers, with 70 horses, under the command of Colonel Julio Soto Villanueva. Since the declaration of war, Col. Soto had created a Defense Committee (Junta de Defensa), which collected funds to carry out the more urgently needed preparations, including the construction of a blockhouse on the rail line near Hormigueros and a defensive structure on a height that dominated the port (Rivero 1922:304-305).

Yauco-Hormigueros

On August 6th, General Theodore Schwan received orders from Commanding General Miles, instructing him to leave Ponce and go to Yauco with the six companies of the 11th Regular Infantry Regiment, squadron A of the 5th Cavalry under Captain Macomb and two field batteries. At Yauco he would meet with the rest of the 11th Infantry and two companies of the 19th Regular Infantry stationed there, proceed to Mayagüez through Sabana Grande and San Germán, and from there to Lares and Arecibo (Rivero 1922:295-296). Miles expressed the objectives of Schwan’s column in the following manner:

> You will drive out or capture all Spanish troops in the western portion of Puerto Rico. You will take all necessary precautions and exercise great care against being surprised or ambushed by the enemy, and will make the movement as rapidly as possible, at the same time exercising your best judgment in the care of your command, to accomplish the object of your expedition... It is expected that in Arecibo you will be joined by the complete brigade (Herrmann 1907:23; Rivero 1922:296).

General Schwan’s command left camp at Yauco and began the march northwest to the town of San Germán on the morning of August 9th, making a straight 12-mile march and stopping at the outskirts of the town of Sabana Grande. Schwan had hoped to begin his movement on August 7th, but was delayed by “...having to send all but two companies of the 19th Regular Infantry to undertake garrison duties or bolster other columns, which reduced his effectives to only about 1,500 men, but he did have 8 artillery pieces (Battery D, 5th Artillery) and 4 Gatling
In addition, Troop A, 5th Cavalry joined his force at Sabana Grande (Rivero 1922:296).

News of the landing at Guanica on July 25th had caused commotions in the southwest of Puerto Rico prior to Schwan’s advance, and the rise of local leaders such as Eduardo Lugo Viña (an assistant secretary of the President of island’s governing Council, who organized and led the Puerto Rican scouts that guided the Americans) and Mateo Fajardo (wealthy citizen and separatist who, after escaping from Puerto Rico at the outbreak of the war, had returned with Miles as part of the Puerto Rican Commission and was organizing the Puerto Rican Guard, made up of native irregular troops, with Miles’ consent, and later led Schwan’s column). In San Germán, news of the landing on the 25th had caused the entire assembled Spanish forces, about 400 men, to march towards Guánica under commander Ramón Espiñeira Fernández. After camping for two days on a height known as Cuesta de la Pica in Sabana Grande, this force received no reinforcements and was later ordered to retreat to San Germán, only to leave for Mayagüez after having requisitioned horses and supplies in the area. In this situation, some adventurous citizens joined Eduardo Lugo Viña’s efforts to organize resistance against the Spanish and occupied San Germán, taking over City Hall, the courts, the telegraph office and the military barracks, naming a new mayor and releasing all prisoners from jail. Anticipating that the Spanish would send troops to reoccupy San Germán, the resistance posted lookouts in forward positions at all the entrances into town. These positions exchanged rifle fire with the advancing Spanish troops in the area of the Sambolin and Imisa sugar haciendas, and after retreating, gave warning that the Spanish were coming, which caused the loosely organized fighters to flee or hide in town. A small party attempting to make an organized retreat towards Sabana Grande tried to stand up to the Spanish cavalry following them, but dispersed after exchanging shots: two of the party, Aurelio Córdoba and Luz Mangual, were captured and taken to Mayagüez and Arecibo, but released after the armistice was signed. The Spanish troops occupied San Germán for two days and nights, after which they left town. Some of the remaining resistance fighters who had hidden in town then left for Guánica, where they stayed for some days, returning with Schwan’s column on the 10th (Rivero 1922:428-433; Camuñas 1999:24).

General Schwan’s command was able to move into San Germán without resistance, where Troop B and its Puerto Rican scouts entered around noon on the 10th (Picó 1987:63-64). On hearing of Schwan’s advance from Yauco, Col. Soto of the Spanish garrison in Mayagüez had sent two telegrams to Governor Macías, which were
not answered. On the morning of the 10th, advised by the telegraph officer in San Germán of the American entry
in town, Soto ordered 6th Company of the Alfonso XIII battalion, under Captain Torrecillas, and 25 guerrillas
under Captain Juan Bascaran, a total of 145 men, to Hormigueros, and engage the American force as soon as it
appeared. The rest of the garrison remained in their barracks, and additional telegrams were sent to Macias,
again without an answer (Rivero 1922:305). Meanwhile, General Schwan was notified upon arrival at San
Germán of the Spanish mobilization and ordered his advance guard to continue to Hormigueros. The
information concerning the Spanish movements was brought to Schwan by the Puerto Rican scouts led by
Eduardo Lugo Viña, who was held in high regard by the General (Hermann 1907:40; Rivero 1922:297-298).
Schwan received reports from the scouts that the 7th Volunteer Regiment had been ordered to congregate on
Mayaguez, and one company of the Alfonso XIII Battalion with mounted guerrillas were concentrating at

**Battle of Hormigueros**

The Spanish force under Captain Torrecillas bivouacked in the area of the pilgrims’ hospice in Hormigueros, and
sent scouts ahead to reconnoiter the area and advise him of enemy troop movements. By noon, they heard the
first shots fired – these were the Spanish guerrillas encountering Lugo Viña’s Puerto Rican scouts. Next, the
Spanish troops occupied the Silva Heights (Alto de Silva), a ridge dominating the broad valley through which
road from San Germán to Mayaguez ran. The Spanish troops also occupied positions several hundred yards in
front the ridge, more or less parallel to the road, and awaited in an extended skirmish line, hidden from the
advancing enemy. After waiting for the American troops to cross a small wooden bridge close to the Cabo Rojo
road, Torrecillas’ troops opened fire. After some initial confusion, the Americans began their ground advance,
while the exchange of fire grew more intense (Nofi 1996:252-253; Rivero 1922:309-310).

The central objective for this battle was control of the approaches to the Silva Bridge, a cast-iron structure that
spanned the Guanajibo River (a.k.a. Rio Grande), and which opened the way towards Mayaguez. The first
Americans on the battlefield were A Troop, 5th Cavalry, a Regular unit that immediately dismounted and
attacked on foot with their carbines. This unit scattered the Spanish forward guerilla units to their front and
pursued them into the town of Hormigueros, crossing over the small cast-iron Torrëns Bridge and right of the
road. The dismounted cavalry took up positions behind a railroad embankment below the Silva Heights, opened
fire on the Spanish positions until joined by two companies of the 19th and the entire 11th Infantry to catch up, along with the artillery (Nofi 1996:253; Oliver 1902).

Schwan’s advance guard – the two companies of the 19th, supported by two field pieces and Gatling guns – reached the Guanajibo River, forming the American left. Cavalry Troop A formed the far American right, with the 11th Infantry (supported by artillery and Gatling guns) spanning the distance between both ends. This was the American battle line facing the Spanish positions. Then the 11th Infantry moved forward toward the Guanajibo River and the Silva Bridge. However, the infantry could not ford the river because it was swollen with the previous night’s rain. The American advance then crossed over the Silva Bridge and pressed on the Spanish right flank, while Troop A remounted and turned the Spanish left flank. The American artillery was emplaced on a ridge to the rear of the attacking force, while the Gatling guns, which were effective against the Spanish, were moved up towards the river, and then to the Spanish right once they were over the Silva Bridge. Then the entire 11th Infantry moved forward and crossed the Guanajibo river, making Captain Torrecillas pull back under the combined weight of the attack, combined with Gatling guns and artillery fire. After about an hour of sustained fire, Captain Torrecillas’ troops were low on ammunition. Repeated attempts to obtain reinforcements and ammunition from the garrison at Mayaguez had been fruitless, and Torrecillas’ last messages to Col. Soto had informed him that, by about 4:00PM, his men had only 10 shots each left, and if reinforcements and ammunition were not forthcoming he would order his men to fix bayonets and charge the American troops. Torrecillas’ account of the battle mentions the arrival of commander Jaspe, Soto’s second in command, and Captain Fruto Huertos, around 4:30PM, just as Torrecillas was about to give the order to charge. Jaspe departed after Torrecillas informed him of the events of the battle, and when Torrecillas returned to his men, found that Huertos had begun leading them on retreat, obliging Torrecillas to hurry after them. The small force later joined the main column and camped on the road to Maricao. The Battle of Hormigueros had ended. The Americans lost 2 killed and 15 wounded, while the Spanish sustained 3 dead and 6 wounded (Nofi 1996:254-255, Rivero 1922:310-312).

One of the puzzles surrounding this action was the lack of Spanish reinforcements for Captain Torrecillas’ force. Having been advised by 3:00PM of the engagement at Hormigueros, Col. Soto positioned his troops on the heights to the west of Mayaguez (Cerro Las Mesas), where he emplaced two field guns. Then he ordered a company under the command of Captain Florencio Huertos to reinforce Torrecillas, with another held in reserve
close to Hormigueros. After going into Mayagüez to verify if there were any messages from Governor Macías (there were none), Soto returned to find that no reinforcements or reserves had been positioned as ordered, and the reasons for this remain unclear to this day (Rivero 1922:306). Whatever the case, it seems certain that it was only Torrecillas’ force of 145 men, if minimally reinforced, that held the Silva Heights against the American advance that afternoon, and not any significant part of Col. Soto’s entire garrison of over 1,500 men. Also receiving unconfirmed reports that American cavalry was maneuvering to outflank the positions at Hormigueros, and that American warships were in sight of the port (both false reports), Soto did not move his troops (Rivero 1922:306-307). William H. Oliver’s account of the battle says that the last shot was fired at about 6:00PM but, just before dark, “...Troop A was ordered to intercept and capture, if possible, a railroad train with a party of Spanish soldiers on board, at the Hormigueros station. The train pulled out and escaped before we could get anywhere near it, also eluding some shots directed at it by the artillery.” (1902:118). Although there are no other corroborating sources, it is perhaps possible to speculate that these troops were reinforcements that arrived in Hormigueros, despite the reigning confusion.

**Occupation of Mayagüez**

Despite the varying accounts, it is clear that the Battle of Hormigueros was over by early evening of the 10th, and that the Spanish forces were concentrated on the heights to the west of Mayagüez (Cerro Las Mesas), while American troops were encamped at the battle site for the night. At about 10:00PM, Col. Soto led his column down from the heights and into town, where citizens informed him variously that the Americans were at the town cemetery, that Americans troops were disembarking from warships on the beach and at Cabo Rojo (to the south), and that an entire squadron was off the coast, pointing its cannon at the city. Believing that his position was untenable, Soto ordered his column to bivouac on the road to Las Marias. Accompanied by his staff and some guerrillas, Soto entered Mayagüez and sent Governor Macías a telegram informing him of the situation. Macías’ reply authorized Soto to retreat if he thought it advisable, taking with him all munitions and supplies possible. Given the information he had at hand, Soto opted to retreat to Arecibo by way of the Las Marias-Lares road. At dawn on the 11th, the entire column began their march to Las Marias (Rivero 1922:307-309).

Schwan occupied on the Silva Heights and rested his men the night of August 10th. He set out in pursuit of the Spanish early on August 11th, arriving at Mayagüez with the main body and scouts at about 9:00AM (Rivero 1922:322). The U.S. flag was initially raised in the local hospital and infantry barracks. The U.S. forces were
given a warm welcome by the local populace. Schwan was received in City Hall by prominent citizens of Mayagüez. Schwan rested his infantry (that had marched 45 miles and fought a battle in three days) and set up camp in an area known as “Sabana de Cuevas” on the road to Maricao at the outskirts of the town, sending Troop A and their Puerto Rican scouts under Lt. Valentine ahead to maintain contact with the Spanish throughout the night of August 11th. At dawn of the 12th, between four or five companies of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Kentucky Regiment disembarked from a transport at the port of Mayagüez, accompanied by the monitors Montgomery and Wasp. This force would garrison the city while Schwan’s forces resumed their advance, and establish quarters at the old Spanish Barracks. The advance cavalry reported back to Schwan the afternoon of the 12th, while one company of the 1st Kentucky, 6 companies of the 11th Infantry, Battery C of the 5th Artillery (Lt. Rogers F. Gardner, commanding) and a detachment of the 3rd Cavalry, all under the command of Lt. Col. Burke, had left at about 10:00AM to catch up with Troop A and the retreating Spanish (Nofi 1996:255; Rivero 1922:327; Clements 1907:50-51; Schwarz & Milligan 1915:28, 24(addendum)).

Action at Las Marias
After leaving the outskirts of Mayagüez, the Spanish force stopped to rest at the Nieva coffee hacienda. An unfortunate accident here crippled Col. Soto, who had to be conveyed to the nearby town of Las Marias in a stretcher. Responding to a telegram from Soto about his injury on the 12th, Macías ordered Soto to relinquish command to his second, Lt. Col. Antonio Osés Mozo, if it impeded the retreat to Arecibo. That night, the officers of the Spanish column held council at the home of Las Marias mayor Olivencia, and Col. Soto formally relinquished command to Osés, as ordered by Macías. After a turbulent meeting to decide the plan for the retreat, commanders Osés, Espineira, Jaspe, captains González, García Cuyar and Torrecillas, and others left for the house of José Pérez Suau, where they were staying; while commander Salazar, captain Bascarán, lieutenant Graña and other volunteers such as captain Serena, stayed at the house of José Guiscafré. Sometime around midnight Osés ordered the troops mustered and the march to Lares began, climbing down the steep slopes in a downpour in order to reach the river Guasio (also known as Río Prieto, today Río Grande de Añasco) and cross in an area owned by Cirilo Blandín (vegas de Blandín), in whose house Soto stayed the night. The river was swollen due to the rains, and the column spent the night there. At dawn on the 13th, one or two Spanish soldiers died attempting to cross, so Lt. Col. Osés decided to march upstream to another crossing, known as Paso de Zapata, where they would wait for the waters to recede (Rivero 1922:312-313, 317, 323-326).
In constant rain and muddy roads, the American troops only made ten miles on the 12th. They camped by the road and rose early to continue the march early on 13th. While entering Las Marias at about 7:30AM, the Puerto Rican scouts reported the Spanish infantry was just ahead, attempting to ford the swollen Rio Prieto, to the northwest of town. Various accounts exist of the initial encounter between Spanish and American troops and the attack on the rearguard of the Spanish column (see Rivero 1922:325, 328; Camuñas 1999:44; Nofi 1996:255-256). However, the accounts are clear that the Americans were able to position their cannon (two guns, Battery C, 3rd Artillery) on the heights of Maravilla hill, overlooking the point where the Spanish column was crossing the Guasio River, unaware of the enemy. It was mid-morning by the time the Americans had placed their artillery, and most of the Spanish column had already crossed, except for the rearguard, when the first rifle and artillery fire was heard from above – the Americans had begun their attack. Completely surprised that the Americans had been able to get their artillery to Las Marias on such short notice, panic ensued in the Spanish column as everyone scrambled for cover. Lt. Col. Suau and Lt. Graña crossed the river and disappeared into the hills, while Lt. Col. Osés and Lt. Lucas Hernández, commanding the rearguard, organized the remaining troops and returned fire for over 15 minutes, after which they dispersed. Osés, Hernández and a few troops found refuge in a house belonging to Gerardo González, where they were captured as they were eating – seeing they were almost starved, they were allowed to eat, and Lugo Viña, the head of Schwan’s scouts joined them for the meal (Rivero 1922: 312-313, 317, 323-326).

On receiving news that the Spanish were in the area of Las Marias, Schwan had left Mayagüez with his staff and a cavalry detachment under Captain Macomb, joining Burke at a point two and a half miles north of Las Marias later on the morning of August 13th. From this point, both field guns and the infantry had been positioned on nearby Maravilla hill and were firing on the retreating Spanish rearguard detachment from the heights, as it began to cross the river. Although much confusion was caused by the American surprise attack, the Spanish rearguard put up a valiant defense. By the end of the engagement Spanish casualties were 3 dead, 27 wounded (Rivero indicates that nine were wounded), and 56 prisoners, including Col. Soto, Lt. Col. Osés and a first lieutenant – with the Americans incurring no losses. Encamping on the battlefield, the Americans learned an Armistice was already in effect when they fought the action at Las Marias. Meanwhile, the retreating Spanish column had regrouped and advanced through Perchas ward in Lares to the Oronoz residence, where Lt. Col. Suau, who had fled when the American troops had fired on the column while crossing the river, joined them.
before arriving in Lares town. The following day, August 14th, the Spanish column reached Arecibo (Nofi 1996:256; Schwarz & Milligan 1915:28; Rivero 1922:324-28, 334-335).

An interesting note to the Las Marias campaign is that one of the members of the 11th Regiment was Dr. Bailey K. Ashford, who formed part of Schwan’s column during the advance from Yauco to Las Marías and treated the Spanish wounded in Hormigueros and Las Marias, including Lt. Vera (part of Torrecillas’ force in Hormigueros), Col. Soto and Lt. Col. Osés. Dr. Ashford stayed in Puerto Rico after the war, and achieved lasting fame when he discovered the cause of the anemia that afflicted a large part of the working-class population in Puerto Rico, a parasite known as *Uncinaria*, and found a cure for the disease. Becoming a well-respected expert on tropical diseases during his lifetime, Dr. Ashford’s invaluable contributions to the advancements in medical care in Puerto Rico are still commemorated today. In 1922, Dr. Ashford was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his services during World War I, in a ceremony held at the field in front of El Morro Castle (Rivero 1922:340-346).
The End of the Puerto Rican Campaign – Armistice and the Peace Treaty

By the end of the campaign on the 13th of August, the Americans held about one-half of the island, and had easily defeated all of the forces they had encountered. However, the majority of the 8,000 regular Spanish troops had not been committed to battle and the Americans would likely have encountered difficulty in dislodging the entrenched enemy in the mountainous regions of Puerto Rico, had the Peace Protocol not been announced. In addition, the taking of the fortified city of San Juan would have required a difficult siege. Although the outcome of the defeat of the Spanish forces was not in doubt, American losses could easily have equated those suffered in Cuba. Total naval and army casualties incurred by the Americans in the taking of the island were nine men killed or mortally wounded and 46 men less seriously wounded (Nofi 1996:258-259).

Between the beginning of the Armistice on August 13th and the departure of the last Spanish forces from the island on October 18, 1898, there was “...a high degree of cooperation and courtesy...between the Spanish and American officers and troops...” (Nofi 1996: 259). The departing Spanish forces, the American troops, and the local Puerto Rican citizenry usually all cooperated in suppressing disturbances by demobilized volunteers who attempted to go into business as bandits (Nofi 1996:259-260). However, all accounts of the period testify to the trepidation felt by both Puerto Ricans and Americans as they carefully regarded each other across the bridge that now existed between their respective cultures and histories.

On December 10, 1898, the peace treaty ending the war was signed between the United States and Spain, at Versailles, outside of Paris, France. According to the treaty provisions, Cuba would be independent after a short period of American occupation, while Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands would be annexed as U.S. territories— the latter in lieu of a $20 million dollar indemnity paid by the United States to Spain. Even before the peace treaty was signed, most of the state militia volunteer units that were sent to Puerto Rico were replaced with regular Army units, and returned to their home states for mustering out. However, the casualties of the war didn’t end with the armistice or the treaty: for example, there were no combat casualties among members of the 6th Massachusetts, but when the unit history was written in 1899, 24 members of the regiment had already died—mostly from sickness caused by unsanitary conditions at Camp Alger, Virginia, prior to embarkation, or from illnesses that were contracted during service in Puerto Rico (Edwards 1899:335-359; Harrison 1988:53-63).
The press coverage of the Puerto Rico Campaign was not as extensive as that of the Cuba Campaign. This can be attributed in part to the fact that General Miles’ strategy for Puerto Rico did not appeal to the press, depending as it did on overpowering the Spanish forces on the island by strategy rather than frontal assaults. It should also be noted that Miles did not arrange for the transport of correspondents, as did General Shafter and Admiral Sampson (Brown 1967:409). It should also be noted that the Puerto Rico campaign was one that emphasized the under-training of the Spanish volunteers (Jacobsen 1899:19).

For the United States, the Spanish-American War was initially viewed as a short, glorious, and not very costly war, or in Theodore Roosevelt’s word “A bully fight” (Nofi 1996:305), or as later Secretary of the Navy John Hay said, “A splendid little war...” (Millis 1931:340). In retrospect, it was a war conducted to gain colonial possessions, similar to other wars of colonization being conducted by European nations during the nineteenth century. More importantly, it marked the emergence of the United States as an international power (Brown 1967:303). On the other hand, for Spain, which had lost much more territory and vastly more valuable colonies in the wars of liberation in Latin America during the 1820s, the defeat marked the definitive end of the vague imperial dream they still pursued. It was a rude awakening, one that allows a more profound understanding of why the seemingly smaller loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico (in addition to its Pacific possessions) has since been regarded as the great “Disaster”.
F. ASSOCIATED PROPERTY TYPES

LANDING AREAS

Property Type Description
This property type seeks to encompass those landing sites used by the U.S. forces disembarking in Puerto Rico between July 25th to August 11th, 1898. All the landings occurred in the waterfronts close to major port cities in the towns of Guánica, Ponce, Arroyo, Fajardo and Mayagüez, initially carried out by naval detachments led by U.S. naval officers. With the exception of Fajardo on the east coast, these landings occurred in port cities located in the south (Ponce and Arroyo), southwest (Guánica) and west (Mayaguez), where facilities and lighters were available to permit the landing of men, equipment and material. No landing occurred in the northern and eastern coastal ports, with the exception of Fajardo, until after the armistice. Most waterfronts used as landing sites had properties like piers, institutional buildings (e.g. customs, harbor pilot), residences, and warehouses. The properties of that period were usually made of wood, brick and/or stone, with relatively few decorative elements, but at present have incorporated alterations in concrete, in some cases. The property type boundaries will include the coastal area of the waterfront and buildings extant where the landings took place.

Property Type Significance
This property type will be eligible at Local, State and National levels under Criteria A of the National Register of Historic Places associated with military history. These landing areas, with the exception of Arroyo, Fajardo and Mayagüez, were chosen because of the availability of barges and lighters critical for the debarkation of troops, supplies and equipment from the transports. The Guánica and Ponce landings are significant at State and National level and are directly associated to the General Nelson A. Miles. The Arroyo and Mayagüez landing sites are significant at Local and State levels as a secondary theatre of operations where individual infantry, cavalry and artillery columns converged for subsequent operations against Spanish forces in the area. The Fajardo landing site is significant at Local, State and National levels because it is associated with the only strictly naval action in Puerto Rico during the invasion, unrelated to the U.S. strategy planned by Gen. Miles.

Property Type Registration Requirements
Landing sites, which will include various resources, must retain integrity of location, setting, feeling and association in order to be eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The property type must retain the
features, artifacts, and spatial relationships to the extent that the remains are able to convey any important association with the events in the Spanish American War. The composition of resources within the waterfronts used as landing areas may vary. Major ports like Ponce will have primarily masonry warehouses, while small ports like Guánica will have wooden residential houses. Although there has been modern construction in these areas, enough historic material and association is retained.

**MILITARY ENGAGEMENT SITES**

**Property Type Description**

This property type seeks to encompass those buildings, structures, objects, sites, and districts associated with the exchange of fire between the Spanish and American armed forces (irregular and regular) from July 25th to August 13th, 1898. The property type will include various skirmish/battle sites in the southern coastal lowlands, in the western mountainous interior, and on the western, northern, and eastern coasts. Only in Coamo (August 9th), Guánica (Battle of Yauco, July 26th), Hormigueros (Battle of Hormigueros, August 10th), Guayama (August 5th), Guamani (August 6th) and Aibonito (Battle of Asomante, August 12th) were there serious attempts by the Spanish to stop the invading force. However, these battles, most of which lasted under two hours, occurred between small Spanish contingents and the U.S. land forces, and two others between Puerto Rican guerillas and Spanish regulars. In addition to those mentioned before there were also skirmishes or battles in San Germán/Sabana Grande (August 1st-4th), Arroyo (August 1st), Guayama (August 5th and August 6th), Fajardo (August 8th-9th), Coamo (August 9th), and Las Marias (August 13th). These skirmishes/battles occurred on the roadways or paths that connected the coastal and mountainous communities.

These sites include infantry and defensive entrenchments, shelled positions, areas of troop movements, artillery and Gatling gun positions, skirmish lines, engagement areas, command posts, and observation points. Among the properties eligible for inclusion are houses, institutional buildings, fortifications, road keeper houses, roadways and bridges, in addition to areas associated with movements, positions, and other locations. The boundaries for these properties will include those major features (geographical) that are crucial for the understanding of the skirmish or battle.
Property Type Significance
Battle and skirmish sites are significant at State and National levels under Criterion A, associated with military history. This property type is important to study the strategy, unit performance and weapons used by the Spanish and the American forces during the Puerto Rican Campaign.

Property Type Registration Requirements
The buildings, structures, objects, sites and districts to be eligible for the National Register must retain integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling and association. The skirmish/battle sites throughout the island must retain location, setting, feeling and association in order to be eligible to the National Register. The properties under this property type must not only retain their essential physical features, but the features must be visible enough to convey their significance. This means that even if a property is physically intact, its integrity is questionable if its significant features are concealed under modern construction. Many of the skirmish/battle site occurred along main island roadways or other roads used by the U.S. forces in their land campaign (July 25-August 13). Since they also occurred in rural areas where there were few buildings and structures, the consideration of setting is crucial for the interpretation and eligibility of the site. Some part of the skirmish sites have either been partly impacted with new construction, like the Hormigueros battle site, or have been impacted with new construction, like the skirmish sites on the outskirts of the towns of Guánica, Coamo and Guayama. The Hormigueros battle site contains numerous properties (approaches used by the U.S. and Spanish forces, two historic bridges, Gatling gun, rifle and cannon positions and areas where U.S. and Spanish troops concentrated) that still retain integrity, due to little new construction (housing and a concrete bridge).

FLAG RAISING SITES
Property Type Description
This property type refers to the sites where the U.S. flag was raised from July 25th to August 13th, 1898. These sites correspond to areas or towns that were taken by the U.S. forces during the campaign, as they came into Guánica (2 sites) and Ponce and moved to other cities like Adjuntas, Arroyo, Coamo, Fajardo (3 sites), Guayama, Hormigueros, Juana Diaz, Ponce, Sabana Grande, San Germán and Mayagüez, Utuado and Yauco. The flag raising also came to symbolize a breaking away with the historic association with Spain. The flag raising sites were usually places in front of institutional buildings (like local town halls or customs houses) or homes in the town plaza. This will not include those properties where the flag was displayed by the local
The populace in their houses or commercial buildings in cities as a welcoming gesture to the U.S. forces. The boundary for these properties will be the area in front of the building or site where the flag was raised.

**Property Type Significance**

This property type is significant at National and State level under criterion A associated with political history of the United and Puerto Rico. These sites are significant at State level for the impact it had on the local inhabitants in the way they viewed themselves as no longer a colony of Spain. At National level they reflect the U.S. government policy goal of establishing a claim for the annexation of Puerto Rico at the end of the war.

**Property Type Registration Requirements**

The area that would be eligible for inclusion would include only the immediate area where the flag raising occurred. The flag raising sites must not only retain the essential physical features, but the features must be able to convey their significance. In the case of institutional buildings, the façade and surrounding area (including area facing the plaza) must retain the integrity of location, design, materials, workmanship, feeling and association. Those sites where the institutional buildings have suffered substantial changes will not be eligible under this property type to the National Register. The town hall of Yauco, where the U.S. flag was raised on July 26, has suffered substantial changes and thus lacks the necessary integrity.

**STAGING AREAS**

**Property Type Description**

This property type will the buildings, structures, objects, sites or districts that served as concentration points specifically for U.S. and Spanish military forces during the campaign period, July 25th to August 12th, 1898. For the U.S. forces, the main concentrations occurred first in Guánica and later in Ponce, which became the most important staging area in the war, since the invading U.S. forces arriving from different U.S. ports were mostly concentrated here before offensive operations began. The staging site in Guánica includes the only defensive works by the U.S. during the war, including “Fort Wainwright”, trenches and barbed wire on the road to Yauco, and Fort Capron. Later U.S. staging sites include Yauco, Mayaguez and Guayama. For the Spanish forces being redistributed throughout the island as the American offensive began and developed, staging sites are found in Cayey (for Asomante and Guayama), Las Marías, Hormigueros, Yauco, Hato Rey (San Juan), and Las Mesas (Mayaguez).
Property Type Significance
This property type is significant at State and National levels under Criterion A, associated with military history. The concentration points or staging areas were crucial sites in strengthening the U.S. landing areas against counterattacks by the Spanish and where both military forces would gather manpower and supplies for the land operations. The ports of Guánica and Ponce, as well as the cities of Ponce and Yauco, were crucial as secured areas where U.S. forces could safely concentrate prior to launching attacks on the Spanish forces in the mountain range. The capture of these areas enabled the American forces to have sufficient time to consolidate their hold on the immediate area, gather important intelligence on the enemy, debark men, equipment, supplies and ammunition needed for the land campaign effort. For the Spanish, Yauco would be important for gathering troops to attack U.S. forces in Guánica, while Cayey would be from where Spanish troops would reinforce their positions at both Guayama and Asomante (Aibonito).

Property Type Registration Requirements
The staging areas of the Puerto Rico campaign would encompass not only the landing area of Ponce but as well those areas used for camping grounds and headquarters by the U.S. forces in the city of Ponce. In the city of Guayama the area would encompass those areas that served as camping grounds and headquarters for the U.S. and Spanish forces. Among the resources that would be eligible would be buildings, structures and sites that served as landmarks for U.S. and Spanish troop concentrations.

NAVAL ACTIONS
Property Type Description
This property type seeks to encompass ships, residences, institutional buildings, religious buildings, fortifications and lighthouses affected by U.S. naval maritime operations, specifically the Puerto Rico blockade (April-August, 1898) and the bombardment of San Juan (May 12th, 1898). The SS Antonio López, sunk off the coast of Dorado (June 28th), is important for its association to the blockade-runners that provided war material and supplies to the defenders of San Juan. The buildings, structures, sites and objects associated to the bombardment of the Old City of San Juan (May 12th) are made mostly made up of brick, masonry or stone. This property type does not include those interventions by the Navy in support of General Miles’ Land Campaign in Puerto Rico.
Property Type Significance
This property type is significant at State and National levels under Criterion A, associated with military history. The naval campaign started before the land campaign. The bombardment of the fortifications in San Juan, the testing the blockade and the sinking of a blockade-runner had important consequence on the morale of the Spanish defenders and local volunteer units that would face General Miles’ force on July 25th, 1898, in addition to the general populations perceptions and reactions to the events of the war.

Property Type Registration Requirements
Because of its association with naval actions, this property type must represent, either individually or as part of a group (district), those properties that were affected either by the blockade or the bombardment of San Juan. The properties that would be eligible under this property type must be directly linked to the actions that occurred in 1898. Properties that are part of a group, but about which there is no direct information available associating it with the actions or the event, will not be eligible.
The geographical area encompasses the territorial area of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
H. SUMMARY OF IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION METHODS

Concise explanation of the field and archival methods used to prepare the multiple property nomination form.

This Multiple Property Documentation Form is the product of a cooperative effort started in early 1997 between the National Register Program Division of the Southeast Regional Office, NPS, Atlanta, and the State Historic Preservation Office of Puerto Rico (PRSHPO). The National Register Program Division conducted archival research to find secondary resources that would help in the preparation of a rough outline for the. A Historic Preservation Intern with the Georgia State University History Department, Julia C. Walker, searched the Internet for bibliographies, list of state volunteer and regular army units sent to Puerto Rico for the war, and articles about the war. The United States Army History Division's web page was also accessed, gathering information not only about the units sent to Puerto Rico but also the number of wounded, dead, and court-martial in each unit. States that sent troops to the war were contacted through the appropriate SHPO offices, as the activities of the units were often recorded and published within five years of the war, in order to find unit histories of the different volunteer and regular units that served in Puerto Rico from July 25 to August 13, 1898.

As a result, the researchers soon became aware that practically every American volunteer infantry, cavalry, and artillery unit that was sent to Puerto Rico left a detailed and illustrated history of the war. Among these unit histories were of several infantry regimental histories (3rd and 6th Illinois, 6th Massachusetts, 2nd Wisconsin, 4th and 16th Pennsylvania, 1st Kentucky, and 4th Ohio); volunteer and regular cavalry units (Troop A, Fifth Calvary, A and C New York City Cavalry, and Philadelphia City Troop); and artillery units (Battery B, Pennsylvania, 27th Indiana Light, and Battery A, Missouri artillery). Some of these resources were found at the Library of Congress, and National Archives, Washington, D.C., and Georgia State University (GSU) Library.

Ms. Julia C. Walker completed the first draft of this nomination in late 1997 (Walker 1997:51-53). The Puerto Rico State Historic Preservation Office staff has reviewed and extensively corrected the drafts of the cover nomination using local publications, in particular Angel Rivero book, *Crónica de la Guerra Hispanoamericana en Puerto Rico*, first published in 1922. The information gathered from the different resources allowed for the identification of a significant number of additional properties to those cultural resources already associated with the Spanish American War in Puerto Rico, and their integration into the cover nomination. Additional research
was carried out the Puerto Rican Archives in San Juan, Puerto Rico to identify photographic and written documentation on the Puerto Rican Campaign of the Spanish American War.

Four field trips involving NPS/PRSHPO personnel (Drs. Frank J.J. Miele, Mark R. Barnes and Mr. José E. Marull) were conducted in 1998 and 1999 to inspect and evaluate for National Register nomination cultural properties identified in the research phase of this study in the Municipalities of San Juan, Hormigueros, San Germán, Ponce, Coamo, Aibonito, Arroyo, Guayama and Las Marías. The resources were photographed and integrity was evaluated. Information gathered was used for the identification and evaluation of historic properties associated with the Spanish American War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPERTY</th>
<th>MUNICIPALITY</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Town Plaza</td>
<td>Adjuntas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish Positions at Asomante (8/29/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Artillery positions at Old Road #1 Aibonito (8/12/98)</td>
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<td>Arroyo Bivouac Areas (8/02/98)</td>
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<td>Arroyo Landing Site (8/01/98)</td>
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<td>Clotilde Santiago House (8/09/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coamo Skirmish Site (8/09/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coamo Thermal Baths (8/09/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Méndez Vigo Bridge (8/09/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road Keeper House near Skirmish Site (8/09/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry start up positions (8/09/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.S. Antonio Lopez Shipwreck site (6/27/98)</td>
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<td>Casa-Alcaldía de Fajardo (5/08/98)</td>
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<td>Fajardo Theatre, Militia Headquarters (8/05/98)</td>
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<td>Fajardo Landing site (8/05/98)</td>
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<td>Fajardo Light house (8/02/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capron Hill fort (7/26/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Caño Hill Spanish positions (7/25/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flag-Raising in Guánica (7/25/98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Wainwright (7/25/98)</td>
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## SPANISH AMERICAN WAR IN PUERTO RICO

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<th>PROPERTY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Guánica bivouac areas (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Guánica Landing Site (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Guánica Lighthouse (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Guánica Wharf Area (Carenero) and Pier (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Guánica Town Skirmish Site (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Guánica Waterfront (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Hacienda Santa Rita Main Buildings (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Seboruco Hills/ U.S. Advance position (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Guamani River Bridge Skirmish site (8/08/98)</td>
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<td>Pablo Vázquez Coffee Hacienda (8/06/98)</td>
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<td>Silva Bridge (8/10/98)</td>
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<td>Silva Heights Spanish positions (8/10/98)</td>
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<td>Cathedral de la playa/ bivouac area (7/28/98)</td>
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<td>Ponce Train Station (7/25/98)</td>
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<td>Puerto de Ponce Warf Area (7/28/98)</td>
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<td>Casa Blanca (5/12/98)</td>
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<td>San Juan Fortifications [El Morro &amp; San Cristóbal Castles, batteries</td>
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<td>Palacio de Santa Catalina [La Fortaleza] (4/21/98)</td>
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<td>Provincial Jail, Puerta de Tierra (5/12/98)</td>
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<td>Seminario Conciliar (5/12/98)</td>
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<td>Tombs of two seamen of the Spanish destroyer Terror buried in San</td>
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<td>Juan’s Cemetery (6/22/98)</td>
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<td>Site visit needed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railway Station (7/29/98)</td>
<td>Yauco</td>
<td>Destroyed: New construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomb of the Unknown Soldier (7/26/98)</td>
<td>Yauco</td>
<td>Eligible (site)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yauco Town Hall Flag Raising Site (7/25/98)</td>
<td>Yauco</td>
<td>Destroyed: New construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yauco U.S. Fortifications (7/30/98)</td>
<td>Yauco</td>
<td>Site visit needed</td>
</tr>
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