1. NAME OF PROPERTY

Historic Name: **BOST BUILDING**

Other Name/Site Number: Columbia Hotel

2. LOCATION

Street & Number: 621-623 East Eighth Avenue Not for publication: n/a

City/Town: Homestead Borough Vicinity: n/a

State: PA County: Allegheny Code: 003 Zip Code:15120

3. CLASSIFICATION

Ownership of Property		Category of Property	
Private:	X	Building(s):	X
Public-Local:		District:	
Public-State:		Site:	
Public-Federal:		Structure:	
		Object:	

Number of Resources within Property

Contributing	Noncontributing
1	___ buildings
___	___ sites
___	___ structures
___	___ objects
___	___ Total

Number of Contributing Resources Previously Listed in the National Register: 1

Name of Related Multiple Property Listing:

4. STATE/FEDERAL AGENCY CERTIFICATION

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this____nomination____ request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60.

Signature of Certifying Official Date

State or Federal Agency and Bureau

In my opinion, the property ____meets ____does not meet the National Register Criteria.

Signature of Commenting or Other Official Date

State or Federal Agency and Bureau

5. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this property is:

___ Entered in the National Register
___ Determined eligible for the National Register
___ Determined not eligible for the National Register
___ Removed from the National Register
___ Other (explain): _____

Signature of Keeper Date of Action

6. FUNCTION OR USE

Historic: Domestic Sub: Hotel

Current: Vacant/Not In Use Sub: Work in progress/Visitor Center

7. DESCRIPTION

ARCHITECTURAL CLASSIFICATION: Other: Vernacular Commercial

MATERIALS:
Foundation: Stone
Walls: Brick
Roof: Asphalt
Other:

Describe Present and Historic Physical Appearance.

The Bost Building is a three story, vernacular brick commercial building laid in a common bond. It is located at 621-623 East Eighth Avenue in the Homestead borough, just over the line from the borough of Munhall, where Heisel Street enters Eighth Avenue from the north. Constructed in 1892, the Bost building was conveniently located adjacent to the Homestead Works steel mill on the borough's main east-west thoroughfare. The mill has since been removed and now a large grocery store and parking lot are located behind the building. The building is approximately 40' x 90', with a skewed front (south) facade running parallel to East Eighth Avenue and the east facade paralleling the west side of Heisel Street. The foundation is stone and the asphalt roof is flat. The exterior plan is unaltered from its 1892 appearance, except at the storefront.[1] At the time of the Homestead lockout/strike, the building still had some interior finishing remaining to be done. Its intended use at the time of completion is not known, although most sources say it was built as a hotel. But it became known to the world as the headquarters for Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers in Homestead, for the Advisory Committee representing eight local AAISW lodges, and for the newspaper correspondents who had come to Homestead from the major newspapers in this country and from Great Britain, who were expecting, and witnessed, a major confrontation between capital and labor on July 6, 1892.

The front facade is distinguished by bands of stone running the entire width of the building, connecting slightly below the top of each of the six windows on the second and third stories and continuing over the tops of the windows as lintels. The cornice has ornate stepped brick corbels that appear to have been rebuilt; the corbels are also found on the east facade. Still very visible below the third story windows on the front of the building are the words COLUMBIA HOTEL painted on the brickwork. The original storefront has been replaced with glass and aluminum, with a wide border of black ceramic tile covering the area between the top of the first floor openings and the bottom of the second floor windows. It is the only major change to the building's exterior.

The east and west facades are symmetrically built. There are six arched windows at the second and third stories on the west and six flat stone lintels on the east. All have stone sills. The doors on the west facade have been filled in with brick. The north facade has five arched windows on the third story, four arched windows on the second story and two arched windows and two doors. The first floor openings have been filled in with brick. A ground floor, small non-original ventilation opening remains in the middle of the first story facade. The upper story windows are covered with plywood. Windows are original 1/1 double hung sash topped by stone lintels. Five chimneys are located along the outer edges of the roof on each of the east and west facades. An undetermined name followed by the barely visible ghost of "HOTEL" has been painted near the roof line of the west facade. Also on this facade, a non-original metal combination ladder and stair, from roof to ground with landings at the second and third stories, was removed in 1997. Its placement in front of double doors on the first floor made them inoperable.

Inside, the three story building has public areas on the first floor and guest rooms on the second and third floors. Walls and ceilings are plaster and lathe. A pressed tin ceiling was applied to the ceiling on the first floor; a portion of it remains. Floors are pine boards throughout. Steep stairways leading up from

[1] A photograph appearing in *Illustrated American, July 30, 1892,* shows the south and east facades of the building, and is reproduced in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 142. The facades are unaltered today, except at the storefront. Although the west and north facades cannot be seen, the west and east facades are symmetrical, and it can thus be assumed that the plan of the west facade is original. The brickwork of the north facade shows no evidence of alteration to the brick work or fenestration pattern.

the doorways on the east and west facades divide the first floor into two unequal halves. The stairway from the east facade has bead board wainscoting. At the second floor is a landing. To the south, toward the front of the building, is a double stacked corridor with rooms on either side. To the north, toward the back of the building, are two doorways and then a wide stairway leading to the third floor. This stairway has wainscoting on only the east side. On the west side is a plaster wall that appears to have been topped originally at the third floor with a railing. The railing has since been replaced with floor-to -ceiling fire wall.

The second floor landing also has an interesting historical feature. The paint has peeled away, revealing graffiti pencilled on the plaster wall. Included are the words "Homestead" and " 1892," as well as the names of people. Similar graffiti is visible at the top of the same stairway. The graffiti could have been produced by men staying and working in the building during the strike, providing a direct link between the building and the events of July 1892.

The floor plans on the second and third floors are virtually intact, and the first floor retains much of its original layout. The third floor has a central hallway that runs from the back (north) to the front (south) of the building. On the east side of the building are six interconnected rooms that are entered from the hallway. All except the front room, which overlooks East Eighth Avenue, would have had a commanding view of the Homestead Works during the pivotal days of the strike. The rooms are approximately 10' X 15', except for the front room, which is slightly larger. Each room has a high ceiling, one 1/1 double hung window, and one shallow closet. Most rooms retain paneled front and connecting doors with transoms (transoms covered), original wood baseboards, and door and window frame moldings with bulls-eye block. The hallway trim is plain and mitred, and does not appear to be original. The rooms were heated by stoves; the stovepipe holes are still present, covered by circular metal plates.

The rooms on the west side of the third floor were arranged two deep along two short side halls. The four at the front of the building best illustrate the floor plan. Except for one room at the front of the building, the interconnected rooms were slightly smaller (13' X 9 ½') than those on the east side of the building. They were built with the same window sash and trim, base boards, closets, doors, and trim. Some of the detailing has been covered with sheet paneling, a reversible modification. The rooms at the north half of the west side have been altered, with a partition wall removed between one set and two small bathrooms added across from the stairways. However, the floor plan is still intact.

The second floor has ten slightly larger rooms. Six are found to the south of the stairway, arranged along a double stacked corridor with a central dividing wall running down the middle. Each is approximately 15' X 12 ½', with the front end rooms slightly larger. There were also two rooms on each side of the stairway leading to the third floor, each originally 14'X 14'. As on the third floor, the rooms are interconnected. Most rooms have original features, including two double-hung 1/1 windows, paneled doors with transoms, wooden baseboards, and door and window moldings with bulls-eye block. Most doorway trim remains on the exterior of the doors. The second floor rooms were heated with fireplaces rather than stoves. Original firebacks are still present, but only one mantle remains, located at the room in the northwest corner. Two small bathrooms have been added to the northwest half, reducing the size of one of the rooms, and some trim has been lost, particularly on the west side rooms, but these are the only changes to the floor plan.

The first floor, used in 1892 as a telegraph office by visiting journalists apparently has served as public space throughout the building's history. Despite relatively recent use as a commercial venture, the floor plan appears to be intact except for the addition of some partitions that can be easily removed. The front portion of the building is divided into two large rooms. The east room has a pressed tin ceiling that is peeling away in places. The west half has vertical wood paneling with a milled chair rail; it appears to be original. The front west room also has a large counter and stove from the last commercial venture, a short order restaurant. The storefront is not original. The north, or back, portion of building has two large, open rooms. The floor and ceiling of the eastern rear room are collapsed and in the process (as of July 1998) of being restored, using the original design and replacement materials of the same fabric as the original. Otherwise, both rooms are original and remain intact.

The Bost Building has high integrity, especially on the third floor, where the union was headquartered during the 1892 strike and lockout. The floor plan is virtually intact and the original plaster and lathe walls are unaltered, as are the high ceilings, original window and door arrangements most of the sash, and nearly all of the interior trim. Stove pipe covers indicate the location of the stoves that heated the rooms. The floor plan is as original on the second floor, with its distinctive double stacked corridor. On the stairway landings is the graffiti made at the time of the July events. The first floor has its pressed tin ceiling and bead board paneling. As period photographs show, the exterior appearance has not been modified except at the storefront, which is hardly surprising given the building's location in Homestead's commercial district. Interior changes since the building's 1892 construction have been superficial and are easily reversible. A room on both the second and third floors has been partitioned to add bathrooms. For fire code purposes a wall has been added at the top of the third floor staircase and door frames (all lacking doors) have been erected in some hallways. They can easily be removed, as can the paneling and drop ceilings added to a small percentage of rooms. The Bost Building retains the design and feeling that it had when it served as the Amalgamated's headquarters during the pivotal days of July 1892.

8. STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

Certifying official has considered the significance of this property in relation to other properties:
Nationally: _X_ Statewide: ___ Locally: ___

Applicable National Register Criteria:	A_X_ B___ C___ D___
Criteria Considerations (Exceptions):	A___ B___ C___ D___ E___ F___ G___
NHL Criteria:	1
NHL Theme(s):	V. DEVELOPING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 5. Labor Organizations and Protests
Areas of Significance:	Social History
Period(s) of Significance:	June 29, 1892 – November 21, 1892
Significant Dates:	July 6, 1892
Significant Person(s):	N/A
Cultural Affiliation:	N/A
Architect/Builder:	Unknown
Historic Context(s):	XXXI. Social and Humanitarian Movements H. Labor Organizations

State Significance of Property, and Justify Criteria, Criteria Considerations, and Areas and Periods of Significance Noted Above.

SUMMARY - SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BOST BUILDING

The Bost Building is significant under National Historic Landmark Theme V. 5 (Developing the American Economy: Labor Organizations and Protests). It is the primary extant resource associated with the 1892 Battle of Homestead. It was the headquarters for Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers in Homestead and for the Advisory Committee representing eight local AAISW lodges, as well as the base for the newspaper correspondents from this country and Great Britain who were expecting, and witnessed, a major confrontation between capital and labor. The period of significance is June 29, 1892, when the workers were first locked out of the Homestead Steel Works of the Carnegie Steel Company through November 21, 1892, when the Amalgamated official ended the strike and its Advisory Committee vacated the Bost Building. It includes the bloody events of July 6, 1892, the date of the Battle of Homestead.

The bloody confrontation on July 6, 1892, between an industrial giant of world proportions and one of America's strongest labor unions was known at the time and still today as the Battle of Homestead. The battle raged around the Homestead Steel Works of the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, located on the southern bank of the Monongahela River in Mifflin Township, Pennsylvania, seven miles upstream from Pittsburgh. The mill was situated just over the boundary between Mifflin Township and the Borough of Homestead. Participants in this worldwide news event[2] were 280 members of Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, the remainder of the steel works' total labor force of 3,800, most of whom were non-union, and 300 guards from the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, hired by the company to protect the property and those workers whom the company planned to hire as strikebreakers. The battle of July 6, 1892 stirred deep feelings of identification between workers throughout the United States and the workers of Homestead. The importance of the Homestead Steel Strike of 1892 and its impact on American history cannot be over emphasized. The strike has entered the annals of American history as one of the great battles for worker's rights at the end of the 19th century.

Battle of Homestead - Historic Context

The seemingly inevitable clash of July 6, 1892, the preceding lockout by the managers of the Homestead Steel Works on June 29-30, and the strike by 3,800 workers on June 30, represented the culmination of capital/labor tension which had existed at the Homestead plant since 1882. In January of that year, members of the young, but powerful, Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steelworkers struck the Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company (PBSC), which had been formed in 1879 by Andrew Kloman and partners.[3] With the 1883 purchase of the PBSC mill, which had been opened in 1881, Carnegie Brothers

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[2] Russell W. Gibbons, "Dateline Homestead," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"*158-159.

[3] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*," 168, 179. In December 1870 Andrew and Thomas Carnegie formed a partnership with Andrew Kloman and Henry Phipps, Jr. to create the new company of Carnegie, Koman & Company, for the purpose of constructing the Lucy Furnace at 51st Street in Pittsburgh. See, Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 355-360. By 1875 Kloman was out of the partnership and would by 1879 form a new company for manufacture of steel, Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company, as a rival to Carnegie's Edgar Thomson Steel Works. Carnegie Brothers & Company, Limited, was formally organized in April 1881. Also see, Muller, "Draft Discussion of Homestead National Historic Landmarks," 4; Mark Brown, Homestead Steel Works and Carrie Furnaces, Homestead, Pennsylvania: Inventory of Historic Structures and their Significance." (Washington, D.C.: Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 1990), 1.

& Company, Limited, bought out its chief rival and started its production of steel at what became known as the Homestead Steel Works. The earlier Carnegie company, Carnegie, McCandless & Company, had opened its first steel mill at the Edgar Thomson Steel Works in Braddock, Pennsylvania in 1875, where it specialized in the production of steel rails.[4]

The steelworkers' union had been founded as the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers of the United States in Pittsburgh on August 4, 1876, a consolidation of three unions that had not been particularly successful representing iron and steel workers as individual organizations.[5] Members of the new union represented skilled workers, while unskilled workers who belonged to a union were represented by the Knights of Labor. By June of 1881, the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers had organized Munhall Lodge No. 24 and had almost immediately called a strike against the PBSC, which had begun production just that spring. The strike was short-lived, with the workers giving in to the demands of William Clark, the general manager and co-owner of Pittsburgh Steel Works. By early October 1881, a second lodge, Homestead Lodge No. 11, had been formed. The union's strength was made evident when the contract came up for renewal at the end of December. At that time, Clark informed the workers that they had to sign an ironclad agreement which prohibited, for one thing, membership in the AAISW. Refusal to sign would result in dismissal. What followed was a three-month strike beginning January 1, 1882, when virtually the entire skilled work force of two hundred men refused to sign. "At stake for both sides was the answer to a specific question: Who would control the Homestead mill and moreover the entire Bessemer industry, labor or management?[6] By 1892 this question would be one of paramount importance. The 1882 strike ended on March 20 with a victory for the union; "within weeks the AAISW ... [had] virtual possession of the mill." The steelworkers had "legitimized their right to control conditions on the shop floor, and they had also earned respect in the arena of municipal government."[7]

The labor/capital relationship that Andrew Carnegie and his partners inherited when they purchased Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Company in 1883, was one which would haunt Carnegie for years, especially between that time and July 1892. Apparently, he got more than he had bargained for. According to Carnegie's award-winning biographer Joseph Frazier Wall, "At little more than its original cost, he not only acquired the industry's most modern and efficiently designed rail and beam rolling mills, but he also got six highly organized and well-disciplined labor lodges of the powerful Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers."[8]

When Andrew Carnegie dedicated the Carnegie Library at Homestead in November 1898 he reminded his audience, even then, of his perception of the type of employees he picked up when he bought the Homestead plant:

Many of you remember that we did not build these works; we did not man them; on the contrary we purchased them as a running concern from some of our neighbors, who had been compelled to employ any kind of men, such was the scarcity of labor at the time they started. If I may be allowed to say so,

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[4] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 318-324.

[5] Sharon Trusilo, "Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"*16-17. The name of the union was later shortened by dropping "United States."

[6] *Ibid,* 178.

[7] *Ibid,* 191-192.

[8] Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 4.

they were not such men as we have been blessed with at our works, and such as we now rejoice in having here.[9]

The manner in which Andrew Carnegie dealt with unions, particularly at the Edgar Thomson mill in 1888 and at the Homestead Steel Works in 1889 and in 1892, appeared altogether contrary to what he said in his writings. In 1886 he published two essays in which he defended unionism and faulted employers for contributing to industrial unrest. While criticizing workers for their role in disturbances of that year, at the same time he declared that the "'right of workingmen to combine and form trade-unions is ... sacred.'" He went on to say that union opposition to nonunion labor was justified and that employers need observe the first union commandment: "'Thou shalt not take thy neighbor's job.'"[10] His writings, particularly those in Forum magazine, brought him recognition as a defender of the rights of organized labor, for while stressing the remarkable advances labor in the United States had made in moving from serfdom to a position of "equal terms with the purchaser of his labor," Carnegie said that the worker should be able to withhold or sell his services as it may seem best to him, making him a negotiator which would allow him to rise to the "dignity of an independent contractor."[11] Writings such as these delighted workers and their union leaders, but infuriated many of Carnegie's colleagues, such as Henry Clay Frick.

Workers would come to ask why Andrew Carnegie's actions did not support what he had said in his writings. Carnegie's biographer, Wall, explains it as part of Andrew Carnegie's complex personality. Part of it, says Wall, "lies in Carnegie's vanity, in his desire to be loved and admired by all Americans." Another part of the puzzle may possibly be explained by his being convinced that "an enlightened labor policy was good business practice, that his two basic desires, to make money and to be a kind and good employer, were not antithetical, but rather complementary."[12]

In dealing with Carnegie, there was the puzzle of which side of his personality would prevail. Would it be the Carnegie who wanted to be loved, or the Carnegie who wanted to be the powerful, aggressive, hard-headed businessman?[13] It is necessary to recognize these two sides of Carnegie's personality in order to comprehend what happened over the years in his dealings with labor.

Henry Clay Frick, on the other hand, was much easier to predict. By 1892 there was industry-wide recognition that Frick was "the most implacable foe of organized labor ... a reputation which he had deservedly earned in the coal fields of Pennsylvania."[14] Altogether in 1892, the Frick Company, of which Carnegie Brothers & Company owned a half interest, held 35,000 acres of some of Pennsylvania's richest coal lands and 10,000 coke ovens.[15] Frick's managerial abilities and his business sense had long been recognized by Andrew Carnegie. Formal acknowledgement of that recognition came with Frick

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[9] Andrew Carnegie, Dedication of the Carnegie Library of Homestead, November 5, 1898. Carnegie Library File, 8.
[10] Krause, *The Battlefor Homestead,* 233-234. 12 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 522-523. 13 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 522.
[11] Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 522-523.
[12] Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"*5.
[13] Wall, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 5.
[14] *Ibid.; Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 521.* Wall stresses the distinction between Frick and Carnegie when it came to labor policy. As Wall notes, "No one could ever accuse Frick of hypocrisy in regard to labor policy. No talk from him on the inalienable rights of labor to organize in order to protect jobs, no softness on the eight-hour day, no backing down in a strike situation. Even in the notoriously antilabor coal fields of Connellsville, Frick was known as a tough man who brooked no nonsense from labor organizers."
[15] Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, July 14, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red, " 6. Also see, Eugene Levy, "The Coke Region," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 8-9.

being allowed in 1887 to buy an interest in two Carnegie enterprises: Carnegie Brothers and Company, which operated the Edgar Thomson Steel Works, among others, and Carnegie, Phipps & Company, which operated the Homestead Steel Works. In January 1889 he was further recognized by his appointment to the position of president of Carnegie Brothers.[16]

While Carnegie was recognizing Frick's abilities, Frick was not enamored with the support Carnegie had given labor in his Forum magazine articles. Particularly disconcerting to Frick was Carnegie's forcing him to settle in labor's favor a dispute between the Frick Coke Company and its workers in the spring of 1887. Carnegie was putting into practice the pro-labor sentiment he had expressed in his writings, while at the same time guaranteeing the maintenance of steel profits. In doing so, Carnegie temporarily lost Frick's services to the company and permanently acquired Frick's distrust.[17]

Carnegie's labor policies were more directly tested at the Edgar Thomson Steel Works in 1888. By the end of 1887, Carnegie became convinced that the eight-hour work day which his E. T. manager, Captain William R. Jones, had persuaded him to adopt in 1877, was no longer affordable. Accordingly, he ordered Jones to announce that starting January 1, 1888, the E.T. Works would put into practice the industry-wide standard of two-turn, twelve hour shifts. The workers immediately went on strike and Carnegie closed the mill.[18] Carnegie reopened with non-union workers and enough Pinkerton guards to protect them. He told his former employees, who ceased to be regarded as employees once they went on strike, that if they wanted to return to work, they would have to sign an ironclad agreement that barred membership in the union, which at E. T. was the Knights of Labor. The agreement also required the workers to accept a return to the twelve-hour day with a sliding wage scale, which would link the steelworkers' piece rate to the fluctuating market price of steel. In May 1888 Carnegie visited E. T. and personally presented his plan to the workers. The next day a thousand workers voted by secret ballot to accept the twelve-hour day and the sliding wage scale. Carnegie got what he had been wanting. With the union's capitulation to Carnegie's demands, unionism at the Edgar Thomson Works effectively ended.[19]

According to historian Paul Krause, "Carnegie celebrated his victory in Braddock by giving his repentant workers a library and calling it a monument to his partnership with them."[20] In his March 30, 1889 dedication of the Carnegie Library of Braddock, Carnegie addressed himself as a "fellow workman." He told his audience:

> I have said how desirable it was that we should endeavor, by every means in our power to bring about a feeling of mutuality and partnership between the employer and the employed. Believe me, fellow workmen, the interests of Capital and Labor are one.

During his remarks he quoted extensively from an earlier article, presumably the one appearing in Forum magazine in 1886, to emphasize the importance he attached to the sliding wage scale, which pegged worker compensation to the net prices received for product month by month. His article had concluded: "It is impossible for Capital to defraud Labor under a sliding scale." He reminded the E. T. workers in

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[16] Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 497; Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, July 14, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 6.

[17] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie, 526-527.* Frick temporarily resigned in May *1887* from the presidency of the Frick Coke Company, of which Carnegie was a major owner.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] Krause, *The Battle for Homstead*, 235-237; Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 528.

[20] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 237.

the audience that they were under the sliding scale at that time and that now Capital and Labor at E. T. were practically partners, sharing alike in the rise and fall of prices. No longer were they antagonists who had to quarrel every year upon the subject of wages. Carnegie firmly stated that he had rather retire from business altogether than to return to the old system. "As far as I am concerned," he said, I will never have anything to do with manufacturing unless Labor is given a sliding scale."

Carnegie raised the subject of doing something for Homestead, with reference to a letter he had recently received on that subject. "Do something for Homestead," he said,

> Well, we have expected for a long time, but so far in vain, that Homestead should do something for us. But I do wish to do something for Homestead. I should like to see a Co-operative Society formed there. I should like to see a library there. I hope one day I may have the privilege of erecting at Homestead such a building as you have here; but this letter compels me now to say that our works at Homestead are not to us as our works at Edgar Thomson. Our men there are not partners . . . When the labor in the Homestead works, like the labor in the Edgar Thomson, goes hand in hand with us as partners, I trust that able men will come forward and establish their Co-operative Society .... I am only too anxious to do for them what I have done for you ...I know of no use so just as to apply my wealth for the benefit of the men who have done so much to produce it. This I gladly promise. -- The first dollar, or first hundred thousand dollars I receive from Homestead will be devoted to the building of such as this.[21]

It would be almost a decade before Homestead would receive a Carnegie Library. In the meantime, much would happen at the Homestead Works to prolong the struggle between labor and capital. Less than two months after Carnegie dedicated the Braddock Library, he announced on May 18 that the contract with the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers scheduled for renewal on June 30, would be based of a sliding scale, with the minimum price per ton of steel billets being $25, rather than the existing tonnage basis. The skilled tonnage men were quite concerned because they had benefited greatly from the increased production due to the recent mechanical innovations made at Homestead. The sliding scale would result in a substantial wage reduction for them. While concerned about the reduction in wages, the workers were more concerned with the provision that "men desirous of employment will be required to sign an agreement." It was well understood by the workers that the "signing of an agreement"meant individual contracts between workers and management and the exclusion of the union from its bargaining position.[22] While Carnegie's announcement made no specific mention of either the AAISW, representing skilled workers, or the Knights of Labor, representing laborers, his decision was clear. All positions in the mill would become vacant as of June 1 and that all workers would have to reapply for work and sign the three-year, iron-clad contracts. The new contract would expire in January, not June. The union was determined to fight all aspects of the proposal.[23]

On June 27 Homestead steelworkers unanimously agreed not to accept Carnegie's proposal. This was done over the strenuous objections of William Weihe and William Martin, respectively the national president and secretary of the AAISW. The Knights of Labor undertook an organizational drive to

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[21] Andrew Carnegie, Dedication of the Carnegie Library at Braddock, March *30, 1889,* in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 1-2.

[22] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 529; Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 245.

[23] Krause, The Battle for Homestead, 241-242.

increase their membership, making certain that Slavic workers were included in whatever union action was taken. With the workers on strike, the company shut down the mill on July 1. At that time the steelworkers "decided to move Just as they had in 1882; they took possession of the town and sealed it off. Directed by the paramilitary Advisory Committee of men chosen from each AAISW lodge, armed steelworkers guarded all approaches to the town." All was calm until July 10, when it was learned that one hundred Pinkerton guards had arrived in Pittsburgh and would be coming to Homestead to protect the scabs who would be coming to take the place of the striking workers. The Pinkertons did not come, but a train carrying thirty-one replacement workers did, under the escort of the Allegheny County Sheriff. The scabs (strikebreakers) had come as a result of action taken by William Abbott, president of Carnegie, Phipps, & Company, disregarding Carnegie's orders: "Homestead is settled. No use fighting there. If it never runs it will not start except with rates it can run upon steadily and compete with others."[24]

When the train arrived in Homestead, it was greeted by nearly two thousand Homesteaders, who formed a barrier between the train and the steel works. Most of those leaving the train hurriedly ran into the woods. Three scabs and an unemployment agent were assaulted physically. On July 12, the sheriff returned to Homestead, bringing with him 125 deputies and an order banning the workers from congregating on Carnegie, Phipps, and Company property. Three thousand Homesteaders prevented the sheriff from moving. Homestead was on the verge of a riot. By late afternoon all of the deputies, except one, had returned to Pittsburgh.[25]

Abbott became panicky while dealing with the first major strike situation under his presidency. Fearing that he was facing violence at Homestead and a mass walkout throughout all of the Carnegie plants, Abbott capitulated. At a meeting at company offices in Pittsburgh between Abbott and other company officials and Hugh O'Donnell and a group of steelworkers from Homestead, an agreement was reached. While the agreement was regarded as a "compromise," the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers came out the victor. The AAISW accepted the sliding scale and was formally recognized as the sole bargaining agent for Homestead. A new contract was signed; it was to last for three years, expiring on July 1, 1892.

The night following the signing on July 14, everyone in Homestead celebrated the union's victory. Even though it had accepted the sliding scale, "the union was more strongly entrenched than ever before. Because it was now accepted as the only bargaining agent with management, not a man could be hired or fired at Homestead without the union's approval."[26]

The union victory had meaning for the town of Homestead as well as for the workers on the job. Andrew Carnegie, in the assessment of historian Paul Krause, had "also given the town the opportunity to realize its solidarity as a defiant workers' republic, united beyond differences of skill or ethnic background in the name of labor." Just as "'the mastery' of the steel lay squarely in the hands of union men, one year later, the town's government, too, would lie squarely in the hands of the union."[27] These would be critically important factors when the next major confrontation between labor and capital would occur. Not only would the union receive its greatest challenge; the town of Homestead, which had been since

[24] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 529.
[25] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 247.
[26] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 530.
[27] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 249.

the early 1880s a model of "participatory, workers' democracy, would see that position seriously threatened and eventually destroyed by the company."[28]

Andrew Carnegie was pleased that the sliding scale was agreed to by the union. He was less than pleased, however, with the overall provisions of the settlement, as he wrote to his company president from his vacation site in Britain:

> The great objection to the compromise is of course that it was made under intimidation –our men in other works will now know that we will 'confer' with law breakers. At this distance one can be very brave no doubt, [but] I don't like this feature at all. Seems to me a curt refusal to have anything to do with these men would have brought matters right in less time than to you seems possible. Whenever we are compelled to make a stand we shall have to shut down and wait as at E. T. until part of the men vote to work, then it is easy. I am glad however we have three years of peace under sliding scale.[29]

The 1889 strike/lockout was a forerunner of what would happen three years hence. Both management and labor would look back to that event as they dealt with a similar, but more drastic, situation in July 1892.

As time for expiration of the three-year contract approached, the union was confident it could get the same contract renewed, based upon the victory it had scored in the 1889 agreement. The union thought that since it had done so well in 1889 and had such a high level of control over what happened in the mills that it would be able to negotiate for a favorable settlement. Furthermore, the company was in no position to have a work stoppage, thought John McLuckie,member of the AAISW and the burgess of Homestead. McLuckie was thinking of the large contracts which the Homestead Works had for architectural ironwork to be used in the World's Fair buildings in Chicago and the furnishing of ten miles of elevated railway for the Fair.[30] At the time, the Homestead Steel Works was also fulfilling a $4 million contract from the U.S. Navy for armor plate.[31] The alloyed steel armor plate produced at the Homestead Works would help make the United States the world's leading naval power. The Homestead Works were a technological wonder of the time boasting an output 50 percent higher than any other mill in the world. It was through the use of technological advances at the Homestead mill that Andrew Carnegie and Henry Clay Frick hoped to reduce the need for skilled workers, with the ultimate goal of eliminating the union .[32] The Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers had not objected to technological improvements, even if it meant the loss of jobs. According to William Weihe, President of the AAISW, "the object and motive of the association has been for years to get the cost of labor as nearly uniform as possible, where the work is similar."[33] Thus, Carnegie's charge that "Amalgamated rules" forced the company to keep "far too many men" was basically true.[34]

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[28] Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* viii.
[29] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 530.
[30] John McLuckie, Interview in *The World*, July 3, 1892. In Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 56.
[31] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 285.
[32] Charles C. McCollester, "Technological Change and Workers' Control at Homestead," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 19-20.
[33] William Weihe, *U.S. Senate Report No. 1280*, testimony given November 24, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 56. Weihe gave essentially the same statement to the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee July 13-14, 1892.
[34] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 553.

It soon became unquestionably clear to the union that it was no longer dealing with a panicky William Abbott. There would be no such thing as negotiating as far as the new manager of the Homestead Steel Works, Henry Clay Frick, was concerned. Frick, who had been given control of Carnegie, Phipps & Company, operator of the Homestead Works, upon the retirement of Abbott on April 1, 1892,[35] was no William Abbott; he did not intend to yield to labor. He would offer the union a new contract whose terms would be so unfavorable that it would be outright rejected. If the union turned it down, as Frick was sure it would, he would go on to deal with the workers on an individual basis. In that case, "unionism in the Carnegie Steel empire would be eliminated."[36]

The position of Andrew Carnegie might have been unclear to some of the workers because of his dual personality regarding labor matters in the past; they remembered his intervening in the coal strike in 1887, when he essentially forced Frick to settle on labor's behalf.[37] Carnegie's position should have been obvious to Frick, however, based on the notice Carnegie sent to him from New York on April 4, 1892. The notice, addressed to the employees at Homestead Works, was never posted, but there was no reason for Frick to doubt what Carnegie wanted. While indirectly referring to the forthcoming official merger on July 1, 1892, of Carnegie Phipps & Company and Carnegie Brothers & Company, to become Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, Carnegie stated in his notice:

> These Works [Homestead] having been consolidated with the Edgar Thomson and Duquesne, and other mills, there has been forced upon this Firm the question Whether its Works are to be run 'Union' or 'Non-Union.' As the vast majority of our employees are Non-Union, the Firm has decided that the minority must give place to the majority. These works therefore, will be necessarily Non-Union after the expiration of the present agreement. . . . A scale will be arranged which will compare favorably with that at the other works named; that is to say, the Firm intends that the men of Homestead shall make as much as the men at either Duquesne or Edgar Thomson.... This action is not taken in any spirit of hostility to labor organizations, but every man will see that the firm cannot run Union and Non-Union. It must be either one or the other.[38]

Carnegie must have frustrated Frick because Carnegie seemed to be vacillating on this position. Exactly one month after he had written the notice, he wrote to Frick from Coworth Park, in Sunningdale, England, asking him to make a change in the notice because as he said,

> I did not get it quite right, because I think it said that the firm had to make the decision of "Union" or "Non-Union." This I am sure, is wrong. We need not make that point, and we should not. We simply say that consolidation having taken place, we must introduce the same system in our works; we do not care whether a man belongs to as many Unions or organizations as he chooses, but he must conform to the system in our works.... One thing we are all sure of: No contest will be entered in that will fail. It will be harder this time at Homestead than it would have been last time when we had the matter in our own hands.... On the other hand, your reputation will shorten it, so that I really do not believe it will be much of a struggle. We all

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[35] Latton, "Steel Wonders," *The Pittsburg Times*, June 1, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 13.
[36] Wall, Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 4.
[37] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 556.
[38] Andrew Carnegie, "Notice to Employees at Homestead Works," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 26.

> approve of anything you do, not stopping short of approval of a contest. We are with you to the end.[39]

With Carnegie out of the country, Frick was determined to follow his own strategy. When the union proposed that the contract be renewed on the terms of the 1889 agreement, he quickly declined and submitted proposals of his own, knowing full well that they would be totally unacceptable to the Association. His assumption was absolutely correct; the union categorically rejected them. The major points of Frick's proposals were the following:

> The minimum price on steel billets below which the sliding scale would not go would be $22, not $25; second, the termination date for the new contract would be 31 December 1894; and third, the tonnage rate would be cut 15 per cent to allow management to get a share of the advantage of the increased production resulting from the new machinery.[40]

Even though the union sensed that Frick was forcing it to either a strike or totally surrender its recent gains, it sought to avoid a showdown by trying to keep negotiations open. The Association, through its workers' committee, selected one of its own, William T. Roberts, to be the chief negotiator with the company. Roberts told the company that the Association would be willing to accept reductions in the minimum for the sliding scale as well as for the tonnage rates if management could show that it was necessary and according to Roberts, "We want to settle without trouble; we don't want a strike."[41]

Frick remained steadfast. On May 30 Roberts and the workmen's committee were called into the office of the mill superintendent, John Potter, and were presented with what became known as Frick's ultimatum. That was, that the wage scale rates had been established on the basis of the market price of $22 a ton, and that "unless the lodges accepted his terms by 24 June, the company would negotiate with the men individually and not through the Association." Roberts reminded Potter that he had earlier been told to come back with a scale which the Association could live with and that the company would enter into negotiations and "arrange the thing in an amicable manner." Potter's response was, "I can't help it, it is Mr. Frick's ultimatum." For all intents and purposes, that ended all conferences with the company, because a meeting on June 23 with company officials in Pittsburgh lasted for only a few minutes.[42] At that June 23 meeting the workers' committee agreed to a new minimum of $24 and Potter told the committee that he thought he could get the company to agree upon a $23 minimum, which did occur. Neither side would acquiesce on tonnage rates and the terminal date for the next contract. The terminal date of July 1 rather than December 31 was very important to the workers, due to the hardships they

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[39] Andrew Carnegie, Ltr. To Henry C. Frick May 4, 1892. Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 545. This reference makes it quite clear that the letter was written in England after Carnegie had conferred with two of his partners, Henry Phipps, Jr. and George Lauder, who were in England at the time. In his article, "Carnegie, Frick, and the Homestead Strike,"5, Wall says that Carnegie wrote his letter of confidence to Frick on May 4, 1892 before leaving for his "annual summer sojourn in Scotland." In the article, Wall does not refer to Carnegie's changing his mind. It seemed that Carnegie was doing "double talk." While on the one hand saying that a man could belong to as many unions as he chose, he was also saying that he must conform to the system at the other works. The latter meant no unions, because there were none at the other works.

[40] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie, 55 1.* For a full discussion by Frick regarding the company's proposals see, *The Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette,* July 8, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 27.

[41] William T. Roberts, U.S. *Senate Report No. 1280,* testimony given on November 24, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 43.

[42] *Ibid.*

would face should a strike be necessary during winter months. Knowing this concern of the workers caused Frick to be that more insistent upon the December 31 date.[43]

In the meantime, Frick relied upon the support of Carnegie. In a May 4 letter, Carnegie had written to his chairman: "We all approve of anything you do, . . . We are with you to the end." On June 10, Carnegie corresponded with Frick while still in England: "Of course, you will be asked to confer, and I know you will decline all conferences, as you have taken your stand and have nothing more to say." Carnegie definitely expected a shutdown of some sort:

> Potter will, no doubt, intimate to the men that refusal of scale means running only as Non-Union. This may cause acceptance, but I do not think so. The chances are, you will have to prepare for a struggle, in which case the notice [*I e.* that the works are henceforth to be non-union] should go up promptly on the morning of the 25th. Of course you will win, and win easier than you suppose, owing to the present condition of markets.[44]

From all appearances, Frick expected trouble, as did the union. Even before the May 30 ultimatum, William Roberts and his fellow workers saw trouble forthcoming. Roberts testified before the U.S. Senate that the men saw the force of what was happening. When they saw that Frick was "building high fences and grating up our sewers ... everybody commenced to look suspicious." They gave Roberts the authority to meet with Superintendent Potter and try to negotiate a settlement.[45]

What had been happening and what was likely to happen at Homestead had not gone unnoticed by the newspapers. In anticipation of an upcoming confrontation between capital and labor, newspapermen, artists, and telegraphers descended on Pittsburgh and Homestead during June.[46] There had been for some time a high level of expectancy that something big was going to happen there, knowing that the principal players were world leaders in the manufacture of steel and "beyond question the most powerful independent labor union in the world."[47] That assessment of the union, made by the *Pittsburgh Post* at the time of the national convention of the Amalgamated in Pittsburgh starting on June 7, 1892, painted a grim picture of the Homestead situation:

> The members of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers are fortifying themselves for the most desperate struggle known in the organization's history. There can be no mistaking the situation: the manufacturers are determined upon a general reduction of wages, and the association is just as determined that it will not stand the proposed cut.

A reporter for the same paper interviewed Superintendent Potter on June 15, asking him specifically if trouble was expected. Later events proved that Potter was being far from truthful when he responded that he did not know anything about any trouble and did not think there was going to be any. "Our mills are running full turn [24 hours] and we have orders ahead that will keep us busy for a year at least," he said. "Our men make good pay .... [and] they are better paid than in most places," he told the reporter. "I don't

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[43] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 555.

[44] Andrew Carnegie, ltr. to Henry C. Frick, June 10, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red, " 26.* This is another example of Carnegie's going back and forth on his position.

[45] Roberts, testimony before the U.S. Senate, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 43.

[46] Russell W. Gibbons, "Dateline Homestead," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 158.

[47] *The Pittsburgh Post,* June 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 32.

think they intend to strike." In explaining about the fence, he said, "We have bought some new ground and are fencing it in, as we have done with all our grounds." Regarding the prospects of hiring non-union men Potter said, "We do not intend to employ non-union men, and have never thought of it. I think our men will sign the scale."[48]

Less than two weeks later, on June 28, the *Pittsburgh* Post carried the headline **"LOOKS LIKE WAR."** What followed bore no resemblance to what was reported earlier. This time, the reporter wrote it the way he saw it:

> The preparations for an actual siege at the Homestead Steel and Iron Mills exceed anything of the kind ever heard of before. The company, judging from all outward appearances at least, is getting ready to withstand violent attacks. This would seem to argue that, in spite of declarations a couple of weeks ago that the firm was not contemplating the employment of non-union labor, this was the very thing they were going to do, and in anticipation of violence on the part of the men in that event, were preparing to carry the day their own way in spite of opposition.

The workers and residents of Homestead called the formidable fence surrounding the mills and extending all the way down to the low water mark of the Monongahela "Fort Frick." The reporter vividly described what resembled an enclosed military stockade:

> The great fences that surround the mill are stronger than any fences one ordinarily sees. They are in reality massive board walls, and strung along the top are two wicked rows of jagged barbed wire. At each of the gates immense fire plugs have also been placed with an enormous water pressure in each. In all of the dark places and exposed portions of the mills are lights of 2,000 candle power each.... Port holes with ugly mouths grimly look out upon the peaceful valley from the mill, fort, barricade, stockade or whatever the Carnegie plant at Homestead could be called today, and silently bear witness that they are there, not for the peaceful purposes of steel manufacture, but for struggle and fight.

The *Post* article also noted that word had been received the previous night that 300 Pinkertons would be coming to Homestead.[49]

Frick had, in fact, been in contact with Robert A. Pinkerton of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency as early as May 22 regarding use of Pinkerton guards at Homestead. In his letter to Pinkerton on June 2, he referred to Pinkerton's "favor of the 22d," then proceeded to specify in detail what he wanted that organization to do:

> We will want 300 guards for service at our Homestead mills as a measure of prevention against indifference [interference] with our plan to start the operation of the works on July 6, 1892. The only trouble we anticipate is that an attempt will be made to prevent such of our men, with whom we will by that time have made satisfactory arrangements, from going to work and possibly some demonstration of violence upon the part of those whose places have been filled, or most likely by an element which usually is attracted to such scenes for the purpose of stirring up trouble. We are not desirous that the men you send shall be armed unless the occasion properly calls for such a

[48] *The Pittsburgh* Post, June 15, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 31.
[49] *The Pittsburgh Post,* June 28, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 40.

> measure later on for the protection of our employees or property. We shall wish these guards to be placed upon our property and there to remain unless called into other service by civil authorities…These guards should be assembled at Ashtabula, Ohio, not later than the morning of July 5, where they may be taken by train to McKees Rocks, or some other point on the Ohio River below Pittsburg where they can be transferred to boats and landed within the inclosures of our premises at Homestead. We think absolute secrecy essential in the movement of these men so that no demonstration can be made while they are enroute... As soon as your men are upon the premises we will notify the sheriff and ask that they be deputized either at once or immediately upon an ontbreak [sic] of such a character as to render such a step desirable.[50]

The use of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency to provide guard service for employers of mass labor had been a common practice for many years. The agency had been founded by young Scottish immigrant, Allan Pinkerton, in 1850. By the late nineteenth century it had become the symbol of labor oppression.[51] With Allan Pinkerton's death in 1886, his two sons, William and Robert, continued the business with great success. Before becoming involved in the Homestead incident of July 1892, the Pinkertons had been used by Frick in dealing with labor problems in the bituminous coal fields of western Pennsylvania, and by Carnegie in the 1888 lockout/strike at Edgar Thomson. They also had been brought to Pittsburgh in July 1889 for potential use at Homestead. By the summer of 1892, the Pinkerton Agency, had been widely condemned by unionists, journalists, and politicians for their role in settling labor disputes. They were so hated that "their mere presence frequently added the spark that led to an explosion of violence." In Pennsylvania the agency had become especially notorious for its "suppression of the Molly Maguires, a secret organization of Irish-American miners in the [anthracite] coal fields of Pennsylvania, in the late 1870s."[52]

As the end of June approached, with neither the company nor the union changing its position, a showdown of some sort was inevitable. The company formally initiated a lockout on June 28 by closing the 119-inch plate mill and one of the open-hearth departments and locking out 800 men. At this point, the situation was a lockout, not a strike, because the workers had not voluntarily walked off the job. It was a different story on the morning of June 29, however, when 3,000 steelworkers met in the Homestead opera house and unanimously supported the negotiating committee's reaction of the company's final offer, which had raised the minimum scale to $23. At this point, there was a combination lockout/strike. To supervise workers' activities during the lockout/strike an Advisory Committee, consisting of fifty members from the eight lodges of the Amalgamated Association of Iron & Steel Workers, was chosen. Headquarters for the Committee was set up on the third floor of the Bost Building at Heisel Street and Eighth Avenue.[53]

On the afternoon of the 29th, laborers walked out of the steel works in support of action taken by the AAISW. At midnight the company shut down every department of the giant steel works. Altogether, 3,800 men were out of work. Even though the workers had rejected the company's offer, thereby

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[50] H. C. Frick, ltr. to Robert A. Pinkerton, June *2, 1892,* contained in *U.S. Senate Report No. 1280, Exhibit C.,* in testimony given November 23, 1892, by H. C. Frick, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 30. Wall, in *Andrew Carnegie,* 556, dates this letter as June 25, citing George Harvey, *Henry Clay Frick--The Man,* 114-115. Also see Kaushik Mukerjee, "'We Never Sleep'--The Pinkerton National Detective Agency," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 71, for reference to Frick's request of June 2, 1892.

[51] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 547.

[52] Mukerjee, "The Pinkerton National Detective Agency," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 70-71.

[53] Demarest, "The River Ran Red, " 46; Krause, The Battle for Homestead, 310-311.

refusing to work, they still regarded the situation as being one of a lockout rather than a strike because the company had laid the entire mill off one day ahead of the technical expiration of the contract.[54] At the time of the shut down, the company posted notices which stated: "All employees of the several departments will report to the office on Saturday next, July 2, when they will receive their full pay." This amounted to a discharge of the entire work force.[55]

One of the first things the Advisory Committee did after its establishment was to assume control of the mills and the borough of Homestead. Acting in concert with Burgess John McLuckie, also a member of AAISW, the Committee moved immediately to close temporarily all saloons in the borough and to establish regular police patrols manned by dedicated union men. A picket system, just as had existed in 1889, was established to prevent the introduction of outside workers and Pinkertons. The government of the borough was now completely in the hands of the Advisory Committee, with its main objectives to preserve order and decency and to protect life and property as well as to keep non-union men out of Homestead.[56] Burgess McLuckie spoke for himself as well as for the other workers when he told a reporter for *The* World what Homestead meant to them when he said that they did not propose that Andrew Carnegie's representatives shall bulldoze them. There was too much at stake: "We have our homes in this town, we have our churches here, our societies and our cemeteries. We are bound to Homestead by all the ties that men hold dearest and most sacred."[57]

The Chairman of the Advisory Committee was Hugh O'Donnell, who had served in the same capacity in 1889. O'Donnell personally accompanied a reporter for *The World* as they crossed the Monongahela River on the "steam-yacht" Edna at 9:30 p.m. on the evening on July 1; they were confirming a report that the Baltimore and Ohio evening express coming into the borough of Rankin was carrying a train load of non-union men. The alarm turned out to be false, but the fast response of O'Donnell and the one thousand other men who crossed the river in skiffs was indicative of the way in which the Advisory Committee had organized to take care of matters.[58] It is also indicative that the battle site was not pre-ordained, but could have occurred anywhere around Homestead.

The committee was organized on a military basis, just as in 1889 and in 1882.[59] They commanded a force of four thousand men divided into three divisions or watches, with each division devoting eight hours to watching the mill around the clock. Each division commander had eight captains, representing one trusted man from each of the lodges. The captains reported to the division commanders, who in turn received their orders from the Advisory Committee. During their hours of duty, the captains had personal charge of important posts, i.e., the river front, the water gates and pumps, the railway stations, and the main gates. So complete and detailed was the planning that in ten minutes the Committee could communicate with the men at any given point within a radius of five miles.[60]

Under the direction of O'Donnell, the committee declared a policy of non-violence. It made every effort to ensure that the integrity of the mill and town would be maintained through peaceful means. O'Donnell

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[54] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 311.
[55] *The Pittsburgh Post,* June 30, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 47.
[56] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 311.
[57] The World, July 3, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 56.
[58] *The World,* July 2, 1892.
[59] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 311.
[60] Hugh O'Donnell, Speech, contained within James Howard Bridge, *The Inside Story of the Carnegie Steel Company* (New York: Aldine Book Co., 1903), in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 54.

told the reporter for *The World,* "Don't look for a battle. Every one of our men is whispering to himself the watchword 'hands down.' You will see no pistols or clubs or stones." He went on to say that they would "simply surround these strangers, whether they be 'black sheep,' workmen or Pinkerton detectives and very gently but very firmly push them away from this locality."[61]

While an open confrontation had not occurred, Homestead was still getting national attention. For one thing, on July 1 the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, officially came into being with Henry Clay Frick as its Chairman, although Frick had been functioning as the overall head for some months. The merger of Carnegie, Phipps & Company and Carnegie Brothers & Company had created the largest steel company in the world. Also, the two leading individuals connected with the firm, Carnegie and Frick, were not only world leaders in the manufacture of steel, they were very high profile individuals when it came to politics and the labor situation at Homestead had gotten the attention of President Benjamin Harrison. During the week proceeding July 1, according to an account in *The World,* Christopher Magee, the Pennsylvania Republican boss and close ally of Andrew Carnegie, Henry Frick, and the company lawyer, Philander C. Knox, had a number of conferences with President Harrison. The report was that the president had directed Magee to carry the message to the mill owners "that the trouble must be patched up at all hazards." Magee was reportedly told "that upon his success in effecting a peaceful settlement would depend the President's favor in the distribution of Federal patronage in Pennsylvania."[62] Magee would indeed play a leading role in directing Allegheny County Sheriff William H. McCleary in the course of dealing with the forthcoming events at Homestead.[63]

As the lockout/strike continued, each day brought heightened expectation of an impending crisis. Fifty journalists and sketch artists were busily reporting on everything happening and speculating on things to come. The first floor of the Bost Building was used to house a telegraph office and headquarters for the press.[64]

In its July 2 edition, the *New York Times* accurately sized up the situation: "it's evident that there is no 'bluffing' at Homestead. The fight there is to be to the death between the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, with its $25,000,000 capital and the workmen." The *Times* reported that the company Secretary, F. T. F. Lovejoy, had given formal notice that day that "the Homestead Mill is to be operated as a non-union plant and that no expense is to be spared to gain this point." Lovejoy told the reporter that the mills had been closed for repairs and would remain closed for two or three weeks. About the 15th or 20th of July, notices would be posted that any of the old employees may return to work, but they must make application by a certain day as individuals. According to Lovejoy, the wages of only 280 men of the 3,800 men employed in the mills were affected by the new scales. While the wages of the remaining workers would remain the same, their strong loyalty to their organization caused them to join the overall fight. The reporter also interviewed Hugh O'Donnell, who brought him up to date on the level of preparedness of the Advisory Committee. "We now have our organization perfect," O'Donnell said. "We will be in touch with every city and hamlet in the United States, and will be enabled to hear the moment a train of men for the mill leaves other cities."[65]

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[61] *The World,* July 2, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 51.
[62] *The World, July 2, 1892,* in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 50.
[63] Krause, *The Battlefor Homestead,* 28.
[64] Gibbons, "Dateline Homestead," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 158.
[65] *The New York Times*, July 2, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 55.

The Advisory Committee used its headquarters building, the Bost Building, as the command center for directing the surveillance activities of the men. A signal station that provided a full view of "Fort Frick" and the surrounding area was set up on the roof of the headquarters. Men positioned in the station could use field glasses to "gaze over the ramparts and take a leisurely survey of what. . . [was] going on in the enemy's camp." During the day the men at the station used colored flags to signal to pickets on the north side of the Monongahela. At night a strong flashlight was used. The river patrol was equipped to send up rockets when necessary. Word could be quickly relayed from the station to division commanders as to what action was to be taken. The signal system was so effective that within ten minutes a pontoon of skiffs could be thrown across the Monongahela, either to intercept and board a steam boat, or to place a large body of men to the other side of the river. To help in sounding a general alarm, the electric light works' steam whistle would be sounded.[66]

While the Advisory Committee had "perfected" its operational plans, the company was moving ahead with its plan to bring 300 Pinkerton guards/agents to protect scab workers reopening the mills. On July 4, Frick sent his final instructions to Robert Pinkerton. "We have all our arrangements perfected," Frick told Pinkerton, "to receive your men at Ashtabula, and to conduct them to Bellevue Station, a few miles below this City on the Ohio River." The plan was to have the guards transferred to two boats and two barges at 11 o'clock on the evening of July 5 and start immediately for the Homestead works, arriving there about 3 o'clock on the morning of July 6. "The boats are well provisioned," Frick assured Pinkerton. "All the uniforms etc. that you have had shipped to the Union Supply Company," he wrote, "are on board the boat." Also on the boat would be the sheriff s chief deputy, who would accompany and remain with the guards.[67] The arrangements with Sheriff McCleary were worked out in a series of meetings with company attorney, Philander Knox. During the meetings Knox requested that McCleary deputize the Pinkertons, but McCleary declined.[68]

On the morning of July 5, McCleary and two of his deputies, former sheriffs Joseph Gray and Samuel Cluley, came to Homestead and met with the Advisory Committee. At that time, Sheriff McCleary informed the Committee that they were there at the request of Frick to provide protection of the property and buildings of the company. When the Committee offered to fill that role the sheriff responded that he preferred to have his own men. Following the meeting, the Committee took the sheriff and his associates on an inspection tour of the plant, then returned to the Bost Building headquarters. The sheriff said that while he saw no signs of disorder or need to do so he would send deputies back to Homestead that afternoon because he "must perform his duties." The Committee, wanting to discuss the matter among themselves, asked the sheriff to leave the room. After an hour they brought Sheriff McCleary back into the room and O'Donnell made a surprising announcement:

> Sheriff McCleary, the last meeting of the Advisory Committee has just been concluded. We, as members of that committee, have, after due deliberation, resolved to formally dissolve this committee, and we have asked you in here in order that you may witness the spectacle. The Advisory Committee from now on will not be responsible for any disorder or any lawless act perpetrated either in Homestead borough or Mifflin township... Our responsibility ceases from this very moment. I now declare the Advisory Committee to be dead.

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[66] *The Pittsburg Dispatch,* July 4, July 5, 1892, in Dernarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 58, 61.
[67] H. C. Frick, Letter, to Robert A. Pinkerton, July 4, 1892, in Dernarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 57.
[68] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 27.

Committee members removed their badges of office, then proceeded to burn committee documents in the open fireplace. O'Donnell, turning to the sheriff, said, "You have seen all; have you anything further to say to us?" To which, McCleary replied: "Gentlemen, I have nothing more to say. Good afternoon."

After the sheriff had left, three unnamed labor leaders sent a telegram to W. J. Brennen, their legal counsel in Pittsburgh, asking him to seek a temporary injunction to restrain the sheriff from sending deputies, because "it is a move calculated to cause unnecessary disturbance." Before the attorney could respond, ten armed deputies arrived by train at the Munhall station. The deputies were met by 2,000 men who had massed themselves on the road-bed and platform. The leader of the deputies was Deputy Sheriff Samuel Cluley, who had been to Homestead that morning. Cluley read a proclamation from Sheriff McCleary, in which the sheriff declared unlawful the assembling and congregating at and near the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited and interfering with workmen employed in the works from obtaining access to them, etc. When Cluley concluded reading the proclamation, he and his associates were "engirdled by a solid wall of surging humanity." A man from the audience shouted to the crowd: "Order, boys, order; these gentlemen are now in our care and you must protect them from the unthinking mob." The decision was made to march the deputies from the Munhall station to the Bost Building, until that morning the headquarters of the Advisory Committee. Hugh O'Donnell led the march. The deputies were escorted to the side entrance of the building and up the narrow stairs to the large smoke-filled room on the third floor. The deputies were given the choice: free transportation back to Pittsburgh or remaining in Homestead and taking the consequences. They chose the former and were put on the steamer Edna and delivered to Glenwood Village, where they continued their journey back to Pittsburgh.[69]

Excitement began to mount around 2:30 on the morning of July 6, when a guard from his lookout position on the Smithfield Street Bridge in Pittsburgh spotted two darkened barges moving quietly up the Monongahela. The alarm was quickly sent to Homestead by telegram and by rider on horseback. The barges, the *Monongahela* and the *Iron Mountain*, were being towed by a single steamboat, the *Little Bill,* rather than two boats as Frick had planned. The community was awakened at twenty minutes to three o'clock the electric light works' steam whistle, described by the *New York Herald* reporter as a sound "like the trumpet of judgment."[70] Around four o'clock the barges approached the shore below the mill's pump house and water tower. At the same time, thousands of men and boys grabbed rifles, hoes, and the staves off picket fences and rushed to the river bank to confront the Pinkertons as they attempted to land. Many women armed with clubs joined the throng streaming up the railroad tracks toward the railroad bridge crossing over the Monongahela. Great crowds of men, workers and townspeople stormed the works, tearing down parts of "Fort Frick's" wooden fence, setting up barricades and taking up positions for battle when they realized that the Pinkertons would be brought into the mill by river landing. Up to this time, the workers had not trespassed the company's property since the lockout/strike began.[71] Now, the workers were in the mill and getting them out would require force.

Labor leaders, including Hugh O'Donnell and O. O. Coon, made their way to the landing site and tried to control the crowd and to communicate with the Pinkertons. When O'Donnell could not make himself heard above the noise of the crowd, Coon, the captain of the Advisory Committee's Sixth Regiment,

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[69] *The Pittsburg Dispatch*, July 6, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 66-69.
[70] Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 558; *New York Herald*, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 76; William Serrin, *Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy of an American Steel Town* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 75.
[71] "Serrin, *Homestead,* 77.

climbed to an elevated position "and with a giant's strength shouted to the men: 'For God's sake put down your guns and look to the protection of your families.'"[72] O'Donnell then made an impassioned plea to the Pinkertons for non-violence:

> On behalf of five thousand men, I beg you to leave here at once.... I do know that you have no business here, and if you remain there will be more bloodshed. We, the workers in these mills, are peaceably inclined. We have not damaged any property, and we do not intend to.... In the name of God and humanity, don't attempt to land! Don't attempt to enter these works by force.

Captain Frederick H. Heinde, stepped onto the deck of the *Iron Mountain* and identified himself and his men as agents of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, who had been sent there to take possession of the mill property and to guard it for the company. Heinde said he did not wish any bloodshed, but he made quite clear his determination to carry out his mission: "If you men don't withdraw, we will mow every one of you down and enter in spite of you. You had better disperse, for land we will!" Still trying to restrain the crowd, O'Donnell shouted to Heinde: "I have no more to say. What you do here is at the risk of many lives. Before you enter those mills, you will trample over the dead bodies of three thousand honest workingmen."[73]

An angry mass of people were on the steep bank beneath the pump house, waiting for the Pinkertons to make their next move. The gangplank of *Little Bill* went down and the Pinkerton captain started moving toward the shore. Before he could come ashore, Billy Foy, a middle-aged Englishman and leader of the Homestead corps of the Salvation Army, "marched resolutely to the foot of the gangplank." Captain Heinde cried out, "Now, men, we are coming ashore to guard these works and we want to come without bloodshed. There are three hundred men behind me and you cannot stop us." Foy responded: "Come on, and if you come you'll come over my carcass," then threw himself face down on the gangplank. The captain slashed at Foy's head with a billy-club and tried to push him away.[74]

About that time, two shots rang out. Both sides insisted that the first shot came from the other side. In a testimony given to the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Charles Mansfield, a Homestead real-estate worker, said that from his position "at the comer of the brick pump house, the new one the machinery is not in yet," he saw the Pinkertons fire the first shot from the boat which was tied up above the pump house.[75] Captain William B. Rodgers, owner and operator of the *Little Bill,* said that the man lying on the landing stage, meaning Billy Foy, fired the first shot. Rodgers qualified his statement, however, by adding, "I mean the first shot that did any damage," that is, the wounding of Pinkerton Captain Heinde.[76] Also, Deputy Sheriff Gray, who had been on *Little Bill* from the time the Pinkertons had boarded, maintained that the first shot was from the "mob on the bank."[77]

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[72] St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 6, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 80.

[73] Krause, The Battle for Homestead, 18.

[74] *New York Herald,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 76*; The Pittsburg Leader,* July 10, 1892, in *Ibid,* 80-81*;* Krause, *The Battlefor Homestead,* 19.

[75] Charles Mansfield, *US. House of Representatives Report No. 2447*, testimony given July 14, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 82.

[76] *The Pittsburg Leader*, July 10, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 77; Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 20.

[77] Joseph H. Gray, Testimony, July 13, 1892, *U S. House ofRepresentatives Report No. 2447*, February 1893, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 93.

While there would never be agreement as to which side fired the first shot, it is an established fact that one shot came from behind the Pinkerton captain, hitting Foy and sending him writhing on the landing with a bullet through his body. Another shot came from the workers (whether from Foy or not is unknown), striking the captain in the thigh. Those two shots signaled quick retreats to barricaded positions and the beginning of heavy firing from both sides, continuing for ten minutes. At the end of that time, a council of war was held on each side, with Homestead Steel Works Superintendent John Potter and the Pinkertons in the barges, and the workers in their makeshift defenses. During the break it was decided that the captain of the *Little Bill* would take Captain Heinde, whose wound was considered life threatening, and five other wounded Pinkertons to Port Perry for transfer to Pittsburgh for treatment. One of the Pinkertons died before reaching the hospital.[78] In the barrage of shots from the barges, three workers had gone down: Martin Murray, Andrew Souljer, and George Rutter. No mention is made of the extent of Souljer's injuries. Rutter would die eleven days later in a Pittsburgh hospital in a bed next to the one occupied by Captain Heinde, and Murray would recover. Another mill worker, Joseph Sotak, would be killed instantly while he was trying to move Murray's prostrate body. But this was after the initial firing episode.[79]

It was obvious to the workers that the confrontation with the Pinkertons, was not going to end with the initial ten minutes. Workers were busy preparing their defenses and securing weapons. The Advisory Committee, before disbanding, had established an arsenal in its headquarters on the third floor of the Bost Building. Workers combed the town for weapons and brought them to the headquarters for further distribution to anyone willing to fight.[80] By the time the *Little Bill* got underway, leaving the *Monongahela* and *Iron Mountain* moored at the battle site, sharpshooters among the workers had taken up positions in the mill yard "wherever a pile of coal, or small building, or freight car afforded protection, other sharpshooters were on the piers of the railroad bridge about three hundred yards distant." Included among the havens of protection for the workers were the water tank and the pump house.[81] Workers also positioned a small brass cannon known as "Griffin's Pet" which they had borrowed from the local Grand Army Post to fire at barges. The cannon turned out to be ineffective in hitting the barges. Most of the time it overshot its target, with one slug striking mill worker Silas Waine in the neck, killing him. About 10 o'clock the cannon was brought back across the river and placed in the gas house, where it would be used to fire at the barges through holes knocked in the brick wall.[82]

Fighting resumed about 8:00 a.m. when the Pinkertons made another attempt to come ashore. A shot was fired from behind the workers' position, resulting in a quick return fire from the Pinkertons. In the fighting that followed, the workers would suffer their greatest loss: four men would die. The first to fall was John E. Morris, a 28-year old immigrant from Wales. Morris, along with other workers, had taken a position on the pump house, which sat high above the landing site, providing a good spot from which to fire at the barges. During a lull in the fighting, Morris moved from his position to get a better view of what was happening. His movement did not go unnoticed by the Pinkertons, however, for he was shot in the forehead, causing him to fall into a ditch sixty feet below. His mangled body, a horrifying sight for his companions to behold, was immediately carried to his home on Ninth Avenue. The death of Morris

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[78] *Ibid.;* Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 20.

[79] New York Herald, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 77; Krause, The Battle for Homestead, 20.

[80] Krause, The Battle for Homestead, 2.

[81] *New York Herald,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 77; *The World,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 83-84.

[82] *The World*, July 10, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 83-84.

and the procession to his house, where his widow and children received him, catapulted the rages of the townspeople to new heights.[83]

While the procession of wounded and dead workers increasingly enraged the townspeople, the Pinkertons were becoming demoralized by their seemingly indefensible position, particularly since the towboat, *Little Bill*, did not return until almost 11:00 A.M. Much to Captain Rodgers' surprise, the workers did not stop their firing when he returned flying the American; instead, the firing intensified and Rodgers narrowly missed being struck. Unable to land the boat, Rodgers was forced to allow *Little Bill* to drift downstream, leaving those on the barges stranded with no hope of immediate rescue. In the meantime, the workers undertook a series of unsuccessful, though frightening, efforts to sink the barges. First, a raft with oil-soaked lumber was set on fire and floated downstream toward the barges. First, a raft with oil-soaked lumber was set on fire and floated downstream toward the barges, but it burned out before colliding with the barges. The next fireball was a railroad flatcar, loaded with burning boxes and rags and sent hurtling down the railroad track running from the mill to the landing, only to run off the track before getting there.[84] Hoping to blow up the barges, the workers tried to dynamite them, but to no avail. Even a burning oil spill did not destroy the barges.[85] Amidst all of the failed attempts to destroy the barges, steady firing continued from the workers. About noon, a second Pinkerton agent, 24-year old Thomas J. Connors, was killed. A third Pinkerton, Edward A. R. Speer, was shot in the leg and died in a Pittsburgh hospital on July 17.[86] The Pinkertons were ready to surrender and started raising surrender flags, only to have them shot down.[87]

While the battle was raging in Homestead, Allegheny County Sheriff McCleary was meeting in Pittsburgh with political boss Christopher Magee and William Weihe, the national president of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, trying to work out a resolution. Weihe stressed that the only way to avoid further bloodshed was for Frick and the workers to have a meeting. An emissary carried that message to Frick, who refused to negotiate. Frick replied, "The time for conferences ended on the 24th of June. I will see no person who represents the Amalgamated Association." Later that day, Frick spoke to the press, stating that the company was "not taking any active part in the matter at present." The company, he stated, could not interfere with the sheriff in the discharge of his duties, and it was "awaiting his further action."[88]

McCleary's only option, at this point, seemed to be requesting that Governor Robert E. Pattison send the Pennsylvania National Guard. After consultation with Magee, McCleary sent a telegram to the governor, describing the situation at Homestead and asking for military assistance. Pattison's quick response was: "Local authorities must exhaust every means at their command for the preservation of the Peace." Shortly after noon McCleary sent another telegram to the governor, urging him to act at once. This time the governor replied with questions: "How many deputies have you sworn in and what means have you taken to enforce order and protect the property?" At the same time, Governor Pattison sent a telegram to the former Advisory Committee in Homestead advising it that he had refused to mobilize the

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[83] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 22.
[84] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie*, 558.
[85] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 24.
[86] Serrin, *Homestead*, 79.
[87] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead*, 25.
[88] *Ibid; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* July 6, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 79; *The World,* July 7, 1892, in Dernarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 96.

Pennsylvania National Guard. During the early afternoon McCleary sent a third telegram to the governor pleading with him to send an armed and disciplined force at once to prevent further loss of life. This time, the governor's reason for his delayed response was that the sheriff had "not made any attempt to execute the law to enforce order." He insisted that the sheriff call upon all citizens for an adequate number of deputies.[89] The governor did, however, give an elaborate public statement regarding his refusal to send troops to Homestead:

> There is no information received from Homestead to warrant any interference from the State. The sheriff must exhaust all of his authority before the state will interfere. The state lends its aid when the local authorities are overborne. The sheriff has employed but twelve deputies up to the present time, his ordinary force. If the emergency is as great as alleged, he should have employed a thousand. It is not the purpose of the military to act as police officers. The citizens of Homestead are industrious, hard-working, intelligent people.... In such a community, there ought to be no difficulty as to adjustments of their troubles: certainly no question as to the preservation of the peace by local authorities. The civil authorities must in the end settle the differences.[90]

During the meeting among McCleary, Magee, and AAISW president Weihe, it was decided that Weihe should go to Homestead to help bring about a peaceful surrender of the Pinkertons. About 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Weihe arrived in Homestead and proceeded to try to convince the workers that the Pinkertons should be allowed to leave with the understanding that they would not return. The workers could not be swayed except by their local leader, Hugh O'Donnell. O'Donnell got their attention by grabbing the American flag carried by three hundred armed men from South Side ironworks who had come to help, climbing on a pile of steel beams, and asking the men to allow a truce. It was obvious that the men respected O'Donnell, for as he began to speak hundreds of men took off their hats and shouted a lusty hurrah. They did not agree, however, to his proposal to let the Pinkertons leave. Someone from the crowd suggested that the Pinkertons should be held in the barges until the sheriff could come with warrants for their arrest on charges of murder. The crowd gave a hearty approval, giving O'Donnell clearance to meet with the Pinkertons. The battle was clearly over.

Around 6:00 p.m. the Pinkertons raised a white flag atop the *Iron Mountain,* and two agents walked onto the deck with their hands held high, signaling their willingness to surrender. O'Donnell and two other members of the former Advisory Committee, which, in reality had never ceased to function even though it had dissolved itself, proceeded to the landing to negotiate with the Pinkertons. O'Donnell assured the Pinkertons of safe passage from Homestead, but he told them nothing of the "agreement" worked out by the crowd regarding criminal prosecution.[91] But neither O'Donnell or his fellow committee members could control the "howling mob" that confronted the Pinkertons.[92]

Once it was clear that the Pinkertons were surrendering, a mob rushed for the barges and took complete possession, running "like wild men about the edges and in a twinkling of an eye filled the cabins of both boats [barges] from side to side," throwing items overboard and confiscating weapons and

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[89] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 29-31.
[90] *Ibid,* 32.
[91] *Ibid,* 32-34. Krause says that by 4:00 P.M., 5,000 additional reinforcements had arrived from South Side, Braddock, and Duquesne.
[92] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 559.

ammunition.[93] One of the workers who rushed aboard the barges was Thomas Weldon. Grabbing a Pinkerton's Winchester rifle, Weldon proceeded to try to break it. In doing so, he caused the rifle to discharge, hitting the guard in the stomach. A few minutes later he was dead.[94]

As the agents left the barges they were able to walk up the bank, unmolested except for jeers and curses. Things changed when they reached the mill yard above. Emerging from a narrow passageway between two huge piles of rusty pig-iron used as workers' barracades, the Pinkertons found themselves between two long lines of "infuriated men who did not act like human beings." *The World* reporter gives a graphic description of what he saw happening to the Pinkertons as they "ran the gauntlet:"

> As the Pinkerton men ... came into view they [workers] jumped upon them like a pack of wolves. The men [Pinkertons] screamed for mercy. They were beaten over the head with clubs and the butt ends of rifles. You could almost hear the skulls crack. They were kicked, knocked down and jumped upon. Their clothes were torn from their back, and when they finally escaped it was with faces of ashen paleness and with the blood in streams rushing down the backs of their heads staining their clothes. It ran in rivulets down their faces, which in the melee they had covered with their hands. They ran like hunted deer panting and screaming through the mill yards.[95]

Before the Pinkertons had reached the top of the bank, hundreds of women and boys descended on the barges, removing things like quilts, pillows, cooking utensils, etc., then began dismantling the barges. Once everything the people wanted to take had been removed, the barges were set on fire. The crowd's attention was divided between watching and participating in the gauntlet as the Pinkertons moved through the mill yards, and cheering and clapping as the barges burned and sank to the bottom of the Monongahela.[96] Unionists moved to take control of the situation.

Forty-five minutes after the surrender, the Pinkertons emerged from the main entrance of the steel works. They continued under the orderly escort of "a battalion of sons of steelworkers," men from South Side and a contingent of Homestead steelworkers, marching two abreast, with a Pinkerton agent locked in their arms. As the procession moved up Eighth Avenue toward the Bost Building, the agents were again beaten and jeered. When the Pinkertons reached the Bost Building they were directed to take off their hats and salute the American flag that hung from a window in the union's third floor headquarters. Strangely, when the Pinkertons followed orders and saluted, the townspeople could not contain their anger: "Men and women hit them with umbrellas and sticks and abused them in every way imaginable."

From the Bost Building, the procession continued to the temporary jail in the Homestead Opera House on Fifth Avenue. As the entourage approached serious trouble erupted when one of the Pinkertons tried to break away. As he escaped from those guarding him, a "heavy-set woman ran him down, threw him to the ground, stamped on him and threw sand in his eyes." As another prisoner was about to enter the opera house, the widow of one of the dead steelworkers, "emboldened by grief, threw herself at him and started pummeling him." Still another Pinkerton was attacked by two East European immigrants: a man grabbed the agent by the throat and hit him in the face while a woman smashed his head with a club. The beating was so intense that one of the guards assigned by the Advisory Committee to protect the

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[93] *The World,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"*The *River Ran Red,"* 86.
[94] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 34.
[95] The World, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 86.
[96] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 36.

Pinkertons leveled his gun at the attackers and shouted: "Stand back, or. . . I'll shoot the next man or woman that raises a hand against them. We have promised to protect them, and we'll do it, even if we have to use our guns." When the crowd yelled out: "Kill the murderers," more guards pointed their rifles at the crowd and prepared to fire. At that point, Burgess John McLuckie came forward, commanded peace and assured the crowd that the Pinkertons would be locked up and held for murder.[97]

The Pinkertons did not leave Homestead until about 1:00 A.M. on Thursday, July 7. At that time a special train arrived to take them to Pittsburgh. Sheriff McCleary and AAISW president Weihe were on the train to assist in getting the men from the opera house to the train. The small group of spectators who were there to witness the departure of "the enemy" heeded O'Donnell's request that the prisoners be allowed to move to the train without any threat of harm; the group was undemonstrative. Some of the Pinkertons who had been wounded were allowed to leave on the early evening train to Pittsburgh.

One wounded Pinkerton agent, seated next to a World correspondent on that early train, talked freely, but quietly, about his experiences that day and about who the Pinkertons were. He told the correspondent that he was a mechanic--a maker of organ bellows in Chicago. "One hundred and twenty-five of our men," he said, "came from Chicago, the balance from Brooklyn, New York and Philadelphia." He confirmed what other reports had said, that they did not know their destination. "We were hired as private watchmen," he told the reporter, "but we did not know we were to be used to shoot down honest workingmen, for we are workingmen ourselves and sympathize with the strikers now that we know the truth." "The real cause of our engagement," he affirmed, "was not made known to us until we were in sight of the steel mill. Then it was too late." He went on to relate the experiences of the day. "We were pushed ashore," he said, "and the shooting commenced. We did not fire the first shots." He told how they were left without a leader all day, "held in a slaughter pen near the shore. There was no chance to escape," for "the barge without motive power stood an easy target for the men on shore." Contrary to other reports, he said not all the men were armed, but those with rifles used them. His fellow agents, he said, "were desperate. It was a case of being shot to death on one side or drowning on the other. We were hopeless, and we resolved to sell our lives dearly."[98]

The train carrying the majority of the Pinkertons, arrived at the Pennsylvania Railroad yards between 2:00 and 2:15 A.M. That location was chosen by Christopher Magee as a temporary holding area, because it was regarded as the safest place until a decision could be reached on the final disposition of the agents. Magee and Sheriff McCleary decided that they would simply be taken away, without being arrested and charged, as had been the expressed desire of the Homestead workers. The attorney for AAISW, William Brennen, agreed with the decision to let the Pinkertons go free, for he reasoned, "how could anyone determine which was responsible for any of the Homestead deaths?" There was a feeling on the part of many of the steelworkers that Brennen, who later would hold high positions in Pittsburgh politics, was operating under the influence of Magee. Nevertheless, by 10:00 A.M., the Pinkertons were out of town, having been placed on trains headed for New York and Chicago.[99]

Who were the Pinkertons? Many of them were men who could not find employment elsewhere, "and so, for a dollar a day and the chance to wear a bright blue uniform with shiny brass buttons, they entered the employment of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency." According to historian Wall, the Pinkertons

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[97] *Ibid,* 37-38.

[98] *The World,* July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 87.

[99] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 39-41; Serrin, *Homestead,* 81.

who were "hated symbols to working men everywhere of everything despicable in the existing order, . . . had become the tools of the oppressors because they had been the most oppressed." "Now on this day of madness," Wall writes, "these 'Have-Nots' have become the victims of the 'Have-Littles."[100]

While the Pinkertons were on their way to their homes, the people in Homestead were preparing to bury their dead. John E. Morris, Peter Faris, and Silas Waine were buried on Thursday afternoon, July 7. Three others, Henry Striegel, Thomas Weldon, and Joseph Sotak would be buried the following day. George Rutter's death on July 17 would complete the list of seven workers who, according to the coroner's record, died as the result of the July 6 confrontation. The Pinkertons suffered three deaths.[101] There were many wounded on both sides, with the greatest number being among the Pinkertons.

There was no doubt that the workers had won the battle of July 6. The *Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette* reported from Homestead on the evening of July 7: "The strikers are masters of the situation to-day." To show their intention to protect company property they rebuilt the fence around the works, cleared the mill yard of all debris, and restored the hose used in throwing oil on the water to its proper location.[102] The "war" was far from over, however. On the evening of July 6, the company spokesman, Secretary Francis Lovejoy, predicted the ultimate outcome of the events of the day:

> This outbreak settles one matter forever, and that is that the Homestead mill hereafter will be run non-union and the Carnegie company will never again recognize the Amalgamated Association nor any other labor organization. The Homestead trouble will doubtless also have the effect of influencing other mills heretofore union to become non-union and thus free their owners from the arbitrary dictation of labor unions.[103]

The following day, Chairman Frick made an even stronger statement to the press:

> The question at issue is a very grave one. It is whether the Carnegie Steel Company or the Amalgamated association shall have absolute control of our plant and business at Homestead. We have decided, after numerous fruitless conferences with the Amalgamated officials in the attempt to amicably adjust the existing difficulties, to operate the plant ourselves. I can say with the greatest emphasis that under no circumstances will we have any further dealing with the Amalgamated association as an organization. This is final.[104]

As for Andrew Carnegie, he was still vacationing in his beloved Scottish Highlands. Frick cabled him on July 7: "Small plunge, our action and position there unassailable and will work out satisfactorily."[105] The reports Carnegie was getting from the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *London Times* presented a different story. In response to what he was reading in the papers and the other cables he was receiving, Carnegie cabled Frick that he was coming back home to take charge of the situation. This put fear into the hearts of senior partners George Lauder, Jr. and Henry Phipps, Jr., for they felt that if Carnegie came home it would mean the repudiation of Frick, Frick's resignation, and the triumph of the union. Both men, who

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[100] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 559-560.
[101] Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 104.
[102] *Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette,* July 8, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 115.
[103] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 39-40.
[104] *Pittsburgh Commercial Gazette,* July 8, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 94.
[105] Henry Clay Frick, cable to Carnegie, Morgan, July 7, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 88.

were in England at the time, sent letters to Carnegie advising him to stay where he was and to keep quiet. Their advice was heeded as evidenced by Carnegie's response to a reporter who visited him at his rented lodge on July 9. When asked if he had an opinion on what had happened at Homestead, Carnegie replied: "No, sir. I am not willing to express any opinion. The men have chosen their course and I am powerless to change it. The handling of the case on the part of the company has my full approbation and sanction. Further than this I have no disposition to say anything."[106] Carnegie said something quite different when he wrote in anger to Lauder, his cousin and partner, on July 17:

Matters at home bad--such a fiasco trying to send guards by Boat and then leaving space between River & fences for the men to get opposite landing and fire. Still we must keep quiet & do all we can to support Frick & those at Seat of War... Silence is best. We shall win, of course, but may have to shut down for months.[107]

Carnegie would write in his autobiography, twenty years after the Homestead incident: "Nothing I have ever had to meet in all my life . . . wounded me so deeply. No pangs remain of any wound received in my business career save that of Homestead. It was so unnecessary." Carnegie's expression of regret in 1912 probably fell on more receptive ears than the same expression would have received in 1892. Despite his many gestures of benevolence, younger workers at Homestead and labor throughout the country saw Carnegie as a hypocrite. In referring to Frick and Carnegie, it was commonly said: "You can't trust any of them, and it is better to confront a Frick with a hard heart than a Carnegie with a false tongue."[108]

In Homestead there was concern that Governor Pattison would send in the Pennsylvania National Guard [state militia], especially after attempts by Sheriff McCleary on July 8 to get people to serve as deputies to protect the mill property were unsuccessful. Furthermore, the workers refused to surrender the mill to the sheriff. On the same day that the sheriff returned to Homestead, O'Donnell and a delegation from Homestead met with the governor for over an hour and left with the conviction that the national guard would not be sent to Homestead.[109]

The Advisory Committee, which had dissolved itself on July 5, but continued to be in control of affairs, officially reorganized itself on July 10 in its office in the Bost Building. The reason for reorganization was that because "a number of irresponsible men were assuming authority and strutting around town giving conflicting orders. It was thought best to have some head." The Committee was to resume charge of civil matters and take responsibility of preserving order.[110] Its control would not last long, however, because the national guard would be coming to Homestead to take over.

At 10: 00 P.M. on July 10, Governor Pattison announced that he would be sending the National Guard of Pennsylvania to Homestead. The governor's decision to activate the entire 8,500 member state militia was made after Pennsylvania Adjutant General Greenland returned to Harrisburg from a visit to Homestead and reported to the governor "that a collision more sanguinary and appalling than that of Wednesday was sure to result if the militia were not sent to Homestead." Greenland's report was

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[106] *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* July 10, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 119-120.
[107] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 560-561
[108] 1bid.
[109] Serrin, *Homestead,* 81-82.
[110] *The New York Herald,* July 11, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 127.

substantiated in a telegram to the governor from Sheriff McCleary in which the sheriff told the governor that while all was quiet at Homestead, the strikers were in control and were determined that the works would not be operated unless by themselves. The sheriff went on to say, "I have failed to secure a posse respectable enough in numbers to accomplish anything, and I am satisfied that no posse raised by civil authority can change the condition of affairs." "Only a large military force," he assured the governor, "will enable me to control matters."

The governor issued an order to George R. Snowden, Major General Commanding National Guard of Pennsylvania: "Put the division under arms and move at once, with ammunition, to the support of the Sheriff of Allegheny county at Homestead. Maintain the peace. Protect all persons in their rights under the constitution and laws of the State."[111] In Homestead, news that the state militia would be coming was favorably received by the union leaders. On the afternoon of July 11 Burgess McLuckie called a meeting at the Homestead Opera House to explain to his audience of "fellow-workmen and gentlemen" that the troops were coming as friends and allies, and would be received as such.[112]

For the morning of the arrival of the militia, McLuckie and his associates had planned an elaborate reception with the Homestead bands prepared to serenade the troops. There was a festive air among those awaiting the big event. Shortly after 9:00 A.M. excitement mounted when it was announced: "The troops are coming, the troops are coming." There was some disappointment, however, because the troops came in at the Munhall station, passing up the bands and crowd as well as the labor leaders waiting for them at the Homestead station. A total of 8,000 militiamen came, with the remaining 500 held at Mt. Gretna as reserves.[113] Immediately upon leaving the train, a detachment of troops was positioned as pickets among the mill yards and the main body marched down the streets, headed by the Regiment Band. The militia then began to establish Camp Sam Black on the grounds of the Pittsburgh City Poor Farm, the future location of the Carnegie Library of Homestead and Carnegie Library Park.

The camp began on Eighth Avenue, with the headquarters of the Ninth Pennsylvania National Guards (provost Guard), located immediately south of the Bost Building.[114] The camp extended west to McClure Street, south to what became 16th Avenue, and to Whitaker Creek on the east, excluding Harrison and Grant Streets. Major General George Snowden established his headquarters in the Carnegie Schoolhouse, high on the hill with a commanding view of the steel works. Outside the camp proper, guards were stationed at railroad stations, along the north side of Eight Avenue, the length of the western edge of the steel works, at the pump house, and on the high grounds in Swissvale, overlooking the Monongahela River and the mills from the north.

Soon after the militia arrived, Hugh O'Donnell and a group of the strikers, including ex-captain of the militia O. O. Coon, called upon General Snowden in his headquarters. The visit was for the purpose of welcoming Snowden and the troops on behalf of the strikers and the townspeople. When O'Donnell asked Sheriff McCleary, who was present with the general, to introduce him, the sheriff ignored him. At that time, Captain Coon addressed General Snowden, telling him that the group had come "to speak for

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[111] *The New York Herald,* July 11, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 129-130.
[112] *The New York Times,* July 12, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 130.
[113] St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 12, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 131-132.
[114] Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 142-143. See illustration contained within this nomination. Also, see map, "Disposition of the militia in Homestead as shown in a report dated November 30, 1892," for the distribution of troops in Camp Sam Black.

the citizens and for the locked-out men of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers." At this, Snowden launched into a sharp response which made his position absolutely clear:

> I neither know nor care anything about them. I have no opinion to express on this subject one way or the other, I am not here to look after the strike or the Amalgamated Association or to pay any attention to either. I do not accept and do not need at your hands the freedom of Homestead. I have that now in my possession, and I propose to keep the peace. I want no strikers to come near the troops as strikers, and I want it distinctly understood that I am in absolute control of the situation.

O'Donnell amended Coon's statement by deleting reference to the union and by emphasizing that they came as citizens of Homestead and Allegheny County. General Snowden acknowledged that he was always glad to meet "the good citizens, of any community." When O'Donnell told the general, "We have been peaceful and law-abiding citizens," the military commander, sternly and emphatically interrupted O'Donnell:

> No, you have not; you have not been peaceful and law-abiding citizens, Sir; you have defied and insulted the sheriff, and I want to say to you and to the strikers that the governor has instructed me to announce to you that we are here to aid the sheriff ... If you insist on it, Sir, I can go further into the conduct of you and your men. You had better not insist. I want to assure you, however, once more that we care nothing about your association or your strike. The peace will be preserved at any cost.

Despite the general's diatribe, O'Donnell offered to have four brass bands and a parade pass in review before the camp to show the community's support. Needless to say, General Snowden quickly rejected O'Donnell's offer of hospitality: "I don't want any brass-band business while I'm here. I want you to distinctly understand that I am master of this situation." O'Donnell and his group, discouraged and angered by the general's demeanor, hastily retreated.[115] There was not the slightest doubt that the military was in complete control. The Advisory Committee, while relinquishing oversight of the preservation of law and order in Homestead, continued to provide the coordination for matters pertaining to settlement of the strike from the Bost Building.

The *New York Times* correctly sized up the situation with headlines which read: "Bayonet Rule in Force; The Reign of the Strikers Ended in Homestead. Gen. Snowden and the State Troops Take Possession of the Town--No Resistance Offered to the National Guard--The Carnegie Works Turned Over to the Owners... The Strikers Almost Abject in their Submission." The *Times* described the level of military occupation of the area: "Soldiers on both sides of the Monongahela River, armed with Gatling guns and Springfield Rifles ... There is a picket line clear around the town and far up and down the river, while sharpshooters and artillerymen occupy every point commanding the river and the approaches to the town."[116] The number of troops in Homestead would be significantly reduced by the end of July, with the Eighth Regiment, the City Troop of Philadelphia, the Fourteenth Regiment of Pittsburgh the Ninth and Fifteenth Regiments would be ordered home.[117] The last contingent of the militia left Homestead on

[115] New York Times, July 13, 1892, in Dernarest, "The River Ran Red," 135.
[116] *Ibid.,* 136.
[117] *New York Times,* July 27, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 183.

October 13, 1892.[118] Historian David Montgomery has said that while "community solidarity sustained the Homestead strikers... What conquered that community was military force brought in from the outside--first unsuccessfully in the form of hired armed guards, and then irresistibly in the form of soldiers ordered in by Governor Robert Pattison."[119]

At the time the National Guard of Pennsylvania was assuming undisputed control over matters in Homestead, the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives had come to Pittsburgh and Homestead to hold hearings on the events of July 6. That committee, already investigating the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, was especially concerned about the use of Pinkertons at Homestead. When committee chairman Congressman Oates returned to Washington, D.C. on July 15, he reported to his colleagues on the extent of the committee's interviews, including those with Frick, Potter, and workmen, what he described as an "immense amount of testimony." Oates categorized Frick as "a remarkably cunning fellow and a great manager." Frick he said "has one of the brightest lawyers [Philander C. Knox] I have ever met. Regarding the labor leaders, he viewed them as "of intelligence and capacity," and the workmen, he said, "as a body are very able and shrewd, certainly the most intelligent lot of manual workers I have ever seen." When asked if he thought there would be further trouble, Congressman Oates replied: "Yes, yes, I do, more trouble and bloodshed, and a great deal of it. The workmen are not acting on impulse. They are pursuing a course dictated by their calm judgment. Legally they do not claim to be right, but morally they think they are." Oates said that non-union men, probably armed, would soon be introduced under military protection. He predicted that on the withdrawal of the troops the trouble would be renewed.[120] A U.S. Senate Committee, also investigating the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, visited Homestead November 23 and 24, 1892, taking numerous testimonies. Neither the House Report or the Senate Report, both released in February 1893, recommended any federal legislation.[121]

With the military in control around Homestead and the Homestead Steel Works turned over to the company, the mills were operating in a limited sense by July 19, but with non-union workers. The company let it be known that individual applications for employment at the Homestead works would be received until July 21, and that all of the former employees, except forty who had played a lead role in the strike and the July 6 episode, were invited to apply. As of the closing date, no striking employees had applied.[122] All was not well in other Carnegie plants in the Pittsburgh area. Sympathy strikes were underway at Duquesne, Beaver Falls, and the Lawrenceville section of Pittsburgh. A Lawrenceville worker spoke well of the sentiments of his fellow workers: "We are quitting work to-day with a view of winning the fight which the Carnegie people have made upon the Amalgamated Association, and we will win it." "We have got to win this fight," he said, "for if we lose it the backbone of our association will be broken."[123] By early August sixteen hundred men were at work in the Homestead mills, and by

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[118] Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 183.

[119] David Montgomery, *Afterword,* in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 226.

[120] *The Pittsburgh Leader,* July 16, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 145-146. Oates' report, entitled "Labor Troubles at Homestead, Pa. Employment of Pinkerton Detectives," *House of Representatives Report No. 2447,* was published in 1893.

[121] Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 180. The Senate hearings were published in *U.S. Senate Report No. 1280.* Before coming to Homestead, the Senate Committee had taken testimony in Chicago on November 18 of Pinkertons involved in the Homestead incident.

[122] *The Iron Trade Review,* July 21, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 155.

[123] The Pittsburgh Post, July 15, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 141.

September 30, Chairman Frick was declaring that everything at the Homestead mills was running nicely, and that the strike was certainly a thing of the past.[124]

In the meantime, Hugh O'Donnell had been trying to bring about a settlement to the strike. On July 17, he traveled to New York where he would meet with national Republican leaders. Within the higher echelon of the Republican Party there was considerable concern about recent events at Homestead. One of the individuals with whom he met was Whitelaw Reid, editor and publisher of the New York *Tribune,* who had recently been nominated at the Republican National Convention to be Benjamin Harrison's running mate in the November election. Reid, who was particularly alarmed over the potential impact that Homestead would have, not only on the labor vote, but in giving credence to the Democrats' charge that the Republicans were the party of big business and the high tariff, was receptive to O'Donnell's plea for assistance in trying to make Andrew Carnegie aware of the concessions that the Homestead workers were ready to make to reopen negotiations to settle the strike. Reid suggested that O'Donnell write him a letter, as if he were writing from Homestead, in which he would elaborate on the concessions the workers would make. The heart of the letter O'Donnell wrote in Reid's New York Office dealt with having the Carnegie Company recognize the Amalgamated Association by re-opening the conference doors, because in O'Donnell's assessment, there was "no disposition on the part of the employees to stand upon a question of scale or wages, or hours, or anything else. The spirit that dominates them," he wrote, "is conciliatory in the extreme, for they deplore the recent sad occurrence as much as any other class of people in the whole country." He proceeded to ask Reid to do whatever he could in every honorable way to bring about an amicable settlement.

Reid cabled O'Donnell's letter and a message of his own to Carnegie by way of the American Consul General, John C. New, in London. In his message, Reid urged Carnegie "to weigh it most carefully before deciding, for so small a reason as the objection to continued recognition of their organization ... to prolong this distressing and bloody strife, which may spread so widely." Reid received what he thought was a favorable response from Carnegie, again, by way of Consul General New. The essence was that Carnegie had accepted the proposal to negotiate, but that Frick should be consulted. Unknown to Reid was the cablegram Frick had received from Carnegie on July 29: "After due consideration we have concluded Tribune too old. Probably the proposition is not worthy of consideration. Useful showing distress of Amalgamated Association. Use your own discretion about terms and starting."[125]

Assuming that Carnegie was willing to negotiate but wanted Frick to be consulted, Reid sent his representative for the Republican National Committee, John E. Milholland, to Pittsburgh on July 30 to talk with Frick. When Milholland arrived at the Frick home he found the chairman of Carnegie Steel Company, Limited in an unreceptive mood. He was still recuperating from wounds he had received on July 23, when a Russian anarchist, Alexander Berkman, entered Frick's Pittsburgh office, shot him twice in the neck and then stabbed him three times in the hip and legs.[126] Frick emphatically told Milholland that he would never consent to settle the difficulties "if President Harrison himself should personally request him to do so. Notwithstanding the fact that he was a Republican and a warm friend and admirer of the President." Frick told Milholland that he was going to fight the strike out on lines he had laid

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[124] New *York Times,* October 1, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 184; Serrin, *Homestead,* 89.

[125] Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 563-566.

[126] Berkman thought, mistakenly, that he was advancing the cause of labor and particularly that of the Homestead steelworkers. Instead, he caused perception problems for the union because of the incorrect assumption on the part of many that he was connected tothe *AAISW. Ibid,* 562.

down even if it took his life. "It makes no difference," he said, "what Mr. Carnegie has said to [Consul] General New or to anybody else. I won't settle this strike even if he should order me peremptorily to do so." If Carnegie interfered, he asserted, he and all of Carnegie's other managers would resign.

Frick's unwillingness to cooperate with the Republican hierarchy, did not set well with President Harrison and vice-presidential candidate Reid. The Republicans lost in the run for the presidency, and both Harrison and Reid blamed Homestead for their defeat. Harrison said that he was defeated by "the discontent and passion of the workingmen growing out of wages or other labor disturbances." Chauncey Depew, the toastmaster-general of the G.O.P., laid much of the blame for the Republican defeat directly on the Homestead strike: "As a matter of fact the Homestead strike was one of the most important factors in the presidential contest." Reid, in reflecting a year and a half after the election, was still blaming Homestead: "It was Homestead more than any other agency…I am not sure but it was Homestead more than all agencies combined that defeated us in 1892." In evaluating the role Homestead played in the 1892 Republican defeat, Carnegie's biographer, Joseph Frazier Wall, says that most historians have accepted the strike as a major contributory factor, but "it is highly doubtful that this tragic event was in any way decisive in determining the outcome." Carnegie and Frick, Wall maintains, "served the Republican Party as useful scapegoats upon whom to load the burden of its defeat."[127]

When O'Donnell returned to Homestead from his meeting with Whitelaw Reid he learned that the other members of the Advisory Committee strongly disagreed with his trying to cut a deal with the company without involving them and that his continued leadership of the Committee was in serious jeopardy.[128] In fact, O'Donnell was replaced by Thomas Crawford, first on an interim basis, then permanently as chairman of the Advisory Committee.[129] The former chairman also learned that Carnegie Steel had filed charges and warrants had been issued on July 18 for the arrest of himself, Burgess John McLuckie, and five other Amalgamated leaders on charges of conspiracy and murder. By mid-September the number of workers being charged had grown to 167. All were released on bail.[130]

On August 3, the Advisory Committee filed murder charges against Frick and several other company officials, including Lovejoy and Potter, and against Robert and William Pinkerton and Captain Fred Heinde of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency. Warrants were issued for their arrest. They, too, were freed on bail.[131] On September 30, additional charges were brought against the entire Advisory Committee by Chief Justice Edward H. Paxson of the State Supreme Court. This time, the charge was treason against the state, with treason being defined by Justice Paxson as "the organization of a large number of men in a common purpose to defy law, resist its officers, and to deprive any portion of their fellow-citizens of their rights under the Constitution and laws." Justice Paxson also declared: "It is a state of war when a business plant has to be surrounded by the army of the State to protect it from unlawful violence at the hands of former employees." Major General Snowden announced that he was responsible for the arrest of the Advisory Committee on the treason charge. As in the earlier arrest of the Homestead labor leaders on murder charges, the defendants were released after posting bail.[132] While the

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[127] *Ibid,* 568-569.

[128] *The Pittsburgh Post*, July 27, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 181.

[129] Krause, *The Battle for Homestead,* 345; 356.

[130] Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 126; *New York Times,* July 19, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 151.

[131] New York Times, August 4, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 183.

[132] *New York Times,* October 1, 4, 11, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 184-186.

treason charges were pending, murder cases against Sylvester Critchlow, Jack Clifford, and Hugh O'Donnell were brought to trial. All were acquitted, beginning with Critchlow on November 23.[133] In February 1893 Clifford and O'Donnell were found not guilty. After three acquittals ' the company and union agreed to drop all charges on both sides. The acquittal of Critchlow, Clifford, and O'Donnell has been interpreted as representing on the part of the jurors the fact that "the heart of the law is common sense fairness."[134]

As the strike continued into fall, it was having a telling effect upon the people of Homestead; the town was split, businesses were suffering, and the borough council was unable to function because of the unwillingness of those favoring the strike and those opposing it to sit together. An attempt to strengthen the position of the strikers was made by Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, when he came to Homestead on October 21. In speaking to almost the entire town, Gompers advocated a boycott of Carnegie products. Nothing came of the proposal. Besides, what impact could such a boycott possibly have unless it extended nationwide? There was no indication that was in the making. There was some optimism represented in the return to the Homestead Steel Works of Charles M. Schwab as its superintendent. Schwab had been superintendent in 1889, but had gone to Edgar Thomson upon the death of Captain William Jones. Schwab was already making overtures to the former workers, particularly the skilled workers, whom the company badly needed.[135]

That the end of the Homestead strike was near was evidenced at the meeting of the strikers on November 13, when William T. Roberts, one of the strike leaders, told the group of his observation that the finishers were deserting the Amalgamated Association. Roberts told it like he saw it: "In view of the confidence you have placed in me, I don't propose to come here and tell you that everything is rosy when it is not. If you think with this combined opposition in your own ranks you can fight it out to the end, I am with you." When asked what they wished to do, the men shouted, "Fight it out to the end! " But resolve was weakening.

The first group of the Homestead strikers to hesitate were the approximately two thousand nonunion mechanics and laborers. At a meeting on November 18, they appointed a committee to meet with the union leaders and present to them a proposal that the strike be declared off and that the mechanics and laborers be released from further obligations. That same night, the Amalgamated Association rejected the proposal by a vote of 106 to 75, then took a vote on whether to continue the strike. The vote in this case was 224 to 129 in favor of continuing. The mechanics and laborers were told that they could act as they liked, but that the Amalgamated Association would not be responsible for their actions. On November 19, the mechanics and laborers re-convened. After receiving the Amalgamated Association's report, they agreed unanimously to return to work, but not to accept tonnage jobs, considering that to be trespassing on the rights of the union men. After the short meeting, the men went immediately to the mill and filed their applications for reinstatement. All of the laborers were put to work, or assured of going to work in a few days, but less than half of the mechanics were rehired because of the limited number of vacancies.

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[133] New York Times, November 24, 1892, in Demarest, "The River Ran Red," 191.
[134] Robert S. Barker, "The Law Takes Sides," in Demarest, "The *River Runs Red,"* 194.
[135] Serrin, *Homestead,* 90; Domike and Fauteux, "The Fate of the Principal Characters," in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 200.

The final chapter of the Homestead strike occurred on November 2 1, when a group of less than three hundred strikers assembled in the rink on that Sunday morning to "register the confirmation of their defeat." Some men continued to argue passionately against giving in, for "to yield," they said, "would be to hasten the disintegration of the Amalgamated Association." This was not the prevailing feeling, however. When a standing vote was taken on the question of declaring the mill open, the proposition carried by a vote of 101 to 91.[136] The strike was over. The first order of business for the Advisory Committee was to provide the closing act by dissolving itself. The Committee met in its headquarters in the Bost Building on the evening of November 21, disposed of unfinished business, then ceased to exist.[137]

On November 22 Frick cabled Carnegie:

> Strike officially declared off yesterday. Our Victory is now complete and most gratifying. Do not think we will ever have any serious labor trouble again, and should now soon have Homestead and all the works formerly managed by Carnegie, Phipps & Company, in as good shape as Edgar Thomson and Duquesne. Let the Amalgamated still exist and hold full sway at other people's mills. That is no concern of ours.[138]

Carnegie's initial response on November 27 while on tour of Italy was: "Life is worth living again ... first happy morning since July ... congratulate all around." Later, he would cable Frick from Rome: "Think I'm about ten years older than when with you last. Europe has rung with Homestead, Homestead, until we are sick of the name, but it is all over now."[139]

Homestead was not "all over now" for him or many others who had been involved in the conflict. Carnegie had reason to feel pangs of pain, as he referred to Homestead in his 1912 autobiography, for "the wounds inflicted upon him by press, pulpit, and political platform were deep and came from all directions." In Britain criticism of him was particularly bitter. "Every major newspaper carried full front-page accounts of the events at Homestead, and most of them editorialized at length on Carnegie's deficiencies as an employer and a man."[140]This grieved Carnegie greatly because there was nothing he wanted more than to be loved; perhaps the most compelling motivation in his numerous acts of charity.

Carnegie did receive considerable comfort from the letters of support he got from such prominent individuals as British Prime Minister William E. Gladstone. In his letter to Carnegie on September 19 1892 Gladstone told the hurting Carnegie: "I do not forget that you have been suffering yourself from anxieties…I wish I could relieve you of these imputations of journalists, too often rash, conceited or censorious, sometimes ill-natured." Continuing in his praise, Prime Minister Gladstone told Carnegie: "No one who knows you will be prompted by the unfortunate occurrences across the water (of which manifestly we cannot know the exact merits) to qualify in the slightest degree either his confidence in your generous views or his admiration of the good and great work you have already done." Carnegie did not waste any time in thanking Gladstone and attempting, though not altogether truthful, to explain what

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[136] Arthur G. Burgoyne, *Homestead.* Pittsburgh: Rawsthorne Engraving and Printing Company, 1893, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 188.

[137] *New York Times,* November 23, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 189.

[138] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 570. Wall dates Frick's cable to Carnegie as November 21, 1892. That could not be correct, because the strike ended on November 21, and Frick refers to the strike having ended "yesterday"-- making November 22 the correct date for Frick's cable.

[139] *Ibid.*

[140] *Ibid.,* 571.

had happened at Homestead. He told the prime minister that "the false step was made in trying to run the Homestead Works with new men. It is a test to which workingmen should not be subject. It is expecting too much to expect poor men to stand by and see their work taken by others." Carnegie said that he had a plan worked out where everything would have been all quietly settled, but his plan arrived too late. He told Gladstone that he heard nothing until days had elapsed, despite the fact that Frick had informed him within twelve hours. He went on to say that the pain he suffered increased daily and that the "Works are not worth one drop of human blood. I wish they had sunk." It was obvious that Carnegie was baring his soul in a profound way to the prime minister, when he said: "I write this to you freely, to no one else have I written so--I must be silent and suffer but after a time I hope to be able to do something to restore good feeling between my young & rather too rash partner & the men over at Homestead."[141]

What did the settlement of the lockout/strike mean for the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers union, the individual workers, and the town of Homestead? The AAISW was, without a doubt, dead at the Homestead mills. Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, did what Frick had said it would do. Each employee would be treated as an individual, which meant that he was required to sign an agreement in which he pledged himself to refrain from belonging to any labor organization and to be governed entirely by the rules and regulations of the company.[142] As to the destiny of AAISW in the steel industry in general, it looked bleak. Unionism throughout the steel industry was effectively destroyed by the victory of Carnegie Steel Company, Limited over the Amalgamated Association at Homestead. Efforts to dislodge the union began in earnest. The Association lost its last major strongholds in 1897 and 1899 at Jones and Laughlin and Illinois Steel, respectively.[143] By 1900 not a steel plant of consequence in western Pennsylvania, where AAISW had previously had its strongest following, recognized the Association. Within three years, the last of the steel mills in the country had surrendered its AAISW charter.[144] For the next thirty-four years there were no recognized unions within the steel mills of the nation.[145]

Some immediate positive results of the July 6 confrontation between workers and the Pinkertons were the reports of the House and Senate committees, which were generally favorable to labor [except in the treatment of the Pinkertons as they were forced to move through the gauntlet] in their investigation of the use of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency.[146] The publicity at the time of the battle, much of it focusing on the company's use of Pinkertons, resulted in a "wave of public indignation over Pinkertonism." The result was that by 1899, twenty-six states had passed laws against the hiring of outside guards.[147] In May 1893, the Pennsylvania legislature passed its anti-Pinkerton bill, the Kearns Act, which made it illegal for anyone, including private companies, to hire guards who were not citizens of the state.[148]

The immediate negative aspects of the lockout/strike and settlement far outweighed the gains, unless one is considering the financial gains the company experienced for the next few years largely because of the

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[141] Andrew Carnegie to William E. Gladstone, September 24, 1892, in Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 575.
[142] *New York Times,* November 23, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 189.
[143] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 579.
[144] David Brody, *Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 57, 69.
[145] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 579.
[146] John A. Fitch, *The Steel Workers* (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 130--132. Fitch's work was originally published by the Russell Sage Foundation in 1910 as part of *The Pittsburgh Survey.*
[147] Wall, *Andrew Carnegie,* 578.
[148] Burgoyne, *Homestead,* in Dernarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 203.

non-union status of its workers.[149] The individual workers at Homestead paid heavily for the strike. Some of the leaders suffered for many years; they were blacklisted, denied employment in the steel industry for the rest of their lives. By the time the strike ended, many people were suffering from the lack of money to buy food and clothes. Despite superintendent Schwab's more liberal policy of rehiring former workers, The *Pittsburgh Press* reported on December 9, 1892, that there were 1,800 men in Homestead who could not find work. "The wolf is at the door," the *Press* reported; "innocent children, hard-working mothers, fathers who in the majority of cases simply obeyed higher authorities—all are suffering in the land of plenty."[150] The *Press* asked for contributions for the relief of the Homestead sufferers, many of whom had absolutely nothing with which to feed their families. That was the situation in much of Homestead.

When Hamlin Garland described Homestead in an article in the June 1894 issue of *McClure's Magazine,* he painted a dismal picture: "The town was as squalid and unlovely as could well be imagined, and the people were mainly of the discouraged and sullen type to be found everywhere labor passes into the brutalizing stage of severity. It had the disorganized and incoherent effect of a town which has feeble public spirit."[151] Things had not changed for the better by the time John A. Fitch worked among the steelworkers in Homestead and in the general Pittsburgh area from 1907-1908 gathering material for *The Steel Workers,* his contribution to *The Pittsburgh Survey.* Fitch found that the majority of the steel workers were resentful and bitter toward their employers, and in speaking of the older men, those who would have participated in the 1892 strike, for example, Fitch noted, "These men, with spirit dead, face a future in which they expect nothing and ask for nothing. They look dull-eyed on a world from which the brightness is gone."[152] The pervasive sullen attitude of the Homestead workers was troubling to author Charles Spahr, who visited Homestead in 1900 while writing his book, *America's Working People.* Homestead presented an atmosphere, he said, which at times was "heavy with disappointment and hopelessness."

But the town and its people overcame this bitter legacy. During the 20th century the mill produced steel in record numbers, and the town eventually enjoyed prosperity, although it would never recapture the kind of labor solidarity it had prior to the 1892 lockout and strike. In the late 1930s the mill was once again organized, by the Steelworkers Organizing Committee; in 1942, their newly formed union, the United Steelworkers of America, dedicated a special monument in Homestead to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the struggle of 1892. The Amalgamated's 1892 headquarters, the Bost Building, located hard by the mill, would continue to play a role in the community, functioning as a hotel and a rooming house. Its prominent role in the Battle of Homestead faded to a distant memory until the 1992 centennial of the battle, when a state historic marker was erected in front of the building.

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[149] Brody, *Steelworkers in America,* 56.

[150] *The Pittsburgh Press,* December 9, 1892, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 195.

[151] Hamlin Garland, "Homestead and Its Perilous Trades: Impressions of a Visit," *McClure's Magazine,* Vol. 3, No. 1, June 1894, in Demarest, *"The River Ran Red,"* 204.

[152] Fitch, *The Steel Workers,* 233.

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Previous documentation on file (NPS):

___ Preliminary Determination of Individual Listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested.
_X_ Previously Listed in the National Register.
___ Previously Determined Eligible by the National Register.
___ Designated a National Historic Landmark.
___ Recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey: #
___ Recorded by Historic American Engineering Record: #

Primary Location of Additional Data:

___ State Historic Preservation Office
___ Other State Agency Federal Agency
___ Local Government
___ University
___ Other (Specify Repository):

10. GEOGRAPHICAL DATA

Acreage of Property: Less than one acre.

UTM References:

Zone	Easting	Northing
17	592680	4473720

Verbal Boundary Description:

The nominated property consists of the lot and building recorded in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Allegheny County in Deed Book Volume 9351 page 579, designated Block 130-G, Lot Number 165.

Boundary Justification:

The boundary is the historic and present boundary of the Bost Building

11. FORM PREPARED BY

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