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Richard G. Ring
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NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

SEPTEMBER 11TH ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interview with

RICHARD G. RING

Associate Director, Park Operations & Education

Conducted by Janet A. McDonnell, Ph.D.

May 29, 2002

Main Interior Building, Washington, D.C.

START OF TAPE

Janet McDonnell: I'm Janet McDonnell and I'm here today with Dick Ring, Associate Director for Park Operations and Education. It's May 29, 2002, and we're in the Main Interior Building. To start, how did you first learn of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade [Center] towers?

Richard Ring: My wife called me. I was here in this office, and I got a call from my wife who said, "Turn on the television, there's just been an incident at the World Trade towers." I turned that on and watched the footage, the filming, on the television of the first tower having been struck, and while we were watching, a few minutes after, we watched the second tower being struck. And then, as we were trying to come to grips with that at some distance, we heard someone say that the Pentagon had been struck. I walked out on the balcony here and I was able to see that, to see the smoke coming up from the Pentagon from a distance and then walked back in and watched the footage here.

Janet McDonnell: So, what was going through your head? What were some of the things that you thought needed to be done quickly?

Richard Ring: Well, from the National Park Service standpoint, I wasn't thinking that. I was thinking that we were probably not directly involved, and my focus was to learn more. I've been through several of these kinds of major incidents before, probably the most significant one was as superintendent of Everglades National Park when Hurricane Andrew came through - without a doubt a national disaster, while localized to one area. Over the years I've learned that the tendency is to run around and do something because there is a lot of energy that wants to get out. And the best thing to do is try and stop, slow down, and try and find out more about what's going on and confirm it. And one of the things that tends to happen right away in these kind of events is that solid information becomes very, very difficult to weed out from all of the speculation and all of the rumors and all of the second-hand or third-hand reported information.

Janet McDonnell: All the confusion.

Richard Ring: The confusion tends to mount. That day, I was here with the rest of the folks in the building dealing with just trying to find out, learn more information. No National Park sites had been struck so in terms of our immediate need to mobilize to deal with an event or incident, there wasn't much to do to except to try and learn more about what potential existed. And anything we were learning, our folks at our sites were learning in the same instance because we were watching it live on the news coverage and hearing probably more directly about what was going on that way.

Janet McDonnell: Was that your primary sources of information?

Richard Ring: Initially.

Janet McDonnell: Were the Park Police providing some information through their communication system?

Richard Ring: They were providing information that they were being drawn into response as a support agency, but that was information we were receiving that didn't require decisions at the national level. It was pretty much all the propositioned plans and the resources were going to work. Mostly with Park Police, it was helping to deal with traffic flow and–

Janet McDonnell: And potential threats here in the city?

Richard Ring: And potential threats here in the city associated with their work around the White House. All of that is operationally set up and tends to crossover and go into place directly with the folks involved. So, we were getting some reports on how they were deploying. But mostly folks where trying to learn what was going on for the first couple of hours, from the 9:00 timeframe until about 11:00. And then there was a determination to basically send people out of Washington, to shut the government down, basically send people home, which was quite a mess on that first day. And there was a determination to send some key–the Director and some key folks from the Department of Interior to–initially our folks were to relocate to Harpers Ferry [West Virginia]. And then they drew them into the National Conservation Training Center.

Janet McDonnell: I wanted to ask you about the implementation of the continuity of operations plan and how effective the implementation of that plan was.

Richard Ring: It wasn't very effective. It was a plan that was done without a lot of actual experience and what it said was we'd go to NCR, National Capital Region, relocate out of this building. The continuity of operations plan, like any emergency plan, has got to have sound assumptions on what event it's reacting to. And if there was a fire in this building or a bomb threat in this building, relocating to the National Capital Region makes sense. If there's a nuclear threat to Washington, then you've got to leave Washington. So, having an alternate location outside the city that you could deploy to was important. So, having the ability to trigger a variety of responses based on the circumstances you were facing required a much more flexible and sophisticated plan than we had in place. That first day, we basically–I mean, I went along with everyone else, we were basically told just leave. In a couple of hours though–We made a couple of runs to the, as I recall, basement of the Interior Building.

Janet McDonnell: The National Business Center down there? I think that's come up. No? Okay.

Richard Ring: There were a couple of points where we were told "get downstairs now," and everyone in the building went down into the cafeteria. And a lot of confusion and a lot of concern that no one knew why we were being told to head downstairs, and concern that it wasn't clear that there was any emergency team or procedure in place. So even for the department there wasn't an orderly way of handling things. There wasn't a known threat. We had some of our folks here who tried to help, our Director to the head of our Fire, Aviation, and Incident Management program, Rick Gale, and several others helped with getting folks organized to communicate down in the cafeteria with the folks in the building about what was going on. And there were just some basic things about communication that nobody was handling.

Janet McDonnell: There's no public address system in this building.

Richard Ring: No public address system, and nobody was tagged with the responsibility –once folks said, "get everyone to the basement," nobody was tagged with the responsibility of being the communications link with those folks. Ultimately, we were able to get that across that somebody needed to do that and to get people connected to each other. And then up to the point where first our Director and then Steve Griles got up and began to explain what they knew was going on and calmed a fair amount of consternation that was going on. And ultimately, they basically said, "Everybody get out, go home," which they all did. And I did as well. But from home I basically set up a conference call with several of my counterparts in the regional offices where we talked about what we knew was going on, and I updated them on what plans we had initially to operate with. I came in the following day and not a lot of folks were here. In fact, most folks were told to stay home, but a few of us were in the following day, operating from this building, in a skeleton crew type of operation.

Janet McDonnell: In those first few hours afterwards were you meeting with the Director and other senior staff, maybe down in the Director's office or something? I just wondered what kind of guidance you might have been given by the Director in those early hours after the attacks.

Richard Ring: I don't think there was any guidance. The response in those first few hours, everybody was stunned. Everybody was trying to understand what implications there were. Certain with regards to their own personal safety of people at our location here and to trying to understand whether not there was any information that indicated either a strike on, or any kind of a specific threat to, any of our areas. I don't think we had any specific

information but number one, none of our areas were struck so we were not in response mode in those areas. And the next question was whether or not there was information related to imminent threats. We certainly had heard on the news that there were things about the White House, so there was still the area in downtown D.C. that might get hit. But we weren't hearing specific information just yet.

Janet McDonnell: Were you getting information about how some of our sites in New York city had been affected–Federal Hall, Castle Clinton, Ellis Island, the Statue of Liberty? Where you starting to get those reports in?

Richard Ring: In that morning? No, it took about an hour and a half or so for us to see what was going on in New York City. Well we knew Federal Hall and the Battery [Park] and Castle Clinton were relatively nearby. No one expected the towers were going to collapse until we saw them come down. When they came down, we realized there was something serious was going on there at which point, we weren't getting–there was not a lot of information going out of New York City at that point.

Janet McDonnell: Their land lines were down–

Richard Ring: Land lines were down. Cell phones were completely blocked. So no, there was not a lot of information flowing. We knew there would be affects up there, but again we had no information that there was a direct impact on our facilities. Even with the collapse of the towers, we had concerns, but no information. And frankly that day it was impossible to communicate in any normal way in and out of this city. We were able to get, because the Park Service does have an incident response system that we are able to organize to deal with major events.

Janet McDonnell: Were you involved in that decision to activate that Type-1 Incident Team?

Richard Ring: Yes.

Janet McDonnell: Can you tell me a little bit about how that decision was made and when? A little background on it?

Richard Ring: I strongly recommended–I had Rick Gale here as well as others from our Ranger Activities office, Dennis Burnett, and others. Given my experience with major incidents, my perception was that we needed a Type-1 Team deployed immediately to coordinate all of the agency's actions because our headquarters function was disrupted in ways that there was no orderly plan in place to deal with. And it was almost impossible to put any orderly plan in place. The first thing that happens during one of these incidents is your plan goes out the window, because it never unfolds the way you think it

will. You usually put a plan in place for the last event and that's is not what happens next.

[Phone rings - tape interruption]

Janet McDonnell: We were talking about the activation of the Type-1 Incident Team and activation of the Incident Management System. You were explaining how you came to that conclusion. Had you had experience with the system with Hurricane Andrew?

Richard Ring: We've used the incident command system on a massive scale–on an interagency basis–for years and years. Probably the largest example that the Park Service has been involved in is the Yellowstone [National Park] fires in 1988. We had twelve thousand people working on those and had literally an area command involving multiple agencies. Twelve thousand folks deployed fighting that fire. It grew up around the edge of the wildland fire system. It's a highly structured command and control system that can be scaled up or scaled down to any size event–and as we began to use it–any type of event. So we basically began to use it in an all-risk mode, where we can have an incident team deployed, and if an incident became a much more significant event, we could bring in resources from around the country, whether they be security resources or firefighting resources or resource management resources or oil spill resources, you name it.

Richard Ring: You could bring a massive number of people together drawing from all the agencies all over the country to address whatever you were facing and you pull it into a structure that had an incident management team that's basically trained in the main functions of incident management. And there are teams that are trained at a local level, at a regional level, and one that is able to handle national scale events, which is a Type-1, Type-2 versus a local incident team. There's a management team that deploys together that has trained together, works together, so they know each other. They deploy as a team and they handle everything from planning to operations, to the logistics associated with supplying the incident with whatever personal or material or support is needed, to public information, which is both information to people on the site as well as the press.

Richard Ring: So, it's usually built around a five-member team. And knowing that and the Park Service having committed to using it in an all-risk mode, I thought that that was the most capable tool that we could deploy quickly, where people were pre-trained and pre-positioned to deploy to handle just about any kind of event that occurred. And I strongly urged, because of the nature of what was unfolding, that we didn't have a situation with regards to how we handle relocation of our headquarters function, that was responding to an already known set of circumstances. So, we needed folks

who could make it up and respond to it as they learned what was going on. We needed the ability to liaise what we were doing with the department and higher levels of government and that's a capability that this incident command process provides.

Richard Ring: We also had people who are experienced. Rick Gale was the incident commander at the Yellowstone fires and incident commander at the Hurricane Andrew event. And he was just one of many who were vastly capable with experience at doing these things. For that reason, we could have coordination going on to support all the changes that needed to occur and in my view you cannot respond to these kinds of incidents with, you cannot manage emergencies with the organization you have in place to manage your normal mission. The structure isn't the right structure. The people aren't necessarily the right people with the right skills. The processes that you use to accomplish things are not designed for the speed and coordination and the command and control you need for an emergency type incident.

Richard Ring: So what I began to see was that, with the new administration, what I was seeing occur was that we had people in place that had never dealt with this kind of an event before–of course no one had. But secondly, they did not know that there was a capability within the organization to step in and deal with these kinds of events. And to the degree they were aware of it, there was not a confidence or a trust that they could just turn things over to someone else. The felt they were personally in the spotlight and on the line for what occurred here, and they tended to turn to the normal day-to-day organization that they weren't even completely aware of because they were relatively new given the change in administration. But they tended to turn to the normal organization to respond to an emergency, which a normal organization is incapable of doing. It's not designed to do that kind of stuff So there was a lot of time spent trying to figure out what needed to be done and how to organize to do it.

Richard Ring: That, in my view, would not have been needed if an Incident Command Structure, whether it was a Type-2, Type-1, an area command, whatever was needed, was put in place. Then the people responsible, i.e. the Director and the Secretary, could have delegated specific objectives who then were highly qualified and trained to carry out those objectives in an emergency situation. As opposed to the people in this building who are highly trained to carry out our mission objective in a normal working circumstance, not an emergency circumstance. So, I strongly advocated that that be done, and it was not clear what was being done at the departmental level. We advocated that at the very least the Park Service convene in this kind of a group. So, I pitched that very hard.

Janet McDonnell: So how did you allay some of the concerns you just described? The concern about, to some extent, turning management over to an entity they weren't familiar with or comfortable with. Did that take some time to raise that comfort level?

Richard Ring: Yes, and I don't think it ever–While a Type-1 Team was convened, I don't think there was ever a delegation to it that really counted. In other words, you have to be familiar with emergency operations and you have to trust it, so that you then back out of it once you turn it over. You have to be capable of setting clear objectives for it. So, you have to know enough about emergencies to say, "Here is what I want done." You have to be able to back away and let people do that.

Richard Ring: And in emergencies you cannot second-guess things like costs. If it is truly an emergency, you simply say, "Get it done, accumulate costs, do whatever it takes to get things done and we'll sort out the issue of where we are going to find the resources to pay for what happened during the emergency stage." And I distinguish that from the recovery stage. Emergencies don't last for months. Emergencies tend to last for a matter of a few days or a week or two.

Janet McDonnell: In this instance, when do you think that transition occurred, from emergency to recovery?

Richard Ring: There isn't a defining moment for me on that. And I'll say it was a little bit muddy or obscure because my view is, we were probably operating in an emergency mode, everybody was feeling in an emergency mode, for longer than was necessary. But part of what helps you transition from an emergency mode is a plan that helps you transition from an emergency mode. It's part of what an incident [team] does for you.

END OF SIDE A

START OF SIDE B

Richard Ring: One of the things that an incident operation does on a daily basis is assess the status of things and set up a process to demobilize the incident and to transition back to, to a normal operation because often times things don't go back to normal after one of these incidents, but at least an operation that can be handled by the normal organization. And because there wasn't a clear understanding of that, and in fact a clear commitment to the incident, there wasn't a clear sense of when we were transitioning out of that.

Janet McDonnell: Given some of the challenges that you just described, how would you evaluate the ultimate success of the incident management system or what

kind of grade would you give the Type 1 team? But the broader question - is the system itself still good if maybe it was underutilized in this particular event?

Richard Ring: I think that the responses that the Department of Interior and the National Park Service put in place to the events of 9/11 were nowhere near as effective as they could have been. And they were okay; they got some basic things done. But they weren't as good as they could have been but that's largely because the incident command system tool that was available to both organizations to pick up and use was not employed. And in the case of the Department and the case of the Park Service it was not employed in a way that let it do fully what it was designed to do.

Janet McDonnell: On the broader question of coordination with the department, how did that occur? What office within the Park Service or who within the Park Service were sort of the conduit for communication with senior Interior officials, and how smooth was that communication?

Richard Ring: Well, the Director was communicating regularly and routinely with the Secretary and the chief of staff. At the same time, we had an incident team in place up in the Ranger Activities corridor, the 7400 corridor [of the Main Interior Building]. And they were communicating with the office set up at the Interior level made up of career Interior folks to work with many of the same issues, but on a more detailed level. So, we had a liaison between the incident team and the career office. And then I suggested that our incident team commander, who initially was Rick Gale, basically get with and stay with the Director. So, there was a cross over between what she was doing in communication and direction to the agency and organization and what he was attempting to do on her behalf with regards to emergency operations.

Richard Ring: One of the most difficult things about use of the incident command system is sorting out its relationship to the normal organization. If it is clearly off doing something else, something special that really doesn't interfere with or is in no way related to the normal work of the agency, that tends to work fairly well. If the agency, normal agency, is just stopped–someone pulled the circuit breaker on the ability of the normal agency to function– then that works pretty well too because there's just the incident in play. But when both are working and one has had to scale back, or a significant amount of the normal organization's mission and function has been disrupted, and the incident team is trying to handle rebuilding or repairing or recovery from that, then how the two relate is a very difficult challenge.

Janet McDonnell: It's more confusing.

Richard Ring: And it's one that has got to be worked very hard from both sides. And whoever the agency administrator is who is over the normal organization and normal incident has got to pay attention to how that works and be sensitive to whose role and responsibility is to do what. That can be very difficult.

Janet McDonnell: How important a role did the communications center out in Shenandoah National Park play in this coordination, in providing the information that the Director needed to make good decisions? It could be information about available resources, that kind of thing–how vital a link?

Richard Ring: Oh, I feel they were an important link and played an important role. Their role was made very difficult because once again they were oftentimes not allowed to play it. We had some folks from Park Service headquarters here, but also principally from the Department, contacting areas directly both to obtain and order out responses, reactions, and resources. So, on a number of occasions there was confusion.

Janet McDonnell: You brought up the issue of funding. As I understand it, there was no existing authority for emergency funding. Is that correct? I also read somewhere that initially bureau heads were told by the Department that expenses would be covered and to take appropriate actions based on that. And then days later bureaus were then told that they would have to cover the cost themselves. Is that accurate?

Richard Ring: Sure.

Janet McDonnell: Okay. What impact did this whole issue of funding have on the way the Park Service responded?

Richard Ring: It had a chilling effect on how the Park Service responded, because decisions were cautionary or second-guessed or hedged, or there was hesitation in place because people were concerned about where the money was going to come from to pay for this. There's statutory authority on the books, I learned in Hurricane Andrew, that says when a national disaster is declared by the President, there is legal authority to take any dollars you have and spend it on anything - to help anyone who is associated with that national disaster. It doesn't have to be your own agency mission. So, the statutory authority is there. The issue of who ends ups footing the bill, well–

[Tape interruption]

Richard Ring: –somebody always has to foot the bill. Even in wildland fires or other emergencies, a decision is always made on whether or not the agency subsequently may have to trade off a number of multimillion-dollar

construction projects or whether or not a supplemental appropriation is passed. That always happens. But in my view, if you try and hedge how you operate in an emergency based on having those questions answered at that point in time, you will almost certainly impair the effectiveness of your emergency operation and risk impairing it seriously to the point where you're not responding effectively. You just have to assume that in an emergency–not recovery, I'm talking emergency–that for the initial period of time, it may be days, it may be weeks, you have to simply agree that you're going to do whatever it takes to accomplish your emergency objectives and understand that at a later point you will take up the issue of how you are going to fund what it costs you to do that. If you place those kinds of constraints on an incident team during the emergency stages of an event, you've effectively second-guessed and curtailed their ability to act and to accomplish the tasks that you've given them - and inappropriately so. And that happened here.

Janet McDonnell: Do you want to be specific at all about an instance where you thought maybe a different decision would have been made if funding hadn't been a concern?

Richard Ring: My general sense is there was hesitation in making decisions because there was concern about where we would find the funds to do it. So, there was hesitation and delays and people second-guessing. "Well, we don't have to do it this way. We can do it a cheaper way here." So there was a lot of second-guessing and micro-management associated with an incident operation that had an effect on delaying actions that could have effectively communicated with employees better, effectively could have put security in place, effectively could have deployed appropriate resources far longer than was necessary and in some cases longer than the period of time it would have been useful to act. It was no longer appropriate to take that action because time had passed when it could have had any effect.

Janet McDonnell: Do you think that the decentralized structure of the National Park Service has an effect on its ability to allocate resources within the Service?

Richard Ring: Do you mean in an emergency?

Janet McDonnell: In an emergency.

Richard Ring: Of course. That just goes back to my point that no normal organization that's set up to do routine day-to-day business is set up to operate in an emergency environment with the possible exception of the wildland fire community, which is only set up to operate in an emergency environment. It's planning and training and preparing for that–so its normal mission is that. But almost no government agency that provides routine services–

including ours–is effectively set up to respond to emergencies through its normal organizational process.

Janet McDonnell: Well, we're getting down to our last few minutes, and what I wanted to end with a few broader questions. Do you think that the mission of the Park Service has changed in any way as a result of the September 11 attacks?

Richard Ring: No. I think we are still in a mode where we have elevated our levels of security at a number of our sites. So, the level of activity–we've always been involved with the level of security–but the level of activity and level of resources committed to that activity is significantly different. And we are trying to find ways to make that fit more routinely so that there's not a disruption to our visitor service or our normal enjoyment of the park. It's just that it occurs now with higher levels of protection in place. We're working to try to smooth that out, but that's always been our mission–we're just trying to adjust to a different level of program activity on the security side of things. So that's one. But I don't think anything fundamentally has changed in our mission.

Richard Ring: I'd add one other thing and that is–we are sending resources away from our agency to help other agencies accomplish a heightened level of security activity associated with their mission. So, I think we are helping to support for instance the Bureau of Reclamation. And we're working with the Navy and some other agencies to help them with their missions. So, there's a workload burden. That doesn't mean we have taken it on as a mission. It's just that we've had a call out by other agencies to try and help them.

Janet McDonnell: Do you think the role of the generalist park ranger has changed at all? Is there more of an emphasis on the law enforcement aspect of the ranger's function?

Richard Ring: I think a lot of the rangers who are commissioned as law enforcement officers have been drawn into guard functions and security functions that are associated with law enforcement to a greater degree than their normal duties, their normal distribution of duties. And I believe that the Department is already on a track to be me more focused on law enforcement as a separate function. But I think that latter part has put more pressure on narrowing the park ranger function from a generalist into more of a law enforcement type of function. I think that the events of 9/11 have simply focused the workload of rangers into security and law enforcement related duties for a period of time.

Janet McDonnell: So, do we have a sense yet of how the emphasis on protection and homeland security missions for the park rangers has cultural and natural

resources in the parks? I ask that because one of the regional chief rangers mentioned that the park ranger has historically been the eyes and ears out in the park, and when they see damage to resources–they are keeping vigil out there, and as they have been drawn into security missions, there are fewer of them out there to perform that function. And I was wondering if we had started to get any feedback yet on what the impact has been?

Richard Ring: Oh, I think there is a perception that there is less time and attention, because people are being drawn away to provide enhanced security at Park Service sites. Drawn away from their normal duties in their normal parks in some cases. And also, being drawn away to provide enhanced security functions at other agency sites that there is a significant amount less of their normal vigilance and monitoring and enforcement role going on and protection role going on throughout the park. There is a concern, and predicted impact, that we'll probably see more archeological sites disturbed that we'll never know about, and that the level of incident will go up and the level of other damage unknown, un-responded to, will go up. I think there is a significant about that, but I have not seen any documentation yet about the actual occurrence that we've experienced as a result.

Janet McDonnell: I'll make this the last question. If you would just talk a little bit more, in a broader sense–of the challenges involved with balancing the need to respond appropriately to an emergency with the Park Service's historic mission of protecting park resources. Is the challenge just that you've got fewer people to do this, or are there some bigger issues here? I guess what I'm asking is, [is] there a larger context to all of this?

Richard Ring: In terms of our capability?

Janet McDonnell: I don't know whether you have had discussions with other senior leaders about this but - what are some of the challenges of balancing the two? I mean, someone–whether it is that park superintendent or the Director herself - someone on a daily basis is probably making decisions about resources and where they go. It's the same issue we were talking about before but in a broader context.

Richard Ring: Well, whenever you have these kinds of things, and I'll liken it again to the wildland fire program, we have a declared level of threat that has been in place with the wildland program for years, so whenever you have one region that has a whole series of fires going on, nationally we go to a certain threat level. When you have two regions going simultaneously, or three or four, you go to higher response levels. And we reach a point when three or four regions in the country are burning up because we've got lots of ignitions and extreme fire danger, we go to a point where we say any and all qualified firefighters will be deployed and any and all support

person will be deployed from the National Park Service in response to the requests we get through the interagency dispatch center. And if that means shutting down parks in order to respond to the fire emergency–when we reach level five, that's exactly what the national guidance has said will happen. We've had that kind of system in place for years and occasionally have had to use it.

Janet McDonnell: So, the decision isn't that difficult. The decision is the emergency comes first, whatever it is. You try to do it all, but the emergency comes first.

Richard Ring: But the decision on a national level that says, when have you reached a certain state of emergency that warrants a level of response and a resulting understood impact as a result of the trade-off that has to occur. Being able to describe what that is at each stage, as things become more and more severe at a national scale, becomes critically important to do. That has been in place with the fire system for a number of years. It is not in place with regards to security. We have now put such a response level progression in place with regards to security, where the Director says, based on what we have been told is going on and based on the demands placed on us from an emergency standpoint, how many of them there are, that we are going to a level three response. Which means there's pre-positioned guidance to the regions and the parks that says, you will send all requested resources in response to this need up to a point where your park operations are affected to this level.

Richard Ring: And of course, it's easy at the level one because it's normal operations. And it's easy at the level five because it means shut everything down and send everybody. At level two, three, and four, in between, you've got to describe the level of impact you will not exceed. So that at a level two you begin to send some people until it begins to affect your operations beyond a certain point, at which point you say, "No. I cannot send anymore." Pre-describing those tradeoffs and being clear on them is critically important to do to have a system that will work–

Janet McDonnell: But since that system didn't exist in the first couple months after September 11–

Richard Ring: –broker those demands to make sure that it is evenly distributed, so that one park isn't reaching that point or going beyond that response point and have the impacts disproportionately land on a few parks. So, it has been trying to manage the requests in a way that equitably distributes the impacts so that the Service as a whole stays within the response level that the Director has declared.

Janet McDonnell: And I suppose that also means that an individual superintendent can't refuse to release resources.

Richard Ring: Well, an individual superintendent is under guidance from the regional director to release resources up to this level of impact from the parks.

Janet McDonnell: Right. According to the plan.

Richard Ring: And when they reach that, they're certainly supposed to get in touch with their regional director or to tell the regional director's representative, the regional chief ranger, that they've reached that point. At which point there may be some brokering going on–"I'll take these folks away from you, but I'll bring these other folks because I need these qualifications over here. But I can bring those folks over to help you out because all you need is people to run the campground. You don't need people with a law enforcement commission that we need over here working at the Statue [of Liberty] or at the St. Louis Arch, or something like that." So, there's some brokering and negotiation that can go on.

Janet McDonnell: Well, I know you need to go, so we'll just end it here. I very much appreciate this. It has been very helpful.

END OF TAPE