

3658



United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places Registration Form

This form is for use in nominating or requesting determinations for individual properties and districts. See instructions in National Register Bulletin, *How to Complete the National Register of Historic Places Registration Form*. If any item does not apply to the property being documented, enter "N/A" for "not applicable." For functions, architectural classification, materials, and areas of significance, enter only categories and subcategories from the instructions.

1. Name of Property

Historic name: River Raisin Battlefield Site (Additional Documentation and Boundary Increase)

Other names/site number: State of Michigan Archeological Site 20MR227; River Raisin National Battlefield Park;

Name of related multiple property listing:
N/A

(Enter "N/A" if property is not part of a multiple property listing)

2. Location

Street & number: 1403 East Elm Avenue

City or town: Monroe State: MI County: Monroe

Not For Publication: Vicinity:

3. State/Federal Agency Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended,

I hereby certify that this X nomination request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60.

In my opinion, the property X meets does not meet the National Register Criteria. I recommend that this property be considered significant at the following level(s) of significance:

X national statewide local

Applicable National Register Criteria:

X A B C D

<u>Leah R. Rowe, Acting FPO</u>	<u>3/4/19</u>
Signature of certifying official/Title:	Date
State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government	

In my opinion, the property meets ___ does not meet the National Register criteria.

Signature of commenting official:

Brian D Conway

Date

12/10/18

Title :

SHPO

State or Federal agency/bureau
or Tribal Government

4. National Park Service Certification

I hereby certify that this property is:

- entered in the National Register
- determined eligible for the National Register
- determined not eligible for the National Register
- removed from the National Register
- other (explain) Accept Additional Documentation

Joe Faltus

Signature of the Keeper

4.17.2019

Date of Action

5. Classification

Ownership of Property

(Check as many boxes as apply.)

- Private:
- Public – Local
- Public – State
- Public – Federal

Category of Property

(Check only **one** box.)

- Building(s)
- District
- Site

Structure
 Object

Number of Resources within Property

(Do not include previously listed resources in the count)

Contributing	Noncontributing	
<u> </u>	<u> 55 </u>	buildings
<u> 1 </u>	<u> 3 </u>	sites
<u> </u>	<u> 3 </u>	structures
<u> </u>	<u> 1 </u>	objects
<u> 1 </u>	<u> 62 </u>	Total

Number of contributing resources previously listed in the National Register 1

6. Function or Use

Historic Functions

(Enter categories from instructions.)

 DEFENSE: battle site
 DOMESTIC: multiple dwellings
 TRANSPORTATION: road related
 AGRICULTURE/SUBSISTENCE: agricultural fields

Current Functions

(Enter categories from instructions.)

 LANDSCAPE: park
 TRANSPORTATION: rail related and road related
 DOMESTIC: multiple dwellings
 COMMERCE/TRADE: warehouse, financial institution, restaurant, specialty store
 VACANT
 UNKNOWN
 WORK IN PROGRESS: park, conservation area

7. Description

Architectural Classification

(Enter categories from instructions.)

N/A

Materials: (enter categories from instructions.)

Principal exterior materials of the property: N/A

Narrative Description

(Describe the historic and current physical appearance and condition of the property. Describe contributing and noncontributing resources if applicable. Begin with a **summary paragraph** that briefly describes the general characteristics of the property, such as its location, type, style, method of construction, setting, size, and significant features. Indicate whether the property has historic integrity.)

Summary Paragraph

The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site includes lands on the south and north shores of the River Raisin and encompasses sites directly associated with the Battles of Frenchtown that occurred between January 18-23, 1813. Covering approximately 230 acres, the site includes the core area of the historic Frenchtown settlement (which became the primary area of conflict and destruction) as well as lines of attack, retreat and surrender. Restoration of industrial brownfields and park development has returned much of the core conflict area to the landscape of open fields and cleared riparian zones that existed in January 1813. Historic landscape features also include the River Raisin shoreline, Mason Run, and a grid of streets, park boundaries, and property lines that still trace the *roture* system of ribbon farms (or long lots) that existed in early nineteenth-century Frenchtown. Another key feature of the Battles of Frenchtown was Hull's Trace, a roadway first laid out in the summer of 1812 that served as the primary route to and from the conflicts of January 1813.¹ The original trace (i.e., path, or rudimentary road) bisects the battlefield area and is now overlain by a railroad right-of-way

¹ Daniel F. Harrison, National Register of Historic Places, Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment, Brownstown Township, Wayne County, Michigan, National Register #10001022 (2010). This site is managed as a unit of River Raisin National Battlefield Park (RRNBP).

consisting of two sets of tracks owned—from west to east—by Norfolk Southern Railway and Canadian National Railway. Aside from these landscape features, physical evidence of Frenchtown, the battles, and their aftermath are archeological. No contributing building, structures, or objects exist on the site. North of the River Raisin, current conditions include two lightly developed municipal parks, National Park Service land and facilities within River Raisin National Battlefield Park (RRNBP), reclaimed brownfields, vacant lots, a small marina with a restaurant, and twenty-four private residences on both sides of East Elm Avenue. South of the River Raisin the expanded National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) site includes a stretch of land along the River Raisin that includes two lightly developed municipal parks, vacant lots, thirteen private residences, and a credit union.

Narrative Description

INTRODUCTION

This document expands and amends the existing National Register designation for the River Raisin Battlefield (National Register site # 82000542). Since the battlefield was listed in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) in 1982, the physical conditions of the battlefield area have changed considerably. The abandonment and removal of large facilities associated with the paper industry, and the conversion of these sites to open park areas, has created an entirely new landscape. As a result of these changes, the historic qualities of setting, association, and feeling have been greatly enhanced, and in large part been returned to their pre-development state. This is true of the landscape within the boundaries of the original National Register site as well as adjoining parcels that compose significant parts of the Battles of Frenchtown but were not included in the 1982 NRHP nomination. The process of demolition, environmental mitigation, and landscape restoration within the core battle areas also created opportunities for archeological investigations which have shed new light on American Indian use and residence in the area, the establishment and development of Frenchtown in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the War of 1812 conflicts that occurred there, and the subsequent history of the site. The establishment of River Raisin National Battlefield Park in 2009, which has administrative and statutory authority within and beyond the original boundaries of the NRHP site, represents another significant development. The sum of these many changes provides a new and larger context that better reveals historic landscape features and more fully conveys the significance and scale of the Battles of Frenchtown and the River Raisin Battlefield.

GENERAL SETTING

The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site is situated within the City of Monroe in southeastern Michigan.² Set on a level plain and extending across the lower reach of the eastward flowing

² In the context of this document, the “core area” of the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site refers to the main scenes of action on January 18, 22, and 23. This corresponds to the central environs of Frenchtown on the north side of the River Raisin as well as near shore areas on the south bank of the river. The expanded boundaries of the NRHP site encompass the areas where battle approaches transitioned into attacks, and where retreats continued as running battles or devolved into complete routs. For purposes of interpretation and administration, the NPS situates the Battles of Frenchtown within a larger area that extends beyond the City of Monroe to the site of the British and American Indian encampment at Swan Creek on January 21, 1813 (about four miles north of the battlefield in Berlin Township), and about five miles to the south of the River Raisin where the last United States surrenders occurred at

River Raisin, the expanded NRHP site is approximately three miles upstream from Lake Erie. The area has supported human use and residence for thousands of years, and served as an important crossroads between areas to the south and north as well as between Lake Erie and inland areas to the west. Though altered by more than two centuries of agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial development, this dynamic continues to define the area. The City of Monroe serves as a hub for the mostly rural and inland areas of Monroe County while the Port of Monroe, which is the only Michigan port on Lake Erie, connects area industries with the entire Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway System. Monroe is also roughly equidistant from the Detroit Metropolitan Area to the north and the Toledo Metropolitan Area to the south. The routes to and from the Battles of Frenchtown essentially followed all of these pathways –along the shore of Lake Erie, inland from the west, up from the Maumee River rapids (present-day Toledo), and down from Detroit. These geographic connections and intersections made the settlement of Frenchtown a site of dramatic conflict in large part because it occupied a contested crossroads of great strategic importance.³

Monroe is a relatively small city with a land area of just over ten square miles and a population of approximately 23,000. Served by railroads, state highways, Interstate 75, and the Port of Monroe, it is well connected within the region and beyond. For most of the nineteenth century, Monroe was a regional hub for a mostly agricultural economy, but in the early twentieth century the city became economically linked to rising new industrial centers in Toledo and Detroit. While most of the county remained rural, the city became devoted to the production of steel, the manufacture of automobile parts and large machinery, furniture manufacturing, and large-scale paper and cardboard container production. Toward the end of the twentieth century Monroe followed the broad economic decline of the so-called Rust Belt, and has since lost much of its manufacturing base. In response to these changes, the city has come to epitomize a new movement that is seeing communities across much of the United States actively reshape themselves in accordance with their unique histories and physical settings. The restoration of the battlefield site and the establishment of the national battlefield park are two key examples of this movement.

In the 1982 National Register nomination, the River Raisin Battlefield site took in an area bounded by Mason Run on the north, Detroit Avenue on the east, and the north bank of the River Raisin on the south. The western boundary followed a line that ran southwesterly from the point where Noble Street intersects with Mason Run and through part of an existing paper mill facility to the River Raisin.⁴ The expansion of these boundaries is significant, incorporating more of the key locales associated with the Battles of Frenchtown and utilizing the boundaries of adjacent parklands that retain—or have recently been restored to—their historic landscape characteristics.

Otter Creek (in LaSalle Township). These more extensive boundaries also include British, American Indian, and United States lines of approach and retreat as well as a few skirmish areas.

³ During the War of 1812, southeastern Michigan had a few mostly French-speaking communities. The largest was known as Frenchtown and included the battlefield site. Most of the properties connected with Frenchtown were located within the present city limits of Monroe, which was established in 1817 and named after then president James Monroe. The communities to the north of the River Raisin and beyond the boundaries of Monroe were later reorganized as the Frenchtown Charter Township, which includes most of the area within Monroe County that lies north of the Monroe city limits.

⁴ This seemingly arbitrary boundary cut across the property of what was then the Union Camp Corporation, but it did follow the survey lines of a historic ribbon farm.

The new boundaries encompass those of the original listing, with the following additions. On the north side of the River Raisin, the west boundary extends all the way to the CSX rail line to take in key areas utilized by various combatants during the Second Battle of Frenchtown (January 22, 1813). This new boundary includes the entire footprint of a former paper mill facility that was partly included in the original listing, and has since become municipal parkland, along with two vacant structures and two commercial sites that are slated for reclamation and incorporation into the national park unit.

The north boundary of the expanded battlefield site extends beyond the Mason Run drainage to encompass an additional fifty-four acres of vacated commercial and industrial property that is being reclaimed for inclusion into the national park unit. This expanse incorporates areas where Kentucky militia pursued Canadian militia and warriors from a confederated alliance of American Indian communities (hereafter referred to as the Native Confederacy or Confederacy) in a running battle at the close of the First Battle of Frenchtown (January 18, 1813).⁵ Areas to the north of Mason Run also include the approach route and relative positions of British artillery and Confederacy warriors during the Second Battle of Frenchtown. This portion of the expanded NRHP site includes part of a reclaimed industrial site as well as former commercial properties that have been vacated, demolished, and slated for reclamation. The eastern boundary extends beyond Detroit Avenue (which served as the eastern boundary of the original NRHP listing) to include approximately thirty-five acres of open field and marshland where Confederacy warriors outflanked and attacked United States forces during the Second Battle of Frenchtown (January 22, 1813).⁶ Along the north bank of the River Raisin, between East Elm Avenue and the river's edge, the boundary extends a short distance eastward and westward from the original NRHP listing: beginning at a point approximately seven hundred feet east of the East Elm and Detroit Avenue intersection, and extending westward to include a cluster of private residences and a stretch of publicly owned riverfront on the west side of North Dixie Highway.

Expansion of the River Raisin Battlefield Site's boundaries also includes areas on the south side of the River Raisin. Along the river this includes two municipal parks—Rauch Park (2.1 acres), which is to the west of the Norfolk Southern tracks, and Hellenberg Park (13 acres), which is to the east of the Canadian National tracks—and a small stretch of vacant land that extends westward from Rauch Park to the CSX rail line.⁷ This area is where United States forces and

⁵ The Confederacy comprised individuals, families and communities from several distinct cultural groups that included Wyandotte (aka Wyandot or Huron), Shawnee, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe (Chippewa), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Myaamia (Miami), Waayaahstanwa (Wea), Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Kiiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Muscogee (Creek), Ökwe'öwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, "Mingo"), Thâkiwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) fighters. Members of these various communities also resided in or moved to areas within present-day Canada before, during, and after the War of 1812. Those who remained in Canada, and whose descendants continue to reside there, are more appropriately referred to as First Nations. The majority remained within the boundaries of the United States during and after the War of 1812 and signed treaties with the United States. For consistency, in this nomination all are referred to collectively as American Indians—in accordance with the standard terminology used by federal and state agencies, American Indian tribes and organizations, and academic institutions in the United States. For more on the terms and orthographies used for referencing specific groups, see note 38 below. The term Canadian will be used in this narrative to identify the local militia forces (both anglophone and francophone) from present-day southwestern Ontario that fought with British Regulars and Native Confederacy fighters.

⁶ This land is part of a larger parcel slated for future acquisition and incorporation into RRNBP.

⁷ Hellenberg Park was improved in 1985 with a Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) stateside assistance

Kentucky militia crossed the frozen river to attack Canadian militia and Confederacy forces in Frenchtown on January 18, as well as where some re-crossed the river as they retreated from pursuing Confederacy fighters on January 22. The Hellenberg Park parcel, which includes Sterling Island, was also a key line of attack on January 18 as well as the site of a brief defensive stand by United States forces on January 22.

Though relevant to the events of January 1813, areas to the south of this mostly open riverfront area are not included in the expanded boundaries for two reasons: first, they encompass nearly two hundred acres of residential and commercial areas that do not possess historic qualities of setting, association, and feeling that exist within the former core of Frenchtown and the near shore areas along the south riverfront; and second, preliminary archeological surveys have concluded “they can't be determined significant under [National Register] Criterion D, potential to provide information important in history.”⁸ A southern extension of the boundaries of the NRHP site may be prudent at a future date, particularly if long-range plans to convert the area into open parklands and interpretive recreational corridors come to fruition.⁹ Toward these possible ends, two specific sites are worth noting. Extending south from the current riverfront parks, known lines of retreat along the route of Hull’s Trace (i.e., between Kentucky Avenue on the west and the Norfolk Southern and Canadian National lines on the east) run approximately one mile to Plum Creek Park. This small park is the site is where United States troops surrendered to Native Confederacy fighters on January 22—and it was in this vicinity that significant numbers were killed. A short distance to the west and closer to the river is the location where Kentucky militia were captured on a knoll that now occupies the center of Woodland Cemetery.¹⁰

The areas that are included within the expanded boundaries present significant features of the Battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath. Though heavily engineered near its confluence with Lake Erie, the section of the River Raisin that runs through the expanded NRHP site follows its historic course and is undergoing significant habitat restoration. The same is true of Mason Run, a small creek that runs across the northern portion of the core battlefield area before flowing to Sterling State Park and the Ford Marsh Unit of the Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge (DRIWR). Historically, the area between Mason Run and Frenchtown was a lightly wooded area composed of a few small orchards as well as cultivated and fallow fields that were laid out in long narrow lots. In accordance with French colonial practices, these “ribbon farms” had a narrow frontage along the River Raisin that extended back for more than a mile.¹¹ While ribbon

grant from the National Park Service. It, therefore, is perpetually encumbered with the LWCF Act for public use and enjoyment as park land.” Bob Anderson, Chief, Recreation Grants Division, NPS Midwest Region, to Senior Historian Ron Cockrell, NPS Midwest Region, email, March 9, 2015.

⁸ Pratt, Rutter, and Richard Green, “The River Raisin Battlefield, Outside the Core: Archeological Survey of Peripheral Battlefield Areas, American Battlefield Protection Program Grant GA 2255-08-008” (2010), 33-34.

⁹ On the south side of the river, residential areas within the River Raisin 100-year floodplain, along with a mix of vacant commercial land in the vicinity of Hull’s Trace, have been identified in a long-range plan for possible acquisition and conversion to park uses and recreational corridors. These plans are detailed in *River Raisin History Corridor East – Master Plan* (2013), which was jointly produced by the City of Monroe, the Monroe County Historical Society, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park Foundation, and the National Park Service.

¹⁰ It should be noted that preliminary archeological fieldwork occurred at two locations along Plum Creek in 2009. Extensive fill materials from the mid-twentieth century were encountered, and researchers were unable to determine if “1813 soil horizons even survive ... beneath the modern fill horizons.” Pratt et al, “The River Raisin Battlefield, Outside the Core,” 33.

¹¹ Dennis M. Au and Joanna Brode, “The Lingering Shadow of New France: The French-Canadian Community of

farms were scattered along both sides of the river for several miles, the area referred to as Frenchtown was a cluster of homes and structures adjacent to the point where Hull's Trace reached the north bank of the Raisin. Frenchtown, as such, was contained within a series of garden fences that had recently been fortified with a puncheon fence. Resembling an informal stockade, this fencing surrounded six extended family homes, outbuildings, and community paths. All of these structures were destroyed in the Battles of Frenchtown, as were many of the small orchards. Even after two centuries of change, however, streets bordering and crossing the battlefield still follow the original ribbon farm layout, and the route of Hull's Trace (which underlies North Dixie Highway) is still used as a major transportation corridor. Along with the persistence of features like Mason Run and the River Raisin, these conditions present an accurate spatial reference to major events and positions within the historic landscape.

The current physical appearance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site's core area also provides a strong sense of the historic landscape. On the north side of the River Raisin, where most of the conflict and destruction occurred, the battlefield site is composed of two larger parcels divided by the railroad right-of-way and North Dixie Highway, and two narrow strips between the River Raisin and East Elm Avenue. East of the Canadian National line is a forty-two-acre parcel that is currently the main area for interpretation within RRNBP. Bounded on the south by East Elm Avenue, on the east by Detroit Avenue, and encompassing the Mason Run drainage on the north, most of this parkland is a converted industrial site that had long been used for manufacturing paper products and packaging. It now consists of a grassy field, scattered trees and shrubs, and a recently replanted stretch of Mason Run. A good deal of the acreage that is closer to the Detroit Avenue side of this National Park Service (NPS) land was formerly used for a plant nursery, and retains the approximate conditions that were present during the War of 1812. The visitor center and administrative offices for RRNBP are located at the southeastern end of this former nursery area, in a house built during the early twentieth century and accessed from East Elm Avenue. A densely-wooded area is immediately east of this facility while a short distance to the north is a pavilion that provides interpretation of battlefield archeology through exhibits, guides, and literature. This area is set within a pedestrian loop that runs through the location of the United States 17th Infantry encampment on the night of January 21, 1813, and through the early minutes of the Second Battle of Frenchtown the following morning. Across Detroit Avenue is a stretch of mowed grass that was once used as an ash dump that subsequently became overgrown and heavily wooded. The landowner has since removed the ash and trees and transformed the area to open field and forested wetlands.

The portion of the expanded NRHP site that lies to the west of North Dixie Highway and north of East Elm Avenue is another former industrial site that was demolished and reclaimed in the 1990s and is now the City of Monroe's Multi-Sports Park. At the north end of this 15.3-acre parcel is the city's 70,000 square foot Multi-Sports Complex, which has been proposed as a future visitor center and administrative facility for RRNBP.¹² Aside from the parking lot at the Complex, and a nearby skatepark, the rest of the site is mowed grass with a scattering of trees and some shrubs. Immediately south of the Multi-Sports Park is Riviere Aux Raisins Park, (1.9 acres), which extends along the north side of East Elm Avenue from the corner of North Dixie to

Monroe County, Michigan," in *Michigan Folklife Reader*, eds. C. Kurt Dewhurst and Yvonne R. Lockwood (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1987), 323-324.

¹² *River Raisin Heritage Corridor-East Master Plan* (Ann Arbor: Beckett & Reader, 2013), 33.

the edge of the original NRHP site boundary. A mostly grassy area with a few trees and a flagpole, the primary feature of the park is a concrete and stone obelisk commemorating the “River Raisin Massacre.” Erected in 1904 and placed near the riverbank, it was moved across East Elm Avenue to its current position in 2002. The area along the river, immediately across from Riviere Aux Raisins Park, is a narrow strip of city-managed greenway with a concrete sidewalk.

The only area within the northern part of the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site that still has a number of developed properties is east of the railroad right-of-way, along East Elm Avenue. A short distance to the east of the Canadian National Railway Bridge is a row of early and mid-twentieth-century homes fronting the river (some with detached garages and small boat launches), with another set of early-twentieth-century homes on the north side of East Elm Avenue. The proximity of these homes to the River Raisin places them in the same vicinity as most of the homes and structures that were extant, and destroyed, during the Second Battle of Frenchtown and the following day.

Immediately south of these home sites, on the opposite side of the River Raisin, is Hellenberg Park. Situated on Strong Island, which was once separated from the mainland by a shallow branch of the River Raisin that was blocked and filled in the early twentieth century, the park is accessed from East Front Street and includes an open grassy area, a baseball diamond, parking lot, boat launch area, basketball court, and a few structures. This park area encompasses the lines of attack and retreat of United States troops, as well as the site of the defensive stand on January 22, 1813. Hellenberg Park also has a footbridge to Sterling Island, which is composed of fill taken from a small chain of islands that were once situated near the south bank of the River Raisin. The vegetation on Sterling Island approximates the riparian conditions that existed along this stretch of the river in the early nineteenth century.¹³ Just west of the Norfolk Southern rail line, and across the river from the Riviere Aux Raisins Park and the narrow greenway, is Rauch Park and another vacant parcel. Together they provide an open green space of mowed grass and trees that is bisected by the approach to the North Dixie Highway Bridge. Most of the remaining area within the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site that lies south of the River Raisin is composed of private residences, streets, and vacant lots.

During and after the battles along the River Raisin, Frenchtown proper was destroyed. The buildings were burned, fences were burned or broken apart, and some orchard trees were damaged or cut down. Consequently, the absence of historic structures at the current battlefield site is consistent with the actions and consequences of the Battles of Frenchtown. For the next few years the immediate environs remained unused and uninhabited, but the site subsequently began a long process of transformation. In 1817 the town of Monroe was platted as an American settlement to the south and west of the ruined core of Frenchtown, along the opposite shore of the River Raisin. Over the next few decades, American settlers and land speculators poured into southeastern Michigan in a movement that was largely fostered by two developments: the dislocation and removal of nearby Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Wyandotte and Odawa (Ottawa) communities, and the opening of the Great Lakes to East Coast markets with the completion of

¹³ C. Stephan Demeter, Donald J. Weir, and Russell B. Henry, *Hellenberg Field Archeological Survey: Phase I, Part 2; Submitted to City of Monroe, Department of Community Development* (Jackson, MI: Gilbert/Commonwealth, 1987), passim.

the Erie Canal in 1825. In the process, francophone families became a distinct minority population and their lands were subdivided or sold off to become American farms that were cleared and drained for more intensive commercial agriculture. The former site of Frenchtown was annexed into the growing City of Monroe, but continued as a productive agricultural area that served local and regional markets.

As the region and city industrialized, most of the battlefield area on the north side of the River Raisin was developed by the River Raisin Paper Company beginning in 1911, and the company's facilities eventually encompassed 200 acres. Over time the company and its properties were acquired by other corporations, and the structures within the expanded NRHP site were variously used, replaced, left vacant, or repurposed through most of the twentieth century. A combination of aging facilities, economic competition, concerns about toxic pollution, and a growing interest in commemorating the Battles of Frenchtown led to the first demolitions of industrial structures in the 1970s. That process ultimately came to a close in early 2015 with the removal of a brick pump house and office structure (ca. 1918) that stood just east of the Canadian National Railway Bridge. After more than 200 years, the battlefield site on the north side of the river—with the exception of East Elm Avenue, portions of the railroad right-of-way, and Dixie Highway—has steadily returned to conditions that reflect conditions that existed at the close of the conflicts and destruction that occurred between January 18 and 23, 1813.

CONTRIBUTING RESOURCES

The River Raisin Battlefield site is the sole contributing resource in this nomination. Much has changed in the past several years, and large portions of the battle site have been restored to conditions approximating those of the early nineteenth century. Subsurface resources also remain largely intact. Archeological investigations have revealed that materials related to Frenchtown and the events of January 1813 remained in situ and mostly undisturbed through decades of agricultural use and a century of industrial development, expansion, and demolition.

The expanded NRHP site also reflects the process of land acquisition and restoration that remains ongoing through partnerships between the City of Monroe, the Port of Monroe, the National Park Service, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park Foundation, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Even as that process moves forward, however, some noncontributing structures and roadways will remain within the approximately 230 acres of the expanded NRHP site. None of the noncontributing features or planned restoration projects will undermine the significance of this expansion of the NRHP site.¹⁴

There are three other sites on the National Register that are historically connected to Frenchtown and the battles that occurred there, but they are all individually listed and are not included here as components of a multiple-property site or district. The most recently listed site is Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment (NRHP ref. # 10001022), which is a partly exposed corduroy road that was laid down in the early-nineteenth-century. This site is an administrative unit of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park, and is an intact remnant of the same road—or trace—that bisected Frenchtown and connected Fort Detroit with the military encampment that

¹⁴ On partnerships, see *River Raisin Heritage Corridor-East Master Plan*.

became Fort Meigs. While this exposed stretch of road has direct relevance to the events of January 1813, it lies 14 miles north of the battlefield and has important associations with other National Register sites—and is thus not part of a multiple-property listing.¹⁵ Within the city limits of Monroe is another National Register site, the Sawyer House (NRHP ref. # 77000721), which has a connection to the Battles of Frenchtown. The Sawyer House occupies the site of a dwelling that belonged to Francois Navarre, who initiated the development of Frenchtown in the late eighteenth century and served with American forces during the War of 1812. Because of its location, on the south side of the river and nearly a mile from the battle site, the Navarre home was peripheral to the events of January 1813. United States General James Winchester used the house as his headquarters, but its distance from Frenchtown caused him to miss, and misread, events as they unfolded during the Second Battle of Frenchtown. The site of Navarre's house was entirely covered over by Dr. Alfred Sawyer's Italianate home in 1873, and no visible trace remains of the original structure. Lastly, the Navarre-Anderson Trading Post (NRHP ref. # 72000645) is a National Register site about five miles west-northwest of the battlefield site. A cluster of three buildings, one being a reconstruction and the other two dating back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, they were part of a small family compound that was located on the north side of the river and just west of the expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site boundaries. The structures were moved a short distance in 1894, and then to their current location in 1971. Bullet holes on the historic facade of the main building likely date back to the Battles of Frenchtown, but distance from its original location preclude the Trading Post's inclusion with the expanded River Raisin Battlefield NRHP listing.¹⁶

NON-CONTRIBUTING RESOURCES

Within boundaries of the expanded battlefield site are seventeen parcels that have been acquired by the National Park Service. The parcels contain non-contributing buildings and structures that do not convey the significance of the battlefield site, nor the events for which the site is significant.

STATEMENT OF INTEGRITY

In regard to setting, feeling and association, it is important to note that none of the Frenchtown village elements that existed at the outset of the Battles of Frenchtown are present above ground. Their absence within the core area of conflict and residence, however, is the product of the

¹⁵ Harrison, Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment. The stretch of Hull's Trace that is preserved near the mouth of the Huron River was part of the route used by the British and American Indians during their approach to Frenchtown on January 21, 1813, as well as in the removal of British wounded and American Prisoners of War on January 22, 1813. It is also the site where United States forces encamped after reentering Michigan Territory from Upper Canada (present-day province of Ontario) in September of 1813 to bury the remains of soldiers killed at the Battles of Frenchtown. Primary documents describing the burying of soldier remains were written from this site. The distance from the battlefield is measured in road miles along North Dixie Highway, United States Turnpike Road, and Jefferson Avenue, which together cover Hull's Trace from present-day Monroe to the mouth of the Huron River. Other NRHP sites that have associations with the Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment site include Fort Meigs (#69000151), Jefferson Avenue—Huron River and Harbin Drive—Silver Creek Canal Bridges (#0000080), and Fort Wayne (#71000425).

¹⁶ Harrison, Sawyer House, Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #77000721 (1977); Dennis M. Au, "Standing for Two Centuries: The Navarre-Anderson Trading Post," *Michigan History*, 23:6 (November/December), 1989: 32-36.

battles on January 18 and 22 as well as the destruction wrought by American Indians on January 23, 1813. While a few properties near the south bank of the River Raisin survived the conflicts, as well as some further west on both sides the river, the general destruction of the core of Frenchtown is a particularly significant event. Consequently, the absence of the former structures is a persistent and historically accurate result of the conflicts. If the current site included representative structures of early nineteenth century Frenchtown, their presence might serve commemorative and interpretive purposes. However, these would be noncontributing resources within the battlefield area since the historical significance of the Battles of Frenchtown derives in part from the complete destruction of the core village area.

The expanded NRHP site maintains historic integrity of setting, feeling, and association in the series of fields, river shores, and wooded areas displaying historic landscape features that were present during the Battles of Frenchtown. The same is generally true of near-shore areas on both sides of the River Raisin, with the exceptions of noncontributing residential structures that front along both sides of East Elm Avenue along the north shore of the river and the sparsely developed mix of residential, municipal park, and commercial structures near the southern shore of the river. On both sides of the River Raisin, streets and property lines that border or run through the expanded NRHP site on a north-south axis follow the *roture* system of ribbon farms (or long lots) that radiated back from their narrow frontages and were first laid out by the *habitants* of Frenchtown in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moreover, East Elm Avenue follows the route of the riverfront road that was first laid out in the late eighteenth century while the original course of Hull's Trace is overlain by North Dixie Highway. These roadways, and the old property lines they trace, make it possible to identify specific sites where allied British, Canadian militia, American Indian forces were arrayed against, United States, Kentucky militia, and local Michigan militia forces prior to and during the battles. The persistence of the historical grid is also being used to identify stretches of land for further acquisition, restoration, and incorporation into RRNBP.

The entire area within the proposed expansion of the River Raisin Battlefield Site possesses integrity of location. Specific events and their locations are well documented in contemporary reports from British and United States military sources, recorded comments from Confederacy fighters, and the published recollections of soldiers, Kentucky militia, and Frenchtown *habitants*. This information is further corroborated in a series of prolonged cases that were brought to the United States Court of Claims by property owners who sought reparations for the damages they sustained in the two battles and their aftermath.¹⁷ Residents of Monroe, which was founded in 1817, remained keenly aware of the battlefield site for many years. Even newcomers in the 1820s acquired some passing familiarity with the town's wartime experience, since the Battles of Frenchtown and subsequent killing of surrendered United States soldiers received a great deal of press in the United States and inspired the War of 1812 battle cry of "Remember the Raisin!" Finding human remains within the battlefield area was not uncommon, even as late as the 1840s, and each discovery sharpened memories of the battles. Guided by contemporary accounts, property records, the Court of Claims cases, and historical recollections, recent archeological investigations have recovered materials related to the battles and the destruction of Frenchtown. These investigations have corroborated the historical record and demonstrated that subsurface

¹⁷ Patrick Tucker, Donna Nightingale and Dennis Au, *Private Land Claims of the Rivière-aux-Raisins Area, 1779 – 1812* (Monroe: Frenchtown Chapter of the French-Canadian Heritage Society of Michigan, 2001).

conditions remained largely undisturbed by the construction and expansion of large industrial sites through the twentieth century. In sum, an expansion of the River Raisin Battlefield Site accords with evidence from contemporary records, published accounts, a long-standing community awareness, and archeological evidence.

NONCONTRIBUTING RESOURCES

At present there are 62 noncontributing resources within the proposed boundaries of the River Raisin Battlefield site (NRHP site # 82000542), as enumerated in Section 5 above. Under the category of buildings, 28 are single-family residences that are located on East Elm Avenue along the north side of the River Raisin and, along the south side of the river, on East Front Street. There are also 25 commercial buildings located on both sides of the river, four of which have been vacant for several years. Most of these properties are located around the northern extension of the NRHP boundaries in an area that is zoned by the City of Monroe as a Light Industrial District. The commercial buildings located near the north and south banks of the river are related to dining, entertainment, banking, and boating. Another two buildings within the proposed boundaries are for public use. These include an early twentieth-century bungalow that serves as the combined Headquarters and Visitor Center for River Raisin National Battlefield Park, and the Monroe Multi-Sports Complex building just north of Riviere Aux Raisins Park. There are also three municipal parks that are counted as noncontributing sites within the proposed boundary expansion: Hellenberg Park (which includes Sterling Island) on the south shore of the River Raisin, Riviere Aux Raisins Park on the north side of the river, and the expanse of open space around the Monroe Multi-Sports Complex. There are also three noncontributing structures within the proposed boundaries that include one bridge (the Dixie Highway bridge) and two railroad trestles (Canadian National and Norfolk Southern railways). Lastly, there is one noncontributing object within the boundary expansion area: fifteen feet tall stone obelisk that was dedicated in 1904 to memorialize the Americans who died during the Second Battle of Frenchtown. Originally placed near the river bank, it is currently located on the southeast corner of Riviere Aux Raisins Park.

8. Statement of Significance

Applicable National Register Criteria

(Mark "x" in one or more boxes for the criteria qualifying the property for National Register listing.)

- A. Property is associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.
- B. Property is associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.
- C. Property embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction or represents the work of a master, or possesses high artistic values, or represents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components lack individual distinction.
- D. Property has yielded, or is likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

Criteria Considerations

(Mark "x" in all the boxes that apply.)

- A. Owned by a religious institution or used for religious purposes
- B. Removed from its original location
- C. A birthplace or grave
- D. A cemetery
- E. A reconstructed building, object, or structure
- F. A commemorative property
- G. Less than 50 years old or achieving significance within the past 50 years

Areas of Significance

(Enter categories from instructions.)

MILITARY

Period of Significance

1811-1814

Significant Dates

January 18-23, 1813

Significant Person

(Complete only if Criterion B is marked above.)

N/A

Cultural Affiliation

N/A

Architect/Builder

N/A

Statement of Significance Summary Paragraph (Provide a summary paragraph that includes level of significance, applicable criteria, justification for the period of significance, and any applicable criteria considerations.)

The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site possesses significance under National Register of Historic Places Criterion A as the site of a significant battle that that took place during the War of 1812. The battles that occurred on January 18 and 20, 1813, and the subsequent killing of wounded American prisoners and destruction of Frenchtown that occurred on January 23, 1813, were significant historic events that derived from broad patterns of North American history and directly contributed to national and regional developments during and after the War of 1812.

The battle events mark a significant victory for the Native Confederacy that came together in 1811 to prevent United States expansion into the Great Lakes region and areas to the south and west. The battles also represent a key point in the War of 1812, as British forces—in alliance with Confederacy warriors—sought to block a United States invasion of Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) and help foster the creation of a distinct American Indian territory to the west and southwest of Lake Erie and the western Great Lakes. This effort came to a formal end when a large gathering of American Indian leaders affirmed a “A Treaty of Peace and Friendship” with the United States (aka Treaty of Greenville, 1814), and British negotiators dropped their support for such a territory prior to signing of the Treaty of Ghent in December 1814. The Battles of Frenchtown collectively remain the largest conflict to ever occur within the present boundaries of Michigan and proved the deadliest engagement for the United States during the War of 1812. This loss inspired the spirited cry of “Remember the Raisin!” for United States forces in subsequent battles during the War of 1812, including the decisive American victory at the Battle of the Thames in Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) where British forces surrendered and the celebrated Shawnee leader Tecumseh was killed. The events along the River Raisin also mark the last hours of Frenchtown, one of the very few French ribbon farm settlements to be established within the United States after the Revolutionary War.

Narrative Statement of Significance (Provide at least **one** paragraph for each area of significance.)

INTRODUCTION

River Raisin National Battlefield Park was created as a result of a grassroots effort to preserve, protect and interpret areas in Monroe and Wayne Counties related to the Battles of the River Raisin and its Aftermath. Many of the partners that came together to create the Battlefield have remained active during its formative years. The organizations directly involved with the acquisition and preservation of Battlefield lands include the: City of Monroe, the State of Michigan (through the Michigan DNR Trust Fund), Monroe County, Monroe County Historical Society

- River Raisin National Battlefield Park Foundation
- Detroit River International Wildlife Refuge
- National Park Service
- Friends of the River Raisin Battlefield
- The Wyandot of Anderdon Nation (State Recognized Tribe)
- The Wyandotte Nation

In addition, numerous Native Nations have been involved in consultation related to the development of the Battlefield. Currently, 75 Federally Recognized Native Nations have been identified with connections directly to the Battles related to the River Raisin. All Native Nations within the United States connect with the Aftermath history related to the Battles in some way. The tribes most actively involved with the preservation and interpretation of the Battlefield include:

- Citizen Potawatomi Nation
- Eastern Shawnee Nation
- Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa
- Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi
- Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma

- Pokagon Band of Potawatomi
- Shawnee Nation
- Wyandotte Nation

Criterion A—Military

The historical significance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site is both expansive and singular. The larger, or expansive, significance derives from the position of Frenchtown within broader geographical and historical contexts that extend back to the 17th century, and involve communities and developments throughout the Great Lakes region. As a military event, it reflects generations of crisis, conflict, and accommodation for a host of confederated American Indian groups, an equally long period of invasion and dispossession of their lands and communities by Europeans and Euro-Americans from the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast, the creation and persistence of French and Métis communities during and after French imperial activity in North America, and competition between French, British, and United States interests in the region that each knew as *Pays d'en Haut* (Upper Country), the Western Territory, or the Ohio Country. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, Frenchtown was situated along a key travel corridor within a historically and culturally complex borderland of competing interests. First established in the mid-1780s, the settlement was primarily inhabited by French-speaking Catholic *habitants* whose French and Métis lineages reached back to the French colonial era in the Great Lakes region. Other nearby communities included multi-ethnic American Indian villages of mostly Wyandotte to the north, mostly Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) to the west and northwest, and mostly Odawa (Ottawa) to the south. While relations between *habitants* and American Indian communities were generally peaceful and mutually beneficial, they operated within a narrow space that was impinged upon by powerful regional, national and global forces.¹⁸

With the Detroit River and western Lake Erie as an easily crossed boundary between British Canada and the United States, unsettled tensions over the disposition of the Great Lakes area after the American Revolution remained a live concern for various groups and communities in the border area and beyond. To the south, in Ohio and Kentucky, American settlers, land speculators and political leaders were committed to finishing a decades-long process of destroying and removing American Indian communities from present-day Ohio and areas to the west. From the upper Great Lakes to the lower Ohio River, a growing confederacy of American Indian communities associated with the Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa was organizing to defend and strengthen their communities against further territorial loss. All of these developments, from the settlement of Frenchtown and the location of the nearby Wyandotte villages of Brownstown and Maguaga to the competing agendas of Kentuckians, British officials, United States policy makers and the Native Confederacy, were rooted in

¹⁸ For an overview of these subjects, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), passim; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed., *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* (Norman: Published for the Newberry Library by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 39-95; David C. McCauley, "The River Raisin Settlement, 1796-1812: A French Culture Area," (MA thesis, Eastern Michigan University, 1968); Au and Brode, "The Lingerin Shadow of New France," 325-28.

historical processes that had been actively shaping the region for more than half a century.¹⁹

All of these interests and dynamics were part of what historian David Skaggs has termed the “Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes,” a period of prolonged crisis and conflict in the region that spanned from the French and Indian War (1754-1763) through Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763-1765), Lord Dunmore’s War (1774), the Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and the Northwest Indian War (1785-1795) to the War of 1812 (1812-1815).²⁰ As the various dates indicate, the region was not wracked by six decades of continuous warfare, but repeated conflict touched every community and generation. In the decade after 1795, for instance, years of conflict gave way to a series of American Indian land cessions and the wholesale displacement of many communities from present-day Ohio. As Native resistance to further loss of villages and land intensified in the early 1800s, however, United States officials, Trans-Appalachian settlers, British officials, and American Indian communities prepared for a renewal of old conflicts. War came in 1811 with the Battle of Tippecanoe in present-day Indiana, and the older dynamics of the “Sixty Years War” both determined and defined the course of the War of 1812 in the western Great Lakes region.²¹

Though maritime issues like British impressment of American sailors and restrictions on United States trade with Europe and European colonies topped the list of grievances in President James Madison’s “War Message” to Congress on June 1, 1812, the push for war with Britain was strongest in the Trans-Appalachian West.²² Led by the so-called War Hawks, a group of influential western congressmen, they sought an expansive war and pressed for an invasion of Canada. More than “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights,” westerners worried about what they called an “ANGLO-SAVAGE WAR” and, like Representative Felix Grundy of Kentucky, wanted to “drive the British from our Continent” to stop their “intriguing with our Indian neighbors” and to bring more territory—as well as the proceeds of the Canadian fur trade—into the United States.²³ The British, for their part, hoped to foster an independent territory for American Indians in the Great Lakes region that would restore pre-Revolutionary War conditions and serve as a buffer against further United States expansion. For the confederacy of American Indians that allied with the British, conflict with the United States related to more existential questions of territory,

¹⁹ For an overview of these conditions, see the essays in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry Lee Nelson, eds. *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), and Tanner, ed., *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*, 48-121.

²⁰ Skaggs, “The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814: An Overview,” in Skaggs and Nelson, eds. *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes*, 1-20. The terms used here reflect commonly used designations in the United States, which can differ from American Indian, Canadian, French, and British conceptions of these conflicts.

²¹ Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 131-47; Robert M. Owens, *Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 188-210; Colin G. Calloway, *Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 296-312.

²² Madison’s message from “Senate Journal—Monday, June 1, 1812,” at *American Memory (Library of Congress): A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: United States Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875* <http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?hlaw:1:/temp/~ammem_LjJD::> (accessed 17 December 2014).

²³ Paul A. Gilje, *Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 26; Gundy quote in *Annals of the Congress of the United States, 12th Congress, First Session* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1853), 426.

culture, and autonomy.²⁴ In every case, the War of 1812 in the Great Lakes region was about ending (and winning) the Sixty Years War. Because Frenchtown was a key location in the strategy of all parties, it was variously claimed and occupied by every faction in the months that followed the United States Declaration of War on June 18, 1812. By January of the following year, the settlement became the epicenter of violence and destruction in the Great Lakes region.

The singular importance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site derives from its strategic position during the War of 1812 as well as the scale and significance of the Battles of Frenchtown and their aftermath. It is no coincidence that Michigan Territorial Governor William Hull, who also served as commanding general of the newly formed United States Army of the North West, first learned of the official declaration of war against Great Britain while approaching Frenchtown on July 2. General Hull received the news while implementing an already planned invasion of Canada that involved the construction of a road from southern Ohio to Detroit. Though it followed well-known paths that had been used for countless generations, the road had to support the passage of an army and its supplies. Construction proved arduous, and involved numerous river crossings, the construction of blockhouses and supply depots, and pushing through the wet and muddy tangle of the vast Black Swamp that encompassed much of the lower Maumee River basin. The crude road, which became known as Hull's Trace, was mostly completed between early May and early July—when Hull and his 1,500-strong force of United States Regulars and Ohio militiamen arrived in Detroit.²⁵

From a military standpoint, the stretch of road from the Maumee River to Detroit was the most critical section of the entire route. The decision to invade Canada by land, and thus develop a road along the western shore of Lake Erie, was largely determined by the strong positions of Fort Amherstburg and the King's Navy Yard at the mouth of the Detroit River—which blocked all upstream access to Detroit and would allow British vessels to easily sweep any United States maritime force from Lake Erie. Consequently, the settlement at Frenchtown was one of the most important locales in Hull's invasion plan. As one of the few populated areas along the entire route, Frenchtown and the farms that fronted the lower River Raisin helped provision Hull's forces—and they were expected to keep supplying Detroit in the coming invasion of Canada. The local militia force also helped with the routing and construction of the road, offered some additional protection along the sections to the north and south of Frenchtown, and provided information about nearby American Indian communities as well as on developments at Fort Amherstburg just eighteen miles to the northeast. All of these qualities were integral to Hull's plan, but the strategic importance of the small settlement could also be exploited by allied British and Native Confederacy forces—which soon made it the Achilles heel of Hull's Army of the North West.²⁶

²⁴ Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 129-147; and Sandy Antal, *A Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812*, 2nd ed. (Kingston [Ont.]: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 13-25.

²⁵ Maria Campbell and James Freeman Clarke, *Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1848), 225-236.

²⁶ For an overview of Hull's invasion plan, see Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies* (New York: Vintage, 2011), 158-163. On the strategic significance of Frenchtown and the assistance its residents provided to the Army of the North West, see Ralph Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides: The Story of Michigan's Greatest Battlefield Scene of the Engagements at Frenchtown and the River Raisin in the War of 1812* (Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Co., 2008), 18-19, 21.

Frenchtown and the First Months of the War of 1812

The invasion of Canada began on July 12, and United States forces were initially unopposed when they crossed the Detroit River. After meeting resistance from Canadian Militia, American Indians, and British Regulars—and then failing to lay siege to Fort Amherstburg—the invasion began to falter by early August. To bolster his position at Detroit and support the stalled invasion on the opposite side of the river, Hull sent three separate detachments to protect and retrieve desperately needed supplies at the Wayne Stockade and other buildings in Frenchtown. The first detachment of 200 Ohio Militia and some United States Regulars was routed on August 5 near the Wyandotte village of Brownstown, and the second detachment of 610 regulars and militia was turned back near the Wyandotte village of Maguagua on August 9. On both occasions they were surprised by large numbers of American Indian warriors led by Tecumseh (Shawnee), Stayeghtha (a.k.a. Roundhead; Wyandotte), Main Poc (Bodéwadmi), and others that had crossed over from their encampments near Amherstburg—as well as a contingent of British troops that participated in the engagement of August 9. All told, American casualties numbered upwards of 180 killed, wounded, or captured. A third detachment tried to reach Frenchtown by a more circuitous route via Godfroy's Trading Post on the Huron River (present-day Ypsilanti, Michigan) and down the Saline River. During the long journey, the detachment ran out of supplies and had to turn back. These failures, along with news that Fort Mackinac had fallen to allied British and Native Confederacy a few weeks earlier, convinced Hull to withdraw his invading forces back to Detroit. Cut off from any possible support from Mackinac, and fearing that a vast number of American Indian fighters would soon pour down from the Upper Great Lakes, Hull intended to entrench his command at Detroit. Within days, however, Detroit was under siege by a force greatly augmented by newly arrived British reinforcements and a growing number of warriors who had come to join the Native Confederacy.²⁷

After a brief period of shelling and a number of expert feints by British and Confederacy forces, Hull determined that his position in Detroit was untenable. On August 16, less than five weeks after his invasion of Canada had begun, Hull surrendered Detroit and Michigan Territory without a fight. This dramatic turn of events was so sudden that word did not reach the small detachment of Ohio militiamen at Frenchtown until almost two days after the event. They had been stationed at the Wayne Stockade, constructed in 1806 about one mile west of Frenchtown, when Captain William Elliott from the British Indian Department presented the written terms of the surrender.²⁸ The militia officer in charge of the site rejected the documents as forgeries, locked

²⁷ On the Battles of Brownstown and Maguagua (a.k.a. Monguagon), and Hull's surrender, see Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 78-84, 97-100; and Anthony J. Yanik, *The Fall and Recapture of Detroit in the War of 1812: In Defense of William Hull* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011), 68-105.

²⁸ The British Indian Department, which operated alongside and association with the British Army, deserves some explanation. The Department dates back to the mid-eighteenth century and the Seven Years' War in North America (French and Indian War). Established to manage diplomatic relations with American Indian groups as well as foster military and commercial alliances, the Indian Department was initially a branch of the British Army. By 1800 authority had transferred to the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada (present-day Southern Ontario and parts of Northern Ontario within the Great Lakes Basin) and the Governor General of Canada—who was responsible for the affairs of the Indian Department in Lower Canada (present-day southern and eastern Quebec). At the time of the War of 1812, Sir George Prevost served as the Governor General of Lower Canada and the Commander and Chief of British Forces in Canada while civilian leadership in Upper Canada devolved to a series of commanding officers who also served as provisional Lieutenant Governors. Consequently, the entire British Indian Department operated under military authority throughout the war. At this time the Department had a distinct officer corps totaling around

Elliott's party in an adjacent blockhouse for a night, and threatened to hang the captain in the morning. New information from Detroit allowed cooler heads to prevail, but instead of honoring the terms of surrender the small group of Ohio Militia fled south. In the wake of the Ohioans' departure, groups of Confederacy warriors ransacked some dwellings while the British sought to establish preliminary authority in Frenchtown and the surrounding area. Within a few days order was restored, most of the Confederacy warriors departed to surrounding villages or Fort Amherstburg, and the British burned the stockade and its outbuildings before leaving the town under a light guard.²⁹

The defeat of the United States Army of the North West and the advent of British administration in Michigan altered but did not diminish the strategic importance of Frenchtown. On the contrary, the settlement's significance in the War of 1812 was magnified. For the rest of the summer and fall of 1812, Frenchtown served as an important procurement center for the British commissariat—as well as an informal and less than voluntary supplier to American Indian fighters en route to present-day Ohio and Indiana. The River Raisin area also served as a base of operations for Tecumseh and his closest associates, who moved to and from battle sites to the south while maintaining regular contact with the British at Fort Amherstburg and allied American Indian villages to the west and north.³⁰

The situation in Frenchtown changed in late fall and early winter, however, when reports came in to Fort Amherstburg that part of the reconstituted Army of the North West was slowly making its way along the lower Maumee River. While the news was hardly unexpected, it triggered an immediate concern about the material and strategic importance of Frenchtown. If United States forces became entrenched at the River Raisin, it could result in the loss of Michigan and jeopardize the security of Upper Canada. With this new threat, the British and Confederacy alliance quickly determined to make the settlement a forward line of defense or—if circumstances warranted—to remove or destroy its resources before they fell into American hands. By the second week of January, when word came that a large American force was settling in at the Maumee Rapids, the two small companies of the Essex militia (who together numbered about fifty men) that were already situated in Frenchtown were bolstered by a contingent of as many as two hundred mostly Bodéwadmi and Wyandotte fighters. Along with an additional artilleryman and a light cannon, the augmented force prepared for an expected United States attack.³¹

The Battles of Frenchtown

Thirty-five miles to the south, the left wing of the reconstituted Army of the North West established a defensive winter camp near the Maumee Rapids (present-day Perrysburg, Ohio) on January 10, 1813. Formed the previous summer and serving under the command of Brigadier

100 individuals who served as agents, advisers, and interpreters for British officials and Confederacy groups and generally fought alongside their American Indian allies. See Robert Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada 1774-1815* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996), 11-21, 149-166.

²⁹ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 111-112.

³⁰ Charles Askin, "Journal," in *Select Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, ed. William Wood (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920), 540-41; Antal, "Michigan Ceded: Why and Wherefore?" *The Michigan Historical Review* 38 (Spring 2012): 14-15.

³¹ Squire Robert Reynolds, "Narrative," in *1812: The War, and its Moral: A Canadian Chronicle*, ed. William F. Coffin (Montreal: John Levell, 1864). p. 208; Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 160-63.

General James Winchester, the combined force of Kentucky Militia and United States Infantry that once numbered close to 2,000 men was down to fewer than 1,300. A good deal of that decline was attributable to desertion or dismissal, but many of those who did not reach the Rapids had either become incapacitated along the way and left behind at a rear post or died from exposure and disease. After four-and-a-half months of hard travel, repeated setbacks, and a few minor engagements with allied American Indian and British forces, the remaining men under Winchester's command were malnourished, poorly clothed and profoundly dispirited. While it was obvious that his force needed to recuperate, Winchester also knew his men required some "progressive operations" or his command would falter altogether.³² After months of wearisome duty, the militiamen had nearly finished the terms of their service and showed no inclination to extend their enlistments. Indeed, many had already come close to deserting on more than one occasion—and most despised Winchester. For men who four months earlier had boasted of conquering the "ancient enemy ... of Americans and Kentuckians" (i.e., the alliance of British and American Indian interests that dated back before the Revolutionary War), the prospect of more hunger, fatigue, and biding time was unacceptable.³³ In short, incessant hardship and prolonged inaction had brought the left wing of the Army of the North West to the verge of collapse.

Such a fate was soon averted, however, when a messenger from Frenchtown arrived in Winchester's camp on January 13. He reported that the British had begun rounding up suspected United States sympathizers and confiscating stored foodstuffs, livestock and portable property for use at Fort Amherstburg. Moreover, the messenger stated that all French-speaking *habitants* were to be taken across the Detroit River to Canada and Frenchtown burned to the ground. The following day another *habitant* of Frenchtown arrived with much the same story, and Winchester decided to send scouts to assess the situation. He received a promising report on January 16: the military force at Frenchtown was hardly formidable, none of the reported confiscation and rounding up had occurred, and the settlement on the River Raisin still held an abundance of resources and supplies that could help support his forces through the winter. That same evening the decision was made to take Frenchtown, and the following morning approximately 550 men from the 1st, 2nd and 5th Kentucky Volunteer Militia Regiments, along with a company of the United States 17th Infantry Regiment, were assembled and sent north under the command of Lt. Colonel William Lewis. Soon afterwards, Winchester dispatched another 110 militiamen from the 1st Kentucky Volunteer Rifle Regiment, and the two forces joined up that evening at the north end of Maumee Bay (near present-day downtown Toledo, Ohio).³⁴

³² Quote from Winchester to Harrison, January 17, 1813, in *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*, vol. 2, ed. Logan Esaray (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922), 314.

³³ Quote is from the speech made by Captain William Lewis just before the battle of January 18, 1813; in "Recollections of the Late War, the River Raisin Battle," *Kentucky Yeoman* (Frankfort), May 7, 1833; reprinted in Federal Writers' Project. *Military History of Kentucky, Chronologically Arranged* (Frankfort, KY: State Journal, 1939), 82. Also see G. Glenn Clift, *Remember the Raisin! Kentucky and Kentuckians in the Battles and Massacre at Frenchtown, Michigan Territory, in the War of 1812* (Frankfort: Kentucky Historical Society, 1961), 46-49.

³⁴ Winchester, "General Orders," Camp Miami Rapids, January 16 and 17, 1813, James Winchester Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library; Elias Darnell, *A Journal Containing an Accurate and Interesting Account of the Hardships, Suffering, Battles, Defeat and Captivity of Those Heroic Kentucky Volunteers and Regulars Commanded by General Winchester, in the Years 1812-13. Also, Two Narratives by Men That Were Wounded in the Battles on the River Raisin and Taken Captive by the Indians*, 2 ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, and Company, 1854), 45-48; Robert B. McAfee, *History of the Late War in the Western Country* (Bowling

The combined force set off in the early morning hours of January 18, using the frozen and snow-dusted shoreline of Lake Erie as a road to the north. South of Frenchtown the Kentuckians were joined by as many as 100 *habitants*—some of whom served in the Michigan Militia the previous summer—and the entire force came together a short distance to the south of the frozen River Raisin around three o’clock in the afternoon. Facing them, on the north side of the river, the Essex Militia was positioned behind the cover of houses, structures, and fences within the village of Frenchtown. On the west and east ends of the village, Confederacy warriors took up similar but less protected positions. The Essex Militia soon opened fire with its lone artillery piece, which was answered with shouts and a three-pronged rush of Kentuckians and *habitants* across the frozen river. They soon took control of the north bank and forced the Essex militiamen and American Indians to retreat from the central core of Frenchtown. The Essex militia briefly held its ground at the north edge of Frenchtown where, as Kentucky rifleman William Atherton recalled, “they made a stand with their howitzer and small arms, covered by a chain of enclosed lots and a group of houses, having in their rear a thick brushy wood filled with fallen timber.”³⁵

Efforts to outflank the allied Canadian and Confederacy fighters proved unsuccessful, and the fighting devolved into a series of fierce skirmishes through the denser woods to the north. Fallen timber offered protection to the slowly retreating allied forces, who were now determined to make a successful escape to the Wyandotte village of Brownstown while forcing the Kentuckians to pay as dearly as possible for their ensuing victory. In “the woods the fighting became general and most obstinate,” as one Kentuckian described this part of the battle, “the enemy resisting every inch of ground as they were compelled to fall back.” Over the course of two miles the slow-moving battle continued until darkness fell, with the retreating forces taking cover to fire on the pursuing Kentuckians, then dashing to another protective area before the pursuers could regroup or return accurate fire. It was this part of the battle that brought the most casualties to the United States side, which all told lost thirteen killed and fifty-four wounded. Records for the Essex Militia are spotty, and no accounting was made for Native losses, but the Canadians suffered at least one casualty (whether killed or wounded is uncertain). American Indian casualties were greater, but the numbers are not clear. Some were certainly killed since Kentucky militiamen boasted of mutilating and scalping at least a few corpses. Traces of blood were also found along the paths taken by retreating American Indians, either from wounded individuals or the bodies of dead fighters who were dragged away by their comrades.³⁶

Word of the victory soon reached General Winchester, who rejoiced at the initial news and agreed to Colonel Lewis’ request for more troops. He quickly assembled the four companies of United States Regulars under his command (17th and 19th United States Infantry) and a few

Green, OH: Historical Publications Company, 1919), 223-26; Au, *War on the Raisin: A Narrative Account of the War of 1812 in the River Raisin Settlement, Michigan Territory* (Monroe, MI: Monroe County Historical Commission, 1981), 25-27; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 103-112.

³⁵ Quote is from William Atherton, *Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the Northwestern Army, under General Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners, Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with the Indians and British* (Frankfort, KY: A.G. Hodges, 1842), 36. For a detailed summary of the early part of the battle, see Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 112-120.

³⁶ One member of the Essex Militia, and two American Indians were also taken prisoner by the Kentucky forces. Atherton, *Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the Northwestern Army*, 37; Darnell, *Journal*, 42-43; Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 163-64; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 28-29. Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 53-55; Benson J. Losing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812* (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1869), 313-315; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 120-21.

militiamen, and then led the force of about three hundred to Frenchtown—which they reached before dawn on January 22.³⁷ The decision to attack Frenchtown, as well as assemble the bulk of his command so close to Fort Amherstburg, came with considerable risk. It also “alarmed” (and contravened the standing orders of) Major General William H. Harrison, who commanded the entire Army of the North West and was then encamped with the right wing at Upper Sandusky about fifty-five miles southeast of the Maumee Rapids.³⁸ The victory at Frenchtown seemed to confirm Winchester’s initial decision to send troops to the River Raisin, while the number of casualties (which numbered roughly ten percent of the original force sent to Frenchtown) precluded any chance of a quick withdrawal back to the Maumee Rapids. As Winchester wrote to Harrison, he both feared and welcomed a counter attack from Fort Amherstburg: admitting that his position “was not very favourable for defence,” yet boasted that if the enemy tried “to retake this place ... he will pay dearly for it.” Comforted by the victorious outcome, Harrison averred that it was right of Winchester to bolster Lewis’ forces at Frenchtown. Consequently, he accelerated the plans for a winter invasion of Upper Canada and quickly mobilized 360 of his troops to aid Winchester at Frenchtown.³⁹

Hopeful expectation trumped anxiety as Winchester’s forces settled into Frenchtown, but across the Detroit River at Fort Amherstburg another sentiment prevailed: decisive urgency. Sometime in the early hours of January 19 news about the loss of Frenchtown first reached the commander of Amherstburg, Colonel Henry Procter. Aware of the United States build-up at Upper and Lower Sandusky, and Winchester’s movements along the lower Maumee River, Procter regarded the force that attacked Frenchtown as the opening act in a planned invasion of Detroit and Canada. To counter such a strategy, he “deemed it requisite, that, [the Enemy] should be attacked without Delay, and with all, and every Description of Force, within my Reach.”⁴⁰ The goal was to destroy or at least dislodge Winchester’s forces before they could be joined by the right and center wings of the Army of the North West, and to reestablish a forward position against the United States

Procter quickly dispatched a company of regulars, some artillerymen, and the twenty-eight members of the Provincial Marine to Brownstown, where they met up with some of the retreating American Indian fighters from the previous day’s battle. By the twentieth, more regulars from the 41st Regiment of Foot and Royal Newfoundland Fencibles, as well as Canadian militiamen and members of the British Indian Department, came in from Detroit and Amherstburg. All told, the British and Canadian force amounted to 595 men and included six pieces of artillery. At Brownstown, it was joined by a confederated force of American Indians that were then wintering on both sides of the Detroit River, and included Wyandotte, Shawnee, Bodéwadmi, Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe, (Chippewa), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Myaamia (Miami), Waayahtanwa (Wea), Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Muscogee (Creek), Ökweöwé (Seneca-Cayuga; aka, “Mingo”), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo) Thâkîwa (Sauk, or

³⁷ Au, *War on the Raisin*, 30-33; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 56-62; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 131-39.

³⁸ “William Henry Harrison to James Monroe, 26 January 1813,” *The Papers of James Madison, Presidential Series*, vol. 5, ed. J. C. A. Stagg et al, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 624–28.

³⁹ Quotes are from “Winchester to Harrison, French Town River Raisin [sic] 21 Jany 1813,” and “Winchester to Harrison, French Town River Raisin 21 Jany 1813,” in *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*, vol. 2, 325-26. On Harrison’s plans and actions, see Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country: Frontier Fighting in the War of 1812* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 143-46.

⁴⁰ Procter to Sheafe, January 25, 1813, in *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, vol. 2, ed. William Wood (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920-28), 7.

Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) warriors. Though each group had formidable war leaders, they formally deferred to the Wyandotte—the longest established group in the Detroit River area—and their most renowned men: Stayeghtha (Roundhead), Sou-ne-hoo-way (Splitlog) and Myeerah (Walk-in-the-Water). Numbering at least six hundred, and perhaps as many as eight hundred, this was one of the largest and most diverse assemblages of American Indians in the entire war. On January 21 the British, Canadians and American Indians moved en masse to Swan Creek, and then on to Stony Creek where they spent part of a restless night before heading toward Frenchtown a few miles to the southwest.⁴¹

Arriving before dawn on January 22 and unnoticed by the American sentries, the allied forces gathered into their battle positions between 250-350 yards to the north of Frenchtown. Arrayed in an arc along the wooded stretch of Mason Run, they were organized into three large groupings: British regulars and the six artillery pieces were positioned across the center; about 200 yards to their right was a somewhat dispersed clustering of mostly Odawa, Ojibwe, Bodéwadmi and some Canadian militia; and another 250 yards to the left of the center position a large number of mostly Wyandotte and Shawnee fighters held the forward position, with Canadian militia and artillery in the rear. The American forces, which numbered 934 able-bodied men, were primarily situated in two locales. Approximately seven hundred men (mostly from Kentucky militia regiments) were encamped within the center of Frenchtown, with defensive positions staked out behind the puncheon fence along the north side of the village as well as the garden fence lines to the east and west. In the open field to the east, about 160 regulars from the United States 17th Regiment slept behind a hastily constructed series of breastworks. The remainder were scattered throughout the Frenchtown community, in barns or homes, while General Winchester slept at his temporary headquarters in the home of Francois Navarre on the south side of the River Raisin—about a mile to the west of Frenchtown proper. A small number of *habitants* from Frenchtown and nearby settlements had also come to help defend the village, and added to the total.⁴²

Just as the British forces in the center readied their attack, reveille sounded on the American side and soon after a sentry spotted the Red Coats in the dim pre-dawn light. He fired a shot into the forward line that killed the lead grenadier, and the report of his musket sent the just awakened Infantry and militia scrambling for their battle positions. Almost immediately, the British opened with their artillery and the regulars pushed forward from their center position. As they

⁴¹ Herbert C. W. Goltz, "The Indian Revival Religion and the Western District, 1805-1813," in *The Western District: Papers from the Western District Conference*, eds. K. G. Pryke and L. L. Kulisek (Windsor, Ont: Essex County Historical Society and the Western District Councils, 1983), 29-32; Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 166-67; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 139-145. References to specific American Indian groups follow the orthographies or common spellings from official communications or language materials used by federally recognized tribes in the United States and by Canadian First Nations that are historically associated with the conflicts in the Detroit River region. These include the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma, the Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, the Nottawaseppi Huron Band of the Potawatomi, the Ottawa Tribe of Oklahoma, the Wikwemikong Unceded Indian Reserve, the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe, the Walpole Island First Nation/Bkejwanong Territory, the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation, the Munsee-Delaware Nation, the Delaware Nation at Moraviantown, the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, the Ho-Chunk Nation, the Muscogee Nation, the Seneca-Cayuga Nation, the Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas, the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, the Sac and Fox Nation, and the Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa.

⁴² Shadrach Byfield, "A Common Soldier's Account," in *Recollections of the War of 1812: Three Eyewitnesses' Accounts*, ed. John Gellner (Toronto: Baxter, 1964), 16-18; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 62-64; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 145-55; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 30-35.

drew within range of Frenchtown, they fired a powerful volley at what, in the still dark distance, had seemed to be a line of soldiers on the opposite end of the field of battle. Assuming they had the advantage, the British then made a fierce charge toward Frenchtown, but the target of their fusillade proved to be the puncheon fence behind which the protected Kentuckians could fire at will. With the British artillery still overshooting the mark, and the puncheon fence providing ample protection, the Kentuckians were unscathed and unrelenting. After 20 minutes the British were forced to retreat, leaving their fallen comrades behind—who tried to crawl away while taking fire from Kentucky marksmen.⁴³

Matters went quite differently on the right flank of the United States position. There the Canadian militia quickly adjusted the aim of their artillery, and soon wreaked havoc on the more exposed position of the United States 17th Infantry. As cannon fire tore through the encampment and shattered breastworks, Canadian militiamen and Wyandotte warriors took possession of some nearby buildings and fired into the exposed encampment. The United States soldiers struggled to hold their ground, but eventually faltered when mounted warriors came around their right flank. An attempt was made to send a few companies of Kentucky militiamen to the aid of the 17th Infantry, but the effort ultimately proved disastrous. General Winchester, who had just arrived from his headquarters, ordered the infantrymen to fall back to the north bank of the river where they could rendezvous with the Kentuckians. Together they made a brief stand, but were soon overwhelmed by the pursuing Wyandotte, Shawnee, and Canadian militia. After a frantic retreat to the south side of the river where some made a weak stand, the American position disintegrated entirely. All were swept up in the ensuing chaos, including Winchester and several officers. Fleeing pell-mell toward the south, many were run down and killed. Others managed to continue for a mile or two along Hull's Trace, but few managed to escape their pursuers—who now included the array of American Indian forces that had swept around the west and south side of Frenchtown. Of the approximately 400 Men who were caught up in the rout, about 220 were killed and another 147 captured. Only 33 escaped.⁴⁴

The actions to the east and south of Frenchtown were barely perceived by the British regulars at the edge of the woods and the Kentuckians still entrenched behind the fence lines. They instead remained locked in what, for them, seemed to be the main battle area. Over the course of two hours, the British regrouped and made two more frontal attacks, but the Kentuckians' position was too strong. The third and last attack proved the most costly, with over 100 British casualties, a number that was more than double the total losses suffered by the entrenched Kentuckians in all three attacks. As the British pulled back and evaluated their weakening situation, Colonel Procter suddenly found himself face-to-face with General Winchester in the custody of Stayeghtha. Procter pressed his opposite for outright capitulation, but the Kentuckians still within the pickets of Frenchtown balked when they first received word of Winchester's captivity. Feeling themselves on the verge of victory, they still believed the battle could be won. As Private Elias Darnell later recalled, "some [men] plead[ed] with the officers not to surrender, saying they would rather die on the field!" With their ammunition almost gone, and now surrounded on the south, east, and west by American Indian warriors, it became apparent to the officer's still within Frenchtown that victory—let alone escape—was not possible. After some

⁴³ Robert Quimby, *The United States Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 134-36.

⁴⁴ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 169-74; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 65-66; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 160-71, 174-87; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 37-39; Quimby, *The United States Army in the War of 1812*, 136-37.

more back-and-forth with the British over the disposition of prisoners and wounded, the Kentucky militia and remaining United States forces surrendered.⁴⁵

The battle was costly for the British regulars and Canadian militia, whose combined losses of 24 killed and 161 wounded amounted to nearly one third of the forces under Procter's command at Frenchtown. For the left wing of the Army of the North West, however, the loss was an unmitigated disaster. Of the 934 Americans who heard the morning's reveille, all but the 33 who managed to escape to the Maumee Rapids were either dead, wounded, or prisoners of war. A preliminary count on the evening of the 22nd put the number of United States dead at 218, while the number of ambulatory prisoners who were marched off to Amherstburg was tallied at 495. Approximately 60 wounded prisoners were unable to make the journey, and they were attended by 30 of their fellows who stayed behind. Aside from the 33 who evaded capture during the desperate retreat from the River Raisin, approximately 66 were missing. Some number was likely dead but their bodies remained undiscovered, while the rest had become captives within various American Indian encampments. Based on later counts of prisoners that passed through Amherstburg, it seems that most of these captives were eventually turned over to the British.⁴⁶

The undisputed victor at the River Raisin was the Native Confederacy. While their casualty numbers remain unknown, American Indians fared much better than their British and Canadian allies in every respect. The Wyandotte and Shawnee war leaders who directed the attack on United States regulars on the east side of Frenchtown quickly turned the fight into the sort of running battle they preferred. Moving "in scattered order," groups of fighters took advantage of small areas of cover and harassed the edges of the United States position. As the soldiers gave ground they were driven toward the Kentucky reinforcements, then all were nearly surrounded. Brief efforts by some United States regulars and Kentucky militiamen to make a joint stand were short-lived, and their retreats were channeled southward along Hull's Trace to a series of awaiting ambushes. All of this went in accordance with a basic strategy that eschewed the massing of forces, emphasized the actions of small groups working in concert with others, and sought to disorient the enemy with quick random strikes from several directions. Once the attack was joined by many of the Bodéwadmi, Myaamia, Odawa, and Ojibwe fighters that had swept around the west side of Frenchtown, the fate of the "Long Knives" (as the Kentuckians were known) was more than sealed.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 169-74; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 189-202; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 40-44. Quote from Elias Darnell, *Journal*, 48.

⁴⁶ While the accounting of wounded and killed is imprecise, the general variance between American and British sources is minimal. See Au, *War on the Raisin*, 44-45; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 73-74; Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 173-74; and Antal, *Remember the Raisin! Anatomy of a Demon Myth*, "The War of 1812 Magazine, no. 10 (2008) <http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/Warof1812/2008/Issue10/c_Raisin.html#_edn14> (accessed 27 January 2015).

⁴⁷ The reference to "scattered order" comes from Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 22. Also see "Extract of the Minutes of a Council held at Michilimackinac the 28th October 1814, between Waindaway & Mishpawkissh[,] Potawatemys on behalf of their chiefs and Lieut. Col. Macdonall," in Michigan Historical Society, *Collections and Researches Made by the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society*, vol. 23 (Lansing: Robert Smith & Co., 1895), 453-55; and Charles Callender, "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organization," in *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15: Northeast*, eds. William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 617-19. The term "Long Knives" was used by American Indian communities in the Great Lakes region as a reference to Kentuckians and, earlier, Virginians—though it could also be applied to Euro-Americans more

The small clusters of regulars and Kentucky militia that managed to get as far as the prairie and woods on the south side of the River Raisin were exhausted, low on ammunition, or had abandoned their cumbersome muskets to improve their chances of flight. Efforts to make a final stand, flee, or bargain for their lives often resulted in the same fatal result. Native warriors were not in a position to safely hold many prisoners, nor were they disposed to spare the lives of men who would kill them at the first chance. Moreover, they were expected to atone for the deaths and destruction their communities had suffered over the past few years at the hands of people with whom they had been in conflict for generations. This sentiment was particularly acute among the Bodéwadmi and Myaamia whose villages had been recently attacked, and their homes and crops destroyed, by some of the very same militiamen and soldiers that were now running, fighting, and begging for their lives. In short, the Kentuckians and the United States regulars (who hailed mostly from Kentucky and southern Ohio) were in the hands of the “ancient enemy” they sought to destroy—and wished to destroy them. Most were killed outright, which accounts for the high death toll and relatively low number of wounded and captured from this part of the battle.⁴⁸

The Native Confederacy was also responsible for ending the battle and bringing about the wholesale surrender of the Kentuckians still entrenched within Frenchtown. While the presentation of General Winchester to Colonel Procter shifted the British focus from assessing their losses to demanding a United States surrender, the decisive victory on the south side of the River Raisin allowed for a new concentration of American Indians around Frenchtown. As Winchester later recalled, this development convinced the Kentuckians to give up their arms and take “the opportunity of surrendering themselves as prisoners of war” to the British—or lose the battle to “the [warriors], who were then assembled in great numbers.” At this point the Kentuckians were already receiving sniper fire from the rear and soon realized that if they tried to hold out too long “the buildings adjacent would be immediately set on fire” and they would be cut down while trying to escape the flames.⁴⁹

For Procter, the United States surrender to his command was an important triumph—but returning to Amherstburg became a matter of great urgency. United States forces under General Harrison were already heading from the Maumee to the River Raisin, and the British feared that they might arrive within a few hours. With his able-bodied forces outnumbered by the large contingent of United States prisoners, Procter could hardly defend his position and guard hundreds of men who would turn on their captors if given the opportunity. Moreover, the large number of grievously wounded British regulars and Canadian militiamen needed care. In short, Procter’s victory over Winchester necessarily became a hurried retreat. Once the Kentuckians within Frenchtown had grounded their arms and surrendered, the decision to return to Amherstburg was immediately set in motion. British wounded were placed on sleighs and sent

generally. It likely refers to the swords of military officers or, more specifically, the long daggers that Kentucky militiamen wore on their belts.

⁴⁸ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 169-74; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 65-66; Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 160-71, 174-87; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 37-39; Quimby, *The United States Army in the War of 1812*, 136-37. On the recent American attacks against Bodéwadmi and Myaamia villages in southwestern Michigan and northern Indiana, see R. David Edmunds, *The Potawatomis: Keepers of the Fire* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 191-95; and Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country*, 134-35.

⁴⁹ Quotes are from Winchester to Harrison, January 23, 1813, in John Brannan, ed., *Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers of the United States During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15, with Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of That Period* (Washington: Way & Gideon, 1823), 133.

back to the fort while the United States prisoners who could walk were assembled and counted—then ordered to march north and east across the frozen Detroit River. Because there were not enough available sleighs, some of the British wounded stayed in Frenchtown until the evening when transport was arranged for their removal to a field hospital a few miles north of Frenchtown (at either Stony Creek or Swan Creek). The 60 or so United States prisoners who were too badly wounded to make the long march to Fort Amherstburg, along with the 30 who stayed behind to care for them, remained in Frenchtown. They were guarded by two militia officers and three interpreters from the British Indian Department, who were nominally charged with preventing escapes as well intervening with any American Indians that might come into the settlement. Procter had agreed to send back any available sleighs the next day to transport the wounded prisoners over to Amherstburg, but all expected that United States troops would arrive from the south before that became necessary.⁵⁰

Colonel Procter's information on the location and movement of Harrison's forces was questionable, but it proved remarkably accurate. While the Second Battle of Frenchtown was still underway, Procter received word that a large United States force was marching along frozen Lake Erie—just eight miles south of Frenchtown. This report was later deemed erroneous, but a battalion of United States regulars that Harrison had sent north from the Maumee was on the ice at that time, though perhaps not so close. By the time the Kentuckians were about to surrender, however, the relief battalion was within two hours of the River Raisin. Harrison was several hours behind with two more battalions of Ohio and Kentucky militia, and it is possible that a substantial force of 900 could have arrived at Frenchtown by nightfall. However, after encountering several escapees from the rout of the United States 17th Infantry and Kentucky militia, Harrison and his officers halted their marches. After convening together, they “unanimously determined that as there could be no doubt of the total defeat of Genl. Winchester there was no motive that could authorize an immediate advance but that of attacking the enemy who were reported to be greatly superior in numbers and were certainly well provided with artillery.”⁵¹ Though Harrison's reasoning is understandable in light of the circumstances and incomplete information, the decision to hold back proved fateful.

Aftermath

Like the prisoners and their five-man guard, the *habitants* who remained in Frenchtown as well as the group of American Indians encamped a few miles north at Stony Creek also expected that some part of Harrison's force would arrive by nightfall. Accordingly, the members of the Indian Department would slip away to Amherstburg, the wounded prisoners would become the responsibility of their countrymen rather than the overtaxed British, and the *habitants* could start the process of cleaning up and sorting through their losses. The group of Confederacy warriors

⁵⁰ Au, *War on the Raisin*, 45-46; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 74-76; Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 174-77.

⁵¹ Procter's information came from a *Canadien* militia scout who reported seeing a large military force on the ice. This sighting was later deemed a Fata Morgana—a kind of mirage across an expanse of ice or water that enlarges and alters the shape of a distant object—of a few Wyandotte drovers moving livestock north from the Sandusky area. Given the nature of a Fata Morgana, which presents enlarged reflections of objects beyond the horizon, this may well have been a sighting of the more distant American forces. The report to Procter is described in John Norton, *The Journal of Major John Norton, 1816* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 316-17. On the movements and decisions of Harrison's troops on January 21-22, see Harrison to Secretary of War, January 24, 1813, in *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*, 331-34; quote is from p. 332. Also see Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*, 363-64; and Au, *War on the Raisin*, 46-48.

gathered a few miles to the north at Stony Creek would have kept an eye on the arriving army, but prudence and a desire to fight another day would have likely prevented them from engaging Harrison's forces.⁵²

By first light there was no sign or news of a United States relief force, and so the able-bodied prisoners began readying their wounded comrades for the trip to Amherstburg. By this time, however, the Canadian and Indian Department guards already knew that no such journey would take place. In the absence of United States troops from the south, a pre-dawn council at Stony Creek had determined to complete the victory that had been cut short by the United States surrender to the British. Soon after the guards learned of this decision, most departed. Since they had no authority over the actions of their American Indian allies, there was nothing they could do without endangering themselves. The last remaining interpreter from the Indian Department conveyed the news to Captain Nathaniel Hart, one of the United States wounded. In answer to Hart's concerned question about what "the Indians intend[ed] to do," the interpreter replied, "They intend to kill you." When Hart then asked the man to intervene in some way, the interpreter replied that doing so would effectively make him an ally of the United States and thus "they will as soon kill [me] as you."⁵³ The promised sleighs had not arrived and any that may have been en route would certainly have been warned off—either by the departed guards who were themselves heading back to Amherstburg or the American Indians still at Stony Creek.⁵⁴

The event that became known as the "River Raisin Massacre" was not a sudden burst of collective violence. Rather, it started as a fairly deliberate taking of valuables and able-bodied captives that was later punctuated by the killing of the most severely wounded survivors of the previous days' battles. According to witness accounts from *habitants* and prisoners, in the first hour or so after daybreak the number of American Indians that had come into Frenchtown was fairly small—with the few who spoke English engaging with some of the men who were taking care of the wounded. As Dr. Gustavus Bower later described the morning, "They did not molest any person or thing upon their first approach, but kept sauntering about until there were a large number collected, (say one or two hundred) at which time they commenced plundering the houses of the inhabitants, and the massacre of the wounded prisoners." Even then, the killings followed a method that—however brutal—might be described as utilitarian. The wounded who could not travel were the primary victims, and they were killed with a suddenness that betrayed little or no emotion. The same could be said of the looting, the taking of able-bodied prisoners, and the burning of buildings and structures—behaviors that Dr. John Todd, a surgeon with the Kentucky 5th Regiment Volunteer Militia later described as a kind of "orderly conduct." A sense of deliberate order did not diminish, and perhaps intensified, the horrors that many would later describe. Indeed, the most gruesome recollections stemmed from the systematic nature of the killings and resulting treatment of the remains. Men were killed with just one or two blows, their bodies quickly stripped of clothing and often scalped, and the bloody corpse left where it had

⁵² Darnell, *Journal*, 57-60; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 28-29.

⁵³ Thomas P. Dudley, *Battle and Massacre at Frenchtown, Michigan, January 1813* (Ann Arbor: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library, 2004), 3. Also see Au, *War on the Raisin*, 44; and Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 85-86.

⁵⁴ While there are no recorded accounts of why the promised sleighs did not arrive from Amherstburg, there are several likely reasons. Two guards, along with an officer, had left Frenchtown around dawn and may well have met the sleighs on the road north of town or on the ice of the Detroit River. It is also possible that the sleighs may have been turned back at Brownstown or Stony Creek, where they would have learned from the American Indians still gathered there of the ensuing events at Frenchtown.

fallen. In places, recalled Elias Darnell, the ground was “strewed with the mangled bodies, and all of them were left like those slain in battle, on the 22nd, for birds and beasts to tear in pieces and devour.”⁵⁵

By late-morning most of the Bodéwadmi, Wyandotte, Odawa, Ojibwe, Myaamia and others had departed toward Brownstown with their spoils and captives. All of the structures and buildings that had survived the previous days’ battles were destroyed, leaving the core area of Frenchtown in utter ruin. The number of men who were killed in Frenchtown that morning is not known, nor is there any clear accounting of the stragglers and prisoners who were cut down on the road north. Plausible estimates range between 30 and 80, with most counts putting the number closer to 60. The number of captives is equally unclear. Over the next several days most of the latter were either turned over to the British at Amherstburg or ransomed in the streets of Detroit. Several were taken to their captor’s villages, with some destinations as near as the River Rouge and others as far as the Straits of Mackinac. In accordance with the precepts of a “mourning war,” these men could expect two fates: kind treatment and adoption by the kin of an individual who had been killed by the Long Knives (and thus fill the place of the deceased); or killed as atonement. In either case the decision about their fate was generally left to the nearest female kin of the deceased.⁵⁶

Remember the Raisin!

The events of January 23, 1813, became known as the “River Raisin Massacre” in the United States, and quickly grew into the most famous and longest lasting echo of the Battles of Frenchtown. In March, President James Madison devoted a good portion of his Second Inaugural Address to a vivid condemnation of “[American Indians] armed with ... the hatchet and the knife ..., devoted to indiscriminate massacre ..., eager to glut their ... thirst with the blood of the vanquished and to finish the work of torture and death on maimed and defenseless captives.” In this and other such accountings, the “massacre” took on a transformative significance. In Ohio and especially Kentucky, “Remember the Raisin!” became a recruiting slogan for more militia volunteers to join an Army that was only recently on the verge of collapse due to a lack of reenlistments. In subsequent battles, including the Battle of the Thames where Tecumseh and Stayeghtha fell, it became a fiery battle cry that would later be celebrated in print alongside other famous slogans of the war like “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights” and

⁵⁵ "Statement of Dr. Gustavus M. Bower, 24 April 1813" in *Barbarities of the Enemy; Exposed in a Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, Appointed to Enquire into the Spirit and Manner in Which the War Has Been Waged by the Enemy, and the Documents, Accompanying Said Report* (Worcester: Isaac Sturtevant, for Remark Durnell, 1814), 139; "Statement of John Todd, M.D., 24 April 1813" in *ibid.*, 145; Darnell, *Journal*, 62. For an overview of various American accounts, see Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 80-91.

⁵⁶ The most detailed estimates are from Au, *War on the Raisin*, 45-46; and Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 87. Both authors put the number of killed on January 23 near 60. For descriptions of captivity within American Indian communities after the Battles of Frenchtown, see Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 198-99. On mourning wars see Timothy J. Shannon, "The Native American Way of War in the Age of Revolutions, 1754-1814," in *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815*, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Washington, D.C.; [New York]: German Historical Institute; Cambridge University Press, 2013), 140-42. Also see Thomas Ablner, "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War" *Anthropologica* 34:1 (1992): 3-20.

“Don’t Give Up the Ship.”⁵⁷

Unlike General Hull’s embarrassing defeat and surrender the previous summer, the death and capture of so many soldiers and militiamen at Frenchtown did not lead to widespread criticism of United States military leadership. Instead, as Madison’s Second Inaugural made clear, “British commanders”—and particularly Procter—were entirely at fault for having “extorted victory over the unconquerable valor of our troops” by the threat and example of “massacre from their [Native] associates.” In other words, Frenchtown was not a fair fight because, as Harrison made clear in a letter to Secretary of War James Monroe, “the British have no intention to conduct the war (at least in this quarter) upon those principles which have been held sacred by all civilized nations.”⁵⁸

These were not new sentiments, and they had as much to do with oft repeated tropes about “Indian atrocities” as they did the recent events at Frenchtown.⁵⁹ Since before the Revolution, the specter of “Savages ... exercising their wanton barbarities”—to quote George Washington—inspired numerous military campaigns into the Great Lakes region, excused most every defeat suffered by United States forces, and explained the cause and purpose of informal conflicts west of the Appalachian Mountains between Euro-Americans and American Indian communities.⁶⁰ In this context the magnitude of United States losses on the River Raisin was not a strike against the war effort, but an affirmation for prosecuting “a war of extermination” in the Great Lakes region. In the build-up to what became the War of 1812, while “preparations for war [were] openly going on,” President Jefferson directed Governors Hull and Harrison in 1807 to convey to the “tribes ... already expressing intentions hostile to the United States ... this solemn declaration of our un-alterable determination...; if ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or driven beyond the Mississippi.... In war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy all of them.” Hull repeated these sentiments during his short-lived invasion of Canada, when he issued a proclamation addressed to the “INHABITANTS OF CANADA!” threatening that if

you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered & treated as enemies, & the horrors & calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous & savage policy of Great Britain be pursued ..., the war, will be a war of extermination. The first stroke of the Tomahawk, the first attempt with the

⁵⁷ “James Madison, March 4, 1813. Speech, Second Inaugural,” *The James Madison Papers, American Memory (Library of Congress)* <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mjm.15_0108_0116> (accessed 30 January 2015). On the subsequent use of “Remember the Raisin!,” see Paul A. Gilje, *Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights in the War of 1812* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 214, 218.

⁵⁸ Madison, “Second Inaugural;” Harrison to Secretary of War, February 11, 1813, in *Messages and Letters*, 2:359. Also see Owens, *Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer*, 128-87.

⁵⁹ This term comes from Hugh Henry Brackenridge, *Indian Atrocities: Narratives of the Perils and Sufferings of Dr. Knight and John Slover among the Indians During the Revolutionary War* (Nashville: W.F. Bang, 1843); first published in 1783. In a prefatory note to his readers, Brackenridge noted “that the nature of an Indian is fierce and cruel, and that an extirpation of them would be useful to the world, and honorable to those who can effect it.”

⁶⁰ Quote from George Washington to the President of Congress, October 5, 1776, in *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799*, Vol. 6, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington Resources at the University of Virginia [online]) <<http://etext.virginia.edu/washington/fitzpatrick/>> (accessed 5 February 2015). For a classic study of these issues, see Roy Harvey Pearce, *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

scalping knife, will be the signal for one indiscriminate scene of desolation. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his lot.⁶¹

Such expressions were almost verbatim repetitions of century-old views on American Indians and warfare, but they were colored by two generations of conflict dating back to before the French and Indian War (1754-1763). In the *Declaration of Independence*, Thomas Jefferson made an explicit connection between “absolute [British] Tyranny” and American Indians. While the latter were reviled as “merciless Indian savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions,” their abilities to wage war were presumed to require the sponsorship of an imperial power.⁶² Through a kind of double-jeopardy, American Indians were also viewed as subjects and agents of British tyranny. When American Indians did not abide the norms of European standards of warfare, the British were at fault for not exercising sufficient control; conversely, the British were deemed weak and dishonorable whenever they relied on the support of American Indian fighters. The killings of wounded soldiers at the River Raisin, which United States government officials and the public widely—but erroneously—believed to have occurred while “British officers and soldiers silently and exultingly contemplated the scene,” was presented as one of the most dramatic examples of British tyranny. The “River Raisin Massacre” was a bloody confirmation that the United States was fighting what many called a “Second War of Independence,” and to remember the Raisin was to redouble the effort to finally destroy the twin menace of British tyranny and American Indian “perfidy.”⁶³

To the Victors

Despite frequent United States pronouncements to the contrary, the alliance between the British and the Native Confederacy did not have a senior partner. They shared a common set of goals (to halt and reverse the northwestward expansion of United States settlements, to sustain the British fur trade, and affirm a collective American Indian sovereignty in the Great Lakes region), but the alliance was also marked by a latent distrust on both sides. As the Shawnee war leader Tecumseh reminded Colonel Procter, the British had twice abandoned an alliance with American Indians—first at the Peace of Paris that ended the American Revolution in 1783, and later at the decisive Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 that eventually led to a vast cession of lands in Ohio. Understandably, Tecumseh was “afraid that [the British] will do so again.” Procter acknowledged as much in his correspondence with his superiors, noting that any “aid we may expect from the Indians will always be in proportion to their confidence in our strength and which they are too sensible is but small.” Yet British officers also complained that their allies were “fickle,” did not appreciate the larger strategic goals that guided British military actions,

⁶¹ Jefferson to Secretary of War [Henry Dearborn], August 28, 1807, in *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. IX: 1807-1815*, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (G.P Putnam's Sons, 1898), 132-33; Hull, “A Proclamation,” in *Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers*, 31.

⁶² “Declaration of Independence,” at *Documents from the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention, 1774-1789* <<http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.rbc/bdsdec.02101>> (accessed 30 January 2015).

⁶³ Alexander James Dallas, *An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War between the United States and Great Britain* (Concord, N.H.: Isaac and Walter R. Hill, 1815), 90; Hickey, “Introduction,” in *The War of 1812: Writings from America's Second War of Independence*, ed. Hickey (New York: Library of America, 2013), n.p.; Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 251-53.

and often abandoned the field of battle when their own designs were accomplished.⁶⁴

For the Native Confederacy warriors at Frenchtown, the hasty departure of British forces for Amherstburg was not “fickle,” but completely understandable. However, Procter’s desire to take care of his wounded and remove a large number of prisoners before Harrison’s troops arrived was a British concern that did not readily align with the personal or collective objectives of the American Indians who remained. For them the battles on January 18 and 22 were not distinct from the subsequent taking of captives, destruction of Frenchtown, and killing of wounded prisoners. When the expected United States troops failed to arrive, the status of the able-bodied prisoners from the previous day’s battle remained unchanged—with one exception. Unlike their fellows in Amherstburg, who were subject to British authority, these men belonged entirely to those members of the Native Confederacy who claimed them as their own. The same was true of the wounded, as well as the property of the *habitants*.

As noted above, the able-bodied prisoners had particular value in the form of ransom, adoption, or a retribution killing. While the second and third alternatives followed age-old practices that sought to rebalance a household, family or community that was still mourning a loss, the first alternative was more akin to plunder.⁶⁵ Unlike United States soldiers and Kentucky militiamen, Confederacy fighters did not draw from a ready set of stipends, bonuses, or payments for the risks they took. Their communities might receive gifts from the British, and any family members who travelled with them to Amherstburg obtained some material support, but otherwise a warrior received little more than ammunition and some rations. Consequently, victory in battle came with an implicit right to plunder. This not only compensated for past dangers or losses, but the rewards of plunder served as a point of honor for warriors who were expected to return to their communities with gifts and resources. Strategically, plundering also weakened the enemy’s position and, certainly through the entire Sixty Years War, often served as direct retribution for the destruction of American Indian towns by United States troops, militias and vigilantes. While taking prisoners to a captor’s home village could also achieve these various ends, obtaining ransom for a healthy and valued captive was more akin to the compensatory purposes of plunder.⁶⁶

The burning and looting of Frenchtown that occurred on January 23 was also directly related to the previous day’s fighting. Just when the British called for a truce to initiate the process of surrender, the core of the village was nearly surrounded by Confederacy fighters and the Kentuckians were on the verge of being burned out. In short, what would have been the final stage of the Second Battle of Frenchtown was thwarted. The surrender denied the Confederacy a potent victory they were about to claim, and left intact a community and an array of structures that would be of great tactical significance to Harrison’s army. Burning and looting the village center thus made good on the purposes and prospects of the previous day’s battle, and forced the

⁶⁴ Tecumseh quoted in Edmunds, *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1984), 204. Procter quoted in Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 150. Also see Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 149, 261, 383.

⁶⁵ White, *The Middle Ground*, 343-351; Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 27, 34.

⁶⁶ Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare*, 98; Wayne E. Lee, "Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800." *The Journal of Military History* 71:3 (2007): 739-41.

habitants to flee toward communities around Sandusky Bay.⁶⁷ Destruction of the town also served as punishment to the *habitants* for making a definitive alliance with the United States. In doing so they rejected an earlier plea for assistance from Stayeghtha (Roundhead) and Myeerah (Walk-in-the-Water), who hoped to draw on the history of good relations between nearby American Indian communities and the *habitants* of Frenchtown. The appeal for aid was also couched in a threat, however, and once Frenchtown effectively declared itself for the United States, the Wyandotte and their allies readily determined that “we will not consider you in future as friends, and the consequences [will] be very unpleasant.”⁶⁸

The killing of the wounded at Frenchtown was horrific for those who died as well as the survivors who witnessed the killings, and certainly traumatized many of the latter. Yet in both respects it was not unlike the many killings of disarmed combatants that had occurred at the hands of Long Knives and American Indians since well before the American Revolution. Just a few months earlier General Hull had threatened “instant destruction”—with no chance of imprisonment—to any “white man found fighting by the side of an Indian;” the fate of the latter was too obvious to state. The Kentuckians who were surrounded by the combined forces of American Indians on January 22 expected a similar fate at the hands of American Indians—and thus preferred to die fighting. Instead of the frenzied mass killing that the Long Knives might have feared, the event known as the “River Raisin Massacre” only struck the badly wounded. The methodical nature of the killings, coupled with the unexpected suddenness of the deadly blows, appalled the survivors—but was nevertheless understood as atonement for recent events. More than random acts in a multi-generational “blood feud,” the killings were meant to correspond to specific American Indian losses in the previous days’ battles as well the death and destruction that accompanied attacks on several Bodéwadmi and Myaamia towns a few months earlier. A number of the Bodéwadmi and Myaamia who were in Frenchtown on January 23 came from these same villages, and certainly knew that the attacks had come from Winchester’s forces.⁶⁹

The most gruesome aspects of the killing and destruction that occurred on January 23 involved the mutilation of corpses. The taking of scalps was widely noted by survivors and later commentators, who accused Procter of paying bounties for each Euro-American scalp. No bounties were offered by Procter, and even his harshest United States critic—Michigan Territorial Judge Augustus Woodward—attributed the violence on January 23 to “an ignoble revenge on [the] prisoners” that needed no cash incentive. However, scalping had a much broader significance than revenge or retaliation for specific wrongs. In many respects, a scalp taken from an enemy was something like a service medal—a demonstration of prowess and a mark of honor to be displayed in a ceremony upon the warrior’s return home. While scalps could be kept as a sort of personal trophy, in which the slain foe’s power became a possession of the victor, they were also incorporated into a community’s ceremonial life. After a series of Victory Dances (or “Scalp Dances”) following a successful conflict, scalps were often left as offerings at grave sites. Among the Hooçaągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago) and other groups, they were also incorporated into war bundles, objects that were “the focus of important

⁶⁷ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 95, 172, 177; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 20.

⁶⁸ *Barbarities of the Enemy*, 132.

⁶⁹ Peter Schmalz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 114-16; Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country*, 125-29; Au, *War on the Raisin*, 50-51.

ceremonies ... that involved a series of supernatural beings associated with war.”⁷⁰

By far the most galling and intentionally offensive action was the mutilation and dismemberment of the dead. Though interpreted as a frightful warning to the inhabitants of Frenchtown and United States troops that would soon be coming into the area, this was primarily about affecting the afterlives of the vanquished and the community where they died. *Habitants* were threatened against burying the bodies so that the violated corpses remained in the open to be picked over and scattered by animals, without the rights of burial and the ceremonies that would bring peace to the dead or their communities. More than any other action, this violation of the dead was directly related to the actions of Kentucky militiamen the previous autumn. The Bodéwadmi leader Segnak (Blackbird, the Younger) explained such actions to the British a few months later, noting that when the “Big Knives” destroyed villages the previous fall, “they did not allow our dead to rest. They dug up their graves, and the bones of our ancestors were thrown away and we could never find them to return them to the ground The way they treat our killed, and the remains of those that are in their graves in the west, makes our people mad when they meet the Big Knives.” Segnak made it clear that “We do not disturb their dead,” but their transgressions require us “to follow their example.”⁷¹ While such actions and reasoning could only inflame a desire within the United States to “Remember the Raisin!” for Segnak and other Confederacy fighters they represented an extreme form of victory: one that vanquished the enemy and mitigated the effects of recent violations of their own dead.

Denouement

The Battles of Frenchtown, along with the subsequent killings and destruction on January 23, capped a six-month stretch of military success for the Native Confederacy that included the routs at Brownstown and Maguaga, participation in the siege and capture of Detroit, engagements with small detachments of United States troops on the lower Maumee, and the gathering of important intelligence for the British at Amherstburg as well as for Tecumseh and other Confederacy leaders in the Detroit River area. In concert with these earlier actions, Frenchtown proved a smashing victory that marked the highpoint of the Confederacy’s strength during the War of 1812. The first United States Army of the North West had been completely defeated just eight weeks after the official declaration of war, and the left wing of the reconstituted Army of the North West was annihilated at Frenchtown barely five months later. In the ensuing months, groups of Confederacy fighters moved at will through present-day Michigan and northwestern Ohio, where they kept a close eye on Harrison’s stalled army on the lower Maumee as well as on nearby settlements.⁷² As spring approached and Procter received new reinforcements at Amherstburg, hopes ran high within the Confederacy that a joint offensive with the British might drive the United States forces into southern Ohio. Such a victory would restore much of the territory that had been lost since the mid-1790s, and thus achieve the vision that Tecumseh conveyed to Harrison in 1810; namely, “to tear up” past treaties, “stop this evil” of coerced land cessions since the 1780s, and restore “for the red men ... a common and equal right in the land,

⁷⁰ Abler, “Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape:” 7-9; Nancy Oesterieich Lurie, “Winnebago,” in *Handbook of North American Indians: Northeast*, 695-96.

⁷¹ David D. Plain, *The Plains of Aamjiwnaang: Our History* (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2007), 85-86.

⁷² Au, *War on the Raisin*, 60-61; Cecil King, *Balancing Two Worlds: Jean-Baptiste Assiginack and the Odawa Nation, 1768-1866* (Saskatoon: Dr. Cecil King, 2013), 133-34.

as it was at first, and should be now—for it was never divided, but belongs to us all.”⁷³

While the Confederacy’s prospects seemed to broaden, General Harrison concentrated his command at the Maumee Rapids where the construction of Fort Meigs commenced just ten days after the Battles of Frenchtown. Harrison needed to protect supplies and artillery for a still planned invasion of Upper Canada, shelter his diminishing command (which shrank to just 700 by winter’s end as enlistment periods for Virginia and Pennsylvania militia service expired and the volunteers returned home), and provide a northern assembly point for expected new recruits. Given its significance to the United States position in the western Great Lakes, Fort Meigs became the focus of the next allied British-Confederacy offensive. After delays caused by a spate of bad weather, a combined force of approximately 530 British regulars, 460 Canadian militia, and 1,250 Confederacy warriors led by Tecumseh and Stayeghtha (Roundhead) assembled in the Detroit River area in mid-April then established a siege of Fort Meigs on April 28. The weather-caused delays thwarted their efforts in several ways, however. Harrison had time to move 300 additional troops to the nearly finished fort in mid-April, and 1,200 Kentucky militia arrived soon after the siege began—which brought the combined United States forces to approximately 2,300. Weeks of cold rain had also softened the earthen ramparts and makeshift embankments that had been thrown up within the fort’s perimeter. These absorbed most of the British ordinance and left the rest of the fort complex relatively undamaged. The siege lasted a week and involved one significant battle on May 5 that resulted in heavy casualties among the newly arrived Kentuckians. Nevertheless, the lifting of the siege amounted to an important victory for Harrison and signaled a change of fortune for the British-Confederacy alliance.⁷⁴

The siege demonstrated that Procter’s limited artillery was not capable of dislodging an entrenched United States position, and confirmed that the American Indian preference for making swift strikes from cover was not conducive to siege warfare. After some debate and disagreement between Procter and Tecumseh about the value of another siege, the alliance returned to Fort Meigs in late July and then moved on to Fort Stephenson (near Sandusky) in early August. The second siege of Fort Meigs was even less successful than the first, while the attack on Fort Stephenson resulted in significant British casualties. These failures weakened the alliance, which was already suffering from a lack of supplies for British troops, Canadian militia, and the large number of Confederacy warriors and their families based near Amherstburg. Moreover, siege warfare exasperated the Native Confederacy since, as Stayeghtha (Roundhead) stated, it was like trying to fight a “ground hog under the ground” that refused to come out. There was no honor and no gain in such an encounter. Through the rest of August, a number of Confederacy fighters and their families departed the Detroit River area and returned to their villages and crops.⁷⁵

⁷³ Tecumseh quoted in Giles B. Gunn, *Early American Writing* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 412-13. Also see Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance*, 139-41; and Edmunds, *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership*, 130-35, 189-91.

⁷⁴ John R. Elting, *Amateurs, to Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1991), 104-106; Skaggs, *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country*, 155-62; Nelson, *Men of Patriotism, Courage & Enterprise: Fort Meigs in the War of 1812* (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1985), 53-68.

⁷⁵ Elting, *Amateurs, to Arms!*, 107-109; Nelson, *Men of Patriotism*, 111-14; Alec R. Gilpin, *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest* (East Lansing, MI: The Michigan State University Press, 1958), 205-207; Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 275-280. Stayeghtha (Roundhead) quoted in Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 137.

After the failed siege of Fort Stephenson, Procter's only option was to consolidate his forces around Amherstburg. After months of chronic shortfalls in supplies and troops, which were increasingly channeled toward the defense of Lower Canada (present-day southern Québec), there was little to do but sustain British, Canadian, and Confederacy forces as best as possible and assist in the preparation and arming of vessels in the Royal Naval Dockyard. By then the war in the western theater had shifted to a maritime contest for control of Lake Erie, and both the United States and the British had to await its outcome before making any strategic decisions. The single and decisive engagement came on September 10, when Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated and captured the entire British squadron in the vicinity of the Lake Erie Islands—about 30 miles east by southeast of Frenchtown. With this victory, the United States could move supplies and troops at will on western Lake Erie and—with the exception of a long and difficult land route up the Thames River Valley—effectively severed Amherstburg from present-day eastern Ontario and Québec.⁷⁶

General Harrison immediately pressed his new advantage by marshaling the 5,000-strong Army of the North West for another invasion of Canada, with about half ferrying up from Sandusky to Amherstburg and the rest travelling on land from Fort Meigs by way of Frenchtown and Detroit. Procter, for his part, hastily prepared for a mass overland retreat from Detroit and Amherstburg to Burlington Heights (present-day Hamilton, Ontario) at the western end of Lake Ontario.

Seeing these preparations, Confederacy leaders chastised Procter for abandoning the alliance and accused him of cowardice. Speaking for many, Tecumseh demanded that Fort Amherstburg and its artillery be left to the Confederacy to defend against the United States invasion. Upon learning that all of the fort's artillery had been used by the British squadron that fell to Commodore Perry, and that United States control of Lake Erie made any position in the Detroit River area indefensible, many in the Confederacy decided to leave for their home villages or prepare to fight another way in another place. Of the approximately 3,000 warriors of the Native Confederacy then in the vicinity of Amherstburg, only a third chose to join the British retreat and make a stand against Harrison's army somewhere along the Thames River.⁷⁷

As Harrison's forces pushed northward along the western edge of Lake Erie, Colonel Richard M. Johnson's Kentucky Mounted Riflemen—along with men from the Frenchtown settlement—were the first to arrive at the River Raisin on September 27. They were followed a few days later by militia under the command of Kentucky Governor Isaac Shelby, and the remains of as many as 65 dead from the Battles of Frenchtown were interred in a mass grave.⁷⁸ By this time United States forces were already garrisoned at Detroit, Sandwich (present-day Windsor, ON), and Amherstburg, and Harrison's lead forces were in pursuit of Procter and the Confederacy. On October 4, Harrison came within striking distance near Moraviantown (present-day Chatham, ON). The following afternoon Harrison arrayed his combined forces, which numbered more than 3,000, against an allied force of some 450 infantrymen and militia who were well enough to bear arms, and another 500-800 Confederacy warriors who were with the main body of the retreating army. Rallying to the cry of "Remember the Raisin!" Johnson's cavalymen rushed

⁷⁶ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 275-293; Skaggs and Gerard T. Altoff, *A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812-1813* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 118-148.

⁷⁷ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 297-309; John Sugden, *Tecumseh's Last Stand* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 62-71.

⁷⁸ Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides*, 288-89; Clift, *Remember the Raisin!*, 101-104.

the overwhelmed British forces and the Battle of the Thames had become a rout almost before it began. Confederacy warriors, using the cover of wooded marshlands, held off the onslaught for about 30 minutes before breaking into a running retreat. While casualty numbers were not particularly high, and about equal on all sides, the United States victory was total. More than half of the British fighting force was taken prisoner, as were nearly all of those who were unable to bear arms. Though Procter and most of his command escaped, and Confederacy warriors made a successful retreat, both Tecumseh and Stayeghtha (Roundhead) were dead.⁷⁹

The Battle of the Thames was not the death knell of the Native Confederacy, but it did lead to a dramatic fracturing of the alliance. Once the magnitude of the United States victory was known, most of the groups of Bodéwadmi, Wyandotte, Myaamia (Miami), Waayaahatanwa (Wea), Odawa, and Ojibwe that had abandoned their alliances with the British during the retreat from Amherstburg chose to refrain from further conflict. This decision, and the new circumstances in which it occurred, was formalized just days after the Battle of the Thames through a provisional armistice agreement with General Harrison.⁸⁰ The armistice generally applied to American Indian communities from the Detroit River area to south of Lake Michigan, and groups of Ojibwe (Chippewa), Hooçaągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Thâkîwa (Sauk, or Sac), and Meskwaki (Fox) from areas further north and west held to their alliance with the British stationed at Mackinac and continued to push back against remote United States settlements and military outposts. Still others moved eastward to fight with the main force of the British military against United States forces along the Niagara Peninsula. Ohio and Kentucky militiamen carried on in a similar manner, but in a different theater of the war, with a number joining the forces led by General Andrew Jackson in the South.⁸¹

Over the next several months, the British contemplated several plans for retaking the western reaches of Upper Canada and Michigan, and the Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi) war leader Main Poc assembled as many as 1,200 Confederacy warriors near Detroit in March 1814. The uncertain course of the war around Lake Ontario, an early spring thaw, and gnawing doubts about troop numbers and equipment all stymied any British movements toward western Lake Erie—and ultimately put off a potential rendezvous with Main Poc and his forces. Small incursions by British and United States forces occasionally occurred in the Thames River Valley, and United States settlements in Michigan still suffered from intermittent raids by small groups of American Indians. Toward the end of spring, however, two years of war and near-constant military requisitioning of crops, cattle, and supplies had created a blighted landscape that extended well to the east and southwest of the Detroit River area. With the population thinned, crops destroyed, fields unplanted, commerce shut down, and nagging fears that war might return, the region was almost as hard for the United States to manage as it would have been for the British to invade and reestablish themselves. For these two antagonists, the result was stalemate and stagnation. However, life for American Indian communities around the western Lake Erie Basin became desperate. Some had lost all of their crops to United States raids the previous summer, and all were now effectively cut off from British supplies. The hunger and disease that plagued their communities through the winter of 1813-1814 continued to haunt them through spring, and

⁷⁹ Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 331-349; Sugden, *Tecumseh's Last Stand*, 105-135.

⁸⁰ "Harrison to Secretary of War, October 10, 1813," "Armistice between Harrison and the Indians, October 14, 1813," "Harrison Proclamation to Indians Armistice, October 16, 1813" all in *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*, vol. 2, 573-75, 576-79.

⁸¹ Gillum Ferguson, *Illinois in the War of 1812* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 110-114.

former concerns about war, neutrality or alliances gave way to elemental concerns about subsistence and survival.⁸²

If nothing else, such desperate straits confirmed that the war in the western Great Lakes region was already over and the Native Confederacy had lost. This general defeat found its first official expression in a treaty council at Greenville, Ohio, in July 1814. Held at the same location as the first Treaty of Greenville of 1795, which ended the series of conflicts known as the Northwest Indian War (1785-1795) and included the cession of most of present-day Ohio to the United States, the second Treaty of Greenville did not involve any new land or boundary issues. Rather it served to “give peace” to groups that assisted United States forces or maintained neutrality in the recent conflicts, and to “extend this indulgence” of peace to groups that had been allied with the Confederacy. The treaty, which identified the Myaamia (Miami), Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa (Ottawa), Kiikaapoi (Kickapoo), Wyandotte (Wyandot, a.k.a. Huron), Lunaapeew (Lenape, or Delaware), Shawnee, and Onöndowága (Seneca), included signatories from different villages in present-day Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan and represented a fair spectrum of the groups that had divided over the issue of war against the United States. The treaty also obliged the signatories to aid the United States in its war efforts against Great Britain and “Indian tribes as still continue hostile,” and further specified that none could seek peace with the other tribes without the consent of the United States.⁸³

With conflict effectively over in the western Great Lakes, the only active theaters of war in the summer and fall of 1814 were on the Niagara Peninsula, along the Eastern Seaboard, and in the South. The general momentum of the war shifted toward the British in the summer of 1815 when the decisive victory over Napoleon at Waterloo allowed the British to direct more forces to North America. In the Chesapeake region, the Royal Navy terrorized coastal communities and in late August a combined force of British Regulars and Royal Marines burned the public buildings in Washington, D.C.—including the White House. Though dramatic, these events were not significant enough to change the course of the war. Nevertheless, they did help end the basic stalemate that had plagued diplomatic negotiations for months. After two years of war, both sides concluded that outright victory was mutually impossible and thus, even as the White House lay in ruins, the United States and the United Kingdom made a concerted push to negotiate a lasting peace. During the initial talks to end the war, the British promoted the possibility of creating an independent American Indian territory in the western Great Lakes region. As negotiations increasingly focused on ending the war rather than solving any of its original causes, however, the idea was pushed aside and eventually dropped. This was true of most every concern that preceded the war and inspired its initial prosecution, and by the time the two nations completed the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814, they could only agree on two key elements: the war between the British and the United States was effectively a draw; and both sides saw little benefit in furthering the conflict. Consequently, the official ending of the war simply amounted to *status quo ante bellum* (the state existing before war).⁸⁴

⁸² Antal, *A Wampum Denied*, 378-87; James A. Clifton, *The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965* (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 210-214.

⁸³ “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1814” in Charles Kappler, ed. *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties* Vol. II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 105-106.

⁸⁴ Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812*, 411-419.

The second Treaty of Greenville, which preceded the Treaty of Ghent by some five months, was also predicated on the same concept of *status quo ante bellum*—as it existed in 1811—but recognized a possible continuation of hostilities with groups not covered by the treaty. This distinction was addressed in September 1815 at the Treaty of Springwells, which marks the official end of the War of 1812 in the area that people in the United States generally referred to as the Northwest. Taking place within the future boundaries of Fort Wayne in Detroit, Michigan, the treaty council included the same principles who signed the Treaty of Greenville in 1814 as well as communities and groups that were directly aligned with the Confederacy and had fought against the United States at Frenchtown and elsewhere. All told the treaty involved Wyandotte, Lunaapeew, Shawnee, Bodéwadmi, and Onöndowága from the Detroit River area as well as Myaamia, Bodéwadmi, Hoocąągra (Ho-Chunk, aka Winnebago), Odawa (Ottawa), and Ojibwe (Chippewa) from further north and west.⁸⁵

Though it repeated much of the same language used in the second Treaty of Greenville, the Treaty of Springwells was not a simple peace treaty. For the groups associated with the Confederacy, accepting conditions as they existed in 1811 amounted to a repudiation of all the reasons they had fought against the United States. These included the vast land cession of 1795 as well as subsequent treaties that ceded large portions of present-day Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. The Confederacy did not consider these treaties valid in 1811, nor did its leaders recognize the right of individual village leaders to sign away large tracts of land that other American Indian communities used or resided in. As the Shawnee leader Tecumseh stated to Harrison at Vincennes in 1810, the members of the Confederacy viewed such dealings as “pretended treat[ies]” that resulted from concerted efforts by government officials to “make differences between” and then “separate the tribes” to acquire land from each group “one by one, and advise them not to come into [the Confederacy].” “No [single] tribe [or individual village leader] has the right to sell,” he continued, “even to each other, much less to strangers who demand all, and will take no less.”⁸⁶

Along with a direct acknowledgement of previous treaties, the Treaty of Springwells also implied an affirmation of the process by which they were conducted. By identifying specific groups and village leaders “associated with Great Britain in the late war between the United States and that power,” but making no reference to their collective association with the Confederacy, the treaty essentially reinstated the framework that Tecumseh described as duplicitous and invalid. Treaty signatories only represented their specific communities, and individually acknowledged the suzerainty of the United States over their external affairs. With the Confederacy defeated, and its former constituents “under the protection of the United States, and of no other power whatsoever,” the Treaty of Springwells effectively reopened the process of land cessions that had ended in 1811.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1815” in Kappler, ed. *Indian Affairs*, 117-119.

⁸⁶ “Tecumseh’s Speech to Governor William Henry Harrison, Vincennes,” Indiana Historical Society <<http://images.indianahistory.org/cdm/ref/collection/dc050/id/560>> (accessed 7 April 2015).

⁸⁷ “Treaty with the Wyandot, etc., 1815”, 118. Very similar terms were incorporated into a series of treaties conducted with more westerly groups in 1815-16. See “Treaty with the Potawatomi” (1815), “Treaty with the Piankashaw” (1815), “Treaty with the Sioux of the Lakes” (1815), “Treaty with the Sioux of St. Peter’s River” (1815), “Treaty with the Yankton Sioux” (1815), “Treaty with the Sauk” (1816), “Treaty with the Winnebago” (1816), “Wea and Kickapoo” (1816), “Treaty with the Ottawa, etc.” (1816), and “Treaty with the Sioux” (1816); all in Kappler, ed. *Indian Affairs*, 110-115, 126-133.

The War of 1812 may have resulted in a draw between the United States and Great Britain, but in the western Great Lakes the war achieved all that the War Hawks hoped to gain short of acquiring portions of Canada. The British had been driven out of the region, the Confederacy defeated, and the Jeffersonian program of aggressive land acquisition reinstated. The victory was as complete for the United States side as the defeat was for American Indian communities—whether they sided with the Confederacy or not. Within six years of the Treaty of Springwells council, the United States had concluded multiple treaties with various American Indian groups in the Great Lakes region and acquired vast tracts of land in Ohio, and the present states of Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. The pace of treaty making slowed through the 1820s, but increased again in the late 1820s. With the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1832, the process of land cessions accelerated further and became fully associated with relocating American Indian communities on lands to the west of the Mississippi River. While some groups managed to remain on small reservations in Michigan and Wisconsin, the majority were forced to move west. These coerced removals were often disorderly and poorly implemented, with many communities suffering exposure, severe hunger and death during the westward treks. In their place, growing populations of Euro-Americans, recent European immigrants, and some former African American slaves created what has since become known as the Heartland of America. Though often referred to in the United States as the “Forgotten War,” the War of 1812—especially in the Upper Midwest—was one of the most transformative in the nation’s history. To many American Indians with current and historical connections to the Great Lakes region, the losses that followed the Battles on the River Raisin are clearly remembered as the beginning of a period that is directly linked to the subsequent removal era.⁸⁸

Battle Setting and Archeology

The historical significance of the River Raisin Battlefield Site derives from several factors, but the site’s physical setting is especially distinct. Unlike other battles and engagements in the western Great Lakes region during the War of 1812—or over the previous six decades—the events at Frenchtown centered on platted land in an inhabited area along an important travel corridor. Consequently, the events and their effects were recorded and recalled by *habitants* and United States civilians in the immediate and near vicinity. The scale of the battles, their strategic importance, and the amount of destruction, death, and captivity that ensued all resulted in a great deal of subsequent attention. Military reports and maps were produced noting physical landmarks and structures as well as the movements and positions of various forces. Official assessments by British and United States officers, as well as formal investigations into the events of January 23, 1813, resulted in numerous recorded interviews with witnesses and principal actors who recalled various details of the battles, their aftermath, and their setting. These were followed in 1817 by a map and report that delineated property lines and the locations of damaged or destroyed structures for a case brought to the United States Court of Claims by affected property holders.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ The material on these subjects is voluminous. For brief but thorough overviews, see William A. Hunter, “History of the Ohio Valley,” in *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15: Northeast*, 592-93; Lyle M. Stone and Donald Chaput, “History of the Upper Great Lakes Area,” *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15: Northeast*, 607-609; Tanner, ed., *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*, 120-167; Andrew R. L. Cayton, “The Meanings of the Wars for the Great Lakes,” in *Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes*, eds. Skaggs and Nelson, 373-390.

⁸⁹ Personal accounts and reports of the battles and their aftermath are referenced in the Narrative Statement of Significance. For later recollections in the nineteenth century, and the historical memory of residents in Monroe, see

This wealth of information, corroborated with persistent landscape features like the River Raisin shoreline, Mason Run, the route of Hull's Trace, and the boundaries of ribbon farms (aka long lots) along present-day north-south trending streets and property lines, provides a remarkably detailed reference for the events and locales associated with the battles and their aftermath. The documentary record has also provided an important guide for several archeological investigations which have confirmed the locations of some destroyed structures and uncovered materials directly related to specific battle engagements. While none of these investigations have resulted in significant reinterpretations of the events that occurred in January 1813, they do confirm the physical integrity of the site in two ways. First, by ground truthing the documentary record and, second, by demonstrating that some archeological resources remain intact and in situ. The latter condition was confirmed through excavations of historically identified sites as well as the discovery that the original paper mill was built atop a two-foot layer of compacted cinder and clay that effectively sealed and protected much of the early nineteenth-century soil strata from a century of construction, expansion, dumping, and demolition.

Though significant for identifying and confirming the location of an important settlement's destroyed remnants that was destroyed, archeological research has not otherwise "yielded ... information important in prehistory or history" —and it is unclear if it "may be likely to yield ... [additional] information important to prehistory or history."⁹⁰ Consequently, the expanded site is not being considered in terms of National Register Criterion D. Yet this updated nomination fully concurs with the conclusion of two archeologists who have conducted research at the River Raisin Battlefield site: namely, that "[archeological] contexts ... add an important dimension to the historical data and strongly support the significance of the [expanded] site."⁹¹

The first archeological studies of the battlefield area began in the late 1970s, but they were long preceded (and partly informed) by accidental discoveries of human remains and battle debris. Following the destruction of Frenchtown on January 23, 1813, most of the *habitants* who lived within or close to the battle area departed for Detroit or towards the Maumee Bay and Sandusky. While the remains of a few individuals were surreptitiously buried or hidden under some brush, it was not until eight months later that burial parties gathered the skeletal remains scattered throughout the battle area. These were interred in mass graves, but subsequent finds were buried individually. Items related to the battle were exposed with some frequency into the middle of the nineteenth century, generally as the result of preparing fields or constructing homes as the battlefield area developed into a mixture of residences and plant nurseries. In 1904 the partial remains of four separate bodies were uncovered during the construction of a monument along the north bank of the River Raisin, near the identified sites of two homes that were destroyed in the aftermath of the

Charles Lanman, *The Red Book of Michigan: A Civil, Military and Biographical History* Michigan: A Civil, Military and Biographical History (Detroit : Washington: E.B. Smith & Co.; Philp & Solomons, 1871), 64-79; Benson J. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1869), 360-362; John McClelland Bulkley, *History of Monroe County Michigan: A Narrative Account of Its Historical Progress, Its People, and Its Principal Interests*. Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1913), 57-86, 126-136. Patrick Tucker, Donna Nightingale and Dennis Au, *Private Land Claims of the Rivière-aux-Raisins Area, 1779 – 1812* (Monroe: Frenchtown Chapter of the French-Canadian Heritage Society of Michigan, 2001).

⁹⁰ Quotation of Criterion D is from Barbara Little, et al, *National Register Bulletin 36: Guidelines for Evaluating and Registering Archeological Properties* (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 2000), 19.

⁹¹ G. Michael Pratt, William E. Rutter, Theodore J. Ligibel, and Jeffrey L. Green, "River Raisin Battlefield National Historic Nomination, March 2, 2009 [DRAFT], 5 (document on file at Office of the Michigan State Archeologist). Pratt and Rutter, whose reports are cited below, jointly and independently conducted archeological research at the River Raisin Battlefield Site between 1999 and 2006.

Second Battle of Frenchtown. In the first decades of the twentieth century, industrial development and road building exposed ammunition, cannon balls and other battle-related items as well as skeletal fragments in areas that would have been within the fenced area of Frenchtown. As the archeologist Barbara Mead noted in the original River Raisin Battlefield Site NRHP nomination, “the confused conditions of burial and the long history of finds of human bone within the site, [make it] extremely probable that both interred and scattered remains yet exist.”⁹²

While many of the materials and artifacts that have been found within the battlefield area are associated with the events of January 1813, some of the human remains uncovered in the early-nineteenth century were from earlier American Indian use and residence. During the 1915 construction of a River Raisin Paper Company mill facility, at least one of the exposed skeletons came from an American Indian cemetery that long predated the establishment of Frenchtown. Accidental finds and amateur surface collections have also revealed materials associated with American Indian populations, but given the circumstances of their discovery they cannot be reliably attributed to any specific period or tradition. In 1976 the first professional archeological investigation of the battlefield area did reveal lithic and artifact fragments associated with Late Archaic (ca. 4,500-3,000 BP) and Late Woodland (ca. 1,400-400 BP) periods. Another archeological survey in 1999 uncovered hundreds of artifacts composed mostly of ceramics, lithics, and faunal remains associated with an American Indian village site (ca. 1450-1650). These finds likely correspond to similar sites throughout the River Raisin watershed and Western Lake Erie Basin, but to date the focus of archeological work has been on the soil layer that corresponds to the core of Frenchtown and the events of January 1813.⁹³

The archeological studies of the battlefield area that occurred in 1976-1977 were conducted by Commonwealth Associates with the support of the Monroe County Historical Commission. Based on careful historical research and the reports of a local collector, the first season of work resulted in a controlled surface collection of the field that lies northeast of the current RRNBP Visitor Center. Along with a significant concentration of lead shot, artifacts included a brass button and brass hat ornament associated with United States military uniforms during the War of 1812. Together these items confirmed the location of the United States 17th Infantry encampment when it was attacked on the morning of January 22. In 1977 the archeological team examined a telephone cable trench that had been cut through the core area of Frenchtown, and were able to identify and partially excavate cellar walls from the Hubert LaCroix, Jean Baptiste Jerome, and George McDougal homesites that had been destroyed in January 1813. Other artifacts included a door latch, a military button, and a British-made pistol flint.⁹⁴

⁹² Barbara Mead, National Register of Historic Places, River Raisin Battlefield Site, Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #82000542 (1982), 2. For a general overview of these matters see G. Michael Pratt, William E. Rutter, Theodore J. Ligibel and Jeffrey L. Green, [Draft] *River Raisin Battlefield National Historic Landmark Nomination* (2009), 5-6. More specific references are in notes 89-93 below.

⁹³ Talcott E. Wing, "History of Monroe County, Michigan," in *Pioneer Collections: Report of the Pioneer Society of the State of Michigan Together with Reports of County, Town, and District Pioneer Societies, Vol. IV* (Lansing: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Company, 1881), 321. John McClelland Bulkley, *History of Monroe County Michigan: A Narrative Account of Its Historical Progress, Its People, and Its Principal Interests*. Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1913), 401; Kenneth E. Dodge, *Fisheries Special Report 23: River Raisin Assessment* (Lansing: Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 1998), 19-20; James E. Fitting, C. Stephan Demeter, Donald J. Weir, "An Archeological Survey of the River Raisin Battlefield Site, Prepared for the Monroe County Historical Commission by Commonwealth Associates Inc. (1977), copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI.

⁹⁴ Fitting et al, "An Archeological Survey of the River Raisin Battlefield Site" (1977).

A Phase II/III excavation in 1980-81 of two areas to the west of Hull's Trace (present-day North Dixie Highway) attempted to find structural elements that were identified on historical maps of Frenchtown. These included the Godfroy barn, which was destroyed during the Second Battle of Frenchtown, the puncheon fence that protected Kentuckians from British assaults, and the Godfroy home site near the north bank of the River Raisin. While excavations of the site near the river revealed subsurface evidence of some structural elements that may have corresponded to a root cellar or privy from the 1810s, all the recovered artifacts and materials from the various sites post-dated the battles. The excavations demonstrated that large portions of the battlefield were sealed under a layer of early twentieth-century ash and cinder fill that was laid down during the construction of the paper mill—and thus indicated that subsurface materials remained relatively undisturbed throughout most of the paper mill site.⁹⁵

In 1991 Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group (now Commonwealth Heritage Group) conducted archeological monitoring, shovel testing, and trenching during the demolition of two abandoned mill structures owned by the Monroe Paper Company. Some trenching beneath the fill and structural debris at a site along East Elm Avenue to the east of the Canadian National Railway Bridge did reveal prehistoric debitage, but no artifacts were encountered to provide a sufficient basis for determining an identified culture phase. Brick and mortar was encountered and attributed to a ca. 1810-1840 setting, but could not be identified with any known historical structure. Other portions of the site, where topsoil had been removed or disturbed during the initial construction of the mill, did not yield any intact archeological materials. Another location immediately northwest of the East Elm Avenue and North Dixie Highway intersection (near the present site of the 1904 "River Raisin Massacre" monument) produced evidence of "an intensive and potentially significant prehistoric site," but a lack of specific artifact types precluded even a tentative association with a particular culture phase. A limestone foundation dating to ca. 1890-1910 was also exposed in the same vicinity, as was an assemblage of ceramic fragments that likely post-dates the Battles of Frenchtown by at least two decades.⁹⁶

As more buildings on the Monroe Paper Company property were demolished, archeological surveys between 1998 and 2000 revealed several buried features and additional cultural materials. In 1998 a Phase II archeological investigation was conducted by Midwest Archeological Associates in what would have been the southwest portion of Frenchtown—an area that now lies about one city block west of North Dixie Highway and fronts East Elm Avenue. Excavation and metal detection survey resulted in the recovery of artifacts from several eras. These included items related to the use of the mill building and its demolition, artifacts from mid- to late nineteenth-century occupation and use, and prehistoric lithics and faunal remains. Two sherds of pearlware and some forged nails were found that either predate or are coeval with the events of January 1813, and their presence indicates that artifacts relating to the era of the battles remain in the topsoil that underlies the twentieth-century layer of clay and cinder. Only one recovered item could be definitively associated with Frenchtown and/or the battles of 1813: a portion of a silver-plated brass shoe buckle that is possibly associated with a denizen of Frenchtown, a member of the Essex Militia, or a Kentuckian. The most significant find proved to be the buried remains of a historic fence line. Post mold patterns suggested that the fence posts could have supported puncheon planks and the fence might have been one of the puncheon or picket fences described in accounts of the Second Battle of Frenchtown. The discovery

⁹⁵ Demeter, "Report on Archaeological Testing: 1980 Season, River Raisin Battlefield Site" (1981), copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI.

⁹⁶ Demeter, "Monroe Paper Mills 1 and 2: An Archeological Evaluation" (1991), copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI; quotation from p. 5.

of the shoe buckle immediately within the area enclosed by the fence lent credibility to this possibility. The discovery of the fence line also provided a key datum point for subsequent archeological research of the battlefield area.⁹⁷

In 2000, Midwest Archeological Associates extended the 1998 Phase II archeological investigation of the previously discovered fence. Trench excavations and test pits led to the recovery of 1,450 artifacts. Most of these came from a prehistoric midden associated with a late Sandusky Culture (1450-1650 CE) village. The midden contained an abundance of “shell tempered ceramics, lithic tools and debitage, and quantities of well-preserved faunal remains” that may well be associated with the materials recovered nearby in 1991. In either case, the location of this village and the ossuary burials at late Sandusky sites would suggest that many if not all of the human remains found during the construction of the River Raisin Paper Mill may predate the events of January 1813 by a few centuries. The excavations in 2000 also revealed 113 historic artifacts, though most seemed to postdate the events of January 1813. Backhoe trenching did reveal the east-west trending fence line that ran along the north end of Frenchtown, as well as its intersection with the north-south trending fence line (on the western edge of Frenchtown) that had been excavated two years earlier. Charcoal evidence at the top of the postholes also indicates that the fence was destroyed by fire. This evidence, along with the lack of any prehistoric materials in the vicinity of the fence line, the nearby presence of the ca. 1810s shoe-buckle, and the ability to accurately predict the course of the fence line based on historical maps and descriptions, indicates that a key feature of the battles had been found. Lastly, the excavations in 2000 confirmed the findings of previous surveys and excavations; namely, that much of the archeological record associated with historic Frenchtown and older American Indian use and residence remained intact beneath the paper mill complex.⁹⁸

Archeologists returned to the former paper mill site in 2003 to follow up on two previous investigations; namely, the excavations of the puncheon fence and the site of the United States 17th Infantry encampment. Seven trenches were excavated in former parking areas, but no artifacts relating to the events of January 1813 were recovered. Two of the trenches did reveal further evidence of the fence and its course along the perimeter of Frenchtown, while another two trenches revealed prehistoric materials that likely correspond to the same late Sandusky village site that had been encountered previously. At the site of the United States 17th Infantry encampment the open field was closely mowed, and the area underwent a surface metal detection survey. A total of 715 artifacts were recovered, with most dating to the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. However, eighty-one of the artifacts were associated with the battle on January 22, 1813. Nearly half of these were either musket balls or buck shot, but other battle-related artifacts included lead waste, gun flints, and gun parts. Further analysis determined that the calibers of the recovered musket balls and buckshot matched those used by American Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) and the Battle of Mackinac Island (1814). Four brass buttons were also recovered, and at least two correspond to those used by the US military. No other recovered items from this survey could be unequivocally attributed to the battle. The locations of these artifacts and the relative lack of shot

⁹⁷ G. Michael Pratt, “A Phase II Archaeological Investigation of the River Raisin Battlefield and Massacre Site, City of Monroe, Monroe County” (1999).

⁹⁸ Pratt and William E. Rutter, “Phase II Archaeological Reconnaissance of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan” (2002); quotation is from p. 23. The 2000 field season was supposed to include a metal detector survey of the field to the north of the current RRNBP Visitor Center, at the site of the United States 17th Infantry encampment, but tall grass and weeds thwarted this effort. On ossuary burials at Late Sandusky sites in the region, see Timothy James Abel, *The Petersen Site: A Prehistoric to Historic Occupation in Northwestern Ohio* (St. John's, Newfoundland: Copetown Press, 2002), 18-20.

that would have been used by US Regulars “suggests that the survey area lies behind the US position at the start of the attack and, perhaps, that the retreating Regulars offered little return fire as they abandoned their position for the shelter of the north bank of the River Raisin.”⁹⁹

Only two other archeological investigations have occurred within the core area of the battlefield since 2003, one in 2006 that monitored the demolition of a paper mill building and another in 2013 that took soil borings during a gas line project. While neither of these resulted in significant finds, they did add to the understanding of the soil profile beneath the former industrial site. Consequently, they contribute to a substantial catalog of information that augments the historical record and provides a fuller understanding of the battlefield area’s significance.¹⁰⁰ As noted by Pratt and Rutter, archeologists have recovered material data that includes the location “of the puncheon fence that partially enclosed Frenchtown and provided protection to American soldiers during the second battle of the River Raisin as well as the cellars of Frenchtown houses referenced and used by American soldiers during the battle and as locations of atrocities afterwards.” In short, the cumulative findings of archeological research provided “the foundation for accurately defining” the central area of the NRHP site.¹⁰¹

Since 2006 much has changed within the core area of the battlefield. The last industrial building from the paper mill was demolished in 2008, the River Raisin National Battlefield Park was established in 2009, clean up and capping of the industrial brownfield was largely completed in 2010, and the transfer of the mill property to the NPS occurred in 2011. At present the national park unit’s boundaries remain unfixed and land transfers are ongoing, but they already encompass the expanded and updated NRHP site on the north side of the River Raisin. Building on the work that had already occurred in the core area of the battlefield, and in response to NPS plans to incorporate areas to the north and south of the former core of Frenchtown, the most recent archeological investigation associated with the battlefield area occurred beyond the former paper mill site.¹⁰² In October 2009, with the support of an American Battlefield Protection Program grant from the NPS, a team of archeologists led by Pratt, Rutter, and Richard Green conducted a preliminary survey of areas to the north and south of the River Raisin.

Based on historical records and recent accidental surface finds, the investigation focused on three areas: (1) north of Mason Run, on lands within the national battlefield park and encompassed by the NRHP expansion; (2) the south side of the River Raisin just above the flood plain on a parcel immediately south of Hellenberg Park (which lies within the floodplain); (3) and at two sites adjacent to Plum Creek, about a mile south the River Raisin. The brief four-day survey did not recover any artifacts associated with the events of January 1813, but did provide important information about subsurface contexts. While intact 1813 soil horizons were encountered in the study area, a number of test units revealed considerable disturbance. Other units had deep layers of fill with various mixtures of concrete, metals, and construction debris that thwarted the use of metal detectors and

⁹⁹ Pratt and Rutter, *Archeological Assessment of Selected Areas of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan*. Prepared for the City of Monroe and the American Battlefield Protection Program by Mannik & Smith Group, Inc., Maumee, Ohio, 2004. Quote is from p. 77.

¹⁰⁰ Rutter, *Archeological Reconnaissance, River Raisin Paper Company Plant “Mill 3 and 4/Area #52,” Elm Street at Dixie Highway, City of Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan*. Prepared for the Monroe County Historical Society; Allen P. Van Dyke, “Michigan Gas Utilities Gas Pipeline in Monroe, Michigan,” AVD Archeological Services, Inc., 2013.

¹⁰¹ Pratt et al, [Draft] *River Raisin Battlefield National Historic Landmark Nomination*; quotations on p. 7.

¹⁰² *River Raisin National Battlefield Park: Study and Boundary Assessment* (November 2009); *River Raisin Heritage Corridor-East Master Plan*, passim.

magnetometers. Consequently, backhoe trench excavation provided the only means for assessing the archeological potential of these areas.¹⁰³

Given these conditions, the archeological team determined that a thorough investigation of areas outside the core of the battlefield was not a worthwhile endeavor. While scattered evidence of running battles, brief defensive stands, and assembly areas might be found to the north and south of an expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site, such investigation would require “massive, yet precise, mechanical excavation of large areas.” The expense of such an investigation would be hard to justify given the limited archeological potential of recovering and contextualizing small, random artifacts like munitions, personal items, and pieces of equipment in areas where historical maps and first-person accounts are less precise than those associated with the actions in the core of Frenchtown.”¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Pratt et al, “The River Raisin Battlefield, Outside the Core,” passim.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. 33-34.

9. Major Bibliographical References

Bibliography (Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form.)

Abler, Thomas "Scalping, Torture, Cannibalism and Rape: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Conflicting Cultural Values in War." *Anthropologica* 34, no. 1 (1992): 3-20.

Antal, Sandy. "Michigan Ceded: Why and Wherefore?" *The Michigan Historical Review* 38, no. 1 (2012): 1-26.

_____. "Remember the Raisin! Anatomy of a Demon Myth." *The War of 1812 Magazine*, no. 10 (2008).

_____. *A Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812*. 2nd ed. Kingston [Ont.]: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011.

Askin, Charles. "Extract of the Journal of Charles Askin." In *Select Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, edited by William Wood, 1. Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920.

Atherton, William. *Narrative of the Suffering & Defeat of the Northwestern Army, under General Winchester: Massacre of the Prisoners, Sixteen Months Imprisonment of the Writer and Others with the Indians and British*. Frankfort, KY: A.G. Hodges, 1842.

Au, Dennis M. "Standing for Two Centuries: The Navarre-Anderson Trading Post." *Michigan History* 23, no. 6 (1989): 32-36.

_____. "Maps and Archaeology: French Colonial Settlement Patterns in the River Raisin Community in Southeast Michigan." Paper presented at the French Colonial Historical Society Meeting; Newberry Library, Chicago, 5 May 1991. Copy on file at the Monroe County Historical Museum.

_____. *War on the Raisin: A Narrative Account of the War of 1812 in the River Raisin Settlement, Michigan Territory*. Monroe, MI: Monroe County Historical Commission, 1981.

_____ and Joanna Brode. "The Lingering Shadow of New France: The French-Canadian Community of Monroe County, Michigan." In *Michigan Folklife Reader*, edited by C. Kurt Dewhurst and Yvonne R. Lockwood, 321-345. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1987.

Barbarities of the Enemy; Exposed in a Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States, Appointed to Enquire into the Spirit and Manner in Which the War Has Been Waged by the Enemy, and the Documents, Accompanying Said Report. Worcester: Isaac Sturtevant, for Remark Dunnel, 1814.

Brackenridge, Hugh Henry. *Indian Atrocities: Narratives of the Perils and Sufferings of Dr. Knight and John Slover among the Indians During the Revolutionary War*. Nashville: W.F. Bang, 1843.

Brannan, John, ed. *Official Letters of Military and Naval Officers of the United States During the War with Great Britain in the Years 1812, 13, 14, & 15, with Some Additional Letters and Documents Elucidating the History of That Period*. Washington, D.C.: Way & Gideon, 1823.

Brose, David "Penumbral Protohistory on Lake Erie's South Shore." In *Societies in Eclipse: Archeology of the Eastern Woodlands Indians, A.D. 1400-1700*, edited by David Brose, C. Wesley Cowan and Robert C. Mainfort, Jr. 49-66. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2001.

Byfield, Shadrach. "A Common Soldier's Account." In *Recollections of the War of 1812: Three Eyewitnesses' Accounts*, edited by John Gellner. Toronto: Baxter, 1964.

Callender, Charles. "Great Lakes-Riverine Sociopolitical Organization." In *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15: Northeast*, edited by William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger, 610-621. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978.

Calloway, Colin G. *Crown and Calumet : British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.

Campbell, Maria and James Freeman Clarke. *Revolutionary Services and Civil Life of General William Hull*. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1848.

Clift, G. Glenn. *Remember the Raisin! Kentucky and Kentuckians in the Battles and Massacre at Frenchtown, Michigan Territory, in the War of 1812. With Notes on Kentucky Veterans of the War of 1812*. Williamsville, NY: Clearfield Publishing, 2009.

Dallas, Alexander James. *An Exposition of the Causes and Character of the War between the United States and Great Britain*. Concord, N.H.: Isaac and Walter R. Hill, 1815.

Darnell, Elias. *A Journal Containing an Accurate and Interesting Account of the Hardships, Suffering, Battles, Defeat and Captivity of Those Heroic Kentucky Volunteers and Regulars Commanded by General Winchester, in the Years 1812-13. Also, Two Narratives by Men That Were Wounded in the Battles on the River Raisin and Taken Captive by the Indians*. 2 ed. Philadelphia: Grigg & Elliot, 1834.

Demeter, C. Stephen. "Report on Archaeological Testing: 1980 Season, River Raisin Battlefield Site." Copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI., 1981.

_____. *Monroe Paper Mills 1 and 2: An Archeological Evaluation*. Jackson, MI: Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group, 1991.

_____, Donald J. Weir and Russell B. Henry. *Hellenberg Field Archeological Survey: Phase I, Part 2; Submitted to City of Monroe, Department of Community Development*. Jackson, MI: Gilbert/Commonwealth, 1987.

Dowd, Gregory Evans. *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815*. Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

Dudley, Thomas P. *Battle and Massacre at Frenchtown, Michigan, January, 1813*. Ann Arbor: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library, 2004.

_____. *The Potawatomis, Keepers of the Fire Civilization of the American Indian Series.V.145*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978.

_____. *The Shawnee Prophet*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.

Edmunds, R. David. *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1984.

Elting, John R. *Amateurs, to Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812*. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1991.

Esaray, Logan, ed. *Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison*. Vol. 2. Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922.

Federal Writers' Project. *Military History of Kentucky, Chronologically Arranged*. Frankfort, KY: State Journal, 1939.

Fitting, J.E., C. Stephen Demeter and Donald J. Weir. "An Archeological Survey of the River Raisin Battlefield Site Prepared for the Monroe County Historical Commission by Commonwealth Associates Inc." Copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI., 1977.

Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799*, Vol. 6 (Washington Resources at the University of Virginia [online]) <<http://etext.virginia.edu/washington/fitzpatrick/>> (accessed 5 February 2015).

Ford, Paul Leicester, ed. *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. Ix: 1807-1815*. New York: G.P Putnam's Sons, 1898.

Gilje, Paul A. *Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Gilpin, Alec R. *The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958.

Goltz, Herbert C. W. "The Indian Revival Religion and the Western District, 1805-1813." In *The Western District: Papers from the Western District Conference*, edited by K. G. Pryke and L. L. Kulisek, 18-32. Windsor, Ont: Essex County Historical Society and the Western District Councils, 1983.

Gunn, Giles B. *Early American Writing*. New York: Penguin Books, 1994.

Harrison, Daniel F. and R. O. Christensen. National Register of Historic Places, Hull's Trace North Huron River Corduroy Segment (2010), Brownstown Township, Wayne County, Michigan, National Register #10001022.

Harrison, Daniel F. National Register of Historic Places, Sawyer House (1977), Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #77000721.

Hickey, Donald R. "Introduction." In *The War of 1812: Writings from America's Second War of Independence*, edited by Donald R. Hickey. New York: Library of America, 2013.

_____. *The War of 1812 : A Forgotten Conflict*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989.

King, Cecil. *Balancing Two Worlds: Jean-Baptiste Assiginack and the Odawa Nation, 1768-1866*. Saskatoon: Dr. Cecil King, 2013.

Lanman, Charles. *The Red Book of Michigan: A Civil, Military and Biographical History Michigan :A Civil, Military and Biographical History*. Detroit : Washington: E.B. Smith & Co. ; Philp & Solomons, 1871.

Lee, Wayne E. "Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 1500-1800." *The Journal of Military History* 71, no. 3 (2007): 701-741.

Little, Barbara, and Erika Martin Seibert, Jan Townsend, John H. Sprinkle, Jr., and John Knoerl. *National Register Bulletin 36: Guidelines for Evaluating and Registering Archeological Properties*. Washington, DC: United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 2000.

Lossing, Benson J. *The Pictorial Field-Book of the War of 1812*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1869.

Lurie, Nancy Oesterieich. "Winnebago." In *Handbook of North American Indians*, edited by William C. Sturtevant and Bruce G. Trigger, 15, 690-707. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978.

Madison, James. "James Madison, March 4, 1813. Speech, Second Inaugural," *The James Madison Papers, American Memory (Library of Congress)* <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mjm.15_0108_0116> (accessed 30 January 2015).

McAfee, Robert B. *History of the Late War in the Western Country*. Bowling Green, OH: Historical Publications Company, 1919.

McCauley, David C. "The River Raisin Settlement, 1796-1812: A French Culture Area." M. A., Eastern Michigan University, 1968.

Mead, Barbara. National Register of Historic Places, River Raisin Battlefield Site (1982), Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #82000542.

Michigan Historical Society, *Collections and Researches Made by the Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society*. Vol. 23. Lansing: Robert Smith & Co., 1895.

Naveaux, Ralph. *Invaded on All Sides: The Story of Michigan's Greatest Battlefield Scene of the Engagements at Frenchtown and the River Raisin in the War of 1812*. Marceline, MO:

Walsworth Publishing Co., 2008.

Nelson, Larry Lee. *Men of Patriotism, Courage & Enterprise: Fort Meigs in the War of 1812*. Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1985.

Norton, John. *The Journal of Major John Norton, 1816*. Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970.

Owens, Robert M. *Mr. Jefferson's Hammer: William Henry Harrison and the Origins of American Indian Policy*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011.

Pearce, Roy Harvey. *Savagism and Civilization: A Study of the Indian and the American Mind*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Plain, David D. *The Plains of Aamjiwnaang: Our History*. Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2007.

Pratt, G. Michael. "A Phase II Archaeological Investigation of the River Raisin Battlefield and Massacre Site, City of Monroe, Monroe County." Copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI, 1999.

_____ and William E. Rutter. "Draft Report: Archeological Assessment of the Selected Areas of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan." Copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI, 2004.

_____ and William E. Rutter. "Phase II Archaeological Reconnaissance of the River Raisin Battlefield, Monroe, Michigan." Copy on file in the Office of the Michigan State Archeologist, East Lansing, MI, 2002.

Pratt, G. Michael, William E. Rutter, Theodore J. Ligibel and Jeffrey L. Green. *River Raisin Battlefield National Historic Landmark Nomination* (Draft). On-file at the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office, Lansing, MI, 2009.

Quimby, Robert *The United States Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997.

Ray, Zackary. National Register of Historic Places, River Raisin Battlefield Site (Draft Amendment and Expansion, 2011), Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan, National Register #82000542.

Reynolds, Robert. "Narrative." In *1812; The War, and Its Moral: A Canadian Chronicle*, edited by William F Coffin, 202-208. Montreal: John Lovell, 1864.

River Raisin Heritage Corridor-East Master Plan (Ann Arbor: Beckett & Reader, 2013).

Rutter, William E. *Archeological Reconnaissance, River Raisin Paper Company Plant "Mill 3 and 4/Area #52," Elm Street at Dixie Highway, City of Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan*. Prepared for the Monroe County Historical Society.

- Schmalz, Peter *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Shannon, Timothy J. "The Native American Way of War in the Age of Revolutions, 1754-1814." In *War in an Age of Revolution, 1775-1815*, edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, 137-158. Washington, D.C.; [New York]: German Historical Institute; Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Silver, Peter. *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008.
- Skaggs, David Curtis. "The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814: An Overview." In *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814*, edited by David Curtis Skaggs and Larry Lee Nelson, 1-20. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010.
- _____. *William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country: Frontier Fighting in the War of 1812*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.
- _____ and Gerard T. Altoff. *A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812-1813*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
- _____ and Larry Lee Nelson, eds. *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010.
- Stagg, J. C. A., Jeanne Kerr Cross, Jewel L. Spangler, Ellen J. Barber, Martha J. King, Anne Mandeville Colony and Susan Holbrook Perdue, eds. *The Papers of James Madison, Presidential Series, Vol. 5, 10 July 1812–7 February 1813*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004.
- Starkey, Armstrong. *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815*. London: UCL Press, 1998.
- Sugden, John. *Tecumseh's Last Stand*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985.
- Tanner, Helen Hornbeck, ed. *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History*. Norman: Published for the Newberry Library by the University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.
- Taylor, Alan. *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies*. New York: Vintage, 2011.
- Tucker, Patrick, Donna Nightingale and Dennis Au. *Private Land Claims of the Rivière-Aux-Raisins Area, 1779 – 1812*. Monroe: French-Canadian Heritage Society of Michigan, 2001.
- Van Dyke, Allen P. Michigan Gas Utilities Gas Pipeline in Monroe, Michigan. AVD Archeological Services, Inc. 2013.
- White, Richard. *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Winchester, James. "General Orders, Camp Miami Rapids, 16 and 17 January 1813." In James Winchester Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.

Yanik, Anthony J. *The Fall and Recapture of Detroit in the War of 1812: In Defense of William Hull*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011.

Previous documentation on file (NPS):

- preliminary determination of individual listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested
- previously listed in the National Register
- previously determined eligible by the National Register
- designated a National Historic Landmark
- recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey # _____
- recorded by Historic American Engineering Record # _____
- recorded by Historic American Landscape Survey # _____

Primary location of additional data:

- State Historic Preservation Office
- Other State agency
- Federal agency
- Local government
- University
- Other
- Name of repository: _____

Historic Resources Survey Number (if assigned): _____

Geographical Data

Acreege of Property Approximately 230

Use either the UTM system or latitude/longitude coordinates

Latitude/Longitude Coordinates

Datum if other than WGS84: _____

(enter coordinates to 6 decimal places)

- | | |
|--------------|------------|
| 1. Latitude: | Longitude: |
| 2. Latitude: | Longitude: |
| 3. Latitude: | Longitude: |
| 4. Latitude: | Longitude: |

Or

UTM References See continuation sheet

Datum (indicated on USGS map):

NAD 1927 or NAD 1983

- | | | |
|---------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1. Zone: 17N | Easting: 303234 | Northing: 4643747 |
| 2. Zone: 17N | Easting: 303026 | Northing: 4643427 |
| 3. Zone: 17N | Easting: 302756 | Northing: 4643554 |
| 4. Zone: 17N | Easting: 302196 | Northing: 4642730 |
| 5. Zone: 17N | Easting: 302891 | Northing: 4642131 |
| 6. Zone: 17N | Easting: 303345 | Northing: 4642894 |
| 7. Zone: 17N | Easting: 303297 | Northing: 4642996 |
| 8. Zone: 17N | Easting: 303349 | Northing: 4643281 |
| 9. Zone: 17N | Easting: 303206 | Northing: 4643357 |
| 10. Zone: 17N | Easting: 301206 | Northing: 4643668 |

Verbal Boundary Description (Describe the boundaries of the property.)

The expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site boundary is defined by streets, railroad lines, property lines, and park boundaries in the City of Monroe, Michigan. The eastern boundary begins a point adjacent to the Canadian National Railway line, then runs south for approximately 1210 feet along the eastern edge of the Canadian National Railway line to a point opposite and northwest of the intersection of Telb Street and Harbor Avenue. From there the boundary extends 950 feet, northwestward across the Canadian National and Norfolk Southern railroad right-of-ways, the Dixie Highway, and intersects with the CSX railroad bed at point very near the northern end of Mason Run Boulevard. The western boundary follows the railroad bed south across the River Raisin for approximately 3,000 feet to the point where the CSX right-of-way intersects with East Front Street. The boundary then runs southwest along East Front Street for approximately 3,170 feet to a point immediately south of the downriver tip of Sterling Island. From there, the boundary turns northeast across the River Raisin for a distance of approximately 900 feet to the southeast corner of parcel # 59-01900-012 and its frontage on East Elm Street. From East Elm Street the boundary runs north along the eastern boundary of parcel # 59-01900-012 for approximately 2,000 feet to Mason Run, then turns northwest along the parcel boundary for approximately 700 feet to Detroit Avenue. The boundary then follows Detroit Avenue north to the intersection with Telb Avenue, approximately 1,300 feet. Turning west on Telb Avenue the boundary crosses Harbor Avenue to the edge of a former industrial site, approximately 580 feet. At this point the boundary runs north for 1,210 feet to a point approximately 360 feet southeast of the origin point. From there, the boundary crosses over to the origin point.

Boundary Justification (Explain why the boundaries were selected.)

The boundary encompasses significant aspects of battle actions that occurred on January 18 and 22, 1813, as well as the killing, destruction, and captivity that occurred on January 23, 1813. The natural and cultural features within the expanded site are significant to the battle and its location within Frenchtown, a *Canadien* ribbon farm community in Michigan Territory. Archeologically defined features of the battle landscape were used to define the boundary in addition to archival documentation on Frenchtown and the events that occurred along both sides of the River Raisin in January 1813.

Specifically, the northern portions of the expanded NRHP site encompasses the British approach to Frenchtown along Hull's Trace on January 22, 1813, their pre-dawn deployment in the woods to the north of Frenchtown, and the establishment of artillery positions just north of Mason's Run. The northeastern portions of the NRHP site also encompass an area of intense fighting during a running battle through the woods at the end of the First Battle of Frenchtown. On the north side of the River Raisin, extending the boundaries of the NRHP site incorporates key areas of action for Native Confederacy fighters during the Second Battle of Frenchtown, who swept around the west side of Frenchtown crossed the River Raisin. The western Norfolk Southern Railroad corridor along the western boundary of the expanded site encompasses areas of skirmishing and the positions of Confederacy fighters to the west of the Frenchtown fences. Extending the boundaries to the east of Detroit Avenue takes in the full scope of actions that involved the attack on the United States 17th

Infantry encampment during the Second Battle of Frenchtown.

The inclusion of areas to the south of the River Raisin incorporates the sites of several key actions during the First and Second Battles of Frenchtown. The south shore of the river acted as a deployment area for American soldiers attacking British positions at Frenchtown on January 18, 1813, as well as the sites of retreat and brief defensive stands on January 22. This is also the area where General Winchester sought to rally the United States 17th Infantry as it retreated across the frozen River Raisin. Once the brief stand collapsed, this area became the locale where Wyandotte (Wyandot, a.k.a. Huron), Shawnee, Bodéwadmi (Potawatomi), Odawa (Ottawa), Ojibwe (Chippewa) warriors pursued fleeing United States soldiers and some Kentucky and Michigan militia in their pell-mell retreat to the south.

11. Form Prepared By

name/title: Mark David Spence
organization: N/A
street & number: 707 Broadalbin St. SW
city or town: Albany state: OR zip code: 97321
e-mail markdavidspace@gmail.com
telephone: (541) 223-3536
date: May 25, 2017

Additional Documentation

Submit the following items with the completed form:

- **Maps:** A **USGS map** or equivalent (7.5 or 15 minute series) indicating the property's location.
 - **See Figure O4 on Continuation Sheet**
- **Sketch map** for historic districts and properties having large acreage or numerous resources.
Key all photographs to this map.
 - **See Figure O5 on Continuation Sheet**
- **Additional items:** (Check with the SHPO, TPO, or FPO for any additional items.)

Photographs

Submit clear and descriptive photographs. The size of each image must be 1600x1200 pixels (minimum), 3000x2000 preferred, at 300 ppi (pixels per inch) or larger. Key all photographs to the sketch map. Each photograph must be numbered and that number must correspond to the photograph number on the photo log. For simplicity, the name of the photographer, photo date, etc. may be listed once on the photograph log and doesn't need to be labeled on every photograph.

Photo Log

Name of Property: River Raisin Battlefield

City or Vicinity: Monroe

County: Monroe

State: MI

Photographers: Zackary Ray and National Park Service staff

Dates Photographed: August 2, 2011 and March 10, 2014

Description of Photograph(s) and number, include description of view indicating direction of camera:

- 1 of 8: View to the south from the former site of Frenchtown and the present River Raisin National Battlefield Park across the frozen River Raisin toward Hellenberg Park and Sterling Island (to the left of the bridge). View encompasses one of the routes taken by American forces when they moved into Frenchtown on January 18, 1813, as well as an American route of retreat and the site of a brief defensive stand on January 22, 1813. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]
- 2 of 8: View to the south from the vicinity of a British Artillery position on January 22, 1813. The NPS visitor center and interpretation pavilion can be seen in the distance. The open field is the location of the United States 17th Infantry encampment on January 22, 1813, to the east of Frenchtown. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]
- 3 of 8: View to the north toward a tree line where British, Canadian, and Native Confederacy forces established initial battle positions on January 22, 1813. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]
- 4 of 8: East view of United States 17th Infantry encampment toward Detroit Avenue and an open field across the road. The field in the distance is where Confederacy fighters came around the American's right flank. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]
- 5 of 8: View to the south of railroad bridges and Dixie Highway crossing the River Raisin. This transportation corridor follows the route north from Frenchtown that was laid out by General William Hull in 1812. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]
- 6 of 8: View to the north from near the intersection of East Front Street and the Canadian National Railway route. This site lies on the approach route used by Kentucky militia at the commencement of the First Battle of Frenchtown on January 18, 1813. [Zackary Ray: August 2, 2011]

7 of 8: View to the east from near the intersection of East Elm Avenue and the Canadian National Railway route. View encompasses the area that represented the western half of Frenchtown, toward the opposite side of tree line that is depicted in photos #2 and #3. The low split rail fence is a feature of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

8 of 8: View to the northeast with Monroe County Historical Commission historical marker and bench on interpretive trail behind River Raisin National Battlefield Park. View encompasses the United States 17th Infantry encampment, with Detroit Avenue and the lines of Native Confederacy attack in the distance. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement: This information is being collected for applications to the National Register of Historic Places to nominate properties for listing or determine eligibility for listing, to list properties, and to amend existing listings. Response to this request is required to obtain a benefit in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended (16 United States S.C.460 et seq.).
Estimated Burden Statement: Public reporting burden for this form is estimated to average 100 hours per response including time for reviewing instructions, gathering and maintaining data, and completing and reviewing the form. Direct comments regarding this burden estimate or any aspect of this form to the Office of Planning and Performance Management, United States Dept. of the Interior, 1849 C. Street, NW, Washington, DC.


United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 1 of 13: River Raisin Battle actions on January 18, 1813




United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 2 of 13: Position of American forces on the morning of January 22, 1813



Detail from original map drawn by Colonel John Anderson, 2nd Michigan Territorial Militia in 1813 (National Archives, Washington, DC). Position markings based on Anderson's annotations, Ralph Naveaux, *Invaded on All Sides: The Story of the Engagements at Frenchtown and the River Raisin in the War of 1812* (Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Co., 2008), 124, 127-130, and a draft map by Zackary Ray.

MAP KEY

- 1) Navarre house: General Winchester's quarters, plus 100 soldiers encamped
- 2) Board fence 5 ft. height
- 3) Puncheon fence 5 ft. height
- 4) Area of incomplete fencing
- 5) Kentucky 2nd Regiment
- 6) Sheltered wounded and dead
- 7) Col Lewis' headquarters
- 8) 1st Kentucky Rifle Regiment
- 9) 1st Kentucky Volunteer Regiment
- 10) 5th Kentucky Volunteer Regiment
- 11) 17th U.S. Infantry
- 12) Orchard and Mason Run


United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 3 of 13: River Raisin battle actions on January 22, 1813




United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 4 of 13: Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinate Points, River Raisin Battlefield Site



Point	Location	UTM Coordinates	Point	Location	UTM Coordinates
A	CN corridor, 794' NE of point B	17N 303234-4643747	G	Mason Run at a point 700 ft. SE of Detroit Ave.	17N 303345-4642894
B	CN corridor & Telb St. extended	17N 303026-4643427	H	Mason Run & Detroit Ave.	17N 303297-4642996
C	CSX corridor & Telb St. extended	17N 302756-4643544	I	Corner of Detroit Ave & Telb St.	17N 303349-4643281
D	E. Front St. & CSX cor.	17N 302196-4642730	J	200 ft. west of Telb St extended	17N 303206-4643357
E	E. Front St at tip of Sterling Island	17N 302891-4642131	K	Mason Run at a point 700 ft. SE of Detroit Ave.	17N 303206-4643668
F	E. Elm Ave, 900' NE of point E	17N 303139-4642262			


United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 05 of 13: Photo Key for Expanded River Raisin Battlefield Site



United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 6 of 13: Photograph 1 of 8



Photo 1: View to the south from the former site of Frenchtown and the present River Raisin National Battlefield Park across the frozen River Raisin toward Hellenberg Park and Sterling Island (to the left of the bridge). View encompasses one of the routes taken by American forces when they moved into Frenchtown on 18 January, as well as an American route of retreat and the site of a brief defensive stand on 22 January.

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 7 of 13: Photograph 2 of 8



Photo 2. View to the south from the vicinity of a British Artillery position on 22 January 1813. The NPS visitor center and interpretation pavilion can be seen in the distance. The open field is the location of the United States 17th Infantry encampment on 22 January, to the east of Frenchtown.

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site

Name of Property

Monroe MI

County and State

N/A

Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 8 of 13: Photograph 3 of 8



Photo 3. View to the north toward a tree line where British, *Canadien*, and Native Confederacy forces established initial battle positions on 22 January 1813. [NPS Staff: March 10, 2014]

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 9 of 13: Photograph 4 of 8



Photo 4. East view of United States 17th Infantry encampment toward Detroit Avenue and an open field across the road. The field in the distance is where Confederacy fighters came around the American's right flank.

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 10 of 13: Photograph 5 of 8



Photo 5. View to the south of railroad bridges and Dixie Highway crossing the River Raisin. This transportation corridor follows the route north from Frenchtown that was laid out by General William Hull in 1812.

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 11 of 13: Photograph 6 of 8



Photo 6. View to the north from near the intersection of East Front Street and the Canadian National Railway route. This site lies on the approach route used by Kentucky militia at the commencement of the First Battle of Frenchtown on 18 January 1813.

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site
Name of Property
Monroe MI
County and State
N/A
Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 12 of 13: Photograph 7 of 8



Photo 7. View to the east from near the intersection of East Elm Avenue and the Canadian National Railway route. View encompasses the area that comprised the western half of Frenchtown, toward the opposite side of tree line that is depicted in photos #2 and #3. The low split rail fence is a feature of the River Raisin National Battlefield Park.

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

National Register of Historic Places
Continuation Sheet

River Raisin Battlefield Site

Name of Property

Monroe MI

County and State

N/A

Name of multiple listing (if applicable)

Section numbers 7 & 8

Figure 13 of 13: Photograph 8 of 8



Photo 8. View to the northeast with State of Michigan historical marker and bench on interpretive trail behind River Raisin National Battlefield Park. View encompasses the United States 17th Infantry encampment, with Detroit Avenue and the lines of Native Confederacy attack in the distance.















Informational sign with illegible text.

PLUM CREEK PARK
PARK CLOSÉS-10:00 PM



National Register of Historic Places
Memo to File

Correspondence

The Correspondence consists of communications from (and possibly to) the nominating authority, notes from the staff of the National Register of Historic Places, and/or other material the National Register of Historic Places received associated with the property.

Correspondence may also include information from other sources, drafts of the nomination, letters of support or objection, memorandums, and ephemera which document the efforts to recognize the property.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
EVALUATION/RETURN SHEET

Requested Action: Boundary Update

Property Name: River Raisin Battlefield Site (Boundary Increase)

Multiple Name: _____

State & County: MICHIGAN, Monroe

Date Received: 3/4/2019 Date of Pending List: 3/21/2019 Date of 16th Day: 4/5/2019 Date of 45th Day: 4/18/2019 Date of Weekly List: _____

Reference number: BC100003658

Nominator: Other Agency, SHPO

Reason For Review: _____

X Accept Return Reject 4/17/2019 Date

Abstract/Summary Comments: Partially NPS property. The battlefield is being reclaimed in piecemeal fashion. This update adds much more context and explains the military significance of the multi-day encounter. The nomination evaluates the property under Criterion A only, but uses some archeological evidence to support the significance of the property. Further evaluation could include Criterion D,

Recommendation/ Criteria: Accept / A

Reviewer Jim Gabbert Discipline Historian

Telephone (202)354-2275 Date _____

DOCUMENTATION: see attached comments : No see attached SLR : No

If a nomination is returned to the nomination authority, the nomination is no longer under consideration by the National Park Service.



RICK SNYDER
GOVERNOR

STATE OF MICHIGAN
MICHIGAN STATE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICE

EARL J. POLESKI
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

December 10, 2018

Dr. Turkiya L. Lowe, Acting Federal Preservation Officer/Chief Historian
NPS Park History Program Office
1849 C Street NW
Mail Stop 7508
Washington, D.C. 20240

Dear Dr. Lowe,

The Michigan State Historic Preservation Office is pleased to forward to you a copy of the National Register of Historic Places nomination for River Raisin Battlefield Site (Additional Documentation & Boundary Increase) for your review and submission to the Keeper of the National Register.

This property is nominated under Criterion A at the national level of significance. This nomination provides additional information about the battlefield site, which was first listed in the National Register of Historic Places in 1982. It describes the changing circumstances at the site, and explains how the broader context in which to view the site better represents and conveys the scale and significance of the battles. The nomination also expands the boundaries of the battlefield site to incorporate more area of the historical battlefield, which has been acquired by the National Park Service in recent years.

The property is located within the municipal boundaries of Monroe, Michigan, a Certified Local Government (CLG). The Michigan State Historic Preservation Office submitted a request for review to the city. We have not received a final report from the city prior to forwarding these materials to you. In lieu of a completed report, we are submitting with this package a copy of our correspondence to the city and a copy of the report form we transmitted to the city with our request for review.

Included in this package for your review are:


- 1) One (1) final, printed nomination for your review;
- 2) One (1) CD containing a copy of the nomination (PDF), Certified Local Government reports, and any correspondence (PDF);
- 3) One (1) CD containing eight (8) nomination photographs; and
- 4) One (1) nomination cover page signed by the Michigan SHPO (commenting official).

Please review these materials and forward to the Keeper of the National Register: the signed cover pages, a PDF copy of the nomination, a PDF copy of the correspondence from our office, and the eight (8) nomination photographs.



If you have any questions about the nomination or these materials, or require additional information please contact National Register Coordinator Todd Walsh, at (517) 373-1979 or walsht@michigan.gov.

Sincerely yours,



Brian D. Conway
State Historic Preservation Officer

BDC/taw



RICK SNYDER
GOVERNOR

STATE OF MICHIGAN
MICHIGAN STATE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
LANSING

EARL J. POLESKI
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Tuesday, January 02, 2018

Mr. Jeffrey Green, Director of Community Development
City of Monroe
120 East First Street
Monroe, Michigan 48161

Dear Mr. Green,

Enclosed please find a draft copy of the River Raisin Battlefield Site (Additional Documentation) National Register of Historic Places Registration Form, and a *Certified Local Government National Register Nomination Review Report* form.

In accordance with our Certification Agreement with the city, we request the city's review of this nomination at the earliest available meeting of the Historic District Commission (HDC).

Upon review by the HDC please complete and return to us the *Certified Local Government National Register Nomination Review Report* form, along with any comments that either the city or the HDC may wish to make. A copy of this form will be submitted with the final nomination to the Keeper of the National Register.

Please contact Todd A. Walsh, Interim National Register Coordinator, by phone at (517) 373-1979 or by email at walsht@michigan.gov if you have questions.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "B. Conway".

Brian D. Conway
State Historic Preservation Officer

**Certified Local Government
National Register Nomination Review Report**

Michigan State Historic Preservation Office
Michigan State Housing Development Authority

- * **Complete and return to:** National Register Coordinator, Michigan State Historic Preservation
- * Office, Michigan State Housing Development Authority, 735 East Michigan Avenue, PO Box
- * 30044, Lansing, Michigan 48909

Name of Property: River Raisin Battlefield Site (Additional Documentation)
Address: 1403 East Elm Avenue, Monroe, Monroe County, Michigan
Owner: various
Date Complete Nomination Approved by the SHPO:

The Certified Local Government (CLG) agrees with the SHPO to expedite the review period for this nomination.

YES _____ (date of agreement) _____ NO _____

Signature of CLG Commission Chairperson Date

Signature of Elected Chief Official Date

Date(s) of commission meeting(s) when the nomination was reviewed:

Date of written notice to property owner of commission meeting:

The CLG provided the following opportunities for public participation in the review of this nomination:

Were any written comments received by the CLG? YES _____ NO _____

Was the nomination form distributed to CLG commission members? YES _____ NO _____

Was a site visit made to the property by CLG commission members? YES _____ NO _____
If yes, when? _____

Did the CLG seek assistance of the SHPO in evaluating the eligibility of this property for the National Register? YES _____ NO _____

VERIFICATION of Professional Qualifications of Commission in accordance with 36 CFR 61, Appendix 1, of Michigan's Certified Local Government Program.

List those commission members who meet the 36 CFR 61 qualifications required to review this type of resource.

Commission Member

Professional Qualifications

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____

Was an outside consultant used? YES _____ NO _____

If yes, provide the name and list the 36 CFR 61 qualifications the person meets:

The CLG Commission finds that the property meets the following National Register criteria of significance:

The CLG Commission finds that the property meets the National Register standards of integrity.
YES _____ NO _____

Recommendation of CLG Commission:

APPROVAL _____

DENIAL _____ (specify reasons on a separate sheet of paper)

Signature of Chief Elected Official

Date

Date of transmittal of this report to the SHPO _____

Date of receipt of this report by the SHPO _____

**United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service
National Register of Historic Places**

**Comments re: Draft Additional Documentation for Battles of
Frenchtown National Register Nomination, Monroe, Monroe Co., MI**

Property Name: Battles of Frenchtown – Draft Additional Documentation to NR Nomination (a.k.a. State of Michigan Archeological Site 20 MR 227, River Raisin National Battlefield Park, River Raisin Battlefield)
Property Location: Monroe, Monroe Co., Michigan
Reference Number: 82000542
Date of Comments: 12/16/2016

Overview

I was tasked with providing feedback on the archeology portion (Significance Criterion D) of the draft Additional Documentation prepared for the River Raisin National Battlefield Park. These materials were provided to me on 11/4/2016. Specifically, I was asked to provide feedback regarding such questions as:

- Are there integrity issues that remain unresolved?
- Is the summary and discussion of archeology conducted to date at the site sufficient to support the Significance Criterion D component of the Additional Documentation?

In doing so, I have a number of comments and some questions that are provided here in an attempt to provide constructive suggestions for finalizing this document. As the draft Additional Documentation document is unpaginated, for ease of reference to specific passages or sections of the nomination I have numbered the pages sequentially, beginning with the front page as p. 1.

Rationale for Additional Documentation

As noted in the text, the Additional Documentation was prepared to amend and expand the River Raisin Battlefield (NR 82000542), designated in 1982, to the Battles of Frenchtown site. Part of the rationale provided is the fact that physical changes have occurred in the intervening years to the landscape such that “As a consequence of these changes, the historic qualities of setting, association, and feeling have been greatly enhanced and enlarged” (p. 5). This is especially important as *National Register Bulletin 40: Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering America’s Historic Battlefields* specifies that “Generally, the most important aspects of integrity for battlefields are location, setting, feeling, and association” (p. 10).

Size of the Site

A reference on p. 4 of the nomination says the site is approximately 457 acres in size. A reference on p. 11, however says it is 405 acres. Please verify this attribute, and edit the document for accuracy and consistency in this regard.

Site vs. District Approach

The expanded nomination is for an area 457 acres in size, that is treated as a site and not a district. As noted in the above-referenced *National Register Bulletin 40...*, when designating

Evaluation/Draft NR Nomination Comment Sheet

Property Name: Draft AD for Battles of Frenchtown National Register Nomination, Monroe, Monroe Co., MI

Property Location: Monroe, Monroe Co., MI

Reference Number: 82000542

Date of Comments: 12-16-16

battlefields, one typically invokes the term district when there are a variety of contributing resources and extensive acreage. Otherwise, the battlefield should be classified as a site. I mention this distinction because when we drill down into the Significance Criterion D (archeology) specifics, if there are multiple sites in play—that is, sites or resources in addition to the site called out in the “Other names” section of the form and registered as 20MR227—then it may be more appropriate to distinguish the resource as a district.

Level of Significance

What is the proposed level of significance for the nomination?

Non-contributing Resource Counts

The non-contributing resources will need to be identified and quantified.

Non-concordance between Archeological Questions and the Site’s Period of Significance

One of the things we look closely for when Significance Criterion D is invoked are the specific research questions that archeology either already has or can be reasonably expected to address. As noted in *National Register Bulletin 36: Guidelines for Evaluating and Registering Archeological Properties*, “For example, if a Civil War battlefield qualifies under Criteria A and D, then both the battle and its importance and the important information that archeological investigations would likely yield need to be addressed” (p. 19). Despite the fact that the current nomination is associated with the War of 1812 and not the Civil War, the remainder of the statement applies.

From the outset, the nomination’s Narrative Description calls out archaeology, noting that activities subsequent to the 1982 designation have resulted in “...opportunities for archeological investigations which have shed new light on American Indian use and residence in the area, the establishment and development of Frenchtown in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the War of 1812 conflicts that occurred there, and the subsequent history of the site” (p. 5). Similarly, most of the archeology discussed in the pages spanning pp. 44-46 lies well outside the established period of significance. These broad generalizations need to be honed in subsequent pages and transformed into specific research questions and answers articulated that speak specifically to the 1811-1814 period of significance attributed to the site. This is not to say that there may not be important cultural deposits that both pre- and post-date the period of significance established for the site. However, the bulk of the research value/data potential should relate to the period for which the site is being designated because of its archeological potential; otherwise, it suggests that archeology best supports a broader period of significance than the one defined in the nomination. That said, specific research questions need to be articulated, data sets identified and described, and synthesis performed on materials that answer questions about the key 1811-1814 period identified for the site. In addition, it would be helpful if the discussion were to address how archeology is uniquely situated to generate important data, what those important data are, and why they are important.

Evaluation/Draft NR Nomination Comment Sheet

Property Name: Draft AD for Battles of Frenchtown National Register Nomination, Monroe, Monroe Co., MI

Property Location: Monroe, Monroe Co., MI

Reference Number: 82000542

Date of Comments: 12-16-16

That is, the discussion needs to synthesize any previous archeology at the site and identify the research questions it either has already addressed or those to which it might profitably be addressed. While the archeological record may well be multi-component in nature and speak to human occupation and material deposits wider than the relatively narrow period of significance associated with the designated resource, at least some of the archeology discussion must speak to the period of significance established for the site proposed for designation.

That said, the research questions identified in the current draft present a bit of a challenge as many of them either (1) lie outside of the 1811-1814 period of significance defined for the site, (2) are not particularly well-developed (i.e., are limited to ground-truthing the locations of buildings, structures, and landscape features documented in primary historical sources or unspecified recollections captured in secondary sources), and/or (3) appear to conflate “accidental finds” with systematically-recovered, provenienced features and deposits whose precise locations and associations can be documented and interpreted. It may prove helpful to solicit the assistance of Michigan SHPO archeological staff or other professional archeologists familiar with the area to assist in developing research questions profitably addressed by archeology at the site.

Archeological Integrity

What is known about the subsurface integrity of the hypothetical archeological sites alluded to in the following: “In regards to setting, feeling, and association, it is important to note that none of the Frenchtown village elements that existed at the outset of the Battles of Frenchtown are present, except as archeological sites” (p. 12). In other words, are vestiges of the Frenchtown village known archeologically, or is this simply a way of saying that the village has no above-ground extant resources? If it’s the latter, it might be worth restating that point.

In distinguishing the original (i.e., 1982) from the current boundaries, the author notes that: “This new boundary includes the entire footprint of a former paper mill facility that was partly included in the original listing, and has since become municipal parkland, along with two vacant structures and two commercial sites that are slated for acquisition and subsequent reclamation” (p. 7). It would be helpful to explain the scale and scope of construction and subsequent demolition of the River Raisin Paper Company’s paper mill, any ground-disturbance associated with creation of municipal parkland, as well as the implications of future reclamation of the two commercial sites as relates to the sub-surface integrity of any archeological materials in those locations associated with the Battles of Frenchtown. If, for instance, those buildings are multi-story, have basements, or were associated with major earthmoving activity, then it does not bode well for the survival of intact, subsurface deposits and remains. Conversely, if any archeological inventory, mitigation, or monitoring of those activities revealed the presence of intact materials whose presence might be inferred to exist in similar locations elsewhere within the boundaries of the site, then it would be well worth making (and demonstrating with specifics) that case. This same discussion should occur for parts of the site’s core area where railroad right-of-way,

Evaluation/Draft NR Nomination Comment Sheet

Property Name: Draft AD for Battles of Frenchtown National Register Nomination, Monroe, Monroe Co., MI

Property Location: Monroe, Monroe Co., MI

Reference Number: 82000542

Date of Comments: 12-16-16

highway construction, an industrial site (built and subsequently reclaimed), home-building, park construction, and other activities such as a plant nursery were constructed. The last paragraph on p. 47 references “new interpretive insights into the battles.” This part should be played up considerably and those new interpretive insights should be catalogued. Finally, the conclusion on p. 49 is not particularly strong as the comparison-contrast of Canadian settlement patterns, while interesting, is not what was defined as significant about the site at the outset of the nomination. Instead, the area of significance was limited to military and archeology (historic, non-aboriginal). If the author wishes to address other topics/themes, they need to be identified in the front matter of the document.

Other Questions/Observations

While less archeology-specific, I was curious about a few additional items. The nomination makes use of the term “ribbon farms,” first appearing on p. 8 and in a handful of later instances. Is this the historical term applied to these farms? (I ask, because they sound very much like the *arpent* system used in French Louisiana with which I am familiar.)

The text at the top of p. 13 references the “persistence of the historical grid” for the roadways. What form does this grid assume (e.g., visible as dirt patterns, is centerline visible or is it the outer edges, and is it visible at the ground surface or, possibly, only from altitude or at certain times of day)? Is this grid part of Hull’s Trace, which is a separate and individually-listed resource? (If so, that should be noted, and if not some additional detail would be welcome.)

Footnote 94 (p. 46) suggests that tall grass and weeds thwarted employment of a metal detector survey. Why didn’t the investigators anticipate the need to cut the grass and weeds prior to establishing their grid and performing the survey? This would not appear to be an insurmountable obstacle, and doesn’t reflect particularly well (as explained) on that earlier effort.

In sum, the National Register staff applaud the considerable effort expended to date to update and expand a nomination that is several decades old. Please do not interpret these comments and questions as a lack of support for the nomination. They are, instead, offered with the desire to assist in honing the document to make the best case for the resource.

Please feel free to call me at 202.354.2217 or e-mail me at: julie_ernstein@nps.gov if you wish to discuss these comments further.

Julie H. Ernstein, Ph.D., RPA
Supervisory Archeologist, National Register of Historic Places



United States Department of the Interior

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
1849 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20240



H32(2280)

Memorandum

To: Keeper of the National Register of Historic Places

From: Acting, NPS Federal Preservation Officer *K.L.L.*

Subject: National Register Additional Documentation and Boundary Increase for River Raisin Battlefield Site, River Raisin National Battlefield Park, Monroe County, MI

I am forwarding the National Register Additional Documentation and Boundary Increase for the River Raisin Battlefield Site, located in River Raisin Battlefield National Battlefield Park. The Park History Program has reviewed the nomination and found it eligible under Criterion A, with an Area of Significance of Military.

This documentation is a concurrent state and federal nomination, under section 60.10 of the National Register regulations. The SHPO has completed all necessary steps for review and notification, and signed the nomination.

If you have any questions, please contact Kelly Spradley-Kurowski at 202-354-2266 or kelly_spradley-kurowski@nps.gov.